Ontario Court of Justice
Court File No.: 2860 999 00 3785681X
Date: 2026-03-26
Between:
His Majesty the King ex rel. The Regional Municipality of Durham
— AND —
Chiranjeewa Samaraweera
Before: Justice of the Peace R. Maltese
Heard on: December 3, 2025 and March 3, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on: March 26, 2026
| M. Pelham | Prosecutor |
| S. Brezden | Agent for the defendant Chiranjeewa Samaraweera |
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE MALTESE:
Overview
[1] The Defendant was charged with Speeding at a rate of speed of 115 Km/hr in a 100 Km/hr zone on July 1, 2024. The matter proceeded before me for trial on December 3, 2025, and after requesting that the parties provide written submissions, oral submissions were completed on March 3, 2026.
[2] The matter proceeded by way of certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act. The Prosecutor filed the Part I Certificate of Offence as the evidence and called no other evidence.
[3] At the trial, the defence did not file any Charter applications, did not request that I make an order requiring the officer to attend for cross-examination pursuant to s. 49 (4) of the Provincial Offences Act, and did not call any defence evidence. These tactical decisions will be important with respect to the issues I have to decide in this matter.
[4] During submissions, Ms. Brezden raised a number of issues challenging the prosecution's ability to proceed by way of certified evidence in this case. Given this, I asked the parties to provide written submissions.
[5] Among those issues, the Defendant submits that a Certificate of Offence alone cannot be the sole evidence that the prosecution can rely on to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It cannot be that the prosecution can only file a Certificate of Offence and call no other evidence and that is enough for them to meet their burden of proof.
Issues to Resolve
[6] I have framed the issues to resolve as follows:
Is the Part I Certificate of Offence certified evidence as discussed in s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act (POA)?
Are the certified evidence provisions in s. 48.1 of the POA available to the prosecution for Highway Traffic Act (HTA) offences other than offences detected through the use of an automated enforcement system?
Does 48.1 POA reverse the burden of proof or otherwise not allow for a defendant to provide full answer and defence and does s. 49 (4) POA provide an appropriate remedy?
If questions #1 and #2 are answered in the affirmative, and there is no reversal of the burden of proof, what is the Court required to consider in deciding a case where the prosecution proceeds by way of s. 48.1 POA?
[7] I will refer to various legal concepts when responding to the issues raised in the questions above.
Issue #1: Is a Part I Certificate of Offence Certified Evidence?
[8] The Defendant's first argument essentially boils down to this proposition: A Part I Certificate of Offence cannot be considered a certified document, such that it could meet the requirements for certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 POA.[^1]
[9] The Defendant submits that the Court has to look at the provisions of s. 3 POA which provides as follows:
Certificate of offence and offence notice
3 (1) In addition to the procedure set out in Part III for commencing a proceeding by laying an information, a proceeding in respect of an offence may be commenced by filing a certificate of offence alleging the offence in the office of the court. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 3 (1).
Issuance and service
(2) A provincial offences officer who believes that one or more persons have committed an offence may issue, by completing and signing in the form prescribed under section 13,
(a) a certificate of offence certifying that an offence has been committed; and
(b) either an offence notice indicating the set fine for the offence or a summons. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (2).
Service
(3) The offence notice or summons shall be served personally upon the person charged within thirty days after the alleged offence occurred. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 3 (3).
[10] The Defendant submits that because s. 3 (1) POA contains the word "alleging" and s. 3 (2) uses the word "believes", the document cannot be considered a certified document and therefore cannot be the basis of certified evidence.
[11] The Defendant further submits that when one looks at the provisions of s. 205.21 HTA and the requirements as to what a Certificate of Offence has to include for offences captured by that provision (offences captured by automated red-light camera systems), that would point to a requirement that a certificate has to contain more that what is contained in a standard Form 1 Certificate of Offence for the prosecution to rely on it as certified evidence.
[12] The law regarding the interpretation of statutes is now well settled. Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada have discussed this issue at length in numerous decisions. Legislation such as the POA and HTA are what are known as "public welfare legislation" whose purpose is to protect the safety of the public, as well as other policy goals. Courts have held that this category of legislation is to be given a large and liberal interpretation that will best ensure that the objectives of the legislation are met.[^2]
[13] Furthermore, the words in legislation are to be read in their "grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament."[^3]
[14] Following this reasoning, it is important to look at the words "certificate" and "certifying" [the verb is "certify"] and the ordinary definitions given to those words. The Cambridge Dictionary[^4] defines each of those terms as follows:
certificate^5
noun [ C ]
B1
an official document that states that the information on it is true:
certify^6
verb
[ I or T ]
to say in a formal or official way, usually in the form of an official document, that something is true or correct:
[ + (that) ] I hereby certify (that) the above information is true and accurate.
to formally and officially state that something is true, especially by signing an official or legal document:
[15] The POA defines "certificate" at s. 1 (1) as follows:
"certificate" means a certificate of offence issued under Part I or a certificate of parking infraction issued under Part II; ("procès-verbal")
[16] When completing a Part I Certificate of Offence, as seen in the example in Appendix A of the Defendant's written submissions, the pre-printed language in the certificate states that and officer "believe and certify" that the information contained in that certificate is true. The pre-printed language further down in the document contains language that the officer "further certify that" in relation to service of the certificate.
[17] The Defendant submits that the ordinary definition of these words cannot apply, given that s. 3 POA also contains the words "alleging" and "believes" (and the certificate itself says "believe and certify") and that I must interpret those words in a manner other that their ordinary meaning.
[18] In R. v. Regalado, [1999] O.J. No. 5309, Blacklock J., sitting as a POA Appeal Court, said the following about what an officer does when they complete a certificate:
9 On its face, when an officer signs a certificate of offence, he is certifying two things. He's certifying the information he's setting out with respect to the offence he describes, and he is also certifying that the offence notice has been served. On it's face, this certificate would appear to be a certification by the officer of both those thing although it does not indicate precisely when the offence notice was served.
[19] Kenkel J., in Iagolnik, holds that officers must certify [emphasis added] that they believe that the statements in a Certificate of Offence are true and those are proof of the facts certified in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[^7] It is evident that his Honour turned his mind to the issue and accepts that they are certified statements as to what happened. This is consistent with Blacklock J.'s interpretation in Regalado, above.
[20] Where there is ambiguity in the words of a statute, a court can use a more restrictive interpretation,[^8] however, that should only occur after looking at the context of the legislation as a whole and it is a rare occasion that an ambiguity in the drafting of legislation is irresolvable.[^9] Furthermore, a court should only resort to a more restrictive interpretation where it is necessary to avoid absurdity.[^10]
[21] As an example, in Kim, one of the issues involved whether assertions in the Certificate of Qualified Technician are statements capable of being the evidence of the facts that were alleged in the certificate. The Court of Appeal held that they were.[^11]
[22] The word "certificate" is used elsewhere in the POA. For example, it is referred to both in ss. 9 and 9.1 of the POA (the "deem not to dispute" provisions). To determine whether there is any ambiguity as to how the word "certificate" should be defined, I look to these and other sections to determine whether the word should be given its ordinary meaning.
[23] Looking at the provisions in ss. 9 and 9.1 of the POA, those provisions allow the Clerk of Court or the Court to convict a defendant if they either fail to file the requisite document to dispute the charge or if they have, they then fail to attend either an early resolution meeting or a trial.
[24] As part of that process, either the Clerk of the Court or the presiding Justice of the Peace must examine the certificates to ensure that there are no defects. If there are none, then a defendant is convicted and the set fine is imposed.
[25] To convict a defendant, the Clerk of the Court or the Justice of the Peace would have to be satisfied that the statements contained in the Certificate of Offence are true and the officer who laid the charges has attested to the truth of those statements. It appears clear that the Legislature intended for the Clerk of the Court or a Justice of the Peace to rely on the statements contained in the Certificate as being true to convict a defendant who fails to respond or fails to appear. Thus, it would make sense to apply the ordinary meaning of the word "certificate" in these provisions.
[26] It is important to note that there is a difference with respect to who can initiate proceedings under the POA. Pursuant to s. 3 (2), only a provincial offences officer is allowed to lay a charge by way of a Part I Certificate of Offence.[^12] Unlike the laying of an information under s. 23 POA, someone who is not a provincial offences officer cannot issue a Part I Certificate of Offence. Given that the Legislature restricts who is allowed to issue a Part I Certificate of Offence to an official appointed by a level of government to a position of authority, that official is attesting to the truth of the statements contained in that certificate. This is a further indication that the ordinary meaning of the word "certificate" should be used and that the statements contained in it are certified true statements.
[27] This is supported by s. 48.1 (2) (1) which states that:
Admissibility of certified evidence
(2) The following are admissible in evidence as proof of the facts certified in it, in the absence of evidence to the contrary:
A certified statement in a certificate of offence.
A certified statement in a certificate of parking infraction.
Other types of certified evidence specified by the regulations. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40). [Emphasis added]
[28] By specifically including this language, the Legislature is telling us that statements in a Certificate of Offence are certified statements, which again is consistent with the ordinary meaning of those words. If they were to mean something else, the Legislature would have said that.
[29] Furthermore, the Legislature doesn't include statements contained in an Information laid under s 23 POA in the list of what is admissible. This again makes sense, as a s. 23 information can be laid by anyone, including a member of the public, whereas a Certificate of Offence is only available to a provincial offences officer who is issuing it in the course of their duties. An information laid under s. 23 POA is not a certified statement and the prosecution cannot rely on it as certified evidence at a trial.
[30] The Legislature also does not make a distinction in the sections about what a Certificate must contain. The POA definition of "certificate" as discussed above, simply refers to a Certificate of Offence issued under Part I or Part II POA.
[31] As I will discuss further below, s. 205.21 is in Part XIV.2 HTA. It is a self-contained part that deals with a particular type of offence involving red-light camera systems. That part provides a complete procedure with respect to the requirements for the laying of a charge, as well as what would be admissible at trial for this specific type of offence. It specifically excludes relying on the s. 3 POA procedure for this offence. The information required in a Certificate of Offence is different than what is required in a standard Form 1 Certificate of Offence, as it is a camera system that captures the offence, and a provincial offences officer is reviewing the photographs after the fact to confirm what the camera system captured.
[32] I disagree with the Defendant's assertion that the amount of information in a Certificate of Offence in this discreet part of the HTA is what is required to meet the test in 48.1 POA, and that a standard Form 1 Certificate of Offence simply cannot be sufficient to be considered certified evidence. There is nothing in 48.1 POA that says a Part I Certificate of Offence must contain the same level of detail as a Certificate of Offence in Part XIV.2 HTA. The Legislature in requiring something different for offences under Part XIV.2 HTA points to the fact that for red-light camera system offences, a Certificate of Offence has to contain details that are not found in a standard Form 1 Certificate of Offence. That action cannot be interpreted to mean that the Legislature was requiring that all Part I Certificates of Offence now require more detail than what they previously contained. The Legislature is making a distinction for a specific offence type and did not change what a Certificate of Offence must include for any Part I offence under the POA.
[33] In the present case, although the words "alleging" and "believes" are used in s. 3 POA, those words do not create any ambiguity such that I must interpret the words "certificate" and "certifying" in a manner other than the ordinary dictionary definition of those words. To do so would conflict with other provisions of the POA where those words are used, especially when reading the legislation as a whole, as the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed in Rousselle. I also adopt the reasons of Blacklock J., in Regalado, that an officer is certifying that the statements contained in the certificate are true. For these reasons I find that a Certificate of Offence contains certified statements that the prosecution can rely on as certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 POA.
Issue #2: Is s. 48.1 POA Available for Non-Automated Enforcement System Offences?
[34] The Defendant's second argument is that s. 48.1 POA is not available for offences other that Red Light Camera offences as found in s. 205.21 HTA. The Defendant submits that since the HTA only provides for certified evidence for this type of offence, it excludes the use of certified evidence for any other offences under the HTA. The Defendant further submits that because the HTA is silent, the Legislator's intention is that certified evidence is only available for these types of offences and not for others.
[35] Section 205.21 HTA is in a self-contained part of the HTA known as Part XIV.2-Red Light Camera System Evidence. That part of the HTA only deals with evidence for offences for failing to stop at a red light, that are detected through the use of a red-light camera system. Similarly, prior to the repeal of Part XIV.1 – Automated Speed Enforcement (2025, c. 11, Sched. 5, s. 5, November 11, 2025), the offence of speeding as detected through the use of an automated speed enforcement system involved a specifically prescribed certificate of offence. The same is also true for offences involving passing a streetcar or failing to stop for a school bus as detected through the use of an automated camera system (Parts XIV.3 and XIV.4 HTA). There are no other provisions in the HTA that prescribe regimes explicitly allowing for the use of certified evidence. The Defendant's position is that because the HTA is silent, the prosecution cannot rely on s. 48.1 POA to proceed by way of certified evidence for offences such as speeding, as the HTA appears to only allow for certified evidence for offences detected through the use of automated enforcement systems.
[36] The Defendant concedes that the POA provides procedural guidance. The POA is much more than that. As the Defendant also concedes, it is the procedural rule book that governs provincial offences matters. It has been well-established that the POA contains the rules and procedures that govern how provincial offences matters make their way through the courts. The purpose of the Act is clearly set out in s. 2(1) - the POA was meant to replace the summary conviction procedure under the Criminal Code of Canada that previously governed procedure for provincial offences.
[37] The POA is a statute of general application. What this means is that legislation that addresses specific public conduct, such as the HTA does for road safety and related issues, can choose to enact provisions that will supplant the procedures of a law of general application where the Legislature has chosen to do for a specific reason. When that occurs, it does not mean that there is now an inconsistency between the two statutes. Statues can overlap, occupy the same field or deal with the same subject matter and still be consistent with and complement each other.[^13]
[38] All legislation of one legislative body is presumed to make up a coherent system. Interpretations favouring harmony between statutes should prevail over discordant ones, as it better represents the thought of the Legislator.[^14]
[39] To address these issues, we again have to look at the law of statutory interpretation. As previously discussed, one has to look at the legislation as whole, its purpose and the intention of the Legislature when enacting provisions.[^15]
[40] In addition to the cases discussed regarding how legislation is to be interpreted, we also have to look at cases that discuss what happens if there are conflicting provisions in different pieces of legislation and how to deal with that.
[41] As stated above, s. 205.21 HTA allows for certified evidence regarding the use of red-light camera system to detect the offence of failing to stop at a red light. As previously discussed, there are also provisions relating to offences involving streetcars and school buses, that allow for certified evidence regarding the use of camera systems to detect those types of offences. These are in self-contained parts of the HTA, and they do not state that certified evidence is exclusively available only for these types of offences. There are no general provisions in the HTA that prohibit the use of certified evidence for offences other than those detected by automated enforcement systems, nor is there a general provision that says that certified evidence is available for all offences in the HTA, save and except the provisions of s. 210 (7) regarding Ministry of Transportation certified documents.
[42] The Legislature by enacting the provisions mentioned above, chose to supplant the procedural provisions in the POA with these offence or subject specific provisions. The Legislature chose that for offences involving automated enforcement systems and with respect to the admissibility of certified documents from the Ministry of Transportation, the procedures and provisions of the HTA would govern over related procedural provisions in the POA. As I will discuss in greater detail below, it would be illogical to infer that the Legislature intended to supplant the provisions of the POA with respect to trial procedure or admissibility of evidence for all other types of offences or evidence because they chose to do so for this unique category of offences and a Ministry-specific category of documents.
[43] The Defendant submits that the absence of a provision allowing for certified evidence for any HTA offences would preclude the prosecution from relying on certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 POA for offences other than those governed by Part XIV.2 HTA. Essentially, the Defendant is arguing that the absence of a provision in the HTA creates a conflict, such that the prosecution is precluded from relying on s. 48.1 POA.
[44] Where a statute provides for an ability to do something (such as proceed by way of certified evidence) in a discreet part of the statute, that does not necessarily mean that it then creates a prohibition against the use of that particular method where another statute may provide an avenue for its use.
[45] The POA sets out the procedural rules for provincial offences matters. Section 48.1 POA provides as follows:
Certified evidence
Application
48.1 (1) This section applies to a hearing, including a hearing in the absence of a defendant under section 54, if,
(a) the proceeding for the offence was commenced under Part I or II and a set fine has been specified for the offence; or
(b) the offence is specified by the regulations. 2017, c. 34, Sched. 35, s. 11.
Admissibility of certified evidence
(2) The following are admissible in evidence as proof of the facts certified in it, in the absence of evidence to the contrary:
A certified statement in a certificate of offence.
A certified statement in a certificate of parking infraction.
Other types of certified evidence specified by the regulations. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
Other provisions on admissibility
(3) For greater certainty, subsection (2) does not affect or interfere with the operation of a provision of this Act or any other Act that permits or specifies that a document or type of document be admitted into evidence as proof of the facts certified in it. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
Onus
(4) For greater certainty, this section does not remove the onus on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
No oral evidence
(5) A provincial offences officer who provides certified evidence referred to in subsection (2) in respect of a proceeding shall not be required to attend to give evidence at trial, except as provided under subsection 49 (4). 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
Regulations
(6) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations,
(a) specifying offences for the purposes of clause (1) (b);
(b) respecting other types of certified evidence for the purposes of paragraph 3 of subsection (2);
(c) respecting restrictions or conditions on the admissibility of evidence under subsection (2). 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
[46] The Defendant's submission is that 48.1 (3) must be read in a manner that would preclude the use of this provision in HTA matters, as s. 205.21 HTA is the only provision provided in the HTA for the use of certified evidence. As the HTA is silent on the issue of certified evidence, the Defendant submits that the Legislature only intended for the use of certified evidence for that specific category of offence that involves red-light camera systems. Given that there appears to be a conflict between the provisions of the HTA and the POA, the Defendant's position is that the conflict must be resolved in a manner that would preclude the availability of s. 48.1 POA for any offences under the HTA, except for the one provided for in s. 205.21 HTA.
[47] As previously stated above, the law of statutory interpretation requires that legislation be given a large and liberal interpretation and not a narrow or restrictive one. This doctrine applies equally to both the HTA and the POA.
[48] With respect to conflict in legislation the Supreme Court of Canada in Thibodeau v. Air Canada, [2014] S.C.J. No. 67, said:
92 The legal framework that governs this question is not complicated. First, courts take a restrictive approach to what constitutes a conflict in this context. Second, courts find that there is a conflict only when the existence of the conflict, in the restrictive sense of the word, cannot be avoided by interpretation. Overlap, on its own, does not constitute conflict in this context, so that even where the ambit of two provisions overlaps, there is a presumption that they both are meant to apply, provided that they can do so without producing absurd results. This presumption may be rebutted if one of the provisions was intended to cover the subject matter exhaustively. Third, only where a conflict [page389] is unavoidable should the court resort to statutory provisions and principles of interpretation concerned with which law takes precedence over the other.
[49] The Court then explains what a Court must look at when determining what constitutes a conflict:
93 Courts presume that "the body of legislation enacted by a legislature does not contain contradictions or inconsistencies, that each provision is capable of operating without coming into conflict with any other": R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed. 2008), at p. 325; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, at para. 30. This is sometimes expressed as a presumption of coherence, based on the common sense idea that the legislature does not intend to make contradictory enactments: Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at p. 38. This is why courts take a very restrictive approach to defining what constitutes a conflict: P.-A. Côté, in collaboration with S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (4th ed. 2011), at p. 375.
94 What then is a conflict in this context? The provisions must be "so inconsistent with ... or repugnant" to each other that they are "incapable of standing together": Daniels v. White, 1968 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1968] S.C.R. 517, at p. 526; Toronto Railway Co. v. Paget (1909), 1909 CanLII 10 (SCC), 42 S.C.R. 488, at pp. 491 and 499; Canadian Westinghouse Co. v. Grant, 1927 CanLII 83 (SCC), [1927] S.C.R. 625, at p. 630; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Town of Summerside, 1960 CanLII 48 (SCC), [1960] S.C.R. 591, at pp. 598-99; Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 489, at paras. 41-45. Application of one provision "must implicitly or explicitly preclude application of the other": P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 350, adopted by the Court in Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., 2007 SCC 14, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 591, at para. 47; see also Côté (4th ed.), at p. 376. [Emphasis added]
[50] This is consistent with the Court's previous decision in Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., 2007 SCC 14, [2007] S.C.J. No. 14, where Bastarache J., writing for the majority stated the following:
47 The starting point in any analysis of legislative conflict is that legislative coherence is presumed, and an interpretation which results in conflict should be eschewed unless it is unavoidable. The test for determining whether an unavoidable conflict exists is well stated by Professor Côté in his treatise on statutory interpretation: According to case law, two statutes are not repugnant simply because they deal with the same subject: application of one must implicitly or explicitly preclude application of the other.
(P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 350)
[51] In Lévis, the case involved a perceived conflict between two pieces of legislation, the Cities and Towns Act and the Police Act. In that decision, there was a clear conflict between the two pieces of legislation, as the Police Act required the dismissal of a police officer unless the officer could demonstrate specific circumstances which would justify another sanction. The Cities and Towns Act, however, provided for the disqualification of a police officer from any municipal service without exception. This put the two pieces of legislation in conflict with each other and that conflict could not be avoided by any reasonable interpretation.[^16]
[52] In the present case, the provisions of s. 48.1 POA and s. 205.21 HTA are not directly in conflict with each other. The HTA is silent on the issue, except for s. 205.21 with respect to red-light camera system offences. The POA provides for this in s. 48.1 (3), where it provides that s. 48.1 does not "affect or interfere with the operation of this Act or any other Act that permits that a document of type of document be admitted into evidence as proof of the facts certified in it."
[53] Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, this provision recognizes that there may be specific provisions in other statutes that would govern the admissibility of certified evidence and where they do, those provisions would take precedence over s. 48.1. For example, s. 210 (7) HTA would take precedence in relation to certified documents issued under the hand and seal of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Ministry of Transportation. Since s. 210 (7) HTA provides the mechanism to introduce that certified evidence, s. 48.1 POA is not the avenue by which a prosecutor can seek to introduce that evidence. There are many other provisions of provincial statutes that would supplant the application of s. 48.1 POA to introduce certified evidence.[^17]
[54] Section 48.1 (6) provides another indication that the Legislature was alive to the issue of potential conflict as it allowed the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) to make regulations with respect to the scope of this provision.
[55] A provincial legislature or in the case of federal legislation, Parliament, is "presumed to know the broader legal context in which it operates."[^18] This presumption includes that the Legislature is aware of the body of legislation that currently exists and how those laws are to work together. Looking at the intent of the Legislature assists a court in determining what the Legislature or Parliament was doing when enacting legislation.
[56] One way of determining the intent of the Legislature is by looking at the debates in the Legislature about pieces of legislation. Another way is by looking at how the Legislature amended legislation or the regulations that it enacted or revoked with respect to a piece of legislation.
[57] In 2014, the LGIC enacted Ontario Regulation 132/14 (O. Reg. 132/14) with respect to certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 POA. That Regulation read as follows:
Provincial Offences Act
CERTIFIED EVIDENCE
Historical version for the period July 1, 2014 to December 7, 2020.
No amendments.
This is the English version of a bilingual regulation.
Specified offences
- (1) Every offence for which there is a set fine, other than an offence referred to in subsection (2), is specified for the purposes of clause 48.1 (1) (b) of the Act.
(2) The following offences for which there is a set fine are not specified for the purposes of clause 48.1 (1) (b) of the Act:
Every offence under a provision of an Act, regulation or municipal by-law that, on the offence date indicated in the offence notice, is set out in the Table to Ontario Regulation 339/94 (Demerit Point System) made under the Highway Traffic Act.
An offence under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.
Other types of certified evidence
The following types of certified evidence are specified for the purposes of paragraph 3 of subsection 48.1 (2) of the Act:
A certified copy of a photograph taken by a provincial offences officer.
In respect of a document, a certified statement by a provincial offences officer that he or she served the document on the person charged, with the date and method of service indicated.
A certified statement by a provincial offences officer respecting the configuration, weight, dimensions or other characteristics of a vehicle inspected by the provincial offences officer.
- OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS REGULATION).
[58] Section 1 (2) (2) of the Regulation specifically precluded the use of certified evidence pursuant to s. 48.1 POA for speeding offence under s. 128 HTA. Therefore, between the period of July 1, 2014, and December 7, 2020, the Legislator did not allow for the use of certified evidence for speeding offences.
[59] In December 2020, the LGIC enacted Ontario Regulation 710/20, amending O. Reg. 132/14:
ONTARIO REGULATION 710/20
made under the
PROVINCIAL OFFENCES ACT
Made: November 26, 2020 Filed: December 8, 2020 Published on e-Laws: December 8, 2020 Printed in The Ontario Gazette: December 26, 2020
Amending O. Reg. 132/14
(CERTIFIED EVIDENCE)
- Section 1 of Ontario Regulation 132/14 is revoked.
Commencement
- This Regulation comes into force on the later of the day section 11 of Schedule 35 to the Stronger, Fairer Ontario Act (Budget Measures), 2017 comes into force and the day this Regulation is filed.
[60] This Regulation amended O. Reg. 132/14 and revoked s. 1 of that Regulation. The current version of O. Reg. 132/14 now reads as follows:
Provincial Offences Act **ONTARIO REGULATION 132/14**
CERTIFIED EVIDENCE
Consolidation Period: From December 14, 2020 to the e-Laws currency date. Last amendment: 710/20. Legislative History: 710/20.
This is the English version of a bilingual regulation.
- REVOKED: O. Reg. 710/20, s. 1.
Other types of certified evidence
The following types of certified evidence are specified for the purposes of paragraph 3 of subsection 48.1 (2) of the Act:
A certified copy of a photograph taken by a provincial offences officer.
In respect of a document, a certified statement by a provincial offences officer that he or she served the document on the person charged, with the date and method of service indicated.
A certified statement by a provincial offences officer respecting the configuration, weight, dimensions or other characteristics of a vehicle inspected by the provincial offences officer.
- OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS REGULATION).
[61] By revoking s. 1 of the Regulation, the prohibition against using certified evidence for speeding offences under s. 128 HTA has been removed. This would point to the Legislator permitting the use of certified evidence for speeding offences. Kenkel J., in Iagolnik, acknowledges this action by the Legislator.[^19] The HTA does not have a specific regulation with respect to certified evidence, which further points to the intention of the Legislator that s. 48.1 would be the avenue by which certified evidence on a speeding trial would be admitted. This would also be relevant as to whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the HTA and the POA on this issue.
[62] Applying the principles in Lévis and Thibodeau, is there a conflict between the POA and the HTA, such that certified evidence is precluded for offences other than those detected through the use of red-light camera systems or other automated enforcement systems?
[63] The Supreme Court in those cases require that a court take a restrictive approach to what constitutes a conflict. They further require that a court should only find a conflict where it cannot be avoided by interpretation. Overlap, where it exists, does not constitute a conflict on its own. Where there is overlap, it is presumed that both provisions can apply as long as they don't provide an absurd result. This presumption is only rebuttable if one of those overlapping provisions was intended to cover the subject matter exhaustively.[^20] The provisions must be so inconsistent or repugnant with each other that they are unable to stand together.[^21]
[64] There is no conflict between the HTA and the POA with respect to certified evidence. The Legislator amended O. Reg. 132/14 to remove the prohibition against the use of certified evidence for speeding offences. That decision points to the intention of the Legislator to allow the prosecution to use certified evidence to prove that offence. This is bolstered by the fact that the HTA itself does not have a specific regulation concerning certified evidence, which the Legislator could have enacted if they wished that an avenue other than s. 48.1 POA exist to tender certified evidence for HTA offences. By amending the Regulation under the POA, the Legislator's intent appears clear that s. 48.1 POA is the avenue through which certified evidence is to be tendered for speeding offences.
[65] The Defendant argued that the Legislator choosing to repeal these provisions does not mean that their intention was to allow for the use of certified evidence for speeding or other offences listed in the repealed provision. If the Legislator wanted that to be the case, they should have clearly stated that. I disagree with this assertion, as the logical inference is that the Legislator intended for the use of certified evidence in cases involving offences that were the subject of the prohibition in the original version of the Regulation. The Legislator's decision to remove the prohibition is evidence of their intention.
[66] The HTA does not contain a provision that prohibits the use of certified evidence. The Defendant's submission about the operation of s. 205.21 and exclusivity, would be contrary to the intent of the Legislator. That provision is in a specific part of the HTA (Part XIV.2) that deals only with offences involving red-light camera systems. It contains all of the procedure for this type of offence, including the ability for a defendant to ask a court to have the officer who reviewed the photographs to attend and be cross-examined.[^22]
[67] Given that the Legislature created distinct parts of the HTA to govern offences detected through the use of automated enforcement systems and have them contain a complete procedural process from the laying of the charge to what is available during a trial, the logical inference is that the Legislature's intent was to create a unique procedure for these types of offences only.
[68] The HTA cannot be read to mean that certified evidence is only available for these types of offences and not others. When applying the principles of statutory interpretation and the principles of Thibodeau and Lévis, the only logical interpretation is that the POA and the HTA are not in conflict. They overlap with respect to certain provisions; however, both can exist at the same time. The presumption regarding conflict has not been rebutted by the Defendant, as the provisions of the HTA and the POA are not so "inconsistent" or "repugnant" that they can't both exist at the same time. To find, as the Defendant submits, that the silence in the HTA about the use of certified evidence for anything other than offences detected through the use of automated enforcement systems means that certified evidence is only available for that type of offence would produce an absurd result, thus I apply the principles of Thibodeau and Lévis and take a restrictive approach on the issue of conflict.
[69] In the present case, s. 48.1 is available for speeding offences and there is no conflict between the POA and the HTA, and s. 205.21 HTA, along with similar provisions in Parts XIV.3 and XIV.4 HTA, do not stand for the proposition that they alone are the only class of offences under the HTA for which certified evidence is available to the prosecution.
Issue #3: Does 48.1 Prevent Full Answer and Defence and is 49 (4) a Remedy?
[70] The Defendant submits that allowing the prosecution to proceed by certified evidence somehow places the burden of proof on a defendant, despite the language in s. 48.1 (4), and denies a defendant the ability to make full answer and defence. As for the provision that allows for the court to order the officer to attend to be cross-examined pursuant to s. 49 (4) POA, the Defendant submits that it doesn't provide a true remedy.
[71] The Defendant is charged with speeding pursuant to s. 128 HTA. It is trite law that speeding is an absolute liability offence. All the prosecution needs to establish is that the Defendant committed the act of speeding (actus reus) and is not required to establish any subjective or objective mental intention to commit the offence. To make full answer and defence, the Defendant may provide evidence to the contrary, which can include evidence that they did not commit the offence or evidence relating to a defence, such as necessity or other applicable defences.[^23] This is true no matter how the prosecutor seeks to prove the actus reus at trial.
[72] The Defendant did not file any applications indicating that any of their rights were violated pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). The Defendant's position is that a Charter application was not necessary, as their defence is rooted in the interpretation of the provisions of the POA with respect to the issues of full answer and defence and burden of proof. I will deal with this more when discussing the fourth issue in the next section of my reasons.
[73] Section 48.1 POA considers the issue of burden of proof and states the following at s. 48.1 (4):
Onus
(4) For greater certainty, this section does not remove the onus on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (40).
[74] The section contemplates the issue and makes it clear that the burden of proof remains on the shoulders of the prosecution. Simply choosing to proceed by way of certified statements and calling no further evidence is a tactical decision that the prosecution makes. As Kenkel J., states in Iagolnik, it matters not whether the prosecution calls a witness or proceeds with certified evidence, the prosecution must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.[^24] He acknowledges that there may typically be no evidence to the contrary found in the prosecution's case, but that does not mean that the legal burden shifts to the Defendant. The Defendant can call evidence to the contrary to contest the certified statements.[^25] He goes on to state that where the prosecution chooses to proceed by way of certified evidence only, it provides no advantage except to establish the basic elements of an offence, and the prosecution is vulnerable to challenge,[^26] including to the certificate itself. For example, in Yan,[^27] the Court of Appeal entered an acquittal because the photographs tendered to support the certified statements did not comply with the regulations and were inadmissible. The lack of the required information on the photographs could not support the certified statements, thus the Court could not rely on them to convict the defendant.[^28] The defendant did not need to call any evidence, as the evidence tendered by the prosecution was sufficient to successfully challenge the certified evidence.
[75] Sickinger J., sitting as a Provincial Offences Appeal Court, in her recent decision in R. v. Hon, [2025] O.J. No. 5727, held that there is no violation of the right to a fair trial where a legislative scheme permitted the introduction of certified evidence.[^29] She also addressed a number of Charter issues, however, as there is no Charter application in the present case, those are not relevant here.
[76] In Cochrane v. Ontario (Attorney General),[^30] the Court of Appeal discusses a number of issues at length, including that despite the fact that certified evidence could create a presumption of proof, that doesn't shift the burden to a defendant, especially where the legislation contains a provision that the burden remains on the prosecution to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.[^31]
[77] On the issue of whether proceeding by certified evidence reverses the burden of proof or denies the right to a fair trial, the text of the legislation and the cases discussed demonstrate that permitting the use of certified evidence does not. The prosecution always bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The law provides a mechanism to rebut presumptions by leading evidence to contrary. As discussed in the cases that I have referred to, certified evidence provisions do not reverse the burden of proof and do not impact a defendant's right to a fair trial. The Defendant is not precluded from making full answer and defence, as they can provide evidence to the contrary. As Kenkel, J., aptly stated in Iagolnik, the prosecution takes a gamble when they choose to proceed by way of certified evidence alone and risks the court acquitting a defendant where evidence to the contrary sufficiently rebuts the certified statements and raises a reasonable doubt. I find that s. 48.1 POA does not reverse the burden of proof, does not deny the Defendant's right to a fair trial, nor is the Defendant precluded from making full answer and defence. Again, as there was no Charter application before me, I need not decide these issues through that lens. If there was, I would adopt the reasons in Hon and Cochrane on this issue and find that there was no Charter violation.
[78] Along with the issue regarding whether s. 48.1 POA reverses the burden of proof, the Defendant submits that s. 49 (4) POA, which allows a defendant to ask the court to have the officer attend to be cross-examined, does not provide a remedy to these issues. The Defendant advances similar arguments on this issue as they did on the other issues discussed above.
[79] One of the main issues in Hon was whether the presiding Justice of the Peace should have granted an application to allow the defendant the ability to cross-examine the officer, which could allow the Defendant to elicit evidence to the contrary to rebut the certified statement. Sickinger, J., conducts an extensive analysis of this issue in her reasons, and ultimately finds that this process can assist a defendant in eliciting evidence to the contrary and provides a procedural safeguard to a defendant's right to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence.[^32]
[80] In Cochrane, the Court of Appeal agrees that permitting the cross-examination of an officer is a safeguard to a defendant's right to a fair trial.[^33]
[81] The scheme of asking a court to order a witness to attend to be cross-examined is not new. For example, s. 540 (9) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, allows a judge in a preliminary hearing to order a witness to attend to be cross-examined where the Crown has sought to introduce evidence without calling a witness pursuant to s 540 (7). The issues that a court decides at a preliminary hearing are very different than at a trial, however, an accused has an ability to ask the court to order witnesses to attend to be cross-examined, to ensure procedural fairness and protect their rights.
[82] Another more apt example is in the context of impaired driving offences where the accused is charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit. The Crown can choose to not call the qualified breath technician to testify at trial and proceed by introducing a Certificate of Qualified Breath Technician. The information contained in that certificate is considered proof of the statements contained therein.[^34] The Criminal Code provides that an accused can ask a court to order that the breath technician attend to be cross-examined.[^35]
[83] In Kim, one of the issues raised by the Appellant was that their ability to receive a fair trial was restricted because the Crown could rely on the statements in the Certificate of Qualified Technician as evidence. The Court held that since there are provisions in the Criminal Code that would allow for an accused to ask that a witness attend to be cross-examined, the accused's right to a fair trial and make full answer and defence was not prejudiced.[^36]
[84] In Yan, the Court of Appeal discussed the issue regarding the ability to summons an officer to attend for cross-examination and the standard that a defendant must meet to succeed in that application. The Court takes no issue with the use of certified evidence and the Legislature's ability to create such a regime that includes limits as to the ability to summons the officer. The Court says that it is a valid safeguard to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial and finds that the burden on a defendant to succeed in obtaining an order to have the officer attend is below that of a balance of probabilities.[^37]
[85] As discussed in the cases referred to above, I agree that s. 49 (4) POA provides a procedural safeguard and is a remedy available to a defendant to protect their ability to make full answer and right to a fair trial. I agree with Sickinger J.'s reasons in Hon, as well as the Court of Appeal decisions in Cochrane, Kim and Yan, and am bound by them, given that they are decisions from appellate courts.
Issue #4: What Evidence is Required for a Certified Evidence Trial?
[86] The Defendant submits that a Certificate of Offence alone cannot be the whole case for the prosecution in a certified evidence trial. To find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution must call more evidence to establish the elements of the offence with which a defendant is charged.
[87] The Defendant points to s. 46 POA which provides as follows:
Trial on plea of not guilty
46 (1) If the defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall hold the trial. 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (39).
Right to defend
(2) The defendant is entitled to make full answer and defence. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 46 (2).
Right to examine witnesses
(3) The prosecutor or defendant, as the case may be, may examine and cross-examine witnesses. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 46 (3).
Agreed facts
(4) The court may receive and act upon any facts agreed upon by the defendant and prosecutor without proof or evidence. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 46 (4).
Defendant not compellable
(5) Despite section 8 of the Evidence Act, the defendant is not a compellable witness for the prosecution. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 46 (5).
[88] The Defendant submits that since the principles of full answer and defence are stated in this section, where traditionally this issued would be raised by way of a Charter application, one is not required.
[89] The Defendant submits that they cannot make full answer and defence because the prosecution relied solely on the Certificate of Offence and did not call any witnesses that the Defendant could cross-examine to test the veracity of the certified statements contained in the Certificate. On page 4, paragraph 8 of their written submissions, the Defendant states that "[i]t should be noted that there is no explicit reference of Certified Evidence in the trial process section of the legislation."
[90] That statement is not entirely accurate. Part IV of the POA is entitled "Trial and Sentencing".[^38] That part of the POA begins at s. 28 and goes through to s. 75. That entire part of the POA is devoted to the procedure that applies to trials and sentencing.
[91] Both s. 46 and 48.1 are in Part IV of the POA. Both deal with the procedure that applies at trial. As we have already seen above, s. 48.1 (1) states that the "section applies to a hearing, including a hearing in the absence of a defendant under s. 54…" It then goes on to specify at paragraph (a) that it applies where the proceeding was commenced under Part I or Part II and a set fine has been specified for the offence.
[92] Since both s. 46 and 48.1 apply to trial procedure, those sections must be read in conjunction with each other and cannot be analysed independently of the other. I refer to the previous discussion regarding the law on statutory interpretation and conflict of legislation, as those principles apply to how we are to read and reconcile the operation of these two sections of the POA.
[93] Applying these principles, it appears that the Legislature intended that s. 48.1 POA provide an evidentiary shortcut by allowing the prosecution to rely on certified evidence to establish the elements of the offence, absent evidence to the contrary. They also provided procedural safeguards, such as allowing a defendant to seek an order to have the officer attend for cross-examination pursuant to s. 49 (4) POA and by stating that although the prosecution can rely on certified evidence, they are still required to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
[94] These sections are not in conflict with each other. Section 46 (3) provides that the prosecutor or the defendant may examine and cross-examine witnesses. [Emphasis added] It is interesting to note that the section uses the word "may" and not "shall". The use of that language lends more to the proposition that it is for the parties to call witnesses, and each party can choose to ask or not ask questions of those witnesses. That section does not compel either party to call witnesses to testify. If witnesses are called, the parties can ask questions of those witnesses. As s. 49 (4) POA allows a defendant to seek an order to have the officer attend to be cross-examined, the ability to cross-examine is not extinguished by s. 48.1, preserving their right to make full answer and defence.
[95] Applying the principles in Lévis and Thibodeau discussed in prior sections of this decision, these provisions can co-exist, and one does not invalidate or restrict the operation of the other.
[96] The Defendant referred to a 2011 Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) Report regarding the modernization of the POA. I must note that the LCO is not a legislative or other government body, it is an organization that will study a legal issue or piece of legislation, based on proposals submitted to it by legal practitioners, law professors or other legal professionals, and write a report that can include recommendations on possible amendments to legislation. In the report relied upon by the Defendant at Tab 2 of their Book of Authorities, pages ii and iii indicate that the LCO is independent of government and this project of study was proposed by a legal practitioner. A government can choose to adopt proposed recommendations, but the report has no binding or persuasive authority, nor does the LCO speak for the Legislature or other agency of the government.
[97] Throughout their written submissions, the defence refers to this report and the principles that a self-represented person cannot be expected to know how the legal system works or be expected to do the same legal research or draft applications as a legal professional would, which is why, for example, the provisions of s. 49 (4) POA are not a true remedy and the self-represented person is denied their right to make full answer and defence as required by s. 46 (2) POA.
[98] That is simply not the state of the law. A self-represented litigant may not have the background to prepare and defend a case like a legal professional would, but that does not exempt them from the rules of evidence and operation of procedural rules that exist in legislation, including the POA. Courts understand that self-represented litigants may not be sophisticated, however, that does not mean that courts are allowed to apply a different set of rules to them. The trial justice is to assist a self-represent litigant to a limited degree but is not to disregard evidentiary or other rules that a represented litigant would have to follow. The Ontario Court of Justice has also created a guide for self-represented defendants and made it available on the Court's website, which provides information concerning the court process and other information that can assist a self-represented defendant prepare for trial.[^39]
[99] In the present case, the Defendant is represented by a legal professional who is aware of the law and the procedural and evidentiary rules that apply in provincial offence proceedings. It is not for the Court to go behind tactical decisions made by either the prosecution or the defence. The Defendant could have made an application to have the officer ordered to attend and be cross-examined or could have chosen to testify to establish evidence to the contrary. The Defendant chose not to do either of those things, and those are decisions that they can make.
[100] Section 48.1 POA provides an evidentiary path to the prosecution to establish the elements of the offence by way of certified evidence. As indicated in the text of s. 48.1 (2) (1), a Certificate of Offence is an admissible document that is sufficient to prove the elements of the offence. The Defendant submits that it is unfair that the prosecution is not required to call any other evidence to establish the essential elements and where the defence calls no evidence, that certified evidence is enough to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
[101] That is what was the trial Justice of the Peace held in the Allen decision.[^40] K.J. Caldwell J., sitting as a Provincial Offences Appeal Court, acknowledged and empathized with the concern that the trial Justice of the Peace had in convicting someone on the basis of the certified evidence, which consisted solely of the filing of the Part I Certificate of Offence issued by the officer. However, the Court held that s. 48.1 POA provided a legitimate path to convict a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt where the only evidence before the Court consisted of the Certificate of Offence that had been filed and there was no evidence to the contrary provided by the defendant.[^41] This is consistent with Kenkel J.'s holding in Iagolnik.[^42]
[102] In Sheeler, the trial Justice of the Peace dismissed the charge where the defendant was self-represented, and the prosecution proceeded by way of certified evidence. The Defendant did not call any evidence.[^43] The trial Justice of the Peace believed that some viva voce evidence should have been called to establish the identity of the defendant and that the filing of the Certificate of Offence alone was not enough.[^44] Stinson J., held that this was an error.[^45]
[103] This is consistent with the other decisions referred to in these reasons. Sickinger J., came to the same conclusion in Hon, in relation to the fourth defendant that was part of that appeal. The prosecution relied on the certified statements contained in the Certificate of Offence and the defence called no evidence. Her Honour found no error in the Justice of the Peace's decision in convicting that defendant, as there was no evidence to the contrary and dismissed that appeal in its entirety.[^46]
[104] As discussed by Kenkel J. in Iagolnik and Lai, and by Stinson J., in Sheeler, evidence to the contrary cannot be based on speculation.[^47] Kenkel J., in Iagolnik refers to the Villaroman decision from the Supreme Court of Canada[^48] and discusses the issue of how a court can consider circumstantial evidence and alternate theories.
[105] It is important to note that in Villaroman, the defence called evidence so the Court could consider alternate theories and whether those theories could provide evidence to the contrary.[^49] Where there is no evidence called, a court would be engaging in speculation as to possible alternate theories and that would be impermissible and would not establish evidence to the contrary as indicated in both Kenkel and Stinson J.'s decisions.
[106] The legislative provisions, the law on statutory interpretation and conflict of legislation and the appellate decisions discussed in these reasons establish that a Part I Certificate of Offence can be sufficient to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt, where there is no evidence to the contrary raised by a defendant. There is no violation of a defendant's right to make full answer and defence, nor is their right to a fair trial violated, as the law provides mechanisms and safeguards to protect those rights.
Conclusion
[107] For the reasons outlined above, I answer the questions posed at the beginning of these reasons for judgement as follows:
Is the Part I Certificate of Offence certified evidence as discussed in s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act (POA)? Yes
Are the certified evidence provisions in s. 48.1 of the POA available to the prosecution for Highway Traffic Act (HTA) offences other than offences detected through the use of an automated enforcement system? Yes
Does 48.1 POA reverse the burden of proof or otherwise not allow for a defendant to provide full answer and defence and does s. 49 (4) POA provide an appropriate remedy? It does not reverse the burden of proof, nor does it deny the defendant the ability to make full answer and defence. Section 49 (4) POA does provide an appropriate remedy to protect the Defendant's right to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence.
If questions #1 and #2 are answered in the affirmative, and there is no reversal of the burden of proof, what is the Court required to consider in deciding a case where the prosecution proceeds by way of s. 48.1 POA? Where a defendant calls no evidence nor seeks an order to have the officer attend for cross-examination, the filing of the Certificate of Offence by the prosecution can, on its own, be sufficient to establish the elements of the offence and prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 48.1 POA provides the prosecution with an evidentiary path to establish their case beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on the Certificate of Offence and that section is not in conflict with s. 46 POA.
[108] For these reasons, I find the prosecution has proven the charge of speeding at a rate of speed of 115 Km/hr in a 100 Km/hr zone, beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore find the Defendant guilty contrary to s. 128 of the HTA.
Released: March 26, 2026
Signed: Justice of the Peace R. Maltese
Footnotes
[^1]: R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33.
[^2]: Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., 2010 ONSC 2013, [2010] O.J. No. 1504 (S.C.J.) at para. 22. This has been reaffirmed many times: R. v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd., 2000 CanLII 5647 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 297 (C.A.); R. v. Hamilton Health Sciences Corp., [2000] O.J. No. 2939 (C.A.); Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), 2002 CanLII 16893 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No 283 (C.A.); Blue Mountain Resorts v. Bok, 2013 ONCA 75, [2013] O.J. No. 520 (C.A.).
[^3]: R. v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd., supra, at para. 11, quoting from R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at p. 704; Blue Mountain Resorts v. Bok, supra, at para. 45; R. v. Kim, [2025] O.J. No. 2968 (C.A.) at paras. 31-32; R. v. Rousselle, [2025] S.C.J. No. 35, at para. 80.
[^4]: Cambridge Dictionary online: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
[^7]: York (Regional Municipality) v. Iagolnik, [2022] O.J. No. 3125, at para. 5.
[^8]: R. v. Rousselle, supra, at para. 81.
[^9]: R. v. Kim, supra, at paras. 32-33.
[^10]: Blue Mountain Resorts v. Bok, supra, at paras. 50-51.
[^11]: R. v. Kim, supra, at para. 45.
[^12]: A provincial offences officer is defined in s. 1 (1) POA. It is limited to persons executing the functions designated in paragraphs (a) – (f).
[^13]: Toronto Railway Co. v. Paget, 1909 CanLII 10 (SCC), [1909] S.C.J. No. 60 at para. 38; see also City of Ottawa v. Town of Eastview, 1941 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1941] S.C.R. 448; R. v. Williams, 1944 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1944] S.C.R. 226; R. v. Morin (1966), 1965 CanLII 483 (BC SC), 52 D.L. R. (2d) 644 (B.C.S.C.); Côté, Pierre-André, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canda, Second Edition, 1991, Les Éditions Yvon-Blais, Inc., at p. 294.
[^14]: Côté, Pierre-André, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canda, Second Edition, supra, at p. 288.
[^15]: R. v. Kim, supra, at paras. 31-32; R. v. Rousselle, supra, at para. 81.
[^16]: Lévis, supra, at para. 48.
[^17]: See for example, s. 276 (2) of the Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. B.16; s. 166 (1) Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5; s. 29 Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23; and s. 175 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19.
[^18]: R. v. Rousselle, supra, at para. 127.
[^19]: Iagolnik, supra, at para. 6;
[^20]: Thibodeau, supra, at para. 92.
[^21]: Ibid., at para. 94; Lévis, supra, at para. 47. See also Abel Skiver Farm Corp. v. Ste-Foy (Town), [1983] S.C.J. No. 32 at para. 136. Where there is an apparent repugnancy, since the Legislator is presumed to be consistent, the court must try and reconcile the two pieces of legislation before deciding if there is a conflict. Where there is no such repugnancy, there is no need for reconciliation.
[^22]: See s. 205.20 HTA.
[^23]: R. v. Hickey (1976), 1976 CanLII 653 (ON CA), 13 O.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.); R. v. Polewsky, 2005 CanLII 38742 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 4500 (C.A.); R. v. Naugler, 1981 CanLII 3268 (NS CA), [1981] N.S.J. No. 547 (C.A.).
[^24]: Iagolnik, supra, at para. 5.
[^25]: Ibid., at paras. 14-15.
[^26]: Ibid., at paras. 26-27.
[^27]: R. v. Yan, 2004 CanLII 73252 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4012 (C.A.).
[^28]: Ibid., at paras. 31-34.
[^29]: Hon, at paras. 23-25.
[^30]: 2008 ONCA 718, 92 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
[^31]: Ibid., at paras. 57-69; see also R. ex rel. Go Transit/Metrolinx v. Allen, 2016 ONCJ 104 at para. 12.
[^32]: Hon, supra, at paras. 31-49; 86-88; and 101-104.
[^33]: Cochrane, supra, at paras. 55-56.
[^34]: See s. 320.32 (1) Criminal Code.
[^35]: See s. 320.32 (3).
[^36]: R. v. Kim, supra, at para. 53.
[^37]: Yan, supra, at paras. 16-21.
[^38]: This heading is located between ss. 27 & 28 of the POA.
[^39]: See the guide on the OCJ's website at the following link: https://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/notices/guide-for-defendants-in-provincial-offences-cases/
[^40]: Allen, supra, at para. 10.
[^41]: Ibid., at paras. 12-13.
[^42]: Iagolnik, supra, at para. 24.
[^43]: Sheeler, supra, at para. 4.
[^44]: Ibid., at para. 18.
[^45]: Ibid., at para. 19.
[^46]: Hon, supra, at paras. 105-109.
[^47]: Lai, supra, at para. 5; Iagolnik, supra, at paras. 16-18; Sheeler, supra, at para. 29.
[^48]: 2016 SCC 33, [2016] S.C.J. No. 33.
[^49]: Ibid., at paras. 10, 35-37 and 50.