A. Craig

In this criminal trial for harassment under s. 264(1) of the Criminal Code, the court considered whether surreptitious video recording of a complainant’s residence constituted “watching” under s. 264(2)(c).

Rejecting a narrow interpretation requiring continuous physical presence, the court adopted a purposive approach that accounted for technological surveillance and held the actus reus was complete when the accused intentionally installed and used a covert camera to capture the interior living space.

The court found the complainant was harassed and reasonably feared for her safety upon discovering the covert recordings in her home.

The court further held the mens rea was established because the accused would have been subjectively aware that covertly watching a person’s residence would cause harassment.

A finding of guilt was entered on Count #1.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the Agreed Statements of Fact (ASF) from two co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter and subsequently recanted portions of their ASF while testifying.

The defence conceded necessity and threshold reliability but contested the scope of the ASF to be admitted.

The court granted the application but ordered the ASF to be edited to exclude hearsay, background information, and matters beyond the witnesses' personal knowledge, allowing only what the witnesses personally heard or observed.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in a cold case dating back to 1974.

The police conducted a 'Mr. Big' undercover investigation, during which the accused confessed to the murder.

The accused brought an application to exclude the confession, arguing that the police conduct amounted to an abuse of process and breached his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found that the police tactics, which included forcing the accused to participate in a simulated body disposal, were excessively coercive and functionally detained the accused.

The court concluded that the investigation breached section 7 and constituted an abuse of process, ordering the exclusion of the confession under section 24(2) of the Charter.

During a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to re-examine the sole eyewitness (the accused's wife) by playing portions of her videotaped police statement.

The defence had cross-examined the witness on prior inconsistent statements made during the interview.

The Crown argued the video was necessary to show the witness's highly emotional state and provide context for the inconsistencies.

The court ruled that the Crown could not play all portions showing the witness in distress, as it would be prejudicial and misleading, but permitted the Crown to play the specific portions upon which the witness was cross-examined to provide full context.

In a second degree murder trial where the accused raised self-defence, the defence sought to introduce an exculpatory audio and video statement made to police shortly after arrest.

The Crown opposed admission on the basis that the statement was a prior consistent statement and not spontaneous.

Applying the principles in R. v. Edgar, the court held that spontaneous out-of-court statements by an accused made upon arrest may be admitted as evidence of reaction to an accusation and as circumstantial evidence relevant to credibility.

The court found the statement had significant probative value in demonstrating the accused’s emotional state, cooperation with police, and consistency with his anticipated testimony, and could rebut evidence of post-offence conduct suggesting guilt.

The post‑arrest statement was therefore admitted.