ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. L.V., 2026 ONCJ 216
DATE: 2026 04 14
COURT FILE No.: Pembroke 22-37100136
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
LV
Before Justice J.R. Richardson
Heard on March 5, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on April 14, 2026
Teresa James..................................................................................... Counsel for the Crown
Marc Lecorre......................................................................... Duty Counsel for the accused
J.R. Richardson J.:
Background
[1] Between the 18th of August 2008 and 26th of July 2009, LV, who was then known by another name, stole $10,775 from the Pembroke and Area Community Centre.
[2] She was a bookkeeper for the organization which ran a canteen for members of the Pembroke Minor Hockey Association and Pembroke Skating Club.
[3] Fourteen years ago, she was sentenced for this crime by Justice Selkirk. His Honour ordered that she serve a twelve-month conditional sentence and pay restitution.
[4] Since then, LV has, despite multiple chances and promises to pay, eluded payment of full restitution.
[5] In fairness to her, she has paid over half of the amount that was originally outstanding.
[6] Full restitution, however, has been outstanding for so long that some of the children who were in minor hockey and figure skating in 2008 and 2009 now probably have children of their own enrolled in these sports.
[7] This is to say nothing of the effect of inflation.
[8] Full restitution has been outstanding for so long that LV has also outlasted at least three judges.
[9] Justice Selkirk retired in 2020 and is now deceased.
[10] According to her criminal record, LV was prosecuted for breaching Justice Selkirk’s order in 2016. The passing of sentence was suspended and she was given another three-year probation order to allow her time to make restitution.
[11] Still she didn’t pay.
[12] She was then prosecuted again in 2020 for breach of the 2016 sentencing order. Justice Anderson suspended the passing of sentence and ordered a further 13-month probation order to allow her time to make restitution.
[13] Justice Anderson has now retired.
The History of the Proceedings Before Me
[14] Still she didn’t pay.
[15] On July 4, 2022, Shallon Varrin, who was then a Probation Officer[^1], swore an information charging LV with breaching Justice Anderson’s Probation Order between December 9, 2020 and January 8, 2022 by failing to pay restitution in the amount of $4895.
[16] The information and the accompanying draft summons were confirmed and issued by Justice of the Peace Colterman the same day.
[17] LV’s first appearance was August 16, 2022. When she did not appear, a warrant was issued for her arrest. That was rescinded later the same day. I presume she appeared late.
[18] Between August 16, 2022, and October 24, 2023, the matter was adjourned 12 times. On October 24, 2023, a bench warrant was issued when LV failed to appear.
[19] The bench warrant was executed on March 27, 2024. She was given a new court date of April 16, 2024. There followed four other adjournments until July 25, 2024 when a trial date was set before Justice March on October 21, 2024.
[20] There were a further three adjournments, presumably to allow for the parties to confirm that they were ready for trial.
[21] On October 15, 2024, less than a week before her trial date, LV, now assisted by Mr. Huckabone as counsel, entered a guilty plea before Justice March.
[22] Justice March ordered the preparation of a Presentence Report, the results of which I have summarized below.
[23] The matter was adjourned a further 12 times to August 27, 2025.
[24] In early 2025, Justice March left Pembroke for the apparently more sylvan environment of Thunder Bay.
[25] LV has also had more staying power than at least two defence counsel.
[26] On January 14, 2025, Mr. Huckabone, who assisted her with her plea, was removed as counsel of record. He told Justice Reccord that there was “a rather significant disagreement” between LV and him.[^2]
[27] LV was able to retain new counsel, Ms Dolinska. Unfortunately, on April 25, 2025, I granted Ms Dolinska’s application to be removed as counsel of record because, to borrow from Ms Dolinska’s Application, “there was a breakdown in the solicitor client relationship and confidence no longer exists” and “Counsel is unable to proceed further due to ethical considerations and lack of instructions”.
[28] On May 1, 2025, the parties agreed that pursuant to section 669.2 of the Criminal Code, I would step into Justice March’s shoes and complete the sentencing.
[29] Despite her track record, even with these setbacks, we had hope that LV would complete paying restitution and avoid going to jail. She made some payments during the remand period until July 2025.
[30] On August 27, 2025, LV failed to appear for court. I issued a bench warrant for her arrest.
[31] The bench warrant was executed on February 3, 2026 and she was required to appear on February 9.
[32] LV’s failure to appear was not a simple “I forgot” in which she called in the next day, the next week or even the next month. No, she was on the lam until the police stopped her for a traffic infraction, learned of the warrant and arrested her.
[33] Over the objection of duty counsel, who sought time for LV to retain (and likely outlast) another defence counsel, I adjourned the matter to March 5, 2026 at which time I heard sentencing submissions.
[34] In total, on the Breach of Probation matter alone, LV has appeared before the Court approximately 40 times, for a simple charge. Three years and eight months have passed since Probation Officer Varrin swore the information.
[35] Crown counsel appeared for the Crown when LV was originally sentenced by Justice Selkirk back in 2012. Unlike Justice Selkirk, Justice Anderson, Justice March, Mr. Huckabone and Ms Dolinska, LV has not managed to outlast Crown counsel.
[36] Originally, I was advised that LV intended to set a trial date on the Fail to Appear charge that has been following along with this Breach of Probation plea that I inherited from the departed Justice March.
[37] I originally intended to sentence LV on April 1, 2026 on the Breach of Probation matter. On that day, she did not attend in person because she had COVID-19. She did appear virtually.
[38] I adjourned the matter to April 2 for her to attend court to complete the sentencing. I made it clear that if she did not appear in person, I would issue a warrant for her arrest.
[39] When she appeared on April 2, it was clear that LV was suffering from some sort of illness. She had a heavy cough and she was wearing a mask. That day, she also paid an additional $200 in restitution.
[40] I adjourned the matter to today for sentencing.
[41] As is her right, I did not take the outstanding fail to appear into consideration as an aggravating factor on the Breach of Probation sentencing before me when I initially prepared my reasons for sentence. I came to the conclusion that if I did so, I would be in error on the basis that if she was later found guilty of Failing to Appear, the Judge who made that finding and adjudicated sentencing would be punishing her twice: See R. v. Singh, 2015 ONSC 904; R. v. Mangat, 2021 BCCA 450. In Singh, Justice Pomerance (as she then was) found that a failure to appear at sentencing can negate the mitigating factor of remorse.
[42] Today, as I was about to render judgment on the Breach of Probation, LV decided to enter a guilty plea to the Fail to Appear charge. I heard that plea and found her guilty.
[43] Both matters are now before me for sentencing.
[44] Crown counsel has always essentially submitted, “Enough is enough. It is time to send LV to jail.” Crown counsel invites me to consider the failure to appear as an aggravating factor on the present sentencing and consider it with proper allowance for totality.
[45] I agree with Crown counsel. These are my reasons why.
The Sentencing Before Selkirk, J.
[46] A transcript of the February 12, 2012 proceedings before Justice Selkirk was filed as an Exhibit. It is clear that Justice Selkirk had taken the plea on an earlier date and remanded the matter for sentencing. Justice Selkirk stated candidly that he adjourned the matter because “[LV] was going to come up with a plan for restitution or I was going to put her in jail.”
[47] Selkirk J. ordered a Presentence Report which I have not reviewed.
[48] LV also filed a letter in which she indicated that she could pay $200 a month until July 2012 after which she would pay $300 a month.
[49] Justice Selkirk ordered LV to serve a twelve-month conditional sentence order followed by three years probation. He stated when ordering the probation, that he set it at three years “in order primarily for the restitution to be made.”
The 2016 and 2020 Proceedings
[50] I do not have a transcript of the proceedings before the Judge who heard LV’s breach charges in 2016, nor do I have a transcript of the proceedings before Justice Anderson.
The Proceedings Before Justice March
[51] As I indicated, Justice March took LV’s guilty plea on October 15, 2024, found her guilty and ordered the preparation of a Presentence Report. A transcript of that was filed in evidence before me.
[52] The facts that were read in included the fact that LV only paid $75.00 pursuant to Justice Anderson’s order.
The Presentence Report
[53] The Presentence Report ordered by Justice March was prepared by Probation Officer Brandie Burgess. It is dated November 22, 2024. It reveals that:
a) Ms Burgess attempted to contact LV’s son and daughter-in-law to assist in the preparation of the report without success.
b) LV also refused to allow Ms Burgess to speak to her husband on the basis that he has dementia.
c) LV grew up in Portage du Fort, Quebec. She moved to Pembroke approximately 25 years ago. When her mother was 44, she passed away and LV was left to care for two younger siblings. Her father passed away when he was 54. She has two sisters and two brothers, only one of whom she is close to.
d) LV left school after Grade 9. She worked in a restaurant for about twenty years.
e) In 2008, she started working for the Pembroke and Area Community Centre where she managed the canteen. She was a board member of that agency as well. She was fired from that job in 2009 because of the theft that she pleaded to before Justice Selkirk.
f) She worked for a call centre for about two years after that, but she lost her job because of her Theft Over conviction. She had on-again, off-again employment until 2016 when she stopped working all together. She collected Employment Insurance for a short while.
g) LV has been with her husband for 36 years. She has two children and three grandchildren.
h) She stated that her husband was diagnosed with dementia in his early 40s. He is legally blind. He had a kidney transplant seven years ago. She is a recipient on his Ontario Disability Support Plan payments.
i) She reported to be working by offering childcare services in her home. She looks after two of her grandchildren at the rate of $100 a week and $125 a week for another child. She hoped to take in a fourth child in January 2025 and told Ms Burgess that she hoped to increase her restitution payment.
j) She does not endorse any substance abuse or gambling addiction.
k) LV indicated that she was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis about eight years prior to the preparation of the report. She states that she also has diabetes. When asked to provide medical records to confirm these diagnoses, LV indicated that she has had three doctors in eight years and could not provide proof.
l) LV was pleasant and on time when she reported. She was not, however, forthcoming with information to assist Ms Burgess in verifying the information she provided. She told Ms Burgess that she could not provide documents to support her financial circumstances because she had health issues.
m) When asked about why she stopped paying restitution, LV said that she was focused on her and her husband’s health issues. She admitted that she “should have made an effort to pay.”
n) LV expressed concern that if she received a carceral disposition, her husband’s ODSP benefits would be reduced, and she might lose her employment as a childcare provider.
Submissions of The Crown
[54] I have already summarized the thrust of the Crown’s position.
[55] Crown counsel asked me to impose a 90-day jail sentence followed by three years probation to allow for the continued making of restitution.
[56] Crown counsel argued that LV has no intention of paying and the history of the proceedings demonstrates that her expectation is that there will be no consequences.
[57] Crown counsel maintained that the Presentence Report does not disclose any mitigating factors. Crown counsel argued that the Court should not trust anything LV says about promises to make restitution. She has refused to provide proof with respect to the presence of mitigating factors. She essentially does the least that she can to avoid paying.
[58] Crown counsel maintained that the Court is out of options. Specific and general deterrence and denunciation demand a custodial sentence. Justice Selkirk’s conditional sentence order and the orders that followed were only partially effective. LV has demonstrated that she has no intention of paying the money.
[59] Crown counsel agreed that there are some circumstances where people who make promises to the Court cannot for reasons beyond their control, keep their word. She argued that this, however, is not one of them.
Submissions of Defence
[60] Duty Counsel stated that LV is 59. She lives with her husband, and she is in receipt of ODSP benefits. After her rent and the necessaries of life are considered, she has about $400 a month left over which is available to pay restitution. Her daycare business provides additional money.
[61] She stated that her husband has severe dementia, and she is his primary caregiver. His condition has been deteriorating.
[62] Duty counsel stated that after LV was convicted of Theft Over, she found it difficult to keep a job because of her criminal record. She then decided to create her own job by offering home daycare.
[63] She operated her home daycare until July 2025 when she had a breakdown. She stated that she learned that someone who had sexually abused her as a child had passed away. Duty counsel advised that she has now restarted her daycare.
[64] Duty counsel indicated that LV also intends to start a catering business from her home. She has a wedding to cater in June and another one in July. She plans to expand that business to cater for funerals.
[65] Duty counsel stated that LV is Indigenous, but she is waiving the preparation of a Gladue report. He also noted that she pleaded guilty, arguing that this is a mitigating factor on sentence.
Analysis
The Applicable Sentencing Principles in the Criminal Code
[66] Section 733.1 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to breach a probation order. It is a dual procedure offence. Where, as here, the Crown proceeds by indictment, the offence is punishable by up to two years imprisonment.
[67] Section 718 of the Criminal Code states:
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
a) to denounce unlawful conduct in the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.
[68] Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code establishes the fundamental principle of sentencing: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”
[69] Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code sets out “other sentencing principles”:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
The Usual Sentence for Breach of Probation
[70] In his seminal work, Sentencing, Clayton Ruby stated at page 522:
With respect to the range of sentence for this offence, it has been noted that it is difficult to establish a range as the sentence imposed is often concurrent to the substantive offence associated with the breach. That being said, a range of one to three months’ imprisonment has been recognized. Clearly an order of probation may become a trap for the unwary or for those who simply find it impossible to exercise the control required to successfully complete a probation order. (Ruby, Clayton C., Sentencing, 10th Edition, (Toronto: Lexis Nexis Publishing, 2020)).
[71] Higher penalties are usually imposed where the breach offence involves continual revictimization of the victim of the original substantive offence by breaching a no contact order (R. v. Kleiman, 2026 BCCA 79; R. v. Kleiman, 2024 BCCA 130; R. v. Szostak, 2005 42471 (Ont. C.A.)), or where the offender is an “incorrigible conman who seeks to victimize women for financial gain” (R. v. Cagnotti, 2009 ONCA 210). In these cases, in addition to the need for denunciation and deterrence, the sentencing principle of protection of the public is heightened and this justifies a more significant carceral sentence.
[72] These cases do not apply to LV. Other than breaching the original order and failing to appear in court, she has not reoffended in such a way that incarcerating her is necessary to protect the public. Her breach is not one of violence.
Assessment of Mitigating Factors
[73] Ordinarily a plea of guilt would be a mitigating factor because the overloaded justice system is saved the time and expense of proceeding with a lengthier trial.
[74] A plea of guilt is also widely seen as an expression of contrition and remorse.
[75] This, however, is the sort of very rare case where I find that the guilty plea is not mitigating.
[76] All it amounted to was a stalling tactic. It has taken almost four years and 40 court appearances to get the Breach of Probation matter across the finish line.
[77] I also find that the likelihood of the Crown being successful at trial on the Breach of Probation was very high. This also diminishes the mitigating effect of a guilty plea.
[78] LV’s guilty plea to the Breach of Probation was entered on the eve of trial. This also diminishes the mitigating effect of a guilty plea.
[79] I consider LV’s age to be mitigating.
[80] Likewise, she has not been subject to a carceral sentence before.
[81] I am unable to consider Duty Counsel’s submissions with respect to her financial constraints, her husband’s health or her health as mitigating. LV was given an opportunity to provide documentary proof of these issues to Ms Burgess and she failed to do so. Given the nature of the original offence and the number of failed promises over the years with respect to her ability to pay, I do not trust anything LV says.
[82] I am mindful of the principle of restraint. The sentence must pay heed to the principles of denunciation and deterrence, but it must be proportionate to her crime.
Aggravating Factors
[83] This is LV’s third conviction for Breach of Probation.
[84] I consider the Fail to Appear as aggravating. It is part and parcel of LV’s attempts to delay matters. It diminishes the mitigation, limited as it is, that she is entitled to for entering a guilty plea.
[85] This is not an opportunity to revisit the sentences that LV received for her earlier findings of guilt. To do so would be punishing her for those offences twice.
The Appropriate Sentence
[86] Balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, I find that the appropriate sentence is a carceral sentence of thirty days on each charge concurrent.
[87] Anything less would fail to bring home to LV the importance of following court orders and deter her from similar future conduct.
[88] Similarly, anything less would fail to deter others that court orders are intended to be followed. Although there are cases where courts will be patient and allow for second (or third) chances, ultimately orders must be respected and followed.
[89] Similarly, anything less would fail to pay heed to the principle of denunciation. Sometimes, people will make a promise to the Court that they cannot deliver. The vagaries of life are such that there are unplanned or intervening events that can render a reasonable promise made an unreasonable one to keep. In those circumstances, it will be necessary to exercise patience and grant a second (or third) chance.
[90] In this case, those chances and the court’s patience are exhausted.
[91] I find that anything more than 30 days would be disproportionate. I am not re-punishing her for her past crimes. I am punishing her for breaching Justice Anderson’s Order and Failing to Appear in court.
[92] Nothing more. Nothing less.
[93] I am mindful that LV has not been incarcerated before. I am also mindful of the deplorable conditions in our jails which apply to men and women alike.
A Conditional Sentence is Not Appropriate
[94] Given that the range of sentence that is proposed here is less than two years, I am required to consider the applicability of a conditional sentence.
[95] I find that a conditional sentence is not appropriate. The original imposition of a conditional sentence and subsequent probation orders have not fostered an attitude of compliance on the part of LV.
[96] For 14 years, she has been advertising an ability to make full restitution.
[97] For 14 years, she has failed to deliver.
[98] Two previous probationary dispositions for failing to comply with a probation order have failed to get that message across. The Court is out of tools to deal with her failure to comply.
[99] A carceral sentence is a last resort, and the time has come to resort to it.
Should I Order Further Probation?
[100] I decline to order further probation.
[101] As I mentioned, I do not trust or accept much of what LV says.
[102] I accept, however, that LV and her husband get by on his Ontario Disability Support Plan payments. I accept that she tries to augment her income by offering daycare services in her home. I accept that the carceral sentence which I intend to impose may have an impact on her ability to offer those services.
[103] Justice Martin considered when probation orders should include restitution terms in R. v. Scherer (1984), 1984 3594 (ON CA), 16 CCC (3d) 30 (Ont. C.A.) at page 36 and found that:
It is incumbent on a sentencing tribunal before making restitution or reparation a term of probation to satisfy itself that the term is one which can reasonably be performed during the period of probation. To impose restitution or reparation as a term of a probation order which cannot realistically be complied with is to invite a breach of the probation order.
[104] Despite its age, Scherer continues to be the leading authority on restitution: see, for example, R. v. Stover, 2025 ONSC 2062.
[105] I am also wary of trapping LV in a further cycle of continual probation and breaches for failure to pay she now finds herself in.
[106] I have considered placing LV on probation and imposing a term of community service. I confess that it is an attractive alternative given LV’s failure to make restitution, and it would provide some reparation for the community.
[107] Upon reflection, however, I am not satisfied that LV will be able to complete community service.
[108] Not only has society had enough of LV’s delay and unreasonable explanations for her breach, the public has had enough of paying Probation Officers to chase her to pay her restitution, paying police to chase her when she fails to appear in Court, and paying for all of the machinery in our Courts to prosecute, defend and adjudicate her matters.
[109] If I place her on probation with a requirement to complete community service, I suspect that this process will simply follow the same pattern under a different guise.
[110] We have done our best to try to help the boys and girls who play hockey and engage in skating in Pembroke recoup their loss.
[111] Unfortunately, however, it is time that we cut our losses. The public has nothing to gain and everything to lose by imposing a public service order.
[112] Precious public resources need to be preserved for those who require the use of justice system resources to protect the public and rehabilitate offenders.
[113] Enough is enough in more ways than one.
Should I Order A Stand-alone Restitution Order?
[114] Different principles apply to a “stand-alone” Restitution Order pursuant to section 738 of the Criminal Code.
[115] In R. v. Devgan, (1999), 136 CC (3d) 238 (Ont. C.A.), Justice Labrosse set out the principles that the Court must follow when making a stand-alone restitution order under section 738 of the Criminal Code. The following factors from paragraph 36 of Devgan are germane to LV:
a) An order for compensation should be made with restraint and caution.
b) Compensation is essential to the sentencing process for the following reasons:
i) It emphasizes the sanction imposed upon the offender;
ii) It makes the accused responsible for making restitution to the victim;
iii) It prevents the accused from profiting from crime; and
iv) It provides a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim.
c) A sentencing judge should consider:
i) The purpose of the aggrieved person in invoking section 738;
ii) Whether civil proceedings have been initiated and are being pursued; and
iii) The means of the offender.
d) A compensation order should not be used as a substitute for civil proceedings.
[116] Applying those factors to this case, I find that:
a) The amount of restitution remaining is modest, $3,520.
b) I am not aware of any civil proceedings having been instituted by the victim.
c) Justice Selkirk’s original intention was that LV repay the victim fully. That intention remains intact. LV remains responsible for paying restitution.
d) LV is prevented from profiting from her crime.
e) There is no evidence that LV does not have the means to continue to pay restitution under a stand-alone order.
[117] I will make an Order for restitution in the amount of $3,520 to the Pembroke Community Centre Association. That Order can be immediately enforced in the Superior Court of Justice.
The Victim Fine Surcharge
[118] As I mentioned I accept that LV gets by on her husband’s Ontario Disability Support Plan benefits and whatever she can earn from her daycare.
[119] In these circumstances, given that the carceral sentence will impact her income, I waive the imposition of the Victim Fine surcharge.
Summary
[120] I impose a thirty-day carceral sentence on each charge concurrent.
[121] I make a restitution order pursuant to section 738 of the Criminal Code in favour of the Pembroke Community Centre Association in the amount of $3,520.
[122] I waive the Victim Fine Surcharge.
Released: April 14, 2026
Signed: Justice J.R. Richardson
[^1]: LV also outlasted Ms Varrin who, some time ago, left the employ of the Probation and Parole office for greener pastures in the Federal Civil service.
[^2]: I listened to the recording of the January 14, 2025 proceedings before Justice Reccord.