ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2026 02 17

COURT FILE No.: Toronto – 4815 998 23 48105316

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— and —

ANEURIN OWEN

Before Justice John McInnes

Heard on September 3, 2024, May 18 and June 19, 2025

Oral Reasons for Sentence given September 23, 2025

Written Reasons for Sentence released February 17, 2026

A. Moser....................................................................................... Crown counsel

P. Klumak ............................................ counsel for the Defendant, Aneurin Owen

McINNES J.:

I Introduction

[ 1 ] On September 3, 2024, Owen Aneurin pled guilty to the charge that he did…

…between the 24th day of June in the year 2022 and the 10th day of May in the year 2023 [in Toronto] did, without lawful excuse, possess child pornography, contrary to Section 163.1 , subsection (4) of the Criminal Code of Canada .

[ 2 ] The Crown proceeded by indictment.

[ 3 ] The parties jointly requested an eight-month adjournment of the sentencing hearing to May 28, 2025, so Mr. Owen could complete counselling before the sentencing hearing. Counsel advised they were not far apart on sentence and might present a joint submission when they returned. Crown counsel indicated her position would be contingent on completion of the upfront work.

[ 4 ] When the hearing began on May 28, counsel advised me they were now far apart on sentence. This was attributed to an unexpected late development, i.e. within the preceding day or two Mr. Klumak had received new medical information that he felt supported a conditional sentence and had just provided it to Crown counsel who had not yet fully examined it. However, Ms. Moser began her submissions, indicating she was seeking a 30-month sentence but that this would be subject to her full review of the new information at the morning or lunch break. [^1]

[ 5 ] The defence was now seeking a two-years-less-a-day conditional sentence or, alternatively, a reformatory sentence in that general range.

[ 6 ] Soon after Crown counsel began her submissions, I happened to ask if I was required to look at the child sexual abuse and exploitation material [“CSAEM”]. [^2] Counsel agreed I was not required to look at the material unless one of the parties requested I do so. Ms. Moser advised that she had decided against doing so because the parties had been so close on sentence. By asking my question, however, I prompted her to reconsider her position now that counsel were taking widely divergent positions. Crown counsel then formally requested the court view a representative sample. Everyone agreed the hearing should be rescheduled to enable the Crown to obtain a representative sample acceptable to the defence before the hearing continued.

[ 7 ] On the resumption date, June 19 at 2:15 p.m., I was given the representative sample on a USB stick just before the lunch break. I examined it over the break, made it a sealed exhibit when the hearing resumed, heard submissions and then reserved my decision.

[ 8 ] On the date scheduled for judgment, September 23, 2025, I was moved into a busy short plea/administrative court at the last minute due to the illness of another judge. This made it impossible to deliver the oral judgment I had prepared. At Mr. Owen’s request, I imposed the 28-month sentence with reasons to follow. [^3] These are those reasons. [^4]

[ 9 ] As I stated when I imposed sentence, I conclude that a sentence of 28 months is the lowest sentence capable of vindicating the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence. This conclusion takes into account both the mitigating factors that relate to Mr. Owen and that this inherently grave offence was aggravated by the comparatively vast size and surpassingly depraved nature of his collection. Mr. Owen possessed a total of 6438 images, 542 of which were videos, all of which showed real children, pre-pubescent girls ranging in age from infants to toddlers to older school-age, being raped or giving or receiving oral sex along with other sexual acts and postures with adult men whose erect penises were sometimes on full view as was ejaculate, including on various parts of the girls’ bodies.

[ 10 ] As I also stated at the time I imposed sentence, given the required length of sentence, a conditional sentence was unavailable. But even had I imposed a sentence in the reformatory range, a conditional sentence would have been disproportionately lenient given the gravity of Mr. Owen’s crime.

II The Facts in Support of the Guilty Plea

[ 11 ] As part of his guilty plea, Mr. Owen accepted the following Agreed Statement of Facts [“ ASF ”] after Crown counsel read it into the record: [^5]

On November 14th, 2022, a member of the Toronto Police Service Child Exploitation Section initiated an investigation into an unknown person (later identified as the accused) using Internet Protocol (IP) address 99.237.61.116 which had an associated Globally Unique Identifier (“GUID”) attached to it.

GUID is a special type of identifier used in software application to provide a reference number, which is unique in any context. Each installation or update of a Peer-to-Peer software client creates a new GUID, for example if a used updates hi/her current version to a new version, this would create a new GUID. A GUID is unique to the computer installation and if there are several user accounts on the computer, the GUID is unique to each user.

The officer viewed several sexually explicit images and videos that were also found in the accused file sharing software. The officer then initiated attempts to download files from the suspected IP address and GUID. As a result of investigation, the subscriber information for the IP address was obtained and returned to the address of 58 Hexham Drive, Scarborough ON.

On May 17th, 2023, a search warrant was executed at 58 Hexham Drive, Scarborough ON. The residence had 2 rental units in the basement, one that was occupied by the accused. During the search of the accused's bedroom a number of electronic devices were located. Through the forensic examination, a quantity of files that meet the definition of child pornography were located in a desktop located in the accused's bedroom.

Police examined the following device belonging to Mr. OWEN:

Tech exhibit 1 (Axiom report) – Desktop P6695113- 13 unique video, 2546 unique images.

Tech Exhibit 2 ( Axiom report) – Performance Desktop P6695111- 569 unique videos. 3310 unique images.

The officer in charge of the case identified the following in relation to the collection of images and videos:

Ages of children: Infants/Toddlers/ Young Children/Pre-Pubescent/Early Pubescent/

Sex of the children: Female

Certain Types of activity captured: Penetrative sexual activity between toddler and adult male. Penetrative sexual activity between children and adults.

The accused had access to and possession of the images and videos during the period between June 24, 2022 to May 10, 2023.

The images and videos viewed by the investigating officer met the Criminal Code definition of child pornography.

[ 12 ] The representative sample consisted of 15 digital photographs fitting the description in paragraphs 9 and 11 above. Each image was unique, and I am almost certain that each involved a unique victim. [^6]

[ 13 ] The representative sample did not include any of the broader collection’s images involving infants or any of its 542 videos. It was stipulated that the videos captured sexual abuse as intrusive as what was depicted in the images. I note, however, that videos, “by adding more realistic and graphic detail [videos]…are more invasive and harmful privacy violations” than still images: R. v. Pike , 2024 ONCA 608 , para.167.

[ 14 ] I will discuss my review of the representative sample in more detail below when I assess the gravity of the offence.

III The Circumstances of the Offender

[ 15 ] Mr. Owen turned 48 during the period he possessed the CSAEM (June 24, 2022 to May 10, 2023). He is now 50. He has a Grade 12 education and supported himself through ODSP. He lived alone in a basement apartment.

[ 16 ] Mr. Owen has no criminal record.

[ 17 ] Mr. Owen has an extensive history of serious psychotic disorder and resulting hospitalizations beginning in 1996, when he was 21. He has been involuntarily committed under the authority of a Form 1 on several occasions. In 2014 or 2015, he was found unfit to stand trial which resulted in a treatment order. [^7]

[ 18 ] Mr. Owen has positive family support. He was supported in court by his mother and step-father. His mother, Judith Allen, advised the court that she and her husband would continue to support Mr. Owen going forward. Ms. Allen also made a statement at the end of the hearing in which she described the impact that Mr. Owen’s history of mental disorder has had on him and his family.

[ 19 ] Mr. Owen’s condition dramatically improved or stabilized in late 2015 and early 2016 and has remained so since. According to his mother, this was largely due to a new medication, Abilify, which he continues to take. I will review Mr. Owen’s psychiatric history in more detail below when assessing the mitigating impact of his mental health issues.

IV.. Positions of the Parties

[ 20 ] On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Moser submits the appropriate sentence is 30 months. She emphasizes the primacy of denunciation and deterrence in the context of a CSAEM collection whose size and nature lie near the worst end of the spectrum. She relies heavily on the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in R. v. Pike , 2024 ONCA 608 [^8] , particularly: (i) its description of recently increased judicial recognition of the severe harm caused both by sexual violence against children in general and simple possession of CSAEM in particular; and (ii) the Court of Appeal’s specification of a clear and elevated sentencing range for this offence.

[ 21 ] Crown counsel further submits that: (i) as the defence concedes, there is no evidence that the defendant’s history of mental disorder had any causal bearing on his commission of this offence; and, (ii) the defence has failed to establish that Mr. Owen cannot receive appropriate treatment while in custody and/or that his mental health issues would make a jail sentence so onerous that a conditional sentence is the only proportionate option. Accordingly, Mr. Owen’s mental health issues have little if any mitigating effect and certainly do not amount to an “exceptional circumstance” (as that term is used in Pike ) justifying a conditional sentence or significant departure from the new sentencing range laid down in Pike . Indeed, but for the other mitigating factors, most notably the guilty plea and absence of a criminal record, a longer penitentiary sentence would be warranted.

[ 22 ] On behalf of Mr. Owen, Mr. Klumak submits that the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence can be adequately addressed with a two-years-less-a-day conditional sentence including, if necessary, house arrest for the full term.

[ 23 ] While Mr. Klumak acknowledges there is no causal link between Mr. Owen’s history of mental disorder and his commission of the instant offence, he submits it would greatly amplify the negative impact of a jail sentence, especially since Mr. Owen will likely be segregated to some degree due to the nature of his offence. A jail sentence would be profoundly deleterious to Mr. Owen’s progress under treatment, acquisition of housing stability and other community supports, possibly to the point of a causing a permanent setback in his condition after eight years of relative stability. Accordingly, together with the other mitigating factors, Mr. Klumak submits that mental disorder does amount to the kind of “exceptional circumstance” that points to a non-carceral sentence as fit, proportional and appropriate.

[ 24 ] Finally, in the alternative, Mr. Klumak submits that if I conclude a conditional sentence is not appropriate, an upper-range reformatory sentence is sufficiently punitive and would have the advantage of allowing me to place Mr. Owen on probation, thus keeping him under some form of supervision for a longer period.

V. Analysis

(a) General Principles of Sentencing

[ 25 ] Section 718 of the Criminal Code declares that the “fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute…to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives”:

• denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

• to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences (i.e. general and specific deterrence);

• to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

• to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community;

• to assist in rehabilitating offenders; and,

• to promote a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

Criminal Code , s.718 [emphasis added].

[ 26 ] The “relevance and relative importance of each of the objectives identified in s. 718 will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender”: R. v. Hamilton , [2004] O.J. No. 3252 (C.A.) , para.102. The weight assigned to each sentencing objective strongly influences the appropriate sentence, especially if denunciation and deterrence are statutorily defined as the primary sentencing objectives (as they are in the present case).

[ 27 ] Sections 718.1 and 718.2 require the sentence be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. The circumstances of both the offence and the offender must be examined with a focus on the aggravating or mitigating factors pertaining to the offence and the offender. This assures that, in the end, “the punishment fits the crime” without losing sight of the person being sentenced.

[ 28 ] I must identify the range of sentence that is on par with sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: Criminal Code , s.718.2(b). But I must also take into account recent shifts in sentencing policy for offences involving sexual abuse of children generally, and possession CSAEM in particular: R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 ; R. v. Pike , 2024 ONCA 608 . In practical terms, this means that older “range” cases are of less value than cases decided after Friesen .

[ 29 ] The Court of Appeal’s decision in Pike has been my principal source of guidance in this decision because its focus is this offence, simple possession of CSAEM. Pike was written for the express purpose of providing much needed “quantitative guidance”, and it explicates the new elevated range that incorporates both the shift in sentencing policy announced in Friesen , and Parliament’s 2015 doubling of the maximum sentence for this offence from five years to ten years imprisonment when the Crown proceeds by indictment.

[ 30 ] In 2015, Parliament also doubled the mandatory minimum sentence, from six months to one year (when the Crown proceeds by indictment). Several lower courts found the mandatory minimum violated s.12 of the Charter , and it was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville , 2025 SCC 33 . However, the majority in Senneville explicitly approved of the approach taken in Pike and reaffirmed the Court’s awareness of “the paradigm shift initiated by Parliament” in 2015 and the need for “sentences imposed for sexual offences against children” to “correspond to Parliament's legislative initiatives and the contemporary understanding of the profound harm that sexual violence against children causes”. Striking down the mandatory minimum did not signal any softening in sentencing policy for this offence. Rather, as the majority noted, it reflected the fact that possessing CSAEM in an offence that can “be committed in a wide range of circumstances”, by virtue of its necessarily broad definition. [^9]

(b) Deterrence and Denunciation are the Primary Objectives

[ 31 ] Because possessing CSAEM involves “the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years”, denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives: Criminal Code , s.718.01.

[ 32 ] This means I must impose a sentence that is sufficiently punitive to denounce the crime and deter others who might be inclined to commit it. A deterrent sentence is by definition more severe than the offender might otherwise deserve, as the Supreme Court explained in R. v. B.W.P. , 2006 SCC 27 , para. 2 :

General deterrence is intended to work in this way: potential criminals will not engage in criminal activity because of the example provided by the punishment imposed on the offender. When general deterrence is factored in the determination of the sentence, the offender is punished more severely , not because he or she deserves it, but because the court decides to send a message to others who may be inclined to engage in similar criminal activity. [emphasis added]

[ 33 ] In concrete terms, the primacy of deterrence and denunciation means that if nothing less than an actual jail sentence is sufficiently punitive to adequately denounce and deter, I must impose one, even if it is less likely to promote rehabilitation, even if it would impede rehabilitation.

[ 34 ] In the present case, one argument in favour of a conditional sentence is that it would avoid interrupting Mr. Owen’s current treatment and community support structure. All other things being equal, that would clearly be preferable. But unless a conditional sentence is sufficiently punitive to vindicate the primary sentencing objectives, I must sentence Mr. Owen to a jail term nevertheless. Rehabilitative and/or restorative objectives would remain relevant, but only to extent of influencing the quantum of sentence.

(c) The Gravity of the Offence

[ 35 ] In Pike , Tulloch C.J.O. observed that ever since this offence was enacted in 1993, judges have been on a “learning curve…to understand [the] wrongs and harms” associated with possessing CSAEM. His objective in Pike was to “further judicial progress along this learning curve” by re-examining the harms as described in R. v. Sharpe , 2001 SCC 2 through the lens of the “child-centered approach” more recently articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 .

[ 36 ] Applying this methodology, Tulloch C.J.O. landed on “six distinct wrongs and harms” arising from the mere possession of CSAEM. I respectfully add that although each is distinct, the six wrongs and harms are interwoven. I would distill them as follows (all emphasis is added by me):

i First…“Because child pornography depicting real children ‘cannot come into existence without [their] exploitation and abuse’…perpetrators ‘possess ... crime scene images of child sexual abuse’ or exploitation” perpetuating the original exploitation by “infringing their right not to have the permanent record of their abuse and exploitation viewed by adults ”: Pike , para.147.

ii “Second, people who possess images of the abused and exploited children directly invade children's privacy. This privacy violation is ‘extreme’” as it robs children “of control over to whom, and in what context, to disclose their abuse and exploitation”: Pike , para.148.

iii “Third, people who possess child pornography inflict severe emotional harm on children” by making “the challenging path of recovery for children much steeper by transforming the initial exploitation and violence of the production into a continuing violation .” Children who have undergone the traumas of sexual abuse itself must then “suffer further pain” or “a " slow acid drip of trauma " whenever “they learn that unknown perpetrators have accessed and can view those recordings”: Pike , para.148.

iv Fourth, people who acquire and possess this material help create a market for it and thus indirectly " instigate the production and distribution of child pornography " and, thus, the sexual abuse and exploitation of children”: Pike , para 151 .

v “Fifth, possessing and viewing child pornography can incite perpetrators to commit and facilitate their commission of other sexual offences against children . To begin with, it leads them to deny and minimize the wrongfulness of, rationalize and normalize, and even fantasize about sexually exploiting children”… perpetrators “can show material to children to facilitate these offences by lowering inhibitions and blackmailing them to participate” and in this and other ways possession fuels “ a cycle of abuse of both original and new victims ”: Pike , paras. 152 and 153 .

vi “Sixth, people who possess child pornography perpetuate pernicious messages that attack children's humanity and equality . Children have "absolute dignity and infinite value" and deserve equal respect [citation omitted]…Our society's future depends on respecting these principles so that children can grow healthily from a position of vulnerability by virtue of their age, dependency, and need, into adulthood and leadership…These principles' fundamental status reflects centuries of hard-won progress by moving away from treating children as property for adults to abuse, exploit, and exchange, and towards recognizing children's rights and the responsibilities that adults owe children:[citation omitted]…Child pornography inverts these values by " perpetuat[ing] lies about children's humanity": citation omitted]. It lies to children by normalizing their sexual abuse and exploitation : [citation omitted]. It also lies to adults. By falsely depicting children seeming to participate in their own exploitation, it erases children's vulnerability and wrongly suggests they can consent, or that their exploitation is not a real crime …[emphasis added]: Pike , paras. 154 and 155 .

[ 37 ] It is the collective effect of these “six distinct wrongs and harms” that make possession of CSAEM a grave offence. As Pike cautions, sentencing courts must be alert to the insidious effects of long-simmering myths casting possession of existing CSAEM images as a victimless crime on the theory that the “real” harm – the abuse of the child to make the video or image – has already been done. Pike reaffirms and draws into sharper focus that possession of CSAEM causes terrible harm in and of itself and that people who commit this crime are profoundly morally blameworthy. The sentencing range has been upwardly adjusted to send the message that people who keep images of children being sexually abused – whether purchased, traded or shared – commit a serious crime and can no longer expect to find shelter in the rubble of the shattered myth that merely keeping a copy of such images is harmless: Pike , paras. 143 to 146, 161 ; Friesen, supra ; R. v. Bertrand Marchand , 2023 SCC 26 , paras. 32-33 ; Senneville , supra , paras. 31-37 .

[ 38 ] Accordingly, Tulloch C.J.O. concluded:

Possession is a grave offence because it causes these wrongs and harms. "[C]ourts do not see [possession as] a minor, or victimless crime" ( Kwok (2007) , at para. 52) or one that merely seeks to prevent future risks to children that have not yet materialized: Smolen, at p. 60. Rather, " possession of child pornography is itself child sexual abuse ": Inksetter , at para. 22 (quotation omitted). People who possess child pornography participate in the producer's initial sexual abuse of children through the market that their demand creates, and drive demand for even more abuse. They also independently abuse those children by violating their dignity and privacy, which causes them severe emotional harm.

Parliament has responded to society's increasing awareness of the gravity of this offence by determining that courts should punish it more severely… [description of increasing punishments in laws passed by Parliament]

Parliament has also recognized the gravity of this offence by directing courts via s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code to prioritize denunciation and deterrence…

Courts must follow Parliament's direction by placing children and the wrongs and harms that people who possess child pornography inflict on them at the centre of the sentencing process. Courts can give significant weight to the personal circumstances and mitigating factors of people who possess child pornography, and to sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation: Friesen , at paras. 91-92, 104 . But it is all too easy for those considerations, which focus on the people being sentenced, to overshadow the wrongs and harms they inflict because their victims are all too often invisible...

(d) The Range for Possession of CSAEM

[ 39 ] Pike directly addressed the new sentencing range for this offence [at paras.174 to 178]:

The range for possession has been rising even before Friesen and Parliament's 2015 maximum sentence increase. In 2007, Justice Molloy provided a historical snapshot of a six-to-eighteen-month range at a time when this court's possession sentencing precedents were lenient: [citations omitted]. The very next year, the Supreme Court of Canada signalled that the eighteen-month upper end was no longer applicable by affirming a three-year sentence for possession as proportionate: R. v. L.M. , 2008 SCC 31 …Thus, as courts progressed along the learning curve following L.M… sentencing judges in pre- Friesen cases ( where the offences predated the 2015 maximum sentence increase) set the range's upper end as three-and-one-half to four years: [citations omitted]. While some sentencing judges continued to impose lower sentences, in my view, this merely reflects the wide variety of circumstances in which the possession offence can be committed as well as, in some cases, confusion about the applicable range: [citations omitted].

I account for Friesen and the 2015 maximum sentence increase by raising the three-and-one-half to four-year upper end of the range for possession of child pornography identified in Lynch-Staunton and Branco to five years . This raise empowers sentencing judges to respond to the "staggering and systematic nature" of the wrongs and harms that people who possess child pornography can cause in cases involving numerous victims: Friesen , at para. 133 (quotation omitted). It also fits comfortably with post- Friesen , post-legislative change cases in which this court imposed or affirmed three- or four-year sentences for possession of child pornography, despite the absence of significant aggravating factors and the presence of mitigating factors: [citations omitted]. I decline to set a lower end for the possession range because, like child luring, possession can be committed in a wide variety of circumstances and is sometimes prosecuted summarily, which lowers the maximum sentence to two-years-less-a-day: [citations omitted].

The increase I set out is measured and harmonizes with related sentencing ranges. The upper end matches the five-year upper end of the range for child luring, which carries the same maximum sentence as possessing child pornography [citation omitted]. Further, it respects Parliament's choice to set higher maximum sentences for contact offences and for the production and distribution of child pornography than for simple possession because it is lower than the ranges for those offences: [citations omitted].

Courts should situate cases on the range by assessing the aggravating and mitigating factors these reasons outline and by comparing them to the facts of decided cases . The most useful precedents are post-Friesen, post-2015 legislative change cases, especially those that, like this court's decisions in Inksetter, John, McCaw, Olivetti , and R. v. Rule, 2023 ONCA 31 , show a deep understanding of the gravity and degree of responsibility of those possessing these images consistent with these reasons: Friesen , at paras. 108-110 . I note that in Inksetter, a five-year sentence for the possession count likely would have been appropriate but for the early guilty plea, lack of a criminal record, low risk, remorse, insight, and treatment: at paras. 7-9, 12, 27. The length of sentence imposed in cases that applied the 2007 Kwok range has limited utility going forward because that range's upper end has long been surpassed .

[ 40 ] As for the availability of conditional sentences for this offence, Tulloch C.J.O. reminds sentencing judges that the first step is to situate the case “on the range and determine whether an under two-year sentence is appropriate before deciding whether it should be served in the community.” Even if a sentence under two years is appropriate, conditional sentences will only “rarely” be appropriate: Pike , paras 179 and 180 .

(e) Offence-Related Aggravating Factors

[ 41 ] In Pike , the Court of Appeal (mostly) affirmed and elaborated on the “ Kwoc factors”, i.e. the widely cited list of aggravating and mitigating factors identified by Molloy J. in R. v. Kwok, supra . The two very significant aggravating factors in this case are “the size of the pornography collection” and “the nature of the collection (including the age of the children involved and the relative depravity and violence depicted)”.

i. The Size of the Collection

[ 42 ] The quantity of CSAEM in an offender’s possession – the number of unique images – has always been one of the primary drivers of sentence for this offence. In Pike , Tulloch C.J.O. elaborated on the meaning and importance of this aggravating factor [at para.167]:

First, the size of the collection is not determinative and should be considered together with the number of real child victims, the degree of organization, and the ratio of videos to still images. In general, the number of different children depicted is more aggravating than large collection size because people who victimize more children should expect to receive "significantly higher sentences": Friesen , at para. 133 . Indeed, large collection size matters in large part because courts infer from it that the collection contains many victims …Further, videos are more aggravating than still images because, by adding more realistic and graphic detail, they are more invasive and harmful privacy violations: (citation omitted). For all these reasons, stricter sentences for smaller-size collections are appropriate if other aggravating factors demand it: R. v. McCaw , 2023 ONCA 8 , 165 O.R. (3d) 179 , at paras. 31-33 .

[ 43 ] As I read this passage, it does not suggest that large collection size is not aggravating. Rather, the point being made is that “stricter sentences” are still appropriate for “smaller-size collections…if other aggravating factors demand it”. Further, the number of “unique victims” is the more important metric than the number of “unique images”. Unfortunately, the ASF in this case does not specify the number of “unique victims”, only the very large number of “unique images”. Consequently, as Tulloch C.J.O. explains in the above-quoted passage, in this case “large collection size matters in large part because [I can] infer from it that the collection contains many victims”: Pike , supra , para. 167 .

[ 44 ] On that point, it is unlikely that all 6,438 unique images involve a unique victim. There is likely some repetition. But even if there is as high a ratio as 10:1, that would mean the collection involves almost 650 unique victims. There is no way to know what the ratio is. I can nevertheless infer that a collection of this size necessarily involves a high number of unique victims. Even if that hypothetical 10:1 ratio were lower by a full degree of magnitude and the collection “only” involves 65 unique victims, this would hardly be a small number. And for the number of unique victims to be that “low”, there would have to be an average of 100 unique images per victim. I have no way of knowing, of course, but that strikes me as implausible; be that as it may, it is at least as likely that the ratio is lower than 10:1, that the number of unique victims is higher than 650, possibly as high as a number in the low thousands.

[ 45 ] Moreover, the fact that the collection included 542 videos is a very serious further aggravating factor above and beyond the large size of the collection. As Tulloch C.J.O. points out, “by adding more realistic and graphic detail, [videos] are more invasive and harmful privacy violations”: Pike, para.167.

[ 46 ] In the final analysis, the defendant possessed a truly massive quantity of unique images including a very large number of videos. This permits an inference that number of unique victims is very large even though I cannot specify what that number is. [^10]

[ 47 ] It follows that the vast size of the collection in this case is a very serious aggravating factor . In R. v. John , 2018 ONCA 702 , Pardu J.A. made the following comments about the impact of the collection size in that case [at para. 45]:

…the size and nature of the appellant's collection is a seriously aggravating factor . The appellant had possession of 89 unique videos and 50 unique images of child pornography. He actively sought out these images and videos. His collection included images of children as young as four years old, and some perhaps as young as two or three years old, subjected to anal and vaginal penetration with sex toys and adult penises. This is terrible abuse of young children….

…But for the appellant's very considerable efforts at rehabilitation, the sentence imposed could have been much higher.

[ 48 ] In contrast, Mr. Owen possessed 5,856 unique images and 582 unique videos. He thus possessed 6.5 times the number of videos and 117 times the number of unique images as a collection whose “size and nature” was “ a seriously aggravating factor ” in John , supra [emphasis added].

ii. The Nature of the Collection

[ 49 ] The second highly aggravating factor in this case is the nature of the material in Mr. Owen’s collection, “ the depicted activity's degree of harmfulness and wrongfulness”: Pike, para.168.

[ 50 ] I strongly agree with Justice Molloy’s observation that “nobody can fully appreciate the sickening horror of such pornography without actually looking at it”: R. v. Kwok , [2007] O.J. No. 457 (S.C.J.) at para.48. Looking at the images allowed me to fully appreciate their iniquitous character and Mr. Owen’s high moral blameworthiness for possessing this vast trove of “sickening horror”.

[ 51 ] This was my first experience as a judge reviewing a representative sample of CSAEM. As a lawyer, I had seen far less serious CSAEM two or three times between 2006 and 2016, and on one occasion in the early 2000’s, I saw a sample of CSAEM on the same scale of depravity as the material in this case. My memory of the latter experience, about a quarter-century old, is vague. It certainly did not prepare me for the impact of looking at the representative sample in this case.

[ 52 ] Looking at the sample impacted my assessment of the gravity of this crime, both in general and in this specific case. I would not have had as complete an understanding of the true character of the harm had my only source of information been the ASF and associated representations made by counsel. In this special context, the aphorism “a picture is worth a thousand words” trivializes the difference between a written description and the experience of looking at the sample.

[ 53 ] I spent about 10 or at most 15 seconds on each image. The experience was emotionally upsetting. I felt a very unpleasant feeling in my stomach as I looked at the first eight images, one by one. When I reached Image #9 (which I will describe below), it nearly caused me to throw up and I had to take a break. By the time I had finished looking at the entire sample, I was in tears and needed 10 or 15 minutes to regain my composure before stepping into court for the resumption of the sentencing hearing.

[ 54 ] I share these rather personal details reluctantly. But the fact is that I lack the words to convey the “sickening horror” of these images. The best I can do is to say that this experience made me cry and Image #9 nearly made me vomit. Sharing that information is the only way I can do descriptive justice to what I witnessed in looking at these 15 images. Expository description simply does not suffice.

[ 55 ] Despite the consensus between the parties that I should view the representative sample, out of an abundance of caution I read R. v. P.M., 2012 ONCA 162 before doing so. P.M. fully satisfied me that it was appropriate to look at the sample. One relevant consideration was that in contrast to the sentencing judge in P.M. , I had no recent experience viewing material on this scale of depravity, and none as a judge.

[ 56 ] While preparing these written reasons, I became aware of the lively debate in the post- P.M. caselaw about the necessity and even the propriety of judges looking at representative samples. The contours of this debate are explored in detail in R. v. R.P.A ., 2025 ABCA 300 and I need not delve deeply into it here. Because I had been unaware of it until recently, it did not play any role in my determination of sentence. Despite that, it does raise certain points that warrant brief comment.

[ 57 ] In the years since P.M. was decided in 2012, two conflicting schools of thought have emerged in trial-level decisions scattered across the country.

[ 58 ] The first view is that sentencing judges should never view representative samples in any circumstance, or, at least, should never be required to. Several distinct rationales have been given for this viewpoint. They are well- summarized in R.P.A ., para. 69 :

In short, it appears from a review of these decisions that a presumption has emerged that viewing child sexual abuse material is inherently and deeply prejudicial. Viewing this evidence is, as the court put it in Borchert at para 20, "always" harmful, resulting in a factor weighing strongly against its admission. The prejudice is articulated in a variety of ways--moral prejudice to the offender, reasoning prejudice, re-victimization of the victim, unnecessary trauma and harm to court actors. The probative value of the material is seen as diminished because of the availability of detailed descriptions of the offences, leading the sentencing judge to conclude that it is unnecessary to view the material in order to appreciate the gravity of the offences and the moral culpability of the offender.

[ 59 ] The countervailing view is that if the nature of the CSAEM is relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence and at least one party makes the request, a sentencing judge must look at the representative sample, irrespective of whether there is an agreed-upon description in writing (as there is in this case). Arguments in favour of this viewpoint include the following:

• descriptions--even if detailed and graphic--do not have the same impact as images. Few judges will recall the details of agreed statements of facts or descriptions of crimes, but certain images are seared in their memory: R.P.A. , para.70;

• audiotapes, photographs, and videotapes have long been recognized as probative and powerful evidence: R.P.A. , para.71, citing R. v. Nikolovski , [1996] 3 SCR 1197 , para.21;

• “ although exceedingly difficult to watch, child sexual abuse material is evidence that best captures the gravity of the offences it depicts. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a sentencing judge who views such material will somehow misapprehend this evidence”: R.P.A., para.72;

• “as graphic as the written descriptions can be, written descriptions seldom do justice to the actual content of the images and videos themselves when viewed. Adjectives inadequately capture just how horrific and how truly haunting, the abuse suffered by these young victims really is . The pain, shame, confusion and humiliation suffered by these children can often be seen etched on their faces. And it is important for us as criminal justice system participants to be witnesses to their suffering, to acknowledge it, confront it and to deal with it . We need to do so in order to ensure that the victims of these offences and the community at large can be satisfied that our courts have a real appreciation for the gravity of this form of abuse”: R. v. Partsch , 2018 ONCJ 962 , para.15.

See also, R. v. Sawatis , [2025] ONSC 50, paras. 10 to 13.

[ 60 ] Nothing in R.P.A . or the cases it refers to would have changed my decision to view the sample. R.P.A . provides guidance on when it is and is not appropriate for a party to ask the judge to view a sample and for a judge to agree or refuse to do so: R.P.A. , para.89. In the present case, the Crown’s request and my decision to look at the sample both fall comfortably with the parameters set in R.P.A . and, as I had already determined, were also supported by both holdings in P.M. , i.e. “I agree that ordinarily the judge should view this kind of evidence if asked to do so”: P.M. , para. 31 , per Rosenberg J.A., writing for the majority, and “ the important aspects of the nature and gravity of the sexual offences could only have been obtained by direct observation of the contents of the disc”: P.M. , para.103, per Epstein J.A., dissenting.

[ 61 ] Curiously, R.P.A. does not list the judge’s prior experience in viewing similar material as a consideration, but P.M. does (although the Court of Appeal divided on whether a judge can rely on prior experience, Epstein J.A. writing in dissent, expressed skepticism that prior experience viewing similar material was pertinent to the duty to view the material). In my view, it was a relevant consideration in the present case.

[ 62 ] I respectfully agree with my colleague Band J. that “‘child pornography’ involves the kind of traumatizing imagery that can affect even those of us who believe we are ‘thick skinned’ or that we have seen it all. The effects can be serious and lasting. They can, in combination with others, have serious impacts on our mental and physical health…”: R. v. Marratt , 2019 ONCJ 618 , paras.7, 10 & 11; R. v. Shaw , [2018] O.J. No. 537 , para.29.

[ 63 ] Both Marratt and Shaw canvass the issue of psychological harm caused to justice system participants, including judges, by viewing samples of CSAEM, especially when done repetitively or needlessly. Both these decisions were referred to at some length in R.P.A . [at para. 67] . It is safe to say that Justice Band’s thoughts on this issue impacted the guidance set out in R.P.A . , including that court’s conclusion that “there is a legitimate concern about exposing justice system participants, including judges, to traumatization and acute stress reactions from dealing with child sexual abuse material, particularly if the exposure is repeated” and its inclusion of that concern in the list of factors to be considered when deciding whether to view a representative sample: R.P.A ., paras. 83 and 89 .

[ 64 ] It was essential for me to look at the sample to fully appreciate the gravity of the offence, and that full understanding was itself essential given the disparity in the positions the parties took on sentence. But it is not an experience I would like to repeat if it were unnecessary. It seems to me that the information gained by viewing the images is of such a visceral character that it might well be transferable to another case where the CSAEM is of a similar nature, depending on the recency of the judge’s prior experience. As R.P.A. holds at para.89, the decision to request the court view a representative sample and the judge’s decision to accede to the request should be made on a case-by-case basis with consideration for a number of factors that Court mentions. I would add that a judge’s own prior experience with viewing such material could be a relevant consideration in some cases, consistent with the majority’s holding in P.M.

[ 65 ] R.P.A. also mentions the concern raised in some decisions that by looking at the images the judge runs the risk of becoming “enraged” to the point of “ impos[ing] unduly harsh sentences or, as an attempt to compensate for their instinctive negative responses, unduly lenient sentences, neither of which is in the interests of justice”: R.P.A . , para. 63 , citing R. v. King , 2024 NWTTC 2 , 2024 NWTTC 02 , para. 9 .

[ 66 ] Implicit in this concern is a rather pessimistic view of the capacity of judges to interrogate their own subjective reactions to disturbing information whether it is conveyed by witness testimony or visual or audio exhibits. For any judge, “being aware of such risks, being careful not to conflate issues, and not allowing decisions to be driven by emotional responses rather than rational analysis, are at the very heart of the judicial function”: R. v. Laplante , 2021 NWTSC 29 , para.21. While CSAEM is as bad as it gets, vicarious experience of very upsetting and traumatic events is something that goes with the territory in criminal law both in and out of the context of the sexual abuse of children. In my experience, including my interactions with colleagues, “the strong presumption that a sentencing judge will discharge their duty to act impartially and manage the negative impacts of traumatic evidence on their decision-making process” is fully justified: R.P.A., paras.75, 79-89; see also, R. v. Yankie , 2025 MBPC 33 , para. 13 .

[ 67 ] Looking at the sample was difficult, but it certainly did not cause me to feel animus or “rage” directed at Mr. Owen. Th e only feeling linked to seeing the images that I recall was a degree of compassion for Mr. Owen’s misfortune in having the unchosen trait that caused his interest in this material. To be clear, this crime has two ingredients: the interest in such material and the choice to act on that interest. No one would choose to have such a trait and compassion for someone who does strikes me as appropriate and perfectly consistent with the immense compassion I felt for the victims in each of the images I saw.

[ 68 ] Choosing to act on the interest, in this case by amassing a vast collection of CSAEM, is a very different matter. That choice deserves denunciation and penal sanction, not compassion. In any event, whatever one may think of feeling compassion for Mr. Owen on account of this misfortunate trait, it is hardly borne of animus.

[ 69 ] My reaction to Image #9, while purely subjective, was instructive. It is a photograph of a girl who is perhaps seven or eight years old, holding an adult’s erect penis in her hand and close to her mouth. She is looking directly at the camera and smiling, the only image of that kind in the representative sample. It was the least “intrusive” of the 15 images by the usual measures. Yet for reasons I did not understand at the time, it affected me more powerfully than the other images.

[ 70 ] I now understand that what sickened me was the girl’s smile , and everything her smile represents. As Tulloch C.J.O. held in Pike , para. 150 : “ [r]ecordings that falsely portray the victim as somehow consenting or enjoying their victimization heighten the humiliation by causing victims to worry about how offenders are misperceiving them. People who possess child pornography thus cause ongoing psychological harm to children that can extend long into adulthood.” Image #9 gave the impression the child was enjoying or even reveling in the act of fellatio that she was either about to perform or had just performed.

[ 71 ] It is not easy to reflect on this even seven months later, but what hit me the hardest was that the girl’s smile seemed so genuine . That child’s smile continues to haunt me because it was something like the living embodiment of the abuse and capture of a human soul; it was difficult to fully take in and I lack the skill to properly describe the evil that was indirectly revealed by that smile.

[ 72 ] I have no information about any of the victims depicted in Mr. Owen’s collection and I therefore have no idea whether the girl involved in Image #9 is 7, 12, 18, 25 or 45 today. I also have no idea if she is aware of the existence of that image or has seen it. I hope not. The thought of that girl or woman being confronted by that image after enduring the abuse that led to its creation sickens my heart.

[ 73 ] Image #9 also illustrates the deep truth in the Chief Justice of Ontario’s comments urging sentencing courts to “recognize that the harms and wrongs of such recordings do not depend on penetration, and that other forms of exploitation can cause severe emotional harm, even absent additional violence and even if victims appear to participate”: Pike at para. 168 . It was also the most vivid demonstration of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s observation that “[c]hild sexual abuse material (videos and photographs) does not just depict the crime, it is the crime … ”: R.P.A . , para. 89 .

[ 74 ] Overall, based on the description in the ASF and what I saw in the representative sample, “ the depicted activity's degree of harmfulness and wrongfulness” is towards the highest end of the range. It is certainly true that penetration is not required for an image to be seriously harmful, as Image #9 so powerfully illustrates. In any event, the distinction between images of penetrative sexual contact, oral sex and/or sexual posing is not one I need dwell on: Mr. Owen’s vast collection abounds with all of the above and, doubtless, many variations on the same hideous themes, a vast mélange of intrusive sexual contact inflicted on female children by adult men.

[ 75 ] It is also an aggravating factor that Mr. Owen’s possession of this material was lengthy, not fleeting: Pike , para. 170 . The ASF also refers to the fact the police learned about Mr. Owen through a file sharing application on his computer. In the absence of specificity about whether he shared with other offenders, however, I am unable to treat this as a specifically aggravating factor. The fact that the images were of real children is of course aggravating, but one that is already bound up in the nature of the material.

[ 76 ] I note that some aggravating factors mentioned in Kwok and Pike are not present in this case, including these:

• there was no evidence of frequency of access or “collaboration with other offenders, planning, organization, sophistication, and participation in the child pornography subculture”: Pike , para. 170 ;

• there was no evidence Mr. Owen was also involved in production or distribution of the pornography (other than the reference to file sharing mentioned above which does not permit any specific inference): Kwok , para.7;

• there was no evidence Mr. Owen “is seen as a danger to children (including whether he is a diagnosed pedophile who has acted on his impulses in the past by assaulting children): Kwok , para. 7 ; and,

• there was no evidence he purchased child pornography thereby contributing to the sexual victimization of children for profit as opposed to free downloads from the Internet: Kwok , para. 7 ; and,

• there was no mention in the ASF of a high "level of organization" such as curation or themed folders which would suggest a higher level of interest and access: see R. v. Jonat , 2019 ONSC 1633 at para. 9 ; Pike , para. 167 .

[ 77 ] To be clear, the absence of an aggravating factor should not be confused with a mitigating factor. The most serious aggravating factors, both in general and in this case, are the size and nature of the collection. The absence of these additional aggravating factors brings down the starting point from the five year ceiling identified in Pike to about the three-to-four-year range. That, of course, only considers half the picture – the offence. It is also necessary to take the mitigating factors relating to the offender into account, the topic to which I now turn.

(d) Mitigating Factors Relating to the Offender

i. No Aggravating Factors Pertaining to the Offender

[ 78 ] I now turn to consider “any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating…to… the offender ”: Criminal Code , s.718.2(a).

[ 79 ] There are no aggravating factors related “to the offender”. Nothing about Mr. Owen weighs in favour of a higher sentence. Mr. Owen has no criminal record, there is no evidence of his participation in production or distribution, no diagnosis of pedophilia or danger to children based on a history of sexual offences against children, no evidence of active trading or active involvement in the kinds of online groups that the Court of Appeal described in Pike at para.144.

[ 80 ] But there are mitigating factors pertaining to Mr. Owen, and they favour a sentence below the three-to-four-year sentence range that would apply if the offence were the only consideration.

ii. Acceptance of Responsibility.

[ 81 ] By pleading guilty, Mr. Owen accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse. In addition, Mr. Owen made this statement at the end of the hearing:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak, Your Honour. I just want to say that I’m extremely sorry for my behaviour. There is no excuse for child abuse. I have none. But I do want to say that I’m not a molester, I’ve never molested a child in my life and I can’t see doing it in the future. I will no longer use any form of porn, and I will be seeking treatment. Thank you.

[ 82 ] To my ears, Mr. Owen communicated genuine contrition and a degree of insight into the nature of the wrong he committed. One might be skeptical about his stated intention to get treatment considering that upfront counselling was the ostensible reason for adjourning the sentencing hearing for eight months after the plea was entered and yet no counselling was done. But this issue was not raised during oral argument; had it been, it is possible I would have heard a valid explanation. Given that, it would be unfair to disbelieve Mr. Owen’s stated intention to get treatment on this basis. I therefore accept his stated intention at face value and give him credit for the measure of insight that it implies.

[ 83 ] I also accept Mr. Owen’s assertion that he was “extremely sorry for [his] behaviour” and his recognition that “[t]here is no excuse for child abuse”. I recognize that sincerity can be feigned; all I can say is Mr. Owen sounded sincere to me, based on both his demeanor and the content of his brief statement. He recognized that possessing the material was a form of child abuse and did not attempt to diminish his responsibility by claiming he committed this crime in the past when he was still floridly psychotic. As explained below, his mother and both psychiatrists certainly had that misimpression, but Mr. Owen attributed his offence to his present self, not the pre-2016 version of himself, and he did so in the presence of his mother who, five minutes earlier, had told the court that the person who committed this “ disgusting and hideous” offence was not “who or what [Mr. Owen] is now and not what he has been for the last 10 years since 2015”.

[ 84 ] Although I suspect Mr. Owen is the source of both Ms. Allen’s and the psychiatrists’ misperceptions about when the offence was committed, I give him credit for setting the record straight, for not trying to pull that particular piece of wool over my eyes.

[ 85 ] The assertion that followed – that he was “not a molester”, had “never molested a child in [his] life” and could not see himself doing so in the future – can be read in at least two ways. The negative interpretation is that he was minimizing the wrongfulness of what he did do by pointing out what he did not do. But another interpretation is that Mr. Owen may well have been concerned I would wonder whether he was a “molester”, given the nature of his collection. Outside the judicial context, that is something that most people would wonder, and Mr. Owen may just have been trying to dispel any such concern. Or, perhaps, these words were part of an instinctive and human defensive response to shame, an assertion meant to convey both to the court and himself “I may be bad but I’m not that bad”. It could also have been both. I prefer to accept one of these more generous interpretations of his words. I do not believe that Mr. Owen was minimizing the seriousness of the offence he plead guilty to.

[ 86 ] I accept that Mr. Owen’s statement and his guilty plea demonstrate remorse, acceptance of responsibility and some degree of insight.

iii. Mr. Owen is a First Offender

[ 87 ] When a crime committed by a first offender demands a denunciatory and deterrent sentence, special care must be taken to ensure the principles of proportionality and restraint are observed: R. v. Curran (1973), 57 Cr. App. R. 945 at pp. 947-948 , cited with approval in R. v. Vandale and Maciejewski , [1974] O.J. No. 1047, (C.A.) , para. 4 ( per Martin J.A.) and R. v. Priest , [1996] O.J. 3369, (CA) , para.23 ( per Rosenberg J.A.).

[ 88 ] Section 718.01 requires me to treat general and specific deterrence as well as denunciation as the primary sentencing objectives. This amplifies the importance of the principle of restraint and, especially in the case of a first offender, I must impose “ the least intrusive sentence and the least quantum which will achieve the overall purpose of being an appropriate and just sanction”: Hamilton , supra , paras. 96, 98 . A first sentence of imprisonment “ should be as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused rather than solely for the purpose of general deterrence": R. v. Priest , supra , para.23; R. v. Barclay , 2018 ONCA 114 , para.50.

iv. Mental Disorder Mitigates but Only to a Limited Extent

[ 89 ] The sources of information about Mr. Owen’s mental disorder are letters from psychiatrists Dr. Wang and Dr. Gratzer, Ms. Allen’s statement to the court at the end of the hearing on June 19 and the chronological account of Mr. Owen’s mental health history related by Mr. Klumak during submissions (but whose content was attributed to Mr. Owen’s mother and Dr. Wang’s earlier letter).

[ 90 ] The best place to start is with Ms. Allen’s statement. She is neither an expert nor a disinterested source of information, but I found her lucid account very helpful in bringing to life the real-world impact that Mr. Owen’s mental health history has had on him and his family.

[ 91 ] Ms. Allen stated that in 1996, when Mr. Owen was 21, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder after some “extraordinary behaviour” had led to his committal to hospital under a Form 1. She explained that his biological father had suffered the same condition and after attempting suicide had left the family and returned to Wales when Mr. Owen was a year old.

[ 92 ] From that time forward, Ms. Allen and her husband David (Mr. Owen’s stepfather) saw and lived with the consequences of Mr. Owen’s “highs and lows”, including risk-taking, paranoia, aggression, delusions and grandiosity. At times, they feared for his life and were often desperate to find appropriate care for him. On several occasions, Ms. Allen herself went to a Justice of the Peace to obtain a Form 1 to have her son committed for his own safety and for treatment. For 19 years after the first episode in 1996, Mr. Owen was prescribed multiple antipsychotic medications, but his life remained “a sad disaster with crisis after crisis” and hospitalization almost every year.

[ 93 ] Ms Allen explained her son was a “difficult patient and often refused to take medication. Several times he displayed extreme fear, distress and aggression.” She stated that in one instance a judge had found him unfit to stand trial and ordered treatment at Ontario Shores.

[ 94 ] Late in 2015, Mr. Owen was admitted to Scarborough General Hospital where he was seen by psychiatrist Dr. David Gratzer (whose own letter indicates that he had been treating Mr. Owen for about 10 years at that time). According to Ms. Allen, Dr. Gratzer prescribed Abilify, then still a fairly new medication that apparently had not yet been tried on Mr. Owen. She related how even Dr. Gratzer was surprised how efficacious Abilify was, how it had a calming effect almost immediately after Mr. Owen started taking it. Mr. Owen agreed to continue taking Abilify, accepted the assistance of a court support worker and attended regular outpatient visits with the psychiatrist. Ms. Allen stated that from that time on, Mr. Owen was collaborative, took his medication, never missed a doctor’s appointment and worked with court social workers with good results.

[ 95 ] Ms. Allen’s statement ended with her expression of concern about the impact a jail sentence would have on Mr. Owen, how he would have a very difficult time, possibly without access to medication and without counselling. She feared, “he may collapse again. Also, he will lose his rented basement room and the continuity and stability in that neighbourhood that he needs. He has been on a waiting list access point for supportive housing for 14 years.” Ms. Allen implored me not to send Mr. Owen to prison because he has been “seeing a forensic psychiatrist regularly” through the Justice and Mental Health program at Scarborough Health Network where “a social worker is available to help him connect to the training and some employment opportunities which he was looking forward to.” Ms. Allen concluded by stating that she and her husband “will continue to help him in anyway we can.”

[ 96 ] Ms. Allen described the period beginning in 2016 as “eight years of peace” for herself, her husband and Mr. Owen. But it ended with his “shocking arrest and charges” in May, 2023. “Yes, the charge is disgusting and hideous”, Ms. Allen acknowledged in a tone of voice that left no doubt about her sincerity, but “the person who did that is not who or what he is now and not what he has been for the last 10 years since 2015. 2015 was when he was last in hospital, and he has never been in hospital since.”

[ 97 ] Dr. Wang’s letter dated May 2, 2025, was referred to extensively in submissions. It read as follows:

I am writing to provide information regarding my patient, Mr. Aneurin Owen, who is under my care through the Justice and Mental Health Program (JAMH) at the Scarborough Health Network. He has been my patient since March, 2024, and my last appointment with them was on May 1, 2025. Mr. Owen suffers from Bipolar I Disorder and has been clinically stable in the time that I have known him, with no evidence of symptoms.

To my understanding, Mr. Owen has recently been convicted of offences that may have occurred in and around 2014 or 2015. In review of his medical records, I can confirm that Mr. Owen was admitted to Scarborough Grace Hospital from September 8 to 22, 2014. He was admitted to hospital again, at Ontario Shores Centre f or Mental Health Sciences, from April 29 to May 5, 2015, then again to Scarborough Grace from May 7 to 16, 2015. This was followed by another admission to Toronto East General Hospital (now Michael Garron Hospital) from May 29 to June 12, 2015. He was at Ontario Shores again from August 13 to October 6, 2015. He was actively symptomatic and unwell at the time of each of these admissions.

While I am unable to specifically comment on the impact of his illness on his offending behaviour, it is clear that Mr. Owen was obviously quite unwell across some of 2014 and much of 2015. The records indicated that he was suffering from manic symptoms that were obviously significant enough to require hospitalization and ultimately led to a finding of being unfit to stand trial during his last Ontario Shores admission. It is plausible that his offending behaviour may have been affected by his mental state, though again, the specific impacts are unclear to me and beyond the scope of my work with Mr. Owen.

As noted above, Mr. Owen is currently doing quite well. He has been adherent with all appointments and with his treatment. There has not been any evidence of mania or other mood symptoms. He is agreeable and able to continue receiving follow-up with our program.

If you require any additional information or documentation, please do not hesitate to contact me at [e-mail address omitted].

[ 98 ] Dr. Gratzer’s letter dated June 16, 2025, was also referred to at some length and it read as follows:

I last saw this patient about eight years ago. That said, over time, I had the opportunity to work with him closely as a psychiatrist, both on inpatient and outpatient bases.

Our first contact was roughly 20 years ago. Then, he was doing enormously poorly – ill with his bipolar disorder and challenging to engage. He had a longer hospitalization and left against medical advice.

I was surprised when, several years later, he reached out. I worked quite closely with this patient until I left the Scarborough Hospital (2017). He was motivated, punctual, and keen to engage. He was adherent to his medication management. He was a model patient at that time.

With the proper medication management and follow-up, his life was transformed. When I first met him, as I noted above, he was profoundly sick; with him engaging in care, it was as if he were a different person. I fondly remember the many meetings with him and his mother – they were both polite and keen for the patient to stay well.

I am aware of the charges against him. I also understand that he’s pleaded guilty and that he is up for sentencing.

I would comment that – when ill with bipolar disorder – he can be erratic and inappropriate. Illness may well have been a contributing factor in his criminal behaviour. When well, he never disclosed any sexually inappropriate thoughts or behaviours.

Moving forward, I understand that he’s up for sentencing.

I would comment that he would do well with ongoing psychiatric care, and possibly a voluntary community treatment order. Depot medications should be continued – which ensures compliance when combined with the community treatment order, as you know.

If you have any questions or comments, please don’t hesitate to contact me. [^11]

[ 99 ] In summary, until 2016, most of Mr. Owen’s adult life had been “a sad disaster with crisis after crisis” including frequent and involuntary hospitalizations, all due to a major mental disorder, likely a genetic inheritance. Then a dramatic and thus far durable stabilization of Mr. Owen’s symptoms began in 2016, greatly improving both his and his family’s quality of life. A jail sentence, especially a first jail sentence, is undeniably a stressor of sufficient magnitude to put at least some of this progress at temporary risk, even with the psychiatric care that will be available to him while in custody.

[ 100 ] It is impossible not to feel compassion for the suffering and loss of much of Mr. Owen’s adult life and heightened apprehension of the negative impact of a jail sentence, all due to this major mental disorder. Frankly, given this misfortune, my strong instinct is to impose a two-years-less-a-day conditional sentence with house arrest for the full term so that the somewhat happy ending to what had until 2016 been nothing but a tragedy for mother, step-father and son alike, is not in any way disrupted by a jail sentence.

[ 101 ] This is what makes my determination of the impact of Mr. Owen’s mental health issues on sentence so challenging in this case. The difficulty is that I must reconcile my personal preference with the legal reality that mental d isorder is not a mitigating factor per se , and that it is not my role to grant equitable relief in the form of sentence reduction to remediate life’s unfairness, including the unfair distribution of good and bad genetic luck. However sympathetic I am, I remain legally obliged to impose a sentence that gives effect to the primacy of denunciation and deterrence in cases involving the sexual victimization of children.

[ 102 ] As just mentioned, mental disorder is not necessarily or automatically mitigating. Whether and to what extent mental disorder mitigates and favours a lower sentence depends on two considerations:

(i) the degree to which the evidence establishes “a direct causal connection between the offender's mental illness and their offending”: R. v. Gilmore , 2025 ONCA 517 ; R. v. Fabbro , 2021 ONCA 494 , para.25; R. v. B.(M.) , 2023 ONCA 224 , paras. 23-30 ; and/or,

(ii) the degree to which an active mental disorder is likely to make it more onerous to serve the sentence, especially a jail sentence: B.(M.) , supra , paras. 23-30 ; Fabbro, supra , para.25; R. v. Husbands ¸ 2024 ONCA 155 , at paras 87 to 88 .

See also, R. v. Batisse , 2009 ONCA 114 , para. 38 ; R. v. Morris , 2021 ONCA 680 , paras. 161-166 ; R. v. Lojovic , 2025 ONCA 319 , paras. 46-50 .

[ 103 ] As the above summary of the evidence on this topic clearly shows, and as Mr. Klumak conceded, there is no suggestion that Mr. Owen’s manic depression had any causal impact on his offending behaviour. On everyone’s account, Mr. Owen stabilized in early 2016 and has remained comparatively well since. He was “well” when he committed this offence from June 24, 2022, until May 10, 2023.

[ 104 ] For obvious reasons, I give no credence to Ms Allen’s assertion that “the person” who committed this “ disgusting and hideous” offence “is not who or what [Mr.Owen] is now and not what he has been for the last 10 years since 2015.” Similarly, because the psychiatrists are under the same mistaken impression that Mr. Owen is being sentenced for something he did prior to 2016, their comments regarding the impact of his condition on the offence are irrelevant. Even had they referred to the correct time period, Dr. Gratzer’s comment that “ when ill with bipolar disorder – [Mr. Owen] can be erratic and inappropriate. Illness may well have been a contributing factor in his criminal behaviour”, and Dr. Wang’s observation that “[i]t is plausible that his offending behaviour may have been affected by his mental state, though again, the specific impacts are unclear to me and beyond the scope of my work with Mr. Owen ” would hardly constitute a basis to find that Mr. Owen’s mental disorder was a significant cause of his decision to commit this offence.

[ 105 ] Dr. Gratzer’s comment that “[w]hen well, [Mr. Owen] never disclosed any sexually inappropriate thoughts or behaviours” is equally inapposite. The first line of Dr. Gratzer’s letter indicates that he had not seen Mr. Owen in eight years, and so this comment clearly tells us nothing about an offence committed in 2022 and 2023. But that aside, the fact that Mr. Owen did not disclose any sexually inappropriate thoughts or behaviours “when well” means nothing more than that: he did not disclose them. Of course, we do not know if there was anything to disclose in 2017, the last time Dr. Gratzer saw Mr. Owen, but we do know Mr. Owen had “sexually inappropriate thoughts or behaviours” when he was “well” in 2022 and 2023, because he has told us so himself. His guilty plea is an admission of sexually inappropriate thoughts ( mens rea ) and behaviour ( actus reus ).

[ 106 ] Given the absence of any causal relationship between mental health and the offence, Mr. Owen’s history of mental disorder can only mitigate to the extent it would make a jail sentence more onerous. The psychiatrists opined that as of the dates of their letters in May and June, 2025, Mr. Owen was “currently doing quite well” and that there “has not been any evidence of mania or other mood symptoms” under treatment. Nevertheless, I do acknowledge that his diagnosed mental disorder is serious and that the medication does not “cure” the illness in the way that, say, a bacterial pneumonia can be “cured” by a course of antibiotics. The psychiatric medications including Abilify address the symptoms of Mr. Owen’s mental disorder; they stabilize his mood and suppress psychotic thoughts. But they do not make the underlying condition go away.

[ 107 ] While there has been no specific evidence on this point, I am aware based on my thirty years of professional experience in criminal law that a prison sentence, and especially a first prison sentence, is a significant psychological stressor. I infer that being in jail will make it more challenging for Mr. Owen to remain as stable as he had been since 2016 even though he will have access to psychiatric care and medication. The sentence will have a more onerous impact due to Mr. Owen’s mental health issues, and I do take this into account as a mitigating factor.

[ 108 ] The real question, then, is how mitigating? The defence position is that together with the other mitigating factors it justifies a conditional sentence despite the primacy of denunciatory and deterrent objectives.

[ 109 ] In R. v. M.M. , 2022 ONCA 441 , the Court of Appeal stated the following in the course of allowing a Crown sentence appeal against a 15-month conditional sentence imposed for possessing and making child pornography:

The Crown argues that the trial judge erred in principle and the conditional sentence he imposed was demonstrably unfit in light of R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 , 444 D.L.R. (4th) 1 .

We agree.

The Supreme Court's instructions from Friesen could not be clearer: sentences for sexual offences against children must increase. There are no qualifications here. Sentences have been too low for too long. Denunciation and deterrence are of primary importance: R. v. Inksetter , 2018 ONCA 474 , 141 O.R. (3d) 161 , at para. 3 . Those who commit sexual offences against children must understand that carceral sentences will ordinarily follow.

Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate. Their availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate - for example, where it gives rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility. It would not be appropriate to enumerate exceptional circumstances here and we make no attempt to do so. Suffice it to say that no exceptional circumstances are present in this case. A sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed.

M.M. , supra , paras. 13-16 [emphasis added]

[ 110 ] I n Pike , supra , Tulloch C.J.O. adopted this analysis and added a specific direction to sentencing courts that before imposing a conditional sentence in such a case, the sentencing judge must consider “ not only personal circumstances and mitigating factors” but “also the severe wrongs and harms that [people who possess CSAEM] cause, their moral blameworthiness, and Parliament's prioritization of deterrence and denunciation”.

[ 111 ] Tulloch C.J.O. then addressed the problem that “the ‘exceptional circumstances’ term that M.M. used to express this point” directly clashed with earlier and very specific holdings of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 and R. v. Parranto , 2021 SCC 46 , that “ appellate courts can neither create presumptions that conditional sentences are inappropriate for specific offences ( Proulx , at paras. 80-83 ), nor require exceptional circumstances to depart from a range ( Parranto , at para. 40 ).”: Pike , para.179.

[ 112 ] Tulloch C.J.O. resolved this apparent clash by more thoroughly explaining the basis for the conclusion in M.M. and by rewording it with language that was more attentive to the nuanced legal context [paras. 180 to 182]:

… M.M. did not and could not have intended to depart from Proulx by creating an offence-specific presumption against conditional sentences. Rather, it used the "exceptional circumstances" term to convey that, since Proulx , Parliament has increased maximum sentences and prioritized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children and, further, that the courts' understanding of the harmfulness and wrongfulness of these offences has deepened: Friesen , at paras. 109-110 ; see M.M. , at paras. 13-15 . Thus, while there is no presumption against conditional sentences, these post- Proulx changes require more compelling personal circumstances, mitigating factors, and/or the absence of aggravating factors, to justify a conditional sentence than might have been the case when Proulx was decided more than two decades ago .

Nor, in my view, did M.M. intend to depart from Parranto by requiring exceptional circumstances to impose a conditional sentence. Rather, M.M. used "exceptional circumstances" as shorthand for personal circumstances and mitigating factors that are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate , as in R. v. Padda , 2019 BCCA 351 , at para. 36 . Not only is there no closed list of such circumstances and factors ( M.M. , at para. 16 ), but multiple seemingly non-exceptional factors taken together, such as being a young first offender with family support who poses little risk and takes responsibility for his actions, can collectively render a conditional sentence proportionate: R. v. Faroughi , 2024 ONCA 178 , 435 C.C.C. (3d) 1 , at para. 99 . This is consistent with Parranto's holding that sentencing must focus on proportionality, not pigeonholing cases into ill-defined exceptional circumstance categories: at para. 40; see R. v. Ellis , 2022 BCCA 278 , 417 C.C.C. (3d) 102 , at para. 118 . [emphasis added]

[ 113 ] The question, then, is whether Mr. Owen’s “ personal circumstances and mitigating factors”, including his mental health issues, “are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate” despite the statutory primacy of denunciation and deterrence, the increased maximum penalty for possessing CSAEM and the deepening understanding of the harmfulness and wrongfulness of this offence, as explained in Friesen and Pike ; in effect, this means that the additional element of mental disorder must “ render incarceration inappropriate ” [emphasis added]: Pike , supra at paras. 179 to 182 ; M.M. , supra , para. 16 .

[ 114 ] Mr. Owen’s position that his circumstances are compelling to that extent really depends on his claim that a jail sentence will destabilize him to the extent of unwinding the improvement in his condition that began in 2016, creating the major risk of returning him to the mental hellscape he inhabited between 1996 and 2015.

[ 115 ] If this language sounds as though I am making light of this concern, I am not. I can certainly understand why Ms Allen in particular would worry about this possibility. But her claim that this is what will happen, or even that it is likely to happen, finds no support in the record. There is neither evidence nor any reason based in experience to believe that Mr. Owen will not be given psychiatric treatment including medication as is routinely done in both provincial and federal institutions. There is no reason to believe that treatment would not be available to Mr. Owen in a custodial setting.

[ 116 ] By everyone’s account, Mr. Owen has been stable since 2016. Ms. Allen attributes this to the medication Abilify, whereas the psychiatrists seemed to attribute it to a more general improvement in his compliance with medication and treatment regimes. Abilify is routinely prescribed in custodial settings, as I have read in many psychiatric reports and other materials related to inmate serving custodial sentences or pretrial custody. No doubt the medical staff in the institution will be made aware of Mr. Owen’s current treatment plan and will take appropriate steps to continue appropriate care.

[ 117 ] It follows that while I have sympathy for and understand Ms Allen’s concerns and fears, they do not find objectively grounded support in the evidence and do not amount to an “exceptional circumstance” as that term is used in M.M. and explained in Pike .

[ 118 ] As stated, I accept that Mr. Owen’s mental disorder will have some impact on the onerousness of a carceral sentence especially given the likelihood that he will experience some degree of segregation due to the nature of his offence, especially during the intake phase. While his condition has been stable for over eight years due to both community supports and medication that has kept him stable and allowed him to function, I recognize the medication is not a complete cure, that his stability will likely be challenged by the stressor of serving a term in jail. Mr. Owen’s condition will make it harder for him to serve this sentence than it would otherwise be. I take all of that into account, just not to the extraordinary extent required to make a conditional sentence a proportional response to this crime.

(e) The Appropriate Sentence

[ 119 ] In this case, the principal aggravating factors are the size and nature of the collection. Standing alone, these factors would justify a sentence towards but not at the high end of the range identified in Pike , i.e. five years.

[ 120 ] What brings this case down from that high point is the absence of certain aggravating features identified in other cases that are absent here, as I have discussed above. Given their absence, the starting point for this offence in the context of these aggravating factors and the fact the Crown proceeded by indictment situates this case in the three-to-four-year level. The size and nature of the collection are very important, but they are not enough standing alone to justify a five-year sentence for a first offender.

[ 121 ] The three-to-four year range only takes into account the offence, not the offender. In my view when the mitigating factors are added into the mix, a substantially lower sentence is warranted.

[ 122 ] Specifically, I give credit in mitigation for remorse, insight and the prospect of self-motivated rehabilitative efforts in the form of treatment, the absence of a criminal record and because Mr. Owen’s mental disorder will make the sentence somewhat more onerous.

[ 123 ] Before continuing with the determination of quantum, I pause to respond to arguments and cases the defence relied on in support of a conditional sentence.

[ 124 ] During his submissions, Mr. Klumak acknowledged that conditional sentences are not typically imposed for this offence committed in the circumstances. However, he referred me to a number of cases that in his submission demonstrate that a conditional sentence is an “available” option in this case. In my view, these cases establish that in some instances a conditional sentence is available, but they do not establish that a conditional sentence would be proportional in the present case. All of these cases are distinguishable for multiple reasons.

[ 125 ] For example, in R. v. Jongsma , 2021 ONSC 536 , the offender received a one-year conditional sentence for possession of CSAEM. The sentencing judge in that case found aggravating factors in the size of the collection: “[t] here were 24 videos, most of which lasted one to two minutes, several lasted four to six minutes and the longest three videos were 15, 22 and 23.5 minutes in length” and the nature of the material, some of which approached the level in this case but most of which did not, based on the descriptions he provided.

[ 126 ] Jongsma is a very different case even apart from the much smaller and somewhat less serious collection. Importantly, the offender had himself been sexually abused as a child and there was evidence supporting the sentencing judge’s conclusion that this history of abuse was a major cause of the offending behaviour. Unlike Mr. Owen, Mr. Jongsma completed extensive upfront counselling. The mitigating factors in Jongsma look much more like the “exceptional circumstances” contemplated in M.M. , as explained in Pike .

[ 127 ] In R. v. Hawes , 2021 ONCJ 40 , the offender was given a 12 month conditional sentence for accessing child pornography. The case involved 92 images meeting the definition of CSAEM of which 75 were located in an accessible web browser cache. Evidently the Crown was not able to establish possession, just access. The sentencing judge noted that the “ images were of children between the ages of 10 years and 17 years of age” and “described as ‘minimal and moderate intrusiveness, with a primary focus on vaginal or anal images’”: Hawes , para.7.

[ 128 ] Like Jongsma , Hawes is a very different case and a poor comparator. The same can be said for R. v. Cusick , 2022 ONCJ 5805 , a case in which a six-month conditional sentence was imposed in respect of possession of 130 unique images and 24 videos. There, the mitigating factors included Charter breaches committed by the police and significant heath issues, among several others. Several distinguishing features make Cusick a poor comparator; further, in my respectful view, the sentencing judge in that case did not fully incorporate the Friesen analysis into his assessment of the gravity of the offence and the proportionality of sentence. Friesen was mentioned, but the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of Pike and his assessment does not fully comport with its guidance in relation to assessing gravity, proportionality, harms and, most importantly, the upwardly adjusted range for this offence.

[ 129 ] Much the same can be said of R. v. Prendivoj , 2022 ONCJ 257 . In that case, the offender received a conditional sentence of eight months for possessing 2 0 videos were found on his computer, 4 images on the USB. The sentencing judge noted that “the nature of [the] ‘collection’ while deeply disturbing, does not contain many of the most horrific and vile images that we see in more recent collections” and, more importantly, there was a substantial body of psychiatric evidence that established her satisfaction that “his active schizophrenia played a significant role in his offending”.

[ 130 ] The sentencing judge in Prendivoj relied on R. v. Rytel , 2019 ONSC 5541 , a case to which counsel in the present case also referred me to. In Rytel , Harris J. was confronted with the problem of “[f]ixing a sentence that is consistent with s. 718.1…where the gravity of the offence points strongly in one sentencing direction and the culpability of the individual offender points strongly in a very different sentencing direction”: Rytel, para.6, citing Hamilton , supra at para.93.

[ 131 ] On the one hand, the size of the collection was even larger than in this case; on the other hand, the expert evidence established that the offender was actively schizophrenic and suffered from other mental disorders and generalized cognitive disability. The evidence appears to have fully supported the following conclusion reached by Justice Harris:

…[the offender’s] mental illness was a substantial cause of his possession and accessing of child pornography offences. It is tempting to say that on the most general level, Mr. Rytel's mental illness is so pervasive that it would be difficult to say that it does not contribute in some measure to almost every aspect of his life. It is difficult to imagine how his mental illness and social estrangement could not have had some role to play in his offences.

In addition, the evidence convinced Harris J. “that a jail term would have deeply destructive effects on Mr. Rytel, effects drastically out of proportion to his moral blameworthiness”. Based on those findings, Harris J. concluded that despite the seriousness of the offence, a 15-month conditional sentence with house arrest was sufficient and proportional.

[ 132 ] Rytel is an excellent example of a case in which evidence was called to demonstrate that mental disorder had a causal impact on the offending behaviour that reduced moral blameworthiness and that schizophrenia and other disorders on top of a profound cognitive impairment would make a jail sentence so much more onerous that a conditional sentence was the only proportional option.

[ 133 ] Nothing like that has been shown in the present case. Even if a sentence under two years could be justified in this case, I would not impose a conditional sentence because even the strictest and lengthiest possible conditional sentence would be an inadequate response to this offence in all the circumstances.

[ 134 ] Returning to the question of quantum, in my view, the Crown’s proposed sentence of 30-months imprisonment essentially hits the bullseye for a first offender who has pled guilty to this offence with these aggravating factors. I rely principally on Pike itself for that conclusion: see also, R. v. Inksetter , 2018 ONCA 474 ; R. v. McCaw , 2023 ONCA 8 . R. v. Olivetti 2022 ONCA 142 ; R. v. Rule , 2023 ONCA 31 ; R. v. Sawatis , 2025 ONSC 50 ; R. v. Torres , 2025 ONCJ 301 .

[ 135 ] The 30-month sentence proposed by the Crown would be a fit sentence, but bearing in mind the mitigating factors I have mentioned and applying the principle of restraint to determine the shortest sentence capable of addressing the primary sentencing objectives, I find that shortest effective sentence to be one of 28-months. For the foregoing reasons, I imposed that sentence on Mr. Owen on September 23, 2025.

Released: February 17, 2026

Signed: Justice John McInnes

[^1]: Neither counsel mentioned the upfront counselling that had been the ostensible reason for the lengthy adjournment between plea and sentence. Nothing filed by the defence suggests that any offence-related counselling was ever done.

[^2]: I do not use the term “child pornography” in these Reasons, despite the convention that offences are described with the language that was in force at the time of commission. Because the word “pornography” connotes a degree of adult agency, consent and voluntary participation, the term “child pornography” has been criticized as misleading, oxymoronic and, to some, even offensive. Parliament responded to this criticism by amending the Criminal Code to replace “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse and exploitation material” [“CSAEM”]. This amendment, which came into force on October 10, 2025, was semantic, not substantive; given that, and that “child pornography” has become such a fraught term, I prefer to use the new language.

[^3]: My stated preference was to adjourn Mr. Owen’s sentencing to a day later that week. However, because his family had attended court to be with Mr. Owen, I agreed to impose sentence that day and convert my oral judgment into a version suitable for release as a written judgment. At that point, I expected it would take two or three weeks to find the time to do that. That it has taken as long as it has is largely due to oversight on my part. I mention this because I was recently advised that Mr. Owen needed my Reasons to apply for parole. If my delay has caused delay in the parole process that could reflect negatively on Mr. Owen or his application, I want the relevant decision maker(s) to know the delay was mine, not Mr. Owen’s.

[^4]: I do not address the ancillary orders in these Reasons. Each was mandatory and/or unopposed and I have nothing to add to what was stated on the record at the time.

[^5]: I have lightly edited this reproduction of the Exhibit copy of the ASF for clarity and to correct typographic errors.

[^6]: I did not consider certainty about these details important enough to justify unsealing the exhibit and looking at the images for a second time.

[^7]: I have no information about the criminal proceedings in which that finding and order was made other than that they did not result in a conviction. I re-emphasize that Mr. Owen is a first offender.

[^8]: This case is frequently referred to as R. v. Scott , its companion case. I refer to it as R. v. Pike because that is the style of cause the Supreme Court of Canada has used in referring to it: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Senneville , 2025 SCC 33 .

[^9]: The “r easonably foreseeable scenario” the majority used in finding the mandatory minimum could result in a grossly disproportionate sentence was the case of an “18-year-old [who] receives on his cell phone, from his friend of the same age, a "sext" originally from the friend's girlfriend, who is 17 years old. The "sext" in question is a photograph of that 17-year-old that satisfies the definition of child pornography (s. 163.1(1) Cr. C.). The 18-year-old decides to keep the image on his cell phone.”

[^10]: Given the emphasis the Court of Appeal places on the number of “unique victims” in Pike , I expect the Crown will begin to routinely ask investigators to provide that information in future cases.

[^11]: The letters from the psychiatrists as well as a social worker were not entered as exhibits. Mr. Klumak later provided the court with a copy of the two psychiatrists letters that were directly referred to during submissions but could not locate either the earlier letter from Dr. Wang dated January 30, 2025, nor the social worker’s letter. The latter was alluded to during submissions and was important only in that it indicated that Mr. Owen was been on a waiting list for stable supportive housing. Dr. Wang’s January 30 letter was also only alluded to in passing in submissions and was described as having set out the history of Mr. Owen’s various hospitalizations: its relevant informational content was evidently communicated indirectly through Mr. Klumak’s submissions and Ms. Allen’s statement. Concurrently with the release of these Reasons, I have entered copies of Dr. Wang’s May 2, 2025, letter as Exhibit 3, Dr. Gratzer’s June 16, 2025, letter as Exhibit 4, and these written Reasons as Exhibit “A” in these proceedings.