Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2026-03-12

Court File No.: Toronto 25 50003806

Between:

His Majesty the King

-- and --

Zechouriah Szakiel

Ruling on Directed Verdict Application

And

Trial Judgment

Before Justice Brock Jones

Heard and Decided on March 11, 2026

Written Reasons Released on March 12, 2026

T. Sarantis, counsel for the Crown S. Hinkson, counsel for Z. Szakiel

Jones J.:

Introduction and Overview of the Evidence

[1] Zechouriah Szakiel was arraigned on one count of failing to comply with a term of a release order contrary to Criminal Code section 145(5)(a). The information alleged that on February 25, 2025, Mr. Szakiel violated the following term of a release order that was lawfully in place:

"Remain in your residence except for medical emergencies involving you by way of ambulance, for the purpose of travelling directly from home to work/school and from work/school to home and while at your work/school, when you are in direct company and under supervision of your surety."

[2] The Crown filed an agreed statement of facts and a copy of the release order. The facts were very simple. Mr. Szakiel was located by a police officer alone in the area around Yonge and Dundas on February 25, 2025.

[3] The Crown then called PC Logan to testify. He explained that he located Mr. Szakiel at 4:30 a.m. He was alone and holding an open can of an alcoholic beverage. When PC Logan investigated him for a possible provincial offence, the terms of his release order were discovered. He arrested Mr. Szakiel accordingly.

[4] PC Logan recalled that the businesses in the area all appeared to be closed at the time.

[5] The defence did not call any evidence.

Directed Verdict Application

[6] At the conclusion of the Crown's case, Mr. Hinkson applied for a directed verdict. In R. v. Kelly, 2017 ONCA 920, the Ontario Court of Appeal articulated the test for a directed verdict at para. 19:

When the defence moves for a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of the Crown's case, the trial judge must decide whether there is a basis in the evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict. In performing that task, the trial judge does not make findings of fact or credibility, but considers whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could, on the entirety of the evidence, favourable and unfavourable to the accused, conclude that the Crown has established guilt. The trial judge must view the evidence in the reasonable light that is the most favourable to the Crown: R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 828, at paras. 21, 29-32; R. v. Jackson, 2016 ONCA 736, 33 C.R. (7th) 130, at paras. 6-9.

[7] Mr. Hinkson argued that there was no evidence to negate the possible exceptions contained in the terms of the release order that the Crown relies upon. Specifically, he argued that PC Logan had not properly investigated whether his client was travelling to or coming home from his place of work at the time. As a result, the charge should be dismissed.

[8] I disagree. Mr. Sarantis gave me a copy of Justice Code's decision in R. v. Blaker, 2012 ONSC 6397. The accused in that case was charged with breaching a term of a probation order, and the trial judge granted a directed verdict. The probation order prohibited the accused from contacting a certain person, with an exception allowing contact "pursuant to a Family Court Order." The trial judge granted the directed verdict because the Crown did not produce evidence negating the existence of a family court order. The judge held that the Crown bore the burden of calling evidence to disprove this exception: see para. 3.

[9] Justice Code held this was an error. The exception to the no contact clause was not an essential element of the offence, but rather a "potential defence that may or may not arise on the particular facts of a particular case, at some point in the evidence, either in cross-examination of the Crown's witnesses or during the defence case": see para. 6.

[10] In some cases, Justice Code noted, the Crown may have the count on an information particularized in such a manner that an exception may need to be negated during its case. This would normally be unnecessary, but if the Crown does draft the information in that manner, and defence counsel responds to the charge in a manner that relies upon the exceptions as drafted, the surplusage rule may not apply: see para. 15.

[11] I do not find that the charge on the information in this case was sufficiently detailed to fall within the scenario contemplated by Justice Code in Blaker. The charge clearly states that Mr. Szakiel was alleged to have been subject to a "house arrest" condition, even if certain exceptions may apply.

[12] I note that Justice Code's admonition in Blaker states that when Crown counsel presents an information with a charge of failing to comply with a court order—such as a release order or a probation order—it is unnecessary to include all possible exceptions that might apply to the charge. It would be simpler and easier for everyone involved to state that the accused is alleged to have violated his release order and specify the appropriate term, such as a "remain in your residence" or "house arrest" condition. Any exceptions that need to be considered when a judge makes a verdict can be derived from the court order itself; including them in the pleadings is unnecessary and often unhelpful.[^1]

Position of the Parties

[13] Mr. Sarantis submits that the Crown has proven its case. Mr. Szakiel was bound by a restrictive term of his release order. He was caught early in the morning wandering around downtown Toronto. There is no evidence that supports any of the possible exceptions. It would be speculation to assume any of them applied.

[14] Mr. Hinkson argues that his client was walking when the officer located him. Therefore, it is entirely possible that he was heading to or from a place of employment. We simply lack sufficient evidence to confirm this. PC Logan could have investigated further, but he did not. I should be left with a reasonable doubt and enter an acquittal.

[15] Mr. Hinkson does not rely upon any of the other exceptions to the "house arrest" term in support of his position.

Analysis

[16] Mr. Szakiel is presumed innocent. The Crown bears the onus of proving the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt see R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC).

[17] In R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14, the Supreme Court of Canada held that failure to comply with a condition of a release order is subject to the defence of "lawful excuse": see para. 37. If the evidence establishes an "air of reality" to the defence, the Crown bears the persuasive burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt: see R. v. Refaeh, 2024 ONSC 755, at paras. 55-71.

[18] In R. v. Nadeau (1984), 1984 CanLII 28 (SCC), Lamer J., as he then was, held that:

"... the accused is entitled, unless a fact has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, to the finding of fact most favourable to him, provided of course that it is based on evidence in the record and not mere speculation." [Emphasis added].

[19] The Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no evidence presented during the trial that Mr. Szakiel was employed or travelling to or from a workplace. The Crown would face an almost impossible task if it had to prove someone was not employed or not travelling in the manner suggested by Mr. Hinkson to establish a failure to comply charge. While there may be cases where the Crown's case itself includes evidence that lends credibility to such an argument (for example, where the accused was seen walking out of his known place of employment), that is not the situation here.

[20] This case also sharply contrasts with R. v. Robinson, 2015 ONSC 3031, where officers conducted a compliance check on the accused, who was subject to a house arrest condition, and did not find him at his residence. In that case, the count on the information was particularized to include an exception allowing the accused to be outside his residence if he was "at work or school." The Crown did not present evidence of his whereabouts at the time of the alleged breach, and the Summary Conviction Appeal Court ruled that the lack of evidence about his location could justify an acquittal because the exception was included in the pleading: see paras. 26-8.

[21] Unlike in Robinson, the Crown provided unchallenged evidence of Mr. Szakiel being located outside his residence. Mr. Szakiel was found alone, walking downtown at 4:30 a.m. by a police officer. It defies belief that he was doing anything other than knowingly violating this term of his release order. Indeed, Mr. Hinkson conceded that if his client had been found sitting and drinking, the Crown's case would have been made out. I do not find that the mere fact that he was walking (i.e. possibly "travelling" somewhere) changes anything.

Conclusion

[22] Mr. Szakiel is found guilty.

Released: March 12, 2026

Signed: Justice Brock Jones

[^1]: Anyone who has observed a busy plea court will also understand the frustration that comes with lengthy arraignments on charges of this nature, as the clerk must read out a complicated charge that often includes every possible exception listed on the underlying release or probation order. Clearer charging documents benefit everyone, cause no prejudice to the accused, and help conserve valuable court resources.