WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.— Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: March 23, 2026

Court File No.: FO 21-028

Between:

Children's Aid Society of the District of Nipissing and Parry Sound, Applicant,

— AND —

J.S. and C.B., Respondent(s)

Before: Justice A. H. Perron

Heard on: January 27th, 2026

Cost Decision released on: March 23rd, 2026

Counsel:

Lauren Doughty ............................................................. counsel for the applicant society

Stephania Sikora ........................................................... counsel for the respondent J.S.

Laura Verdin............................................ agent for the Office of the Children's Lawyer, legal representative for the child

No appearance by or on behalf of C.B., even though served with notice.

Cost Decision

Perron, J.:

Overview

[1] This matter proceeded to a nine-day trial, with a Decision being rendered on December 12, 2025. At that time, counsel for the mother made a request for costs against the Society. Submissions on costs were made on January 27, 2026.

[2] This matter came before the court on a status review application after the previous application had been resolved with a final order in November 2022, placing the child, MKB, in her mother's care subject to a supervision order. The child was brought to a place of safety on February 15, 2023, with the Society seeking an order for extended society care. The child had been in care for 1,410 days on the day final trial submissions were made.

[3] The matter has been the subject of three access motions. On September 7, 2023, the mother was granted an order for expanded access to include unsupervised access, which included overnight access on alternating weekends. Access motions were also heard by this court, with temporary orders being made on May 1, 2024, and May 7, 2025. The final decision after trial was made on December 12, 2025, with the child returning to the care of her mother, subject to terms and conditions.

[4] Mother's counsel is requesting what she describes as the modest cost in the amount of $5,000 against the Society. For unknown reasons, no formal Bill of Costs was filed with the court. When questioned by the court about this, counsel advised that the total costs were well above $15,000 to $20,000 and that she was only seeking partial indemnity. Considering that the trial lasted nine days, counsel for the Society and the OCL agreed to proceed without a formal Bill of Costs, and all agreed that the amount claimed was partial indemnity.

The Law

[5] The Courts of Justice Act represents the starting point for costs in a proceeding such as this.

1. Section 131(1) mentions that:

"Subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid."

[6] The Family Law Rules also apply. Rule 24(1) sets out a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. However, subrule 24(2) states that the presumption does not apply in a child protection case or to a party that is a government agency. Finally, Rule 24(10) requires, with some flexibility, a court to decide costs as the case moves through a proceeding.

[7] Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules also applies. Rule 2(2) reminds us that the primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. Rule 2(3) elaborates as follows. Dealing with a case justly includes:

(a) Ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) Saving expense and time;

(c) Dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) Giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

[8] Madam Justice Chappel summarized the jurisprudence applicable to costs considerations in Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. K.L. and T.M., 2014 ONSC 3679, at paragraph 14:

1. Child protection agencies do not enjoy immunity from a costs award.

2. However, the starting point in analyzing a claim for costs against a child protection agency is that child welfare professionals should not be penalized for carrying out their statutory obligation to protect children.

3. The approach to costs as against child welfare agencies must balance the importance of encouraging child protection professionals to err on the side of protecting children and the need to ensure that those professionals exercise good faith, due diligence, and reason in carrying out their statutory mandate.

4. The high threshold of "bad faith" is not the standard by which to determine a claim for costs against a child protection agency.

5. Costs will generally only be awarded against a Children's Aid Society in circumstances where the public at large would perceive that the Society has acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner.

6. A Society should not be sanctioned through costs for an error in judgment, or in cases where the nature of the case makes it very difficult to weigh and balance the evidence and predict the legal outcome.

7. Important factors to consider in deciding whether costs against a Society are appropriate include the following:

   i. Has the Society conducted a thorough investigation of the issues in question?

   ii. Has the Society remained open-minded about possible versions of relevant events?

   iii. Has the Society reassessed its position as more information became available?

   iv. Has the Society been respectful of the rights and dignity of the children and parents involved in the case?

   v. In cases involving procedural impropriety on the part of a Society, the level of protection from costs may be lower if the irregularity is not clearly attributable to the Society's efforts to diligently carry out its statutory mandate of protecting children.

[9] Justice Deluzio of our court in Highland Shores Children's Aid Society v. A.M., 2015 ONCJ 528, reminds us at paragraph 9 of the following:

"Costs will generally only be awarded against a child protection agency where the public at large would perceive that the society has acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner. A society is obligated to conduct a thorough investigation, remain open minded about possible versions of relevant events, consider alternative less intrusive measures before apprehending children from their parents, continue to investigate and work with parents up until a final court determination, reassess its position as more information becomes available, and treat parents and children fairly, respectful of their rights and dignity."

Analysis

[10] The final decision on the matter was delivered on December 12, 2025. The court met with the parties in court and advised that the child would be returned to the mother's care subject to a supervision order. The general principles of the terms that the court was looking for were explained to the parties, and they were given the opportunity to negotiate the details of reasonable terms and conditions. Prior to the court advising of its final decision and the parties entering into negotiations on the terms and conditions, counsel for the mother advised the court of some serious recent developments.

[11] Counsel advised that three days prior, legal counsel for the Society had advised that they had omitted to provide the mother and the OCL with a complete disclosure package. Society counsel had discovered that 400 pages of disclosure notes had not been produced.

[12] Due to a lack of foster placements in the local catchment area of the applicant Society, the child had been placed in foster care in the Barrie area, supervised by the Simcoe Muskoka Children's Aid Society. None of their notes had been disclosed prior to trial. They were provided only three days prior to this court rendering its decision.

[13] The disclosure in question consists of 400 pages of contact logs relating to the child's time in care, including her medical appointments. The notes disclose that the child was struggling in foster care.

[14] Some of the entries, as described to the court, are very concerning. They include:

a. An entry in April 2024 that the child's teacher was reporting that the child was removing her clothing at school, not wearing any underwear, and touching herself inappropriately;

b. A report of the child putting Play-Doh in her vagina at school;

c. A report of the child punching a number of holes in the walls of her foster home;

d. An incident where a boy requested the child to pull her pants down in the backyard;

e. Numerous reports of the child removing a glass pane from her window at her foster home and climbing out of the window.

[15] Counsel for the mother advised that she did not have time to review all of the late disclosure, but that it was clearly relevant and alarming. She advised that the most concerning point was that none of the workers who testified in court mentioned any of this in their sworn affidavits or while testifying. Accordingly, none of this evidence was before the court.

[16] Counsel also advised that the mother had not been informed of most of these incidents and that most of these allegations were new to her. There also appeared to be some suggestion that the results of appointments with medical professionals were included in the disclosure package and that these had not been shared with the mother.

[17] Society counsel advised that she personally disclosed all the documents once the omission was discovered. She acknowledged that the nondisclosure was problematic but stated that it was a simple oversight. There was no ill intention on behalf of the Society, and the nondisclosure was characterized as a simple human error.

[18] The parties sought direction from the court on how to proceed. After a brief recess, I made general comments to the effect that this nondisclosure to counsel was problematic and serious, that hiding it from the mother was not acceptable, and that hiding it from the court during trial was simply wrong and unethical. It was clear that the Society needed to get to the bottom of this serious problem. However, even prior to this issue being raised, the court had already decided to dismiss the Society's application and that the child would be returned to the care of the mother subject to terms and conditions. Therefore, the court continued with the release of its decision, and the parties proceeded to negotiate the details of the terms and conditions.

[19] There are other issues with the Society's handling of this matter that are concerning. As already mentioned, three motions had to be argued concerning the mother's access to the child. Justice C.D. McMorrow mentions in his ruling of May 1, 2024, at paragraph 64:

"…Given the fluid nature of the situation, the society need the flexibility to change access as it evaluates the quality of the mother's access, her presentation during access, and her plan to have the child returned to her care. An access order providing flexibility while prescribing minimum access is in the temporary best interest of the child."

[20] The matter returned before Justice McMorrow for another access motion. In his oral ruling of May 7, 2025, he mentions at page 6 of the transcript:

"The Society conceded that the mother's supervised access in Barrie had gone well and has been devoid of any protection concerns. Given the quality of the mother's access and the child's clear views and preference, it is incomprehensible that access had not increased even occasionally even by an hour or two. The Society's failure to meet the expectation that it would increase access when safe to do so represents a material change in circumstance sufficient to justify a variation to the minimum prescribed access."

[21] Reference is also made to these issues in the trial reasons released on December 12, 2025. On page 15, the court rules:

"Despite this direction, the Society did nothing to increase access. They did nothing to encourage or facilitate family reintegration, contrary to their mandate. This Society has had great success with other families in promoting reunification. However, as in this matter, when they appear to give up on a family, they do the bare minimum. The court was clear about encouraging more access and promoting reintegration. They failed to do so. This is unacceptable, and it is hoped that under new leadership these practices will change."

[22] The child in this matter has a very small family circle. Her father is not involved in her life, and she has no siblings. She essentially has only her mother and her maternal grandfather. The grandfather has played a very active role in her life. Not only did he provide financial support, but all three of them resided together on more than one occasion. He was also named as a supervisor in many past temporary access orders, including the last final order in this matter.

[23] After the child was taken to a place of safety, she was placed with a foster family in the Barrie area. The grandfather repeatedly requested access to the child. The child was also asking to see him. Despite this, they went over one and a half years without seeing each other. The court ultimately had to address this issue with a temporary order providing for access at least once a month in the North Bay area to allow the child to see her grandfather. This is yet another example of how the Society failed to meet the court's expectations.

[24] I have considered all the trial evidence and submissions by all counsel, and I find that the Society's conduct in this matter was patently unfair and indefensible. The Society's approach to access was unfair and demonstrated a lack of respect for the bond the child had with her mother and her grandfather. The distance created as a result of this approach to access was not consistent with the child's best interests.

[25] The lack of disclosure in this matter is simply unacceptable. Important safety and health issues were not disclosed to the mother. This was not only sloppy and negligent but a complete failure of the Society's legal obligations. What is most troubling is the fact that none of this relevant information was ever presented to the court. Hiding important information about the child's well-being is unethical and inexcusable. It is fundamental to the integrity of a properly functioning child protection system that Societies comply with court orders, remain open-minded, continually reassess their positions, and keep parents well informed of their child's well-being while in care. Finally, the failure to meet legal disclosure obligations is unacceptable and will have consequences.

[26] This court therefore finds it just, in the circumstances of this case, to order the Society to pay costs to the mother.

Quantum of Costs

[27] As already mentioned, no Bill of Costs was submitted by counsel for the mother. This was a nine-day trial spread out over a number of months. All parties agree that the cost request of $5,000 is partial indemnity.

[28] The mother in this matter is of limited financial means and retained her lawyer with a Legal Aid Certificate. Legal Aid Ontario is a government-funded agency with a mandate to provide legal assistance by paying modest lawyer fees to ensure that parents, like J.S. in this matter, can obtain proper and much-needed legal advice and representation in complex trials such as this one.

[29] Children's Aid Societies are also government-funded agencies. This funding allows Societies to investigate and report on child safety, provide support to families, and sometimes lead to the removal of a child from a home if necessary to ensure the child's safety and well-being. Their focus, as provided by legislation, is the best interests and protection of the child.

[30] At the end of the day, both Legal Aid Ontario and the Applicant Society are funded by the taxpayers of Ontario. The cost award will not end up in the mother's hands and will amount to a simple accounting exercise from one government-funded agency to another.

[31] This matter has been before the court for a long time, with the child being in care for years. The purpose of these types of proceedings is to ensure the safety and well-being of children. Government funding spent on publicly funded agencies is intended to ensure that the best interests of children are met. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that funding remains with the agency providing first-hand care to children. The limited funding available should therefore be used to pay for the child's continued care rather than past legal fees incurred by her struggling mother.

[32] This court therefore orders nominal costs against the Children's Aid Society of the District of Nipissing and Parry Sound in the amount of $500, payable forthwith.

Released: March 23rd, 2026

Signed: Justice A. H. Perron