Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCJ

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failure to stop at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The charge under section 252 was quashed as it did not constitute an offence known to law.

At trial, the Crown proved that the accused operated a vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public.

The accused did not testify.

The court found that the accused's conduct—leaving the roadway, driving onto private property, gunning the engine to escape the yard, coming within five feet of a pedestrian, and subsequently driving a severely damaged vehicle in an erratic manner—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.

The court convicted the accused of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

A provincial court judge presiding over a lengthy trial involving charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a stage collapse at a Radiohead concert in Toronto was appointed to the Superior Court of Justice mid-trial.

The Crown argued the judge retained jurisdiction to complete the trial under the Provincial Offences Act, while the defence argued the appointment resulted in loss of jurisdiction.

The court found that the judge had lost jurisdiction to continue the trial, as the Provincial Offences Act lacks a provision comparable to section 669.3 of the Criminal Code permitting continuing jurisdiction upon appointment to another court.

A new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red traffic light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred at the intersection of Taunton Road and Garrard Road in Whitby on March 2, 2016.

The prosecution presented evidence from the other driver and a police officer, while the defendant testified that her traffic light was green.

The court applied the presumption of regularity to find that both directional traffic lights could not have been green simultaneously.

After assessing credibility using the Faryna v. Chorney test and R. v. W.D. principles, the court found the defendant's evidence unreliable and accepted the prosecution's evidence.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with four offences arising from driving a red Mustang at 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401 while fleeing from individuals in a green Audi: performing a stunt, racing, driving with a suspended licence, and operating a motor vehicle with open liquor readily available.

The defendant claimed the defence of necessity, asserting he feared the occupants of the Audi would shoot him and his cousin.

The court found all elements of the offences proven beyond a reasonable doubt but rejected the necessity defence on a modified objective standard, finding reasonable legal alternatives were available.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to preclude dual convictions for performing a stunt and racing, staying the racing charge.

The defendant was convicted of performing a stunt, driving with a suspended licence, and operating a motor vehicle with open liquor.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a motor vehicle collision at a four-way stop intersection.

The prosecution presented evidence from two independent witnesses and a police officer.

The defendant testified in his own defence, represented by his father.

The court found that the defendant's conduct—including stopping abruptly in the intersection, shouting profanities at other vehicles, and accelerating aggressively toward another vehicle—constituted careless driving.

The defendant's testimony was found to be inconsistent and unreliable, while the independent witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts of aggressive and erratic driving behaviour.

The court convicted the defendant.

The accused pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The accused, aged 24, consumed alcohol at a bar and then drove his father's vehicle through the Western University campus at excessive speed, striking and killing an 18-year-old first-year student.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was 171 mg/100 mL, more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence as the paramount sentencing principle in impaired driving causing death cases.

A 16-year-old youth pled guilty to dangerous driving causing death while street racing.

The offender was driving his mother's car at approximately 130 km/h in a 60 km/h zone while racing another vehicle when he struck and killed an 18-year-old cyclist.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 months open custody followed by 3.5 months community supervision and one year probation, for a total of 10.5 months custody.

The sentence included 100 hours of community service, with a significant portion to be spent speaking at schools about the dangers of street racing, and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The court applied principles of accountability and denunciation while recognizing the offender's youth, remorse, and rehabilitation potential.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following an incident on August 25, 2015.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving behavior including crossing the centre line, driving on and off the road shoulder multiple times, and nearly striking another vehicle.

Police responded and observed the defendant with a smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, and slow movements.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 140 and 136 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only three beers and attributed his driving errors to construction confusion and texting, and his unsteady gait to tiredness.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol and exceeded the legal blood alcohol limit.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with speeding 82 kilometres per hour in a posted 60 kilometres per hour zone on Tremaine Road in Milton, Ontario on January 24, 2014.

The prosecution relied on radar speed measurement evidence obtained by a qualified police officer using a Genesis II Select radar device.

The defendant challenged the accuracy of the radar reading, arguing that adverse winter weather conditions with blowing snow caused a false reading.

The court found that the prosecution established all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence of the posted speed limit and the defendant's speed as measured by radar.

The defendant's theory regarding weather-induced radar error was found to be speculative and unsupported by expert evidence or effective cross-examination.

The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding (117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone) and failure to surrender his driver's licence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on both counts following a trial where the Crown called the investigating officer and the appellant testified on his own behalf.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the speeding conviction on the basis that the trial judge improperly restricted cross-examination regarding potential flaws in the radar unit as identified in the manufacturer's manual.

The appellant also challenged the failure to surrender licence conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting his evidence that he had eventually produced his licence.

The appeal court allowed the appeal on the speeding charge and dismissed the appeal on the licence charge.

The accused was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, failure to yield to a pedestrian contrary to sections 140(1)(a), and turn not in safety contrary to section 142(1).

The Crown proceeded only on the careless driving and turn not in safety charges.

The accused struck a pedestrian with his truck while making a left turn at a signalized intersection.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused drove carelessly and that the accused failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court found the accused guilty of careless driving and entered a conditional stay of proceedings on the turn not in safety charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, impaired operation, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of blood alcohol following an incident on Highway 417 on April 9, 2011.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath readings on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) regarding reasonable grounds for arrest, failure to facilitate access to counsel due to language barriers, and failure to follow R. v. Prosper procedures when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court found the arrest was properly justified based on the totality of circumstances, that the accused understood his rights to counsel despite speaking broken English, and that no Prosper violation occurred as the accused made an informed decision to defer contacting counsel.

The breath readings were admitted as evidence.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant stopped at a red light holding a black BlackBerry device in his right hand with his thumb moving in a texting motion, while holding a dog in his left hand.

The officer continued to observe the defendant driving southbound while holding and using the device.

The defendant's agent argued that the prosecution failed to prove the device was a wireless device capable of texting.

The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the prosecution proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the device was a hand-held wireless communication device capable of receiving or transmitting communications.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop for a red light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred at the intersection of Bristol Road and Hurontario Street in Mississauga when the defendant's pickup truck struck a high school student riding a bicycle in a pedestrian crosswalk.

The central issue was whether the defendant's vehicle crossed the stop line when the traffic light was red or yellow.

The court found the defendant's testimony that he crossed on a yellow light to be self-serving and incredible, and determined based on credible witness testimony and circumstantial evidence regarding traffic light timing that the defendant crossed the stop line when the light had been red for approximately 2.5 to 3.5 seconds.

The defendant was convicted.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, operating a motor vehicle while disqualified, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle collision on June 26, 2012, in which the accused made a left-hand turn into the path of an oncoming motorcycle, killing the driver and seriously injuring the passenger.

The court applied the test for committal under section 548(1) of the Criminal Code and committed the accused to trial on all counts except the disqualified driving charge, which was withdrawn by the Crown.

The appellant was charged with speeding (74 in a 50 zone) contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

He was convicted on May 18, 2011, after failing to appear for trial on three separate occasions.

The appellant appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in refusing to grant a third adjournment.

The court found that the trial justice properly exercised discretion in denying the adjournment request, as the defendant had already been granted two adjournments and failed to present compelling evidence or documentation to support the third request.

The defendant was charged with failing to move over, if safe to do so, contrary to section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was operating a motor vehicle in Lane 1 of a three-lane highway when he approached a police cruiser parked on the left shoulder with emergency lights activated.

The defendant did not reduce his speed while passing the police vehicle.

The court found that the defendant breached section 159(3) by failing to reduce speed and proceed with caution, which are mandatory requirements under the statute.

The court did not need to consider whether the defendant could have safely moved to another lane, as the failure to slow down was sufficient for conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding, challenging whether the Crown must strictly prove that the police officer who operated the laser speed measuring device was formally qualified to do so.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the officer sufficiently trained and qualified based on evidence that he had received training on the device, tested it before and after his shift in accordance with manufacturer's specifications, and performed five manufacturer-recommended tests.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, holding that formal certification is not a prerequisite to admissibility of speed measurement evidence.

The court found that qualifications go to the weight of evidence rather than admissibility, and that the officer possessed sufficient training and experience to operate the device properly.