Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - ONCJ

The appellant appealed a provincial offence conviction on the grounds that the Justice of the Peace erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The appellant had retained counsel days before the first trial date without disclosure, resulting in an adjournment to September 15, 2017.

At trial, the appellant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge and was sentenced.

The court dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge pre-trial rulings, and second, that on the merits, the delay was caused by the defence and therefore did not violate the applicable legal tests.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle at 3:11 a.m.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant testified that he had driven to a bar with the plan to take an Uber home if he drank, that he had lost his car key while attempting to retrieve his personal belongings from the vehicle, and that he had no intention to drive.

The court found that the defendant had rebutted the presumption and that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle with a speed measuring device (radar detector) contrary to section 79(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to stop and search the vehicle; (2) insufficient evidence proved the seized device was a speed measuring device; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds based on the Spectre device detection and visual observation, that the prosecution adequately proved the device was a radar detector through the officer's experience and the device's response to police radar, and that while one passage appeared problematic, the trial judge's overall decision correctly applied the burden of proof.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Operation over 80 following an incident on September 28, 2016.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving to police.

The accused was stopped at his residence and arrested.

Breath tests conducted approximately 90 minutes after the incident showed readings of 135 mgs and 131 mgs.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, determined that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and found the accused guilty on both counts based on the evidence of impaired driving and the breath test results exceeding the legal limit.

The appellant was convicted of failing to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that he observed the appellant driving a tractor-trailer without a fastened seatbelt on Highway 401.

The appellant testified that he was wearing his seatbelt and that the colour of his shirt may have created a visual illusion.

On appeal, the court found that the trial justice erred by permitting cross-examination on statements made to the police officer without a voir dire on voluntariness, and by allowing improper cross-examination suggesting the appellant had tailored his evidence based on disclosure.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The prosecution charged an individual with smoking tobacco in an enclosed workplace contrary to section 9(1) of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, and charged the corporate owner of the vehicle with failing to ensure compliance with the Act contrary to section 9(3)(a).

The central issue was whether hearsay evidence from a police officer regarding observations made on a vehicle ownership document and confirmed through Ministry of Transportation database records was admissible to prove the vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle and was owned by the corporate defendant.

The court held that such hearsay evidence was admissible under the principled approach to hearsay, satisfying both necessity and reliability requirements, and was further corroborated by other evidence including the licence plate configuration, absence of a personal-use sticker, and corporate ownership.

Both defendants were convicted.

An appeal from a conviction under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2007 for acting as a motor vehicle dealer without being registered.

The trial was conducted ex parte in the absence of the defendant.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct the required inquiry into whether an ex parte trial was appropriate, particularly given the prosecution's intention to seek a custodial sentence.

The court found that the procedural history demonstrated inadequate notice to the defendant and no proper consideration of the defendant's right to be present at trial, amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding following entry of a guilty plea.

The paralegal representing the accused entered a guilty plea contrary to the accused's instructions and without her consent.

The court found that the decision to plead guilty was the exclusive right of the accused and that the guilty plea was entered without proper authority.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings for driving while under suspension and failing to properly wear a seatbelt, alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Crown argued the matter should be assessed under the Morin framework, while the applicant relied on the newly released Jordan framework establishing an 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that although the total delay was 17 months and 1 day, the case became significantly more complex mid-proceedings when the Crown discovered the defendant had multiple driver's licences that had been merged by the Ministry of Transportation.

The court held that the time spent on judicial pre-trial conferences constituted inherent time requirements of the case and that the Crown had acted expeditiously throughout.

The motion to stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding 62 kilometres per hour in a 40 kilometre zone under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The grounds of appeal concerned the alleged failure of the prosecution to disclose information respecting the testing of the laser speed-measuring device used by the police officer.

The appellant argued that the failure to disclose testing times and the officer's testimony about testing without corresponding notes in his notebook resulted in an unfair trial and brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a commercial property owner, was convicted of infractions under the Ontario Fire Code for permitting a private school to operate on the premises without compliance with fire safety regulations.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the private school was regulated by the Education Act and therefore exempt from the Ontario Fire Code under section 9.2.1.2 of Regulation 213/07.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the private school was not governed by the Education Act because no notice of intention to operate had been filed as required by section 16(1) of the Education Act.

The court found that the burden of proof rested on the appellant to establish the exemption and that a factual finding at trial could not substitute for the express statutory requirement of filing a notice of intention.

A London Police Service constable was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after responding to a Code 1 armed robbery call.

While responding with lights and sirens activated, the officer approached an intersection controlled by a red light.

The officer slowed significantly but did not come to a complete stop, failed to reactivate her siren (which she had turned off per a sergeant's direction), and did not see an oncoming vehicle proceeding on a green light.

The collision resulted in injuries to two pedestrians and occupants of the other vehicle.

The trial judge acquitted the officer, finding that while the conduct constituted the actus reus of dangerous driving, the Crown failed to establish the required mens rea of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit.

The accused was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with keys in the glove compartment.

The Crown alleged care and control; the defence argued the accused had arranged for a sober driver to pick him up and had no intention to drive.

The court found the statutory presumption of care and control was rebutted and that no realistic risk of danger existed that the vehicle would be set in motion.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle at 149 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 407.

During trial, the Justice of the Peace amended the charge to reflect 153 km/h based on evidence presented.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: alleged interference by the trier of fact preventing full answer and defence, bias arising from the amendment of the speed charge, and misapplication of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility assessment principles.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error occurred at trial.

The accused was convicted after trial of two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The accused drove aggressively into an intersection while impaired, striking an oncoming vehicle and causing serious injury to both the driver of that vehicle and the accused's own passenger.

The accused had a prior record for impaired driving offences and was operating a vehicle in violation of an Interlock restriction on his license.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 12 months followed by two years probation and a 10-year driving prohibition, emphasizing that general deterrence is paramount in impaired driving cases involving significant injury.

The appellant appealed his conviction under subsection 5.1(a) of the Dog Owners Liability Act for failing to exercise reasonable precautions to prevent his dog from attacking and killing a neighbour's dog.

The trial judge found the appellant was the "owner" of the dog under the Act's expanded definition, despite evidence that the dog was actually owned by a subtenant residing at the appellant's premises.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in law by failing to clearly explain how the appellant fell within the statutory definition of "owner" (possession or harbouring), and by not addressing the standard of proof or the reasonableness of precautions taken.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant corporation was charged with unlawfully disposing of oil field fluids in violation of the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act and related regulations.

The Crown sought to admit a Certificate of Analysis from Maxxam Analytics containing chemical analysis results of soil and vegetation samples collected from the defendant's well site.

The defendant objected to admission of the document as hearsay.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the business records exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act.

The court found that the Certificate of Analysis met all requirements for admission as a business record and admitted it into evidence.

The Crown charged Timur Leckebusch with two counts of unlawfully undertaking development without a permit in a Development Control area under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act: construction of an earthen berm and construction of a retaining wall.

The Crown also charged 819743 Ontario Inc. with unlawfully undertaking development without a permit for construction of an armour stone wall.

The defendants argued that the structures were exempt from the permit requirement as accessory structures to general agricultural development under Ontario Regulation 828.

The court found that the Crown proved the actus reus of all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that Leckebusch successfully established the exemption for both the berm and retaining wall on a balance of probabilities, resulting in acquittals on both counts.

The court found that 819743 Ontario Inc. failed to establish the exemption for the armour stone wall and was convicted.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop on the right for an emergency vehicle contrary to section 159(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown alleged that on October 12, 2009, the defendant failed to immediately stop her vehicle near the right-hand curb when a fire truck with siren sounding and emergency lights flashing approached from behind.

The defendant denied that the fire truck had approached her vehicle.

The court found that the offence is a strict liability regulatory offence and that the Crown proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible police officer testimony.

The defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities, as her mistaken belief that the fire truck had not approached was not objectively reasonable given that she had initially observed the truck 500-1,000 metres behind her and should have taken immediate steps to move to the right lane.

The defendant was charged with five offences under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act: one count of wilfully failing to inform the WSIB of a material change in circumstances within 10 days, and four counts of knowingly making false or misleading statements to the WSIB.

The charges arose from the defendant's failure to report various work activities and his responses on WSIB forms regarding his employment status and medical condition.

The court found that the WSIB failed to establish a clear communication strategy to ensure claimants understood what constituted a "material change" and that the defendant's understanding of "work" as paid employment was reasonable given the WSIB's own forms.

The court acquitted on all five counts, finding reasonable doubt as to the defendant's knowledge and intent.