WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.— (3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025-02-03
COURT FILE No.: Chatham 137/24
BETWEEN:
Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports
Applicant,
— AND —
YW and Dr. RW
Respondents
Before Justice M. Vickerd
Heard on January 20, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on February 3, 2025
Counsel:
Paula DeBoer — counsel for the applicant society
Tara Gatten — counsel for the respondent mother YW
Stephen Andari — counsel for the respondent father Dr. RW
J. C. — Korean Interpreter for YW (affirmed)
VICKERD J.:
OVERVIEW
[1] This is a child protection application commenced by Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports (“Linck”) in October 2024.
[2] A temporary care and custody hearing was convened in this proceeding on January 20, 2025.
POSITIONS
[3] Linck seeks an interim order placing the children into the care of the Respondent mother, subject to supervision by Linck. Further, the Society seeks an order for access between the children and their father to occur supervised by the Society or its designate, to be offered three times per week and other times as approved by the Society.
[4] The Respondent father “Dr. RW” seeks an interim order placing the children into the joint care of the parents, subject to supervision by the Society. In the alternative, he seeks placement of the children into the care of the mother, with liberal daily access to the children to be supervised by the mother or another society designate. He proposes a term that such supervision shall include “eyes on supervision” and that he not be in a caregiving role for the female children or be responsible for any of the female children’s personal intimate care.
[5] The Respondent mother “YW” supports the interim order sought by the father.
[6] In consideration of the parties’ positions, I reviewed the pleadings which include: the Child Protection Application issued October 17, 2024; the Society’s Notice of Motion dated October 17, 2024; the Affidavit of C. Chevalier sworn October 17, 2024; the Affidavit of A. Taylor sworn October 17, 2024; Answer of Dr. RW dated November 15, 2024; Dr. RW’s Notice of Motion dated November 15, 2024; Affidavit of Dr. RW sworn November 15, 2024; Answer of YW dated November 20, 2024; Affidavit of YW sworn November 20, 2024; Affidavit of S. Salter sworn December 5, 2024; and, Affidavit of A. Taylor sworn December 17, 2024.
BACKGROUND
[7] There are three subject children of this proceeding. The two female children are ages four (4) and seven (7) years. The male child is age ten (10) years.
[8] The Respondents, Dr. RW and YW, are the parents of the children. The Respondents are married.
[9] On October 13, 2024, Dr. RW was charged with three counts of sexual assault, three counts of sexual interference and three counts of invitation to sexual touching in relation to two female children, unrelated to him, but are sisters to each other—ages three (3) and six (6) years. The alleged events leading to these charges occurred in the W’s family home.
[10] Linck became involved with this family on October 13, 2024, as a result of Chatham-Kent Police Services Constable Thompson’s report to the Society that Dr. RW was under investigation for sexual offences relating to neighbour children. The officer was noted as concerned as Dr. RW has three children in his home.
[11] On October 14, 2024, Dr. RW was released from police custody. Thereafter, the Society imposed terms on the father’s contact with the parties’ children.
[12] The child protection application and temporary care motion were first addressed in court on October 18, 2024. On that date, a “without prejudice” order was made pending fulsome argument of the motion. Justice P. Kowalyshyn made an “interim interim” order that provided:
The children are placed into the care of the respondent mother subject to supervision of Linck on the following terms and conditions:
a. The mother shall allow society representatives access to her home on an announced and unannounced basis.
b. The mother shall allow society representatives access to the children as requested.
c. The mother shall ensure that the medical, emotional, developmental and educational needs of the children are met.
d. The mother shall not permit the father to have access with the children except in accordance with a Court Order and as has been directed by the Society.
e. The mother shall sign all necessary forms of release pertaining to herself and/or the children as requested by the society and after being afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel.
f. The mother shall notify the society two weeks in advance of any change in address and/or contact information.The father shall have access to the children as arranged by the society and which shall be supervised by the society or its designate, which access shall be offered three (3) times per week and such other times as approved by the society.
[13] On October 25, 2024, Dr. RW was further charged with sexual assault and sexual interference relating to a five-year-old female child. The circumstances of those alleged events are not described in the Society’s evidence.
ANALYSIS
Evidence
[14] The Respondent Dr. RW opposes the admission of portions of the Society’s evidence found in the Affidavits of the workers C. Chevalier sworn October 17, 2024, and A. Taylor sworn October 17, 2024 relating to:
(a) Statements made by the initial two child complainants and their mother to Constable Carlie Horvath about the alleged sexual assaults as relayed by the worker in his Affidavit.
(b) Statements made by the two initial child complainants to society worker, A. Taylor; and
(c) Information from Constable Carlie Horvath concerning items of clothing located in the family home.
[15] In response, the Society argues that if the statements of the child complainants made to the police officer and the society worker are excluded, then the court should not consider the parents’ evidence concerning the statements of their children respecting their wishes to have Dr. RW resume cohabitation in the family home.
[16] According to section 94(10), the Court may admit and act on evidence that the Court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances. Justice Kathleen Baker confirmed in Child and Family Services of Grand Erie v. G.L. [2023] O.J. No. 5731 that this does not mean any evidence is admissible. She notes that at the preliminary stage of the proceeding the rules of evidence are relaxed but not completely suspended. The court must consider the quality of the evidence and determine whether such evidence is capable of being relied upon. While this is a relaxed evidentiary standard, the court must ensure that cases are dealt with justly.
[17] Direct evidence from witnesses is likely to be more reliable, as it is not being interpreted or summarized by a third person. When courts are dealing with the protection of children and the intrusion by the state into a family, it is imperative that it be able to make decisions based on the most reliable evidence that can be presented. In Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M. , 2017 ONCJ 661 at para. 17, Justice Sherr addresses the issue of evidence presented at a temporary care hearing and provides the following factors for the court’s consideration when assessing evidence at this stage:
(a) Rule 2(2) of the Family Law Rules requires that dealing with a case justly includes ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties.
(b) It is admissible evidence in writing that can be filed, not just any evidence.
(c) Rule 14(18) of the Family Law Rules requires that the affidavit should contain as much personal knowledge as possible. If from a third party, the source must be identified.
(d) Past parenting evidence must be relevant. Issues of relevance, probative value and admissibility are still alive.
(e) The affidavit material should set out at the beginning of the affidavit, the reasons for the intervention, why less disruptive steps were not taken, and what has been learned in the investigation to date. The parent's entire life should not be on parade.
(f) There should be a respect for the rules of evidence. Supposition, conjecture, speculation, innuendo, gossip, unqualified opinion, where qualified opinion is required have no place in an affidavit.
(g) Exhibits should not be used as a substitute for proper evidence.
(h) The affidavits should be proportionate. Factual inferences can be drawn from the evidence only if the facts alleged to support the inference are established by the evidence.
[18] Also, Justice L. Madsen (now of the Ontario Court of Appeal) in Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v AH, [2019] OJ No 1494 confirms that:
Courts have held that consistent hearsay evidence from a number of professionals obliged to keep accurate records may be considered "credible and trustworthy" and be given more weight by the court, particularly where the evidence is recorded by a professional with an obligation to keep accurate, contemporaneous notes. This obligation can mitigate the inherent risks hearsay evidence.
[19] I find that the evidence which was relayed from Chatham Kent Police Constable Carlie Horvath to society worker C. Chevalier about her direct interviews with the children and the disclosures they made is credible and trustworthy. Both professionals are required to keep accurate, contemporaneous notes. Police officers have a high duty to ensure that their notes are accurate in the course of their investigative duties in order for the Crown to prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Further police officers have a duty to report child protection concerns, pursuant to section 125 of the CYFSA. The officer’s interview of the complainant children occurred in the course of her professional duties as a police officer, and she is assumed to be trained and unbiased in the exercise of her duties. This evidence is credible and trustworthy.
[20] I find that the purported statements of the complainants’ mother made to the police officer, and as reported to the society worker about what her children said to her, which prompted the initial report to the police (paragraph 8 of the affidavit of C. Chevalier sworn October 17, 2024) to be inadmissible. This evidence is not credible and trustworthy as it is the children complainants’ mother relaying what she recalled her children telling her. The exact circumstances of those disclosures are unknown. Further, the accuracy of the mother’s recitation of the alleged statements is unknowable. There are significant frailties in this evidence as it is more than double hearsay when reported in the worker’s affidavit.
[21] I find that the evidence from society worker A. Taylor, about the children complainants’ statements to her to be admissible evidence. Again, A. Taylor interviewed the children directly, had a duty to make accurate and contemporaneous notes, and was acting in the course of her duties as a society worker. This evidence is credible and trustworthy. It is admissible for the current motion.
[22] The evidence from the parents about the children’s views and preferences carries little value. Children’s views and preferences when presented through the evidence of the parents, who have a significant interest in the outcome of this motion, is suspect. The parents may not accurately repeat the children’s statements, the children may feel intentional or unintentional influence from their parents, or the children may not feel empowered to speak their minds—there are many ways that the children’s views and preferences may be influenced through discussions with their parents. This evidence is not credible or trustworthy and is inadmissible.
Care of the Children
[23] This temporary care and custody motion is governed by section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (“CYFSA”). It reads:
94(2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,
(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part.
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society's supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society's supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.
[24] The court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with the adequate protection of the child or children, as outlined under section 1(2) of the CYFSA (Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.D. and F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448 at para. 29 and Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. C.N. , 2018 CarswellOnt 11610 at para. 27 and 28). The degree of intrusiveness of the society intervention and the temporary protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. Similarly, the terms and conditions relating to the child's care and supervision must be reasonable and proportionate to the risks highlighted by the evidence.
[25] At this stage, the Society’s onus is to show that on a balance of probabilities it is more likely than not that the children are at risk of harm in the care of their parents and that there is no lesser intrusive order available to address that harm (CCAS of Toronto v. M.L.R., 2011 ONCJ 652, Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v C.O., 2020 ONCJ 400 at para 12, Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.G., 2021 ONSC 2260).
[26] In considering the best order to apply, the court must bear in mind the paramount purpose under the CYFSA which is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.
[27] In this matter, Dr. RW has been charged with very serious sexual offences against three children, biologically unrelated to his family. The alleged victims of those crimes are female children, similar in age to the youngest two subject children of the W family.
[28] A parent’s sexual abuse of unrelated children may place his own children at risk of sexual abuse (Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County v. G. (M.), 1994 ONCJ 4268, Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society v JC, [2018] OJ No 3592 and Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. O. (L.M.), 1995 ONCJ 6216). In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251, a trial decision was upheld finding a 6-year-old child at risk of sexual harm due to the presence of the child’s uncle in the home who was charged with sexual offences against two older children and possession of child pornography. In that case, there was a concern that the mother did not appreciate the risk to the children of having the uncle reside in the home and she minimized the risk of harm that he posed to the children. The court found that risk was present due to the uncle’s conduct, that he was secretive, that he showed extremely poor judgment, abused his position of trust and authority, lured and groomed his victims for his own sexual gratification, together with the mother's failure to assess and appreciate the risk that his conduct created.
[29] In R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, the Supreme Court of Canada addresses crimes of sexual violence perpetrated against children:
65 The protection of children is one of the most fundamental values of Canadian society. Sexual violence against children is especially wrongful because it turns this value on its head. In reforming the legislative scheme governing sexual offences against children, Parliament recognized that children, like adults, deserve to be treated with equal respect and dignity (Badgley Committee, vol. 1, at p. 292; Fraser Committee, vol. 1, at p. 24, and vol. 2, at p. 563). Yet instead of relating to children as equal persons whose rights and interests must be respected, offenders treat children as sexual objects whose vulnerability can be exploited by more powerful adults. There is an innate power imbalance between children and adults that enables adults to violently victimize them (Sharpe, at para. 170, per L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.; L. (D.O.), at p. 440, per L'Heureux-Dubé J.). Because children are a vulnerable population, they are disproportionately the victims of sexual crimes (George, at para. 2). In 2012, 55 percent of victims of police-reported sexual offences were children or youth under the age of 18 (Statistics Canada, Police-reported sexual offences against children and youth in Canada, 2012 (2014), at p. 6).
66 Children are most vulnerable and at risk at home and among those they trust (Sharpe, at para. 215, per L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache JJ.; K.R.J., at para. 153, per Brown J.). More than 74 percent of police-reported sexual offences against children and youth took place in a private residence in 2012 and 88 percent of such offences were committed by an individual known to the victim (Police-reported sexual offences against children and youth in Canada, 2012, at pp. 11 and 14).
67 It is for this reason that sexual violence against children can all too often be invisible to society. [page466] To resist detection, offenders perpetrate sexual violence against children in private, coerce children into not reporting, and rely on society's false belief that sexual violence against children is an aberration confined to a handful of abnormal individuals (see R. J. R. Levesque, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Human Rights Perspective (1999), at p. 11). Violence against children thus remains hidden, unreported, and under-recorded (Report of the independent expert for the United Nations study on violence against children, at pp. 8-9). The under-reporting of sexual violence against children is compounded by the ways in which the criminal justice system and the court process have historically failed children, including through rules of evidence premised on the assumption that children are inherently unreliable witnesses (see R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 SCC 47, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, at p. 483; N. Bala"Double Victims: Child Sexual Abuse and the Canadian Criminal Justice System", in W. S. Tarnopolsky, J. Whitman and M. Ouellette, eds., Discrimination in the law and the administration of justice (1993), 232, at p. 233).
The SCC acknowledges that children, as vulnerable members of our community, are disproportionately victims of sexual abuse. Sexual abuse of children occurs within the children’s homes and by those they trust. This abuse often occurs in private.
[30] In relation to the first set of criminal charges relating to the neighbour children, there is an allegation that the sexual abuse of the children occurred within the W family home. The circumstances of the allegations against Dr. RW, alleged by the neighbour children include:
(a) That he isolated the children from the others when committing the acts in his home.
(b) That he dressed the female children in underwear/bathing suit with the vaginal area cut out.
(c) That he bounced both the female children on his pelvis while singing a song.
(d) That he put goggles on a child and stuck something in her mouth that “tasted like a thumb.”
(e) One child reports that she saw his penis.
(f) One child reports that he stuck his penis “in her bum.”
[31] Further, it is alleged that this abuse occurred when the subject W children were present in the home. Also, there were items of clothing purportedly used in the criminal acts found within the home. There were statements made by the initial child complainants to the police officer and social worker that during the acts of sexual violence, Dr. RW made references to his own daughters.
[32] Having considered all of the evidence, the applicable legislation, and the case law, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the subject children would suffer harm if placed into the joint care of the parents. At this time, there is no concern about the mother’s care of the children. Continued placement of the children in her care, with society supervision would mitigate risk to the children. The terms of supervision proposed by the Society are proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.
[33] I find that the least disruptive placement that is consistent with the children's best interests at this time is placement with the mother under the terms of supervision proposed by Linck.
Dr RW’s Access/ Presence in the Home
[34] Section 94(8) of the Act provides that: “An order made under clause (2) (c) or (d) may contain provisions regarding any person’s right of access to the child on such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.”
[35] The CYFSA requires a careful balancing of the paramount objective to promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children, with the value of maintaining the family unit. The legislation does not emphasize parental rights but rather recognizes the importance of maintaining the family unit as a means of fostering the best interests of children. The values and purposes outlined under section 1(2) must always be evaluated in contemplation of what is best for the child (Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. M. (C.), 1994 SCC 83, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 165). Also, in CFSA v. K.L.W., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 519, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that child protection legislation is about protecting children from harm and commented at paragraph 80 that the child protection legislation is “a child welfare statute and not a parents’ rights statute.”
[36] Both parents seek an interim order which would facilitate Dr. RW resuming cohabitation in the home with his family. The parents argue that any potential risk to the female children could be mitigated with a requirement for supervision of the father in the home and with terms that he not be involved in personal care for the female children. The parents argue that the father’s absence from the family home is having a detrimental impact on the children who miss him. The parents describe the children as exhibiting new negative behaviours consistent with their feelings the loss of their father from their daily lives. The parents express in their affidavits a desire to keep their family life “as normal as possible” under the circumstances. Dr. RW wishes an opportunity to continue to participate in the children’s daily lives and attend at the children’s extra-curricular activities with the mother present. These requested orders are not prohibited by the terms of the father’s criminal Release Orders which allow him to be present in locations where children are if he has an adult present who is aware of his criminal charges. Further, in the Release Orders there is a term that Dr. RW could not be alone with any children, except his own, unless an adult was present who was aware of his criminal charges.
[37] For this motion, I can accept that the parents and their children have maintained close and loving relationships. I accept that the children may miss their father and want to have their family reunited. But, these expressions from the children do not outweigh the importance of minimizing the risk of sexual harm or emotional harm to the children which can result from the father having unsupervised parenting time or the mother’s inability to effectively monitor his contact with the children.
[38] I am concerned about YW’s ability to act protectively of the children for the following reasons:
(a) I have no evidence about the current status and nature of YW and Dr. RW’s relationship. I have no evidence that YW is sufficiently independent – financially and otherwise – of Dr. RW to assert herself should he disregard terms of supervision. The father is a medical doctor. I have no evidence of the mother’s education or occupation. No evidence was presented about her commitments outside of the home—whether employment, volunteer, or otherwise. At the motion hearing, the mother required a Korean interpreter and her level of fluency with the English language was not identified in the evidence. Her level of dependence on the father may impact her ability to act protectively of the children. At this time, I do not have enough evidence to address her level of dependence on her husband;
(b) Also, I have no evidence if the mother has family and community supports independent of the father. The reference to family members in the evidence for the current motion were to YW’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law. For example, when the father was first incarcerated, the children stayed with the paternal grandmother overnight and the mother at a friend’s home.
(c) The mother YW told the worker C. Chevalier on October 14, 2024, that she has no concerns with Dr. RW as a parent and has no concerns for her children. She confirmed that she had observed nothing “suspicious, strange or concerning” in their home. Despite learning that the father had been charged with sexual offences concerning other children, the mother was steadfast in her support of her husband. Also, despite receiving details of the charges through the society’s pleadings, the mother remains committed to the reunification of her family.
(d) The alleged events of sexual abuse against the children’s female friends occurred in the family home when the parties’ children were present.
(e) Police found clothing items related to the alleged sexual abuse within the family home. Specifically, the police located: pink children’s underwear with the front area cut away, a child’s bathing suit with the vaginal area cut out of it; a pair of children’s pajamas with the vagina and buttocks area cut out. There was also a pair of men’s shorts with the front area cut out of them. These items were found in the family home in a box located in the garage. The clothing items associated with the alleged abuse found in the W family home were items described by the first two children in making their disclosures to police about sexual touching by Dr. RW. The fact that these items were located in the family home raise concerns about the mother’s ability to monitor events and items in her home. If she knew about these items, they should have compelled her to act protectively of her children. If she did not know about these items, then Dr. RW was operating in secrecy within the home and a concern arises about her attention. Whether the items were known to the mother or not, I have concerns about her ability to monitor things happening in proximity to the children.
(f) The mother may have facilitated retributory allegations against the father of the alleged neighbour victims of Dr. RW. On October 14, 2024, after the criminal charges were laid against Dr. RW concerning the neighbour children, the mother reported to C. Chevalier by telephone that she had a concern that the neighbour children’s father, Mr. D, had inappropriately touched E (age 4 years) during a sleepover which occurred the week before. This disclosure was investigated, and Mr. D was not charged with any criminal offence. There is a concern that the mother could have facilitated this disclosure as at the same time that YW made the report to C. Chevalier, she noted that her mother-in-law had shared with her the family name of the complainants. The mother denies that this is the case. Also, when C. Chevalier interviewed the W children on October 14, 2024, before the allegation against Mr. D, to explore whether they had been abused and no disclosures were made at that time. If the mother intentionally facilitated the fabrication of these allegations, I would have significant concerns about the potential for emotional and psychological abuse of the female W children. This is especially true in light of the fact that this disclosure against Mr. D required E. to undergo a physical examination which was determined inconclusive.
(g) After the Society advanced the current motion based on the first set of criminal charges, neither the father Dr. RW nor the mother YW revealed to the Society the imposition of the third set of sexual assault charges laid against Dr. RW relating to an unrelated five-year-old female child.
(h) It is impractical to expect that the mother can provide “eyes-on” supervision of the father at all times with three children in the home. There is no detailed plan advanced by the parents regarding how such supervision could work.
[39] In advancing that Dr. RW’s return to the home will not pose risk to the children, the parents argue that there is no evidence that Dr. RW acted inappropriately with the W children. They point to the lack of disclosures made when the W children were interviewed by the society worker. The female W children were interviewed once by society worker C. Chevalier about potential sexual abuse from their father. All agree that the W children did not make any reports of harm at that time. This lack of disclosure does not unequivocally lead to a conclusion that no sexual abuse of the W children occurred. As is clear from the Supreme Court of Canada in the decision of R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43: "there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault will behave." Also, in another SCC decision, R. v. W. (R.), 1992 SCC 56, [1992] 2 SCR 122, a case relating to sexual abuse of children by a family member, “victims of abuse often in fact do not disclose it, and if they do, it may not be until a substantial length of time has passed.” It may take time for children to make disclosures of sexual abuse. If Dr. RW were permitted to resume living in the family home, emotional harm may result for the children, especially if they were victims of past abuse by him. I find the lack of disclosure by the W children at one interview not to be a compelling reason to allow the father to have unlimited contact with them in the family home.
[40] The parents advocate for a return to normalcy for the W children. They want the father in the home with “seamless” supervision of his contact with the children by the mother. Unfortunately, this goal is not achievable at this time as the potential risk of harm to the children is too great. Given the nature of the charges against Dr. RW, the alleged circumstances surrounding the charges, the fact that there are three complainants, and the similarities in age and gender to Dr RW’s own children, a cautious approach to Dr. RW’s contact with the subject children is warranted. The risk of sexual harm and emotional harm to the subject children is great and there is no order which could assure the mitigation of harm if Dr. RW were permitted to resume cohabitation in the family home. As such, I decline to make an order permitting the mother to act as supervisor to Dr. RW’s access with the children.
ORDER
[41] Given the foregoing, an interim order is made on the following terms:
The children are placed into the temporary care of the Respondent mother YW subject to the supervision of Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports on the following terms and conditions:
b. The mother shall allow Society representatives access to her home on an announced and unannounced basis.
c. The mother shall allow society representatives independent access to the children as requested.
d. The mother shall ensure that the medical, emotional, developmental and educational needs of the children are met.
e. The mother shall not permit the father to have access with the children except in accordance with this court order and as directed by the Society.
f. The mother shall execute all necessary forms to allow the Society to obtain information about herself and the children directly from any service providers, after being afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel.
g. The mother shall notify the society two (2) weeks in advance of any proposed change of residential address and/or contact information.The respondent father Dr. RW shall have supervised access with the children which shall be supervised by Linck or its designate, which shall occur for up to four hours per day with times and supervisors to be approved by the society in advance. The mother shall not act as a supervisor to the father’s access until further court order.
The Child Protection Application is adjourned for a Settlement Conference to occur on March 21, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. in person. Korean interpreter required.
Released: February 3, 2025
Signed: Justice M. Vickerd