ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2026 02 19

COURT FILE No.: Halton Info #998 24 12102669

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

IMRAN AHMED

Before Justice Jennifer Campitelli

Heard on November 12 th and14 th , 2025 and January 9 th , 2026

Reasons for Judgment released on February 19, 2026

R. Morrow............................................................................................. counsel for the Crown

A. Craig................................................................... counsel for the accused Ahmed Imran

CAMPITELLI J.:

Introduction and Overview

[ 1 ] Mr. Ahmed was initially charged with two counts on the information before the court. Following the evidence of the complainant in this matter, the crown reasonably withdrew Count #2. As such, Mr. Ahmed remains charged with one count of criminal harassment contrary to s. 264(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada . It is alleged that between July 3, 2024, and July 6, 2024, Mr. Ahmed surreptitiously recorded the living area of Monika Kaznowski’s place of residence. Mr. Ahmed and Ms. Kaznowski were intimate partners at the relevant time, which gave Mr. Ahmad the requisite access to install a covert recording device without her knowledge. Ms. Kaznowski later discovered the recording device and notified the police. There is no evidence on this record that Mr. Ahmed was able to view the recordings captured either remotely or otherwise. Additionally, there is no dispute that Mr. Ahmed purchased the video recording device and was responsible for creating the recordings filed as an exhibit on this record. [^1]

[ 2 ] When the relevant videos are reviewed, Mr. Ahmed can be seen placing and adjusting the recording device in the complainant’s residence without her knowledge. His actions were deliberate and intentional. The videos captured of Ms. Kaznowski’s home by the recording device, in Mr. Ahmed’s absence, totalled approximately fifteen minutes in length.

Guiding Legal Principles

The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Proof

[ 3 ] Mr. Ahmed is presumed innocent unless and until the crown has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system, originally embedded in our common law tradition and now guaranteed as a fundamental legal right under our constitution: R. v. Nyznik 2017 ONSC 4392 , [2017] O.J. No. 4138 at para. 4 (S.C.J). The presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are important safeguards to ensure that no innocent person is convicted of an offence. Without these protections, there would be a serious risk of wrongful convictions, an outcome, which cannot be accepted in a free and democratic society: R. v. Nyznik at para. 5 .

[ 4 ] The concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lifchus . A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. Even if I believe Mr. Ahmed is probably or likely guilty, that is not sufficient. In those circumstances, I must give the benefit of the doubt to Mr. Ahmed and find him not guilty, as the crown would have failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It would not be safe to convict: R. v. Lifchus , [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 at para. 39 (S.C.C); R. v. Nyznik at para. 6 .

[ 5 ] On the other hand, I have reminded myself that it is virtually impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty and the crown is not required to do so. Such a standard of proof is impossibly high. Essentially, before I can find Mr. Ahmed guilty, I must be sure that he has committed the offences charged: R. v. Lifchus at para. 39 ; R. v. Nyznik at para. 7 .

The Offence of Criminal Harassment

[ 6 ] In R. v. Kosikar , [1999] O.J. No. 3569, the Ontario Court of Appeal clearly outlines the five essential elements of the offence with respect to a charge of criminal harassment, contrary to s. 264(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada . They are as follows:

(a) It must be established that the accused has engaged in the conduct set out in s. 264(2) (a),(b),(c), or (d) of the Criminal Code of Canada ;

(b) It must be established that the complainant was harassed;

(c) It must be established that the accused who engaged in such conduct knew that the complainant was harassed or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant was harassed;

(d) It must be established that the conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety or the safety of anyone known to her; and

(e) It must be established that the complainant’s fear was, in all of the circumstances, reasonable: R. v. Kosikar , [1999] O.J. No. 3569 (C.A.) at para 19 .

[ 7 ] Threatening conduct need not be repeated in order to violate s. 264(2) (d). A single threatening act directed at the complainant, or a member of the complainant’s family may constitute criminal harassment. Moreover, the conduct itself need not be harassment, provided it causes the complainant to be harassed: R. v. Kosikar , at paras. 20, 22, 26 , R. v. Province, [2019] O.J. No. 4003 (C.A.) at para. 121 .

[ 8 ] It is not enough that the conduct vexes, disquiets or annoys the complainant. What is required is that the conduct “tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedevilled and badgered” the complainant: R. v. Kosikar , at para. 24 , citing R. v. Lamontagne , (1998) 129 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Que. C.A.) at para 188 , R. v. Province, at para. 122.

[ 9 ] The nature of the threatening conduct must amount to a “tool of intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in the recipient”. The conduct should be viewed objectively with due consideration for the circumstances in which it took place, together with its effect on the complainant: R. v. Province, at para. 123, R. v. Burns 2008 ONCA 6 (C.A.) at para. 2 , citing R. v. George, 2002 YKCA 2 , R. v. Sim , 2017 ONCA 856 (C.A.) at para. 16 .

Assessing the Credibility and Reliability of Witnesses

[ 10 ] I must consider both the credibility and the reliability of a witness’ evidence, and these concepts are different. Credibility relates to the veracity, or the truthfulness of a witness’ evidence, while reliability relates to the accuracy of the witness’s testimony including their ability to accurately observe, recall and recount the events in question. Sometimes an honest witness might be unreliable: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56 , [2009] O.J. No. 214 at para. 41 (C.A.); R. v. McLeod, [2025] O.J. No. 3315 at para. 467 (S.C.J.) .

Circumstantial Evidence

[ 11 ] Where proof of one or more of the elements of the offence depends exclusively or largely on circumstantial evidence, guilt can only be found if it is the only reasonable inference available from the proven facts: R .v. Villaroman , 2016 SCC 33 , [2016] S.C.J. No. 33 at para. 30 (S.C.C.).

The Evidence

Monika Kaznowski

[ 12 ] Ms. Kaznowski provided credible and reliable evidence. Her evidence was not challenged in any meaningful way, as both parties focused my attention on the application of legal principles, particularly with a view to s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada , to a largely undisputed factual record.

[ 13 ] Ms. Kaznowski testified that she commenced a romantic relationship with Mr. Ahmed around November of 2023. That relationship ended in August of 2024. As the relationship progressed, Mr. Ahmed would spend increasingly more time in Ms. Kaznowski’s apartment. Overall, Ms. Kaznowski recalled that the relationship was characterized by “inconsistency” on the part of Mr. Ahmed. Ms. Kaznowski described this as Mr. Ahmed breaking plans often, which caused her to develop “suspicion” surrounding whether Mr. Ahmed had another relationship or was still married. [^2]

[ 14 ] On July 8, 2024, Ms. Kaznowski was looking for a book to read and noticed that her diffuser was connected to a charger she did not recognize. After confirming the charger did not belong to her son and noticing that there was glass on the top of it, Ms. Kaznowski decided to ‘Google’ the serial number. When the serial number of the camera was searched using ‘Google’, it came up as a “spy camera”. It was Ms. Kaznowski’s evidence that she took a knife and started poking around and saw there was a camera located inside the device. [^3]

[ 15 ] Ms. Kaznowski was able to describe the area captured by the video recordings. [^4] She explained it was the living room area of her home, with some of her kitchen being visible as well.

[ 16 ] Ms. Kaznowski testified that when she found the recording device in her home she felt “terrified”. She expressed experiencing concerns for her safety at that time, worrying that someone was going to come and attack her at night. Ms. Kaznowski remembered feeling that if someone was spying on her, then they could potentially want to hurt her as well. It was her evidence that she experienced a lot of anxiety and had to take time off work as a result. Ultimately, Ms. Kaznowski turned the recording device over to the police, and it became clear it was Mr. Ahmed who had installed it. [^5]

Position of the Parties

Crown

[ 17 ] The crown urges me not to distinguish between the lens of a camera and the naked eye on this record. It stresses that “watching”, captured by s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada , involves continuous observation for a purpose, which is exactly what Mr. Ahmed facilitated by surreptitiously installing a camera in Ms. Kaznowski’s home. The crown takes the position that parliament intended that continuously “watching” a person’s place of residence with intention be subject of criminal attention, and that is exactly the act engaged in by Mr. Ahmed relative to Ms. Kaznowski. The crown reminds me that I am required to take a purposeful approach when interpreting the applicable legislation, keeping in mind factors such as technological advancements.

[ 18 ] Additionally, the crown takes the position that Mr. Ahmed is not able to escape criminal liability simply because he used a recording device to facilitate “watching” Ms. Kaznowski’s place of residence on this record. Simply put, the crown rejects any suggestion that Mr. Ahmed had to be physically present at Ms. Kaznowski’s window, making the very same observations captured by the camera he installed, in order for the actus reus of the offence to be made out.

[ 19 ] Finally, the crown argues Ms. Kaznowski discovering the recording device doesn’t assist Mr. Ahmed. Mr. Ahmed would have been subjectively aware that Ms. Kaznowski becoming aware that her place of residence was being covertly “watched” would have caused her to feel harassed. Whether Ms. Kaznowski located the device personally or learned of the recordings after the fact is simply a red herring . The crown takes the position that, even if I disagree, and find Ms. Kaznowski intercepting the recording device prevented the act of “watching” from being complete, it has still proven an attempt with a view to the offence charged.

Defence

[ 20 ] The defence attacks the crown’s ability to prove both the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence of criminal harassment on this record.

[ 21 ] With respect to the actus reus , the defence relies on my colleague Justice Block’s decision in R .v. Harper , 2021 ONCJ 11 (OCJ). On that record, in applying the applicable legislation Justice Block found that there was no authority for the proposition that the use of a GPS tracking device fits within the definition of “watching and besetting”. He acknowledged that the advent of GPS tracking technology was, no doubt, unanticipated as the section was framed. However, held that “watching” as contemplated by s. 264(2) (c) requires the “continuous physical presence of the harasser for the purpose of harassing the targeted person, not surreptitious surveillance unknown to the victim at the time of its occurrence”: R .v. Harper , at paragraph 44 . Mr. Ahmed urges me to come to a similar conclusion, ultimately finding that he had to be physically present or capable of viewing the recordings being captured remotely in order for the actus reus of the offence to be made out.

[ 22 ] The defence also attacks the crown’s ability to prove the mens rea of the charged offence relying on the decision of my colleague Justice Doody in R .v. F.G. , 2018 ONCJ 31 (OCJ) . Justice Doody concluded that since the defendant did not intend the complainant find the surreptitious cameras, or become aware of their existence, the crown could not prove he had the requisite mens rea . Essentially, the defendant had to know his conduct would result in the complainant being harassed or be reckless with respect to his conduct bringing about that consequence. Justice Doody found that since he was unable to conclude that the defendant recognized there was a risk the complainant may find the cameras, the defendant could not have had the necessary mens rea : R .v. F.G. , at paragraphs 498-500 . Given Mr. Ahmed installed the recording device on this record surreptitiously, the defence asks me to reach a similar conclusion to my colleague.

Analysis

The Actus Reus

[ 23 ] Turning first to the actus reus of the charged offence, I find the crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ahmed “watched” Ms. Kaznowski with continuous attention in a manner, which is captured by s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . I accept Ms. Kaznowski’s evidence that she felt “terrified” after discovering the recording device, realizing it had been capturing video in her home, and feared for her safety. In all the circumstances, I find Ms. Kaznowski’s fear was reasonable. There is no question that an individual’s place of residence is meant to be a secure environment, free from intrusion. The recordings captured erode a very basic expectation of privacy and security, which on this record, resulted in Ms. Kaznowski being fearful and experiencing significant feelings of anxiety.

[ 24 ] Carrying my analysis forward, I respectfully disagree with my colleague Justice Block’s interpretation of the applicable legislation. However, I do note that I find a GPS tracking device to be distinguishable from a video recording device. Considering very specifically the notion of “watching”, a GPS tracking device obviously tracks the movements of its target; but it is not capable of capturing any visual imagery. The recordings subject of my analysis capture an area of Ms. Kaznowski’s home for a combined length of approximately fifteen minutes. This is obviously a very different type of surveillance than tracking. Notwithstanding, despite these distinguishing features, Justice Block concludes that 264(2)(c) requires the obvious, “continuous physical presence of the harasser”. This is where I respectfully disagree with my colleague.

[ 25 ] Courts must take a broad and purposive approach to our interpretation of relevant legislation as we apply such legislation to the factual record before us. That approach must include considerations relative to advancements in technology since the time in which the legislative framework was drafted. It is through this lens that I approach the task before me. I have a circumstance where Mr. Ahmed has utilized a surreptitious recording device to capture visual imagery, identical to that which could be viewed had he been physically present at Ms. Kaznowski’s home and looked through any of the windows visible on the recording. There is no dispute between the parties that if Mr. Ahmed had peered through one of Ms. Kaznowski’s windows for approximately fifteen minutes, rather than utilizing the recording device at issue, his behaviour would be caught by s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada .

[ 26 ] We must always remember to see the forest from the trees. Clearly, the advent of technology has enabled a harasser to facilitate “watching” his target with continuous attention without being physically present. Mr. Ahmed was intentional in his installation of the recording device. He can be observed adjusting it, and ensuring it captured precisely the area of view in Ms. Kaznowski’s residence he desired. I fully appreciate that the record before me is silent with respect to any evidence associated with Mr. Ahmed viewing the recordings, which were captured. Whether that be remotely or otherwise. However, I find the only reasonable inference available is that Mr. Ahmed was going to view the recordings he facilitated: R .v. Villaroman , 2016 SCC 33 , [2016] S.C.J. No. 33 at para. 30 . Viewing recordings you deliberately set out to capture is, of course, entirely logical.

[ 27 ] I have determined that Ms. Kaznowski’s place of residence was “watched” with continuous attention, and it was Mr. Ahmed who was responsible for that reality. On my review and in applying the relevant legislative framework, Mr. Ahmed need not be physically present at Ms. Kaznowski’s window for the criminal act to be complete. The actus reus was complete when the recordings Mr. Ahmed personally facilitated were captured. As a result, Ms. Kaznowski’s interception of the recording device is of no consequence.

Mens Rea

[ 28 ] In my assessment of whether the mens rea of the charged offence has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, again, I must respectfully disagree with my colleague, Justice Doody. Justice Doody’s analysis appears to have been focused on the defendant’s subjective awareness of the risk associated with the complainant discovering the recording equipment. Connecting that to his subjective awareness of whether his conduct would cause the complainant to be harassed. Respectfully, I do not believe that is where my focus is properly placed. Rather, I find my analysis is properly focused on the defendant’s conduct, which is surreptitiously recording the complainant’s place of residence, and whether Mr. Ahmed would be subjectively aware that such conduct would result in the complainant being harassed. That is the actus reus of the offence, and clearly the idea that she was being “watched” in her place of residence is what caused Ms. Kaznowski to be fearful. Ms. Kaznowski’s evidence on that point was that if someone was “spying” on her, then someone might want to hurt her. That makes perfect sense.

[ 29 ] It is not always the case that a harasser who is watching his target’s place of residence will be subjectively aware that there is a risk of the complainant discovering their presence. The harasser might be hiding in the bushes, peering through windows, or similar to this record, utilizing a surreptitious recording device. That is of no moment. Mr. Ahmed would have been subjectively aware that “watching” Ms. Kaznowski’s place of residence would cause her to be harassed. The crown has proven the mens rea of the charged offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

[ 30 ] In the result, I find Mr. Ahmed continuously “watched” Ms. Kaznowski’s place of residence in a manner captured by s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada . Further, I find Ms. Kaznowski was harassed by Mr. Ahmed’s conduct, fearing for her safety. A fear, I find to be reasonable in the circumstances. Finally, I find Mr. Ahmed would have been subjectively aware that the prohibited conduct, “watching” Ms. Kaznowski in her place of residence, would cause her to be harassed.

[ 31 ] I find Mr. Ahmed guilty with respect to Count #1.

Released: February 19, 2026.

Justice Jennifer Campitelli

[^1]: Exhibit #2

[^2]: Transcript of Proceedings: November 12, 2025. Page 2, Lines 26-29; Page 3, Lines 13-14; Page 4, Lines 18-22.

[^3]: Transcript of Proceedings: November 12, 2025. Page 5, Lines 1-18.

[^4]: Exhibit #2

[^5]: Transcript of Proceedings: November 12, 2025. Page 9, Line 10; Page 11, Lines 10-11, 18, 20.