Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCJ

The defendants, including William Adamson Skelly and two corporations, were convicted of 11 counts of operating a place of refreshment without a license and 6 counts of operating a refreshment vehicle without a license, contrary to the City of Toronto Municipal Code.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate penalties, considering general and specific deterrence, proportionality, and totality.

The court imposed fines of $1,500 for 10 counts and suspended sentences for 7 counts, finding that daily charges for the same offence over a short period were unaligned with proportionality and totality principles.

The defendant, Garrett Depippo, was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with an illegal blood alcohol content.

The court addressed whether the roadside breath demand satisfied the "immediacy" requirement and if the defendant had a realistic opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found the immediacy requirement was met and there was no realistic opportunity for counsel at roadside, dismissing the Charter application.

The court then found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of evidence, including his own testimony and poor judgment.

Following a Supreme Court decision (R. v. Breault), the excess blood alcohol count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

Tyrone Joseph pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after stabbing Cassandra Cole multiple times, causing grievous injuries.

The court considered mitigating factors, including his guilty plea, genuine remorse, and efforts towards rehabilitation, alongside aggravating factors such as the severity and unprovoked nature of the attack, the profound victim impact, and the offender's cognate criminal record and alcohol abuse.

The decision applied "Downes credit" for stringent bail conditions, "Summers credit" for pre-trial custody (1.5:1), and "Duncan credit" for harsh detention conditions (lockdowns, triple-bunking).

A net sentence of 33¼ months imprisonment was imposed after deducting 502 days for bail and pre-trial custody credits, along with various ancillary orders.

The accused, A.S., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay was 40 months and 15 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, determining the presumptive ceiling was 30 months due to the matter having been in Superior Court.

After subtracting defence-caused delay (3 months and 27 days), the net delay was 36 months and 18 days.

The court found that the remaining delay of 33 months and 13 days (after deducting 3 months and 5 days for COVID-19 impact) exceeded the presumptive ceiling and was not justified by exceptional circumstances, including the Crown's decision to add indictable charges and then consent to re-election without a waiver.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendant was charged with one count of dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant drove aggressively, making multiple unsafe lane changes, brake-checking other vehicles, and ultimately striking an e-bike rider.

The defendant contended that his driving was not a marked departure from that of a reasonably prudent driver and that the accidents were attributable to other motorists.

After hearing evidence from multiple witnesses, the court found the defendant guilty, concluding that his intentional aggressive driving—including rapid acceleration, aggressive braking, unsafe lane changes, and gesturing at other drivers—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care required and posed significant risk to other highway users.

The applicant sought production of third-party records (medical and counseling records) maintained by the complainant's physician and two counseling facilities pursuant to section 278.7 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant was charged with three sexual offences alleged to have occurred between 1996 and 1999.

The complainant did not report the allegations until 2018, approximately two decades later.

The court conducted a two-stage hearing under the Mills application framework.

The complainant conceded the first stage threshold was satisfied and agreed to judicial inspection of the records.

At the second stage, the court balanced the applicant's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy interests and societal interests in encouraging reporting of sexual offences and obtaining treatment.

The court ordered limited production of redacted portions of the records that substantively referenced the incidents forming the basis of the criminal allegations, subject to conditions restricting copying, sub-distribution, and requiring destruction upon disposition of the matter.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued to search his residence on the grounds of alleged violations of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained inaccuracies and omissions that rendered the warrant invalid.

The Crown contended that the warrant was valid on both facial and subfacial analysis.

The court conducted a voir dire and examined three main areas of challenge: non-disclosure of relevant information, misdescription or omission of identification evidence, and grounds to believe items were at the premises.

The court found that despite certain inaccuracies in the ITO, the issuing justice could have properly granted the warrant based on the totality of the evidence presented.

The court addressed an ex parte communication from an unrepresented accused who objected to the pre-trial process and requested a further judicial pre-trial meeting.

The accused had failed to attend the Trial Co-ordinator's office following a judicial pre-trial conference and subsequently sent an unsigned letter to the court raising procedural objections.

The court rejected the accused's objections, finding the pre-trial process was properly conducted and that trial dates could be set.

The court reminded the accused that ex parte communications with the judge are prohibited and that all future communications must occur in open court on the record.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with dangerous driving.

The Crown withdrew the "over 80" charge during trial.

The defendant admitted to being the driver at the scene but later claimed his friend, the vehicle owner, was actually driving.

The court found the defendant guilty of both impaired driving and dangerous driving based on eyewitness testimony, the defendant's own admission to police, and the implausibility of the defence evidence.

The court rejected the defence narrative that the defendant was lying in the back seat and that the vehicle owner was the actual driver.

The accused was charged with possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and carrying a concealed weapon following an altercation at the Sheraton Centre Hotel in downtown Toronto.

Security witnesses observed the accused wielding a knife with a distinctive red handle and hooked blade during a fight.

The accused was detained by police, and despite pat-down searches finding no knife, a red-handled folding knife with a hooked tip was later discovered under the rear seat of the police cruiser after the accused was observed on video moving around extensively in the back seat.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed and concealed the knife and did so for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The defendant, an Ojibway woman and member of the Serpent River First Nation, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of Schedule I substances (fentanyl and cocaine).

The Crown sought a conviction with a suspended sentence, emphasizing the dangers of fentanyl.

The defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court granted a conditional discharge with 18 months probation, finding that the defendant's circumstances as an Indigenous person with a history of intergenerational trauma, sexual abuse, mental health issues, and addiction warranted a restorative approach rather than punitive measures.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of a loaded firearm, two counts of possession of a firearm knowing its possession was unlawful, and one count of possession of a firearm obtained by crime, following a RIDE check that revealed two loaded firearms in a vehicle.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds in a reverse onus bail hearing.

The court found that the accused had discharged his onus on both grounds and granted bail with strict conditions including house arrest, residence with his mother as surety, and a substantial pledge from a co-surety.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and touching for a sexual purpose of a person under the age of 16 contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, relating to alleged conduct on or about May 25, 2014.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the statement on the grounds of improper inducement and alleged violation of the right to counsel.

The court found that the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, rejecting the defence's arguments regarding both inducement and the right to counsel violation.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision arising from Project Bermuda, a Durham Regional Police investigation into cocaine trafficking.

Four accused were charged with various drug trafficking, firearm, and proceeds of crime offences.

The Crown proceeded on numerous counts with some concessions by defence counsel.

The judge applied the Shephard test to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to commit each accused to trial.

The decision addresses key legal principles regarding possession, conspiracy, voice identification, and the scope of preliminary inquiries.

Multiple counts were dismissed for insufficient evidence, while others proceeded to trial.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration on June 23, 2014.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol based on the evidence presented.

Additionally, the trial judge found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, rendering the breath analysis results inadmissible.

Both charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter motion to exclude the breath test evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer's account of the traffic violation justifying the initial stop was unclear, inconsistent, and not supported by objective facts.

The officer's testimony regarding which stop signs were disobeyed was contradicted by a map and was not recorded in contemporaneous notes.

The court concluded that the defendant's detention was arbitrary and that his Charter rights were infringed.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the breath test evidence as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused conceded his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory limit but challenged the lawfulness of his detention, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The court found that the accused was not detained when the officer knocked on his vehicle window, as there was no significant physical or psychological restraint at that point.

The detention crystallized only when the officer directed the accused to exit the vehicle, at which point the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on observations of impairment.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of the Over 80 charge.

The impaired driving charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

Media organizations sought an order to terminate or vary a sealing order issued by Justice Marin on May 31, 2013, which sealed documents relating to search warrants executed by the Toronto Police Service between May 31 and June 14, 2013.

The Crown sought a six-month adjournment to vet the Information to Obtain (ITO) before disclosure.

The court found the Crown's proposed timeline unreasonable and contrary to the open court principle protected by the Charter.

The court ordered the Crown to provide a redacted version of the May 31 ITO on a counsel-only basis by August 27, 2013, with a return hearing scheduled for no later than September 12, 2013.

The accused was charged with assault and uttering a threat to cause death against Joanne Villamia on September 25, 2011.

The Crown proceeded summarily and called only the complainant as its witness.

The accused testified in his own defence, along with his sister and a friend.

The central issue was whether the accused assaulted the complainant and threatened to kill her at his apartment, or whether the complainant fabricated the incident out of jealousy and concern about being charged with stalking.

The court applied the W(D) analysis and found that while the accused's evidence was not credible, the complainant's evidence also contained significant inconsistencies and contradictions.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood on June 19, 2010.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening device demand under section 8 of the Charter and sought exclusion of the breath test results under section 24(2).

The defence also argued that evidence of late consumption of alcohol (bolus drinking) immediately before the RIDE stop raised a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand and dismissed the Charter application.

On the trial issue, the court accepted the accused's evidence regarding his consumption pattern but found that "straddle evidence" (evidence showing blood alcohol concentration could have been either above or below the legal limit) was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted.