Ontario Supreme Court

J.P. Towing Service and Storage Ltd. v. Toronto Police Service Board

Date: 1999-05-31

J.P. Towing Service and Storage Ltd.

and

Toronto Police Services Board

Court File No: 345/99

Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court Cosgrove J.

Heard: May 31, 1999

Judgement rendered: May 31, 1999[1]

S. LeDrew and Hugh Wilkins, for applicant.

D. Dimmer, for respondent.

COSGROVE J. (orally):—Under the facts the applicant is a provider of motor vehicle towing services who, since 1994, has held contracts with the Toronto Police Services Board permitting the applicant to provide motor vehicle towing services to the Toronto Police Service in District No. 1.

On or about February 10, 1999, the Toronto Police Services Board announced that it had decided not to exercise its options on the existing Toronto Police towing contracts and would not extend those contracts for an additional year.

On March 15, 1999, the Toronto Police Services Board issued tender documents for the Toronto Police Service towing contract for 1999 to 2001.

On April 7, 1999, the applicant submitted a bid for the 1999-2001 towing contract for District No. 1. The applicant was in compliance with all of the terms and conditions of the tender and was the sole bidder for the towing contract for District No. 1. I will expand upon that a little bit later.

On April 22, 1999, the Toronto Police Services Board declined to award any of the joint contracts for the Toronto Police Services Board towing districts and directed that new tenders be held with the contract start date of August 1, 1999. The applicant was not given notice of the contract not being awarded to the lowest bidder and was not given an opportunity to comment, nor were any of those who did have contracts; that is, only those persons who had previous contracts bid, plus one further bid. None of those persons were given an opportunity to make submissions to the Toronto Police Services Board prior to the significant decision of the Board to, in effect, reconsider its policy as regards its practices for the issuing of towing service contracts.

It is not clear upon the material what criteria the Toronto Police Services Board used in its decision. The Toronto Police Services Board directed on April 22, 1999, that the current contract holders be offered the opportunities to extend their contracts until July 31, 1999, under the current rates and on the same terms and conditions as contained in the 1997-1999 towing contracts.

On May 7, 1999, the applicant received correspondence from the Toronto Police Superintendent of Traffic Services requesting the applicant to consent to an extension of its 1997-1999 towing contract for one year at the rates set out in the 1997-1999 towing contracts, as were the other contract holders and towing companies who had existing contracts with the Board.

On May 13, 1999, the applicant requested to be permitted to make submissions to the Toronto Police Services Board regarding extension of its current contract. Counsel for the applicant at the May 20, 1999, meeting did make submissions to the Board. The Board’s decision was confirmed.

On those facts, with the applicant’s contract set to expire as of today’s date, May 31, 1999, the applicant, together with the other contract holders, had very short notice and some difficult decisions to make in a very short period of time.

I said that I would expand upon the issue of the nature of the bids submitted in response to a call for the bids for the 1999-2001 period.

Bids were received on April 7, 1999. There were seven vendor packages submitted and, until the bids were opened and reviewed, the Board did not know whether there were competitive bids in the various districts. With the exception of District 5, there was only one towing operator who submitted a bid in each of the districts to supply the towing and storage services despite the clear provision in the quotation requests that bidders could submit bids for all of the districts.

The tenders received reflected the following by J.P. Towing, the applicant, and six other towing operators:

For District No. 1, the applicant, J.P. Towing, showed a bid, a towing charge of $75, a storage charge of $20, total bid of $95.

Walsh Auto Service Ltd., in District No. 2, showed a towing charge of $25, a storage charge of $15, for a total bid of $40.

Abrams Towing Services Ltd., in District No. 3, showed a towing charge of $90, a storage charge of $40, for a total bid of $130.

L.B. Towing Ltd., in District No. 4, showed a towing charge of $85, a storage charge of $20, for a total bid of $105.

Diamond Towing Ltd., in District No. 5 showed a towing charge of $52, storage $16, for a total of $68.

The Downtown Group Towing in District No. 5 showed a towing charge of $54, a storage charge of $20, for a total bid of $74.

A. Towing Services Ltd., in District No. 6 showed a towing service of $67, a storage charge of $16, for a total bid of $83.

The Board, as I have indicated, at a meeting of April 22, 1999, considered the tenders and decided not to award any of the contracts to any of the bidders, but rather to re-tender the contracts for towing and storage services for each of the six districts and to offer the six current contract holders an opportunity to extend their arrangements for two months at the current rates and on the same terms and conditions as the current contracts. Concerns were expressed by the Board in this meeting over the significant range in price between the bids and over the terms of the quotation requests which may have resulted in the lack of a competitive process.

As a result of the decisions by the Board at its meeting, the applicant was asked whether it was prepared to continue to provide towing and pound service to the Toronto Police Service for a period from June 1, 1999, up to and including July 31, 1999, on the same terms and conditions as contained in the 1997 contract between the parties. The applicant did not respond to this inquiry. The Board’s policy and budget subcommittee determined that it needed a longer period to facilitate development of an approved contract tendering process and a letter further was sent to the applicant inquiring whether it was interested and prepared to offer their services for one year from June 1, 1999, through to and including May 31, 2000, in District 1. As I indicated, the same offer was made to the other contract holders. The applicant did not accept the Board’s offer. At the hearing today when a request was made for an adjournment, the counsel for the applicant did indicate that it was prepared to extend its services on an interim basis pending resolution of the legal issues between the parties. At the meeting of the Board on May 20, counsel for the applicant was present and made representations as I have indicated. The Board confirmed the position which I have outlined.

Counsel in their facta are pretty similar in identification of the issues for the court and both begin by raising the first issue: (1) Are the decisions of the Police Services Board in this matter subject to judicial review? The respondent frames the next issue as follows: (2) Can the Board rely upon the privative clauses and decide not to accept the J.P. Towing tender? And (3) Is J.P. Towing entitled to an Order of Mandamus? As I have indicated, the issues in effect between the parties are identical insofar as judicial review is concerned.

The applicant frames the second issue somewhat differently as follows: (2) Did the Board abide by the rules of procedural fairness by denying the applicant a reasonable opportunity to make submissions to the Board regarding the award of the 1999-2001 contract and the extension of the 1997-1999 contracts? And then following that: Did the Board err in law by not accepting the bid made by the applicant pursuant to the March 15, 1999, call for tenders and by deciding to terminate the 1997-1999 contract on the 31st of May, today?

Although it is not readily apparent in the material in terms of the issues, I have inquired of counsel what was the magnitude of the issue that was before the court. In other words, I wanted to get some idea of a ballpark figure of the economic activity generated under the contract with the applicant servicing Area 1 on an annual basis. I believe that counsel did not seem to object that the information came to the court, that it was roughly in the area of one million four hundred thousand, and presumably that is gross. So the issue obviously is of significant economic impact to everyone involved.

While the application was underway counsel for the company that has a contract for Area No. 6, A. Towing Services Ltd., advised the court that he wished to make representations on behalf of his client. His client, together with Walsh Auto, the court was told, were the two companies that the Board had decided to invite to provide backup towing services in the face of what appeared to be an impasse between the applicant company and the Board. These two companies apparently were not served with the notice of application. The court did learn, though, that in fact these companies have been in communication with the Board and have been looking at the practicalities of the provision of services to Area No. 1. Counsel for A. Towing Services Ltd. did say to the court that in fact a conclusion in the context of written executed paper contracts had not been concluded pending the legal proceedings which are before the court today.

A request for an adjournment was made by counsel for A. Towing Services Ltd. After hearing submissions, I declined to grant the request for an adjournment. I offered counsel the opportunity of presenting either affidavit evidence this evening, some two hours after the conclusion of the argument, or offering his client or personnel from his client who would be available to give viva voce evidence. Counsel indicated to the court that he was not, on behalf of A. Towing Services, calling any additional evidence. On the other hand, the court then did hear submissions from counsel for A. Towing Services and there was response from Board counsel, as well as from counsel for the applicant.

In addition to that, I had asked for supplementary argument with respect to a case to which I will make reference presently, the Ottawa-Carleton and the Ministry of Health decision. All counsel made representations on that case, including the implications of that case in the context of arguments that have been made by three counsel earlier today.

I want now to turn to the law that I believe binds me now on this application. Is this a case for judicial review or not? That issue, I believe, is highlighted in the two cases which were before me.

For the respondent Board, the court was provided with an unreported decision of Mr. Justice Then of this court in a decision in 1994. (Todays Towing & Storage Corp. et al. v. The Metropolitan Police Services Board (June 10, 1994, Then J., (Ont. Div. Ct.), docket nos. 317/94, 321/94.)

In that decision, many of the cases relied upon by counsel for the respondent are cited and are referred to by Mr. Justice Then. He says at page 3 of his decision:

After anxious consideration of the respondent’s submission, I find myself in agreement with the respondent’s submission and the authorities in support of it. In my view, the actions of the Board in this case do not constitute the exercise of statutory powers of decision but rather are mere commercial transactions. It follows from this that I have serious doubt that the applicants will be successful upon their application for judicial review.

It goes on, on page 4:

The ultimate decision on this issue will, of course, be for the full panel on the application for judicial review but because of the opinion which I hold, I find that the applicants have not made out a prima facie case to warrant either a stay or an interlocutory injunction.

In that context, I suppose that the comments by Justice Then on page 3, to which I referred, might be obiter, however they do tie in to his conclusion.

I note that in the record of Mr. Justice Then’s decision which is appended to the decision, I have learned some interesting things. For example, the applicant seeks a declaration in paragraph (a), but it also seeks in paragraph (c) the relief as follows:

…an order quashing the decision of the Board made on April 28, 1994 to issue a new quotation request and solicit new bids for the police towing contracts for District 1 and 5A in Metropolitan Toronto;…

And there is a request that the Board be restrained from issuing a new quotation until the application is completed.

But then further in paragraph (e) the applicant in that decision by Mr. Justice Then sought:

…an order directing the Board to award the police towing contract for District 5A to the applicant in accordance with the Bid.

The point that I am making is that it is apparent that the Board has in the past issued separate invitations to tender upon the different, on the individual, or in this case two different districts apart from the others. It is interesting to note as well that, for example, it is argued in paragraph 4 of the application under “grounds” in paragraph (B):

The Board erred in law and exceeded its jurisdiction:

(i) by failing or refusing to accept the recommendations of the Chief of Police and of the Board’s legal counsel with respect to Districts 1 and 5A after accepting their recommendations for Districts 2, 3, 4, and 5B.

These are ancillary points but they were argued before me today on the basis of the chronology and the advice in the process of what happened before the Board in this case.

The other case to which I wish to make reference now, which I think guides and binds me on this application, is the decision offered by counsel for the applicant. It is the decision of Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. City of Vancouver (1994), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 1. This is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1994. In my view, this case signals that the law in the area of judicial review is in a state of evolution in our law. It is one that, as I say, I believe is binding upon the court.

The significance of the decision is, in brief, that both the majority and the minority, the court split 5-4, agreed that judicial review was appropriate in the case in front of them. The court did in fact proceed with the judicial review of the municipal actions complained of or in issue, but they disagreed as to the results of the review. The headnote in brief I think sets the context for the competition:

The council of the respondent city wished to make a symbolic gesture against international companies with business links to South Africa. It passed resolutions that the city would not do business with the appellant company and declared the city “Shell Free” until the appellant divested itself of its South African holdings. The appellant was one of several oil companies from whom the city purchased petroleum products and was not the only one with South African connections; it was picked as a symbol and council knew it was discriminating against the appellant. The appellant brought this application for an order quashing the resolution. It was successful at first instance, but the city’s appeal was allowed.

On further appeal, held, Lamer C.J.C., L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin J.J. dissenting, the appeal should be allowed.

As I indicated, the significance of the decision is not the result, but has to do with the comments of the court on the issue of the role

or ambit of judicial review. The late Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, under the issue of reviewability at page 11 says:

The powers of a municipality are classified for some purposes. The classifications include legislative functions, quasi-judicial functions and business functions. The nature of the function may affect the duties and liabilities of the municipality. Accordingly, it may be liable in contract or tort in respect of its business function, but civil liability in respect of its legislative or quasi-judicial function is problematic. In its quasi-judicial function, council may have a duty of fairness which does not apply in respect of the exercise of its legislative powers:…

It goes on at the bottom of page 11:

It follows that the exercise of a municipality’s statutory powers, whatever the classification, is reviewable to the extent of determining whether the actions are intra vires. Normally this is done by a motion to quash or a declaration of invalidity with respect to the act of council which is impugned. The authorities referred to in argument do not support the contention that the exercise of business or corporate powers is immune from review.

Madam Justice McLachlin, speaking for the minority, says at page 21:

There is a long line of cases in Canada holding that the purchasing decisions of a municipality, referred to as the procurement power, are immune from judicial review:…

And there are a number of cases which she then sets out that have been discussed by counsel before me today.

Madam Justice McLachlin at the top of page 22 says:

In more recent times, however, some courts have been willing to review governmental contractual powers:…

The cases are thereafter set out. What is suggested to me is that in effect she is echoing Justice Sopinka’s observations, or putting it another way, her observations and comments in this area are not disputed in the majority decision. She goes on at the bottom of page 22:

In favour of allowing judicial review of the procurement or purchasing power of governments is the argument that while this principle is valid for private contracts, the public nature of municipalities renders it inapplicable to them. As Arrowsmith states, op. cit., at p. 14., “there are many considerations applicable to public bodies and not to private which may justify different treatment of the two, even when engaged in similar activity”. The most important difference is the fact that municipalities undertake their commercial and contractual activities with the use of public funds…

And I contrast that, for example, with the comment of Justice Then in Todays Towing and Storage Corp. et al v. The Metropolitan Toronto Police Services Board, supra, where he says:

In my view, the actions of the Board in this case do not constitute the exercise of statutory powers of decision but rather are mere commercial transactions.

The Supreme Court is saying: Call them mere commercial transactions, but they are nonetheless within the ambit of a power granted to the municipal governments, and what is important is the fact that municipalities undertake their commercial and contractual activities with the use of public funds.

Madam Justice McLachlin goes on at pp. 22-23:

Another consideration justifying different treatment of public contracting is the fact that a municipality’s exercise of its contracting power may have consequences for other interests not taken into account by the purely consensual relationship between the council and the contractor. For example, public concerns such as equality of access to government markets, integrity in the conduct of government business, and the promotion and maintenance of community values require that the public procurement function be viewed as distinct from the purely private realm of contract law. Finally, it must be remembered that municipalities, unlike private individuals, are statutory creations, and must always act within the legal bounds of the powers conferred….

On balance, it is my view that the doctrine of immunity from judicial review of procurement powers should not apply to municipalities. If a municipality’s power to spend public money is exercised for improper purposes or in an improper manner, the conduct of the municipality should be subject to judicial review.

I appreciate that the context of those comments concerned the question of whether the City of Vancouver exceeded its legislative powers; were the City’s actions intra vires its legislative powers?

I can tell you from my municipal experiences, municipalities seem to have a bent to solve the world’s problems by resolution. However, the thrust of the comments and the principles enunciated in the case, which are explicit by Madam Justice McLachlin (and in my view supported by the comments of Justice Sopinka in the majority decision) have turned a new page and offer a new chapter of evolution in the area of the law dealing with the scope of judicial review.

On the facts before me, it is urged that most significant about the complaint of actions of the Board is that the tendering process has been abandoned. To my view, that is a very integral part of the procurement practices of municipalities or agencies or boards. Counsel for the respondent indicated to the court that she is advised that contracts for towing have always been in the past by tender. That contrasts with the decision of the Board admittedly made under pressing circumstances to abandon the process of calling for tender and initially inviting two of the six original or existing towing companies to share the provisional services in Area No. 1 for a year.

The court has learned from counsel for A. Towing that one of the companies, Walsh, has declined, and it would appear that he is informed that his client has been negotiating with the Board to be sole provider of the services in District No. 1. The significance of that is not only were tenders not called, but the contracts apparently seemed to be offered on invitation. The other aspect is that the tender documents used for this call, and I believe the policy of the Board in the past, has been that no single towing company would be permitted to provide services except in one area.

In addition to those cases, I will make reference as well to the decision of Ottawa-Carleton Dialysis Services v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1996), 41 Admin. L.R. (2d) 211 (Ont. Div. Ct.). This is a decision of Mr. Justice Chadwick. Counsel were invited to make submissions on that case and I heard those prior to giving my decision.

The headnote properly captures the issues:

Practice and procedure—on application for certiorari—Minister of Health cancelling request for proposal for independent health care services—Minister failing to provide any evidence to establish decision to cancel based upon proper considerations—Minister relying on extract from Hansard to provide reasons for cancellation—Statements not able to be used to support Minister’s position—Question being one of weight rather than admissibility—Minister providing no evidence other than Hansard record and self-serving press releases to establish reason for cancellation—Order of certiorari issued quashing cancellation of request for proposal.

Counsel indicated that an appeal was taken [leave to appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal granted 67 A.C.W.S. (3d) 624]. I responded by advising that I have been told today by Justice Chadwick that the Ministry of Health is proceeding on the basis of his decision. I have no more information than that.

The judgment before me at page 230 is as follows. Justice Chadwick states:

Having concluded that the applicants have not been dealt with fairly, it now becomes a question of identifying what is the appropriate remedy.

This is not a case where the applicants can be compensated in damages as a result of the action of the Ministry. The reasonable expectations of the applicants was that once their proposal was accepted, they would then proceed to negotiate with the Ministry towards reaching an agreement resulting in the issuing of the license. These are legitimate expectations which flow from the manner in which the RFP’s were put forward.

Next paragraph:

The proper remedy is to move the applicants back to the position they were in prior to the cancellation of the RFP… [that would be the request for proposal]… on May 2nd, 1996. To put them in that position an order of certiorari will be issued quashing the cancellation of RFP (95-035). This will require the Ministry to proceed to the second stage and to negotiate in good faith with the applicants towards reaching an agreement and issuing a license.

I proceed now to my findings on the evidence which is before me on the application.

I have already commented that the Board’s decision not to award any contracts pursuant to the tenders open for 1999-2001 presented the towing companies, including the applicant, with difficult decisions in a very short period of time. I do not believe that I have commented that counsel of course know that under the contracts the Board had the option of extending the contracts for an additional year, but they began the process by indicating that the Board was not going to extend or make use of that option.

When the Board made its decision after dealing with the tenders not to accept any of the tenders and communicated its decision to the applicant and the other towing companies, in my view they ought to have given the applicant and other towing companies the opportunity of input into the decision and the alternatives that were available to the Board at that time. One of the best reasons or the best evidence that that might have been useful was in fact the Board’s recognition that its original offer to the applicant and other towing companies to extend the contracts for a period, of a couple of months was insufficient for the Board to come to grips with its perceived problem and wish to review and consider its process in terms of the awarding of the towing contracts. As a result of that, a second offer was made by the Board offering that the contracts could be extended for a year at the same price and terms as the old contracts. In effect, what the Board was doing was going back to and reversing its original decision not to exercise its option under the contracts, which was really the beginning of the process which has led to the dispute before the court.

Counsel for the applicant was given an opportunity to make submissions to the Board with respect to his client’s position after this second offer was made. The offer, by the way, is one, as I have called it, that required acceptance by I believe it was the 14th of May. On the evidence, my recollection is that the other towing companies accepted the offer and communicated this to the Board. When counsel for the applicant on May 20th argued for reconsideration of his client’s position with respect to the Board, he was advised that the Board would not change its position; to me that illustrates again how the problems of the Board seemed to compound one another. I ask myself, rhetorically: How could the Board do something different for the applicant through his counsel at a meeting on May 20th when the Board had already accepted a proposal and had agreed with the other towing companies to proceed with the extension of the one year at the old terms?

What I am saying is in effect the decision was one that for all practical terms was made before the meeting of May 20th and happened before counsel for the applicant had the opportunity of making submissions.

To repeat, I believe that the applicant and the other towing companies should have had the opportunity of input to the Board’s quandary and to its decision respecting the problems which have been alluded to in the material by the Board prior to the decision by the Board to take unilateral action.

The Board’s problems were further compounded. In my view, it was a dramatic departure of the Board to issue invitations to companies, towing companies, to cover District No. 1. I am told that had never been done before in the Board’s history. That was further complicated by the fact that apparently one of the two companies offered or invited to share in that declined; that left the Board in effect negotiating with one of the existing towing companies without notice to others or opportunities to others, for example, to make submissions. Obviously, that excluded as well the applicant in that process.

I will conclude by reviewing the relief that is sought. The balance of my comments will be made in the context of the relief area in the application.

No one, I believe, argued short notice in the application, which was the first paragraph of the relief sought in paragraph (a).

In paragraph (b) an Order of Mandamus is sought requiring the Toronto Police Services Board to extend the applicant’s towing contract for Toronto Police Services Towing District No. 1 beyond May 31, 1999, at the rate set out in the applicant’s bid made on April 7, 1999, until a final judgment is made in these proceedings. That relief is in context of the further relief in paragraph (c), similar, but on a permanent basis, and the relief is an order sought as an Order of Mandamus requiring the Toronto Police Services Board to reward the applicant with the police towing contract for District No. 1 in accordance with the terms of the Toronto Police Services Board tender dated March 15, 1999, and the applicant’s bid dated April 7, 1999.

I have indicated that I view this to be an appropriate case for judicial review. In my view the relief sought in paragraphs (b) and (c) is inappropriate. Referring to the decision of Mr. Justice Chadwick at page 230 of Ottawa-Carleton Dialysis Services, at this point in looking at the practical remedies he commented that:

The proper remedy is to move the applicants back to the position they were in prior to the cancellation of the RFP on May 2nd, 1996.

In this case, because the court is concerned about proper public practices of tendering governments at all levels, because the court is concerned about fairness to those who contract or seek to contract with the government, and because the court is concerned with the implications of the lack of tendering practices (the towing services may be wanted or unwanted by the public in Greater Toronto) bearing all that in mind, in my view, the fair thing to do is to permit all of the towing companies to be put in the same position as they were when the offer and decision was made by the Board not to accept or deal with the tenders that were opened seeking response to contracts for the business for towing for 1999 to 2001. In other words, in my view, the Board should be required to offer and to extend to the applicant the same proposals which were accepted by the other towing companies.

I appreciate that the applicant was the only person who sought to give input to the Board in its decision in this area. It was as a result of that decision that the process got to the court today. The parties have not come together because of the complaint of unfairness. That being said, the remedy, I believe, is not to complicate the decision by putting the applicant in any different position than were the other towing companies.

As a result, rather than the orders sought in paragraphs (b) and (c), an order will go requiring the Board to offer to the applicant the option of continuing with its 1997-1999 contract at the same terms and conditions (a towing charge of $38) for the same time that has been accepted by the other towing companies.

Paragraph (d) seeks, in the alternative, an Order of Mandamus requiring the Toronto Police Services Board to immediately re-tender the Toronto Police Services Board 1999-2001 towing contract for District No. 1. I go back to my original observation about the decision of Justice Then in which it is apparent that the Board in the past has, it would appear, tendered for various of the districts. At least that is how I read the material that is before me.

In any event, I am satisfied that the Board, for reasons that have not been fully explained, and probably more alluded to than explained, has indicated that it does not wish to deal with this matter in a piecemeal basis. As a matter of fact, I have detailed the chronology of the development of the dispute between the parties is as a result of one decision made in order to catch up to another decision, to catch up to another decision, et cetera, which has led to complications to which I have referred; accordingly, I do not believe it appropriate to require the Board that it should simply order up a re-tendering of the contract for the towing contract for District No. 1. One good reason is that would be in essence be giving the applicant different treatment and opportunity than the other applicants. The whole idea behind the tendering system is that anyone interested and all interested, potentially the world, would have the same opportunity to deal with the Board on the same footing; for that reason I think it is inappropriate that an Order of Mandamus require a partial re-tendering of only one of the districts.

My decision is in effect dictated by the practicalities of what is before the Board, what is before the court, what is before the public in terms of services being provided after midnight tonight. However, the application was heard on an emergency basis; counsel for A. Towing argued that his clients should be given the opportunity of expanding its services from District No. 6 into District No. 1, which could be concluded after the decision of this court. I have already noted that counsel for the applicant has indicated that it was willing to extend its contract and its services under the terms of the 1997 contract pending a resolution of this issue. That was in the context of a potential adjournment of this application to a later date. Bearing in mind, as I say, the practicalities pressing upon the parties and the court, my order is further enlarged by the direction and requirement that the applicant communicate its response in writing to the Order of Mandamus issued by this court requiring the Board to extend the offer or re-extend the offer for continuation of one year prior to midnight today.

That is my decision, ladies and gentleman.

Order accordingly.

[1] Received October 25, 1999.