CITATION: R. v. Rampat, 2026 ONCJ 227

DATE: April 22, 2026

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

CHANDRIKA RAMPAT

Before Justice Michael Waby

Reasons for Sentence released on 22^nd^ April, 2026

Dihim Emami....................................................................................... Counsel for the Crown

Karen Lau-Po-Hung...................................................................... Counsel for the Accused

Waby M. J.:

INTRODUCTION

[1] On 26^th^ March, 2025 the accused, Chandrika Rampat concluded a 5 day preliminary hearing with respect to a count of Second degree murder and related charges. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing an exit judicial pre-trial was conducted. Following this on 27^th^ February, 2026 Mr Rampat subsequently plead guilty before me to a single count of the manslaughter of Mohamed Alladin. Mr Rampat appears before me today for sentencing.

[2] A number of exhibits were filed during the preliminary hearing and on the sentencing by counsel. These included an agreed statement of facts, various segments of video footage, victim impact statements, photographs and a comprehensive package of defence materials, including letters of support, a letter of apology from the accused and a psychiatric assessment. Counsel have also provided various case law which I have reviewed and considered.

Overview

[3] Mr. Rampat and Mr Alladin lived in the same apartment, in Toronto. They had been living together as housemates since 2015. On 15^th^ May, 2024, Mr. Rampat and Mr Alladin went to a bar with their mutual friend, Ramanad Kaladeen.

[4] Mr. Rampat and Mr Kaladeen left the bar and returned to the apartment and continued drinking. At approximately 1:35 a.m., Mr Alladin returned to the apartment. Video surveillance near the bar captured Mr Alladin leaving the bar, walking toward the apartment, stumbling and falling outside of the bar.

[5] When Mr Alladin arrived inside the apartment, he and Mr. Rampat became involved in a verbal argument. The argument escalated into a physical altercation in which both men ended up on the floor wrestling. At this point in altercation, Mr. Rampat retrieved a hand-made wooden cricket bat and struck Mohamed Alladin body multiple times, including on the head and legs. The incident was captured in its entirety by Mr Kaladeen who recorded it on his cell phone.

[6] After the final blow to the head, Mr Alladin stopped moving. All parties then went to sleep, including Mr Kaladeen, who woke up in the morning and left the apartment to go to work. It is accepted by the Crown that neither Mr. Rampat nor Mr. Kaladeen realized the severity of Mr Alladin’s injuries at the time they occurred.

[7] Mr. Rampat subsequently made a call requesting police to attend the apartment on 15^th^ May, 2024, but cancelled the request on 16^th^ May, 2024 at 5:30 a.m. Later that day, Mr. Rampat called 911 requesting an ambulance. Toronto Paramedic Services subsequently requested the attendance of the Toronto Police Service.

[8] On 16^th^ May, 2024, Toronto Police Service officers attended the apartment and observed Mr Alladin being taken away on a stretcher with life threatening head injuries. Mr. Rampat admitted to striking Mohamed Alladin in the head with a cricket bat. He was arrested by members of the Toronto Police Service and charged with aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

[9] Mr Alladin was transported to Sunnybrook hospital in Toronto and put on life support. On 19^th^ May, 2024, Mohamed Alladin was pronounced deceased. As a result of this the charge of aggravated assault was amended to second degree murder.

[10] A post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Maliha Khara of the Ontario Forensic Pathology Service. She determined the cause of Mohamed Alladin’s death to be a blunt force trauma to his head.

Sentencing Principles to be Applied

[11] The criminal law is a system of values. In criminal proceedings, sentencing is meant to reflect and reinforce the basic values of our society. Accordingly, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe community by imposing just sanctions.

[12] Sentencing is a process that is meant to address a number of objectives, including: denouncing unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims and the community as a result of it; deterring the offender and others from committing offences; separating offenders from society where necessary; assisting in the rehabilitation of offenders; providing reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and the community. The weight to be given to each of these objectives will depend on the circumstances of the offence and the offender.

[13] The sentencing judge must also consider the following matters: any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender; the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances; and the principle that courts should exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment.

[14] In reconciling these differing goals, a judge is to be guided by the cardinal principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender

[15] Imposing a sentence is a highly individualized exercise, tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender and the harm caused by the crime (see: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, para. 43).

[16] The fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. The sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility.

[17] Proportionality “ensures a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence and is closely tied to the objective of denunciation, promoting justice for victims and ensuring public confidence in the justice system" while also ensuring “that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender, serving a limiting or restraining function, ensuring justice for the offender. In our criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other”. (see: R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433, at para 37)

[18] As articulated by West J. in R. v. Booker, “It should be emphasized that these sentencing principles do not include a principle of revenge. Offenders are not incarcerated for the purpose of establishing an equivalence between the loss of the victims and the sanction imposed by the Court. Sadly, nothing this court can do will restore Mr Alladin to his family or can repair their grievous loss. Rather, the Court is required to recognize the inherent worth and dignity of the offender and, having balanced the principles provided by the Criminal Code, determine a fit sentence in the circumstances of the case”. R. v. Booker, [2021] O.J. 6853

[19] The principle of parity under s. 718.2(b), which states a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances is an important and laudable objective but it is important to note that no two cases are exactly alike, and as emphasized by Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paragraph 92:

“Sentencing is an individualized process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise or academic abstraction.”

[20] Consequently, a proportionate sentence in each case, in large measure, is determined by the specific and unique facts and circumstances surrounding the offender and the commission of the offence. Although precedents involving similar cases can provide guidance in determining a proportionate sentence, they should not dominate the sentencing process.

[21] The case law provided to me by Crown and defence counsel has been helpful and instructive while also underscoring the reality that cases of manslaughter often turn very much on their own particular facts.

[22] The case before me does not involve the use of a firearm or a knife but it does involve the use of a weapon and an accused who arms himself as part of the incident. The case before me is not one that centres around a single blow being struck but multiple ones as part of a sustained and repeated assault, although I accept that Mr Rampat acted out of character when he acted as he did in the heat of the moment, fuelled by alcohol and an accompanying loss of self control. There was not a history of animus between the parties but a long-standing, if occasionally tempestuous friendship.

[23] In R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, [2012] O.J. No. 3096 (C.A.), at paras. 29 and 30, the Ontario Court of Appeal cautioned that: It goes without saying that a fit sentence must be ascertained on an individual basis.” It is therefore inappropriate to allow the parity principle, a principle that, by definition considers another sentence imposed on another offender, to dominate the determination of a fit sentence.”

Position of the Parties

Defence Position

[24] Ms Lau-Po-Hung, on behalf of Mr. Rampat submits that the facts of this case place the sentencing range on the ‘near accident” spectrum of 4-6 years imprisonment and submits the appropriate sentence in this case is a penitentiary sentence of 4 years less appropriate credits. She does not oppose the ancillary orders sought by the Crown.

[25] In the course of her submissions Ms Lau-Po-Hung emphasised a number of mitigating factors on behalf of Mr Rampat, aside from his guilty plea. Mr Rampat has substantial health issues and on 5 separate occasions since he has been in custody he has been found ‘non-responsive’ and transported to hospital. Defence counsel also filed records from the institutions at which Mr Rampat has been housed outlining some of the conditions he has experienced in his pre-sentence custody.

[26] The helpful materials filed by defence counsel included a psychiatric assessment by Dr Abramowitz who met with Mr Rampat at some length. Both Ms Lau-Po-Hung and Dr. Abramowitz found that Mr. Rampat tended to be a poor historian who had some significant difficulties remembering details and dates from his own background. Although he presented to both defence counsel and Dr Abramowitz as cooperative and friendly, there was a general reluctance on the part of Mr Rampat to discuss himself even when he was able to recall events.

[27] Ms Lau-Po-Hung points to the numerous letters of support from family members, and the very significant immigration consequences for Mr Rampat that will ensue following his conviction. She highlights the toxic and destructive impact of alcohol on both Mr Rampat and his large, immediate family and the loss of his siblings as a result of their alcohol abuse. Defence counsel also emphasised the genuine and deep sense of remorse Mr Rampat feels at his actions and which I too have heard him express.

[28] Ms Lau-Po-Hung also submits that the evidence of the police officer’s at the preliminary hearing disclosed a significant s.10(b) Charter breach regarding both informational and implementational components that should result in Mr Rampat’s sentence being mitigated.

Crown Position

[29] Ms. Emami for the Crown asks the Court to sentence Mr. Rampat to total period of incarceration in the penitentiary of 8-10 years, less appropriate credit for pre-sentence custody. In addition, the Crown seeks ancillary orders for a section 109 order and DNA.

[30] The Crown accepts that Mr Rampat killed his best, and perhaps only, friend and is deeply remorseful for his actions. Although the guilty plea was not an early one and occurred after the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the Crown accepts that the plea saved a future trial and the further attendance of witnesses and that Mr Rampat has now accepted responsibility for his actions.

[31] Mr Emami also accepts the report that indicates the cognitive deficiencies of Mr Rampat and the various other factors advanced in mitigation. Nevertheless, the Crown submits that these factors do not eliminate Mr Rampat’s moral culpability and the fact remains that Mr Rampat armed himself against an unarmed and vulnerable individual and engaged in a sustained and deliberate, alcohol fuelled, assault on Mr Alladin.

[32] Mr Emami submits that neither the case law nor the facts of this case support a penitentiary sentence of 4 years and that at the very least, if the Court does not accept that the sentencing range is one of 8-10 years, then the Crown argues in the alternative that the sentence of the Court should be at the upper end of the defence suggested range of 4-6 years.

[33] Mr Emami points to the following aggravating features. Mr Rampat used a series of derogatory names during the assault on Mr Alladin and exhibited a significant level of anger during a sustained assault.

[34] Mr Alladin himself was not a well man and was vulnerable. Mr Rampat only called the police when prompted to do so much later in the day after the assault had occurred.

[35] The assault occurred inside the joint residence of Mr Alladin and Mr Rampat, a place where Mr Alladin should have felt, and should have been, safe from harm.

Mitigating Factors –

[36] I have identified and considered a number of mitigating factors that includes the following;

[37] Mr Rampat has entered a guilty plea for this offence and has expressed remorse. I accept this remorse as being genuine and heartfelt and that he deeply regrets the loss of his friend Mr Alladin. I accept that he has some insight into his actions and the role he played and the irreparable loss and harm he caused to both Mr Alladin and his family.

[38] He comes before this court with no criminal record and as a first-time offender. At 66 years of age he is not a young man.

[39] Mr Rampat has a notable level of cognitive impairment and functioning across a range of criteria. In addition to his mental health issues, he also has a number of significant health issues and has substantial and increasing issues with both his vision and his hearing and a lengthy history of problematic alcohol use.

[40] Mr Rampat has strong family support in Canada and I have reviewed the letters of support from his family members. They speak positively about many aspects of his character and a significant number of family members attended court in support of him.

[41] He has a varied and variable employment history but equally seem to have a long history of helping others and trying to be productive.

[42] These proceedings have been lengthy and some considerable time has passed since he was arrested and charged. I accept that, as is sadly an increasingly common experience for many, his time in pre-sentence custody has been marked by a significant number of lockdowns and he has been triple bunked for well in excess of 300 of his days on remand.

[43] These pre-sentence condition should neither become acceptable nor be considered the new norm in correctional standards. Continued adverse commentary by the courts has so far done little, if anything, to help mitigate this recurring situation.

[44] The inevitable consequences of this conviction and sentence are such that Mr Rampat will be deported from Canada. The collateral consequences here are undeniably significant. Although he has been a permanent resident in Canada since 1993 Mr Rampat has inexplicably not sought Canadian citizenship. His entire extended family have built a new life over the past decades in Canada following the move from Guyana. Mr Rampat’s and his family’s roots are in Canada and I accept he no longer has any meaningful connections to Guyana, to which he will be returned at the conclusion of his sentence.

[45] I accept defence counsel’s submission that the police evidence I heard at the preliminary hearing was obviously troubling with respect to their approach to the provision of s. 10(b) Charter rights. At best, the officer’s view that the provision of a caution amounted to ‘a courtesy” on the part of the police clearly reveals a profound training issue and lack of awareness on the officer’s part of a fundamental tenet of his duties.

[46] While I accept that the officers encountered a serious and initially confusing scene it should have been apparent to them that Mr Rampat should have been provided with a caution earlier than he was given the information with which they were armed and which they elicited from Mr Rampat. Charter rights are not a courtesy to be dispensed as a gift by the police as they see fit to those with whom they engage. Their provision is an obligation for the police to fulfill as a foundational part of our justice system.

[47] However, on the fact of this case, I do not find that the officers acted in deliberate bad faith as they sought to determine what had occurred with respect to Mr Alladin and when they initially engaged with Mr Rampat. I also accept Mr Emami’s submissions that any prejudice occasioned to Mr Rampat in this case is minimal in light of the fact that Mr Kaladeen videoed the entire incident on his phone and there was no room for doubt as to Mr Rampat’s responsibility for what happened to Mr Alladin.

Aggravating Factors

[48] I have identified and considered the following aggravating factors in this case.

[49] The offence Mr Rampat has plead guilty to is obviously and unarguably exceptionally serious. His actions resulted in the loss of the life of Mohamed Alladin. Notwithstanding the various factors in mitigation, his actions were violent and sustained.

[50] As the Crown has rightly submitted, this was not a freak accident or the product of one single spur of the moment act on Mr Rampat’s part. I do not accept defence counsel’s submission that this offence can reasonably be described as being analogous to an accident and nor in my view can it be treated as such by the Court.

[51] However much Mr Rampat may not have deliberately intended to take the life of Mr Alladin, fuelled by alcohol and anger, he armed yourself with the bat and repeatedly struck an unarmed and vulnerable man about the head and body in his own home.

[52] It is further aggravating that Mr Rampat did not take it upon himself to call for any actual help for Mr Alladin until prompted to do so much later in the day despite knowing what he had done.

[53] I have heard much about the tragedy you and your family have experienced and the profound loss you have suffered. I accept the significance of these various experiences and their impact on you and your family. However, it is very important to make it clear that the victim in this case is Mr Alladin and his family will forever continue to experience the tragedy and loss that resulted from your actions that night.

Sentence

[54] Deterrence and denunciation quite rightly have to be the principle factors on sentencing in this case, although I accept that they are not the only factors for me to consider.

[55] Mr Rampat, your responsibility for these offences is mitigated by the various factors I have outlined previously. I accept that your risk of harm to society is relatively low. It is clear to me that you struggle with a very significant issue with alcohol. You have some insight into that issue and of the need for you to avoid alcohol in the future. Your age and the physical health issues you suffer from increasingly render you infirm and further reduce your physical risk to others.

[56] It is clear will be deported at the conclusion of your sentence- You have spent 33 years in Canada and are the only member of your family not to secure Canadian citizenship. The inevitable result is that you will be deported at the conclusion of your sentence to a country that has not been your home for over three decades and with which you have no family, social or other significant ties. Your deportation will effectively result in you being retuned to a country that is largely alien to you.

[57] I accept that you are to be treated as a first-time offender. The principle of restraint is therefore an important one. It is inevitable that a significant penitentiary sentence is appropriate and the courts’ have a duty to protect the public from those who commit violent offences, especially when they result in the loss of a life, although I recognise that no sentence from this Court will restore Mr Alladin to his family.

[58] I find that the starting point for the appropriate sentence in this case is one of 6 years imprisonment. However, I accept Ms Lau-Po-Hung’s submission that the particular conditions of your pre-sentence detention makes it appropriate for me to enhance the credit of your pre-sentence custody beyond the standard 1.5:1

[59] The challenging conditions of the Toronto East and Toronto South Detention Centres are well-known to the courts and those who practice in them and I accept from institutional records provided by Ms Lau-Po-Hung that as of 27^th^ February, 2026 you experienced 151 days where there were full or partial lockdowns owing to staff shortages or security issues. I am confident those numbers will have increased since you were last before me on 27^th^ February, 2026 along too with the number of days on which you were triple bunked in a 2 person cell.

[60] For the reasons I have given above, I do not find that there is a basis to apply a further reductions to this sentence with respect to any Charter issue specific to this case. While I do not countenance the perspective taken by the officer in this case, I am satisfied that their actions did not meaningfully impact you and nor were their actions motivated by bad faith.

[61] As of today you have spent 709 days in pre-sentence custody. Applying the standard credit of 1.5:1 would result in credit of 1063 days. I am satisfied it is appropriate in this case to enhance your pre-sentence credit to reflect a total of 1200 days presentence custody.

[62] The net affect of this is that in addition to your pre-sentence custody you will serve an additional penitentiary sentence of 33 months (or 990 days).

[63] I also make the following ancillary orders. Pursuant to s.109, you will be prohibited from possessing any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years. There will also be an order made for the taking of your DNA.

Dated: 22^nd^ April, 2026 ______________________________

Justice Michael Waby