ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2025 11 21

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

-- AND --

TANYA MOQUIN

Before Justice J.R. Lalande

Heard on November 10 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on November 21, 2025

R. Feldstein -- counsel for the Crown

R. Langevin -- counsel for the accused Tanya Moquin

Lalande J.:

Overview

[1] Tanya Moquin is charged with causing a disturbance and assaulting a peace officer. While the evidence is conflicting on the various accounts, at its highest, the assault consists of an allegation that, while being removed from her vehicle during the process of arrest for causing a disturbance, Ms. Moquin kicked the leg of one of the officers.

[2] Ms. Moquin seeks a stay of proceedings, arguing that her right to be tried within a reasonable time has been breached. I accept her argument and the case will be stayed for the reasons set out below.

[3] The overall delay in this case is 718 days or 23 months and 18 days. It exceeds the presumptive ceiling of 548 days or 18 months.

[4] The framework in Jordan requires me to consider first whether there is any defence-caused delay by conduct or waiver. After deducting any defence delay from the overall delay, the remaining time is measured against the presumptive ceiling. Should it exceed the ceiling, the burden is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances either in the form of discrete events or unusual complexity. Failure to do so must result in a stay.

[5] Essentially, there are two issues to be resolved in this application. The first is the characterization of certain periods as defence-caused delay. The Crown alleged that some delay was attributable to defence during the initial period following the swearing of the information and prior to the trial dates being set. The Crown also sought to characterize periods of unavailability for the continuation dates as defence-caused delay. After considering the matter, I would deduct 99 of the proposed 128 days sought by the Crown.

[6] The second issue is whether any delay beyond the presumptive ceiling is justified based on exceptional circumstances. No argument was raised by the Crown as to discrete events. Instead, it argued that the case was of a particularly complex nature such that it warranted further reductions from the overall delay (Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 77-79). As I will explain, I decline to do so.

[7] The net delay is 619 days or 20 months and 10 days. It exceeds the presumptive ceiling by more than two months. Therefore, as the law instructs, I must find that Ms. Moquin's right to be tried within a reasonable time has been breached and the charges will be stayed.

Preliminary Observations

[8] As the Local Administrative Judge, I am aware that in recent years, the number of incoming cases in this jurisdiction has increased substantially, at a far greater rate than other jurisdictions in our region or province. In addition, it is well-known that the local trial rate has been well above the provincial and regional average for years. In recent times, justice system participants have strived to reduce the overall delay to trial in an effort to comply with provincial directives and to recover from the backlog caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. In short, we are taking on more work, trying many more cases than other jurisdictions, and doing so on tighter timelines than ever before.

[9] This case is, in several ways, symptomatic of some of the problems that plague our collective ability to effectively manage cases in this difficult climate. Overall, it took approximately six hours of court time to complete but was scheduled for a total of five and a half Court days. This was because the matter was dealt with in fits and starts over its first two days and was not reached on the third and fourth. Disclosure issues arose during the trial and additional time was required to complete the matter and to accommodate a lost evidence application as well as the need to recall a witness. These avoidable issues took up a significant amount of the overall trial time.

[10] Without them, the case could have taken significantly less time. I would conservatively estimate four hours as the appropriate duration for the trial. Despite this, the matter occupied more than five days on the Court calendar and significantly more actual Court time than was warranted. These references do not include the additional resources and time required to process and hear the 11(b) application.

[11] In short, there were challenges and failings on multiple levels in this case. When this occurs, I recognize that it often falls on the Crown to explain the consequences to victims, law enforcement and the public. I also appreciate the many challenges that come with stacking our Court lists. Day-to-day, prosecutors in my courtroom have attempted to triage the scheduled matters in an efficient manner but far too many cases are scheduled for trial. Public confidence demands that all professional participants in the justice system pay close attention to the resources available and a sharper focus is required at all pretrial and trial stages to keep our dockets manageable. I call on all members of the local bar, Crown or defence, to be mindful of these challenges and the pressing need for the efficient use of our resources.

Issue 1 -- Defence-Caused Delay

Positions of the Parties

[12] Mr. Langevin, on behalf of the Applicant, suggested that some 30 days ought to be characterized as defence delay during the initial phases of the prosecution.

[13] Mr. Feldstein suggests deducting the following 128 days as defence-caused delay:

• 28 Days from January 16 to February 13, 2024 -- Defence caused delay for failing to retain counsel
• 28 Days from April 18 to May 16, 2024 - Defence caused delay as additional time required to obtain instructions on potential resolution
• 13 Days from May 16 to July 4, 2024 -- Defence caused delay due to unavailability for earlier judicial pre-trials [^1]
• 59 Days from July 23 to September 10, 2025, and October 24 to November 4 2025 - Defence caused delay due to unavailability for trial continuation dates

Analysis

[14] The defence-caused delay in the early part of the case's lifespan is easily dealt with. Given the concession by Mr. Langevin that defence caused approximately one month of delay at the beginning of the case, the first period of 28 days for failing to retain counsel will be attributed as defence delay.

[15] As well, the additional 28 days needed to obtain instructions from April through May of 2024 is clearly defence-caused delay. The evidence is clear that defence had three weeks to obtain instructions before seeking this adjournment while the Court and Crown were ready to proceed to the next phase. No argument made by defence with respect to this period in submissions.

[16] I also agree that the 13 days of delay due to Mr. Langevin's unavailability for a judicial pretrial is attributable to defence. Again, no argument was made by defence as to this segment.

[17] While these issues are straightforward, the Crown's argument regarding defence unavailability for the trial continuation for 59 days between June 23rd and September 10th 2025 is more complicated. To begin, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Hanan, at paragraph, there is no bright line rule according to which all the delay following defence counsel's rejection of a date until the next available one must be characterized as defence delay. Referencing Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2 at paragraph 8, the Supreme Court in Hanan instructs that all relevant circumstances should be considered in a what they describe as a 'contextual approach'. Recently, Justice Schrek, in Bowen-Wright, 2024 ONSC 293 at paragraph 40, a summary conviction appeal, reviewed factors that are usually relevant to the contextual approach in this type of situation:

• The reason for the need to reschedule
• The extent to which defence was available
• The reasons for defence's unavailability
• The extent of notice given of a new trial date

[18] I turn now to a review of each of these factors.

a) The Reason for the Need to Reschedule

[19] First, the reason for the need to reschedule in this case was not caused by defence. On the four days scheduled for trial, Ms. Moquin and her counsel attended on time and prepared to proceed. Unfortunately, the matter was only reached for approximately two hours on the first day in May and for just over one hour on the second day. On the second day, the matter was plagued by disclosure issues that necessitated a lengthy break and the recalling of an officer.

[20] Unfortunately, the matter was not reached at all on the remaining two days. Rather, the Crown opted to prioritize other matters over that of Ms. Moquin. Decisions of this nature are difficult ones, and I do not fault the Crown whatsoever for their assessment and prioritization of the competing matters on any of the scheduled days for trial. In fact, a review of the dockets for each of the scheduled trial days reveals that two to three other trials were scheduled along with Ms. Moquin's, in addition to other matters. Many of them were serious in nature.

[21] To illustrate, on May 26, 2025, Court started an hour early to deal with sentencing in a matter involving a tragic motor vehicle collision. That was followed by the conclusion a serious multi-day sexual interference trial. Also scheduled were trials for assault with a weapon and a dangerous driving. Over lunch, another sentencing matter was completed. Eventually, Ms. Moquin's matter was heard for approximately two hours towards the end of the day.

[22] On May 27, 2025, two sentencing hearings were held between 9 and 10am. There were also three other trials on the docket to be dealt with, including an in-custody matter involving allegations of intimate partner violence. Over the lunch hour, a sentencing hearing took place on a serious matter where an offender failed to provide the necessities of life. When a French trial involving stolen property completed in the mid-afternoon, Ms. Moquin's matter was continued in two segments with a break in between to deal with a disclosure issue. During that break, another case was dealt with.

[23] The remaining days where Ms. Moquin's trial was not reached, May 30 and June 24, 2025, had similar dockets.

[24] In short, Ms. Moquin bears no responsibility for the matter being adjourned. Rather, the delay is the product of the Crown making responsible choices in line with its duty to call the list and to manage a high volume of serious cases.

b) The Extent to Which Defence Was Available

[25] After the matter failed to complete on time, a date was required to continue. That date was chosen on June 24 2025.

[26] Despite having a trial scheduled in the same courtroom that day, defence was willing to schedule the matter for June 27th. Unfortunately, the assigned Crown was unavailable. Defence counsel was available for other dates offered by the trial coordinator, including September 10th and October 15th 2025.

[27] When it comes to the dates in July that were unavailable to defence, the transcript from June 24 2025 reveals that, initially, no dates were available between June and September. After the trial coordinator took a few minutes to "work some magic", two dates were offered in July. The first, July 9, was unavailable for both parties and July 24 was unavailable to defence. No other dates were offered until September 10th when the Crown was unavailable.

c) The Reasons for Defence's Unavailability

[28] According to the transcripts, defence counsel in this case was unavailable for two dates due to pre-existing Court commitments. With respect to the July 9 date, Mr. Langevin had a bail hearing scheduled on a serious matter. The trial coordinator then offered July 24th in a satellite Court in Alexandria, Ontario. Defence unfortunately had a trial booked in Cornwall that day.

[29] While Crown counsel argued during submissions that defence ought to have prioritized this matter, I see the situation as quite understandable. As was observed in Safdar, 2021 ONCA 207 at paragraph 50, counsel cannot be expected to "compromise one client's interests for another."

d) The Extent of Notice Given of a New Trial Date

[30] Here, there was little notice that a date would be offered within one month after Ms. Moquin's matter failed to complete in late June 2025. As pointed out in Bowen-Wright at paragraph 48, judicial experience shows that, "Counsel are much more likely to be booked up nearer in the future."

[31] Applying a contextual approach to this segment of delay, I decline to attribute the entire period between July 23, 2025 and September 10, 2025, as defence delay due to unavailability. Defence was not responsible for the continuation and was available for some dates offered. This includes one available date the very same week. That he had some commitments in the weeks ahead is entirely understandable. He was also willing to double-book himself with this matter in the same courtroom where he had a trial scheduled and the date that was refused in July was offered in a satellite location.

[32] On balance, I conclude that a fair apportionment of the delay is to attribute 30 of the 59 days elapsed as defence-caused delay.

Conclusion

[33] The following portions will be deducted from the overall delay of 718 days as defence delay:

• 28 days (from January 16 to February 13 2024)
• 28 days (from April 18 2024 to May 16 2024)
• 13 days (within May 16 2024 to July 4 2024)
• 30 days (within July 23 2025 to September 10 2025)

[34] These deductions, totaling 99 days, reduce the overall delay to 619 days. Thus, the matter exceeds the presumptive ceiling by 71 days. The Crown bears the onus of establishing that this delay beyond the presumptive ceiling is justified based on exceptional circumstances.

Issue 2 -- Exceptional Circumstances: Complexity

Positions of the Parties

[35] Relying on Anderson, 2025 ONCA 172, Mr. Feldstein, for the Crown, argues that Ms. Moquin's matter had certain administrative complexities that require further qualitative deductions from the overall delay. These deductions, in his submission, ought to result in a net delay below the presumptive ceiling. No argument was put forward in terms of any discrete events.

[36] Mr. Langevin submits that no deductions should be made for any exceptional circumstances.

Analysis

[37] The characterization of "cases that are particularly complex" was described by the majority in Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, at paragraphs 77 and 79 in the following terms:

Particularly complex cases are cases that, because of the nature of the evidence or the nature of the issues, require an inordinate amount of trial or preparation time ... hallmarks of particularly complex cases include voluminous disclosure, a large number of witnesses, significant requirements for expert evidence, and charges covering a long period of time. ... a large number of charges and pre-trial applications; novel or complicated legal issues; and a large number of significant issues in dispute...

... the trial judge will also want to consider whether the Crown, having initiated what could reasonably be expected to be a complex prosecution, developed and followed a concrete plan to minimize the delay occasioned by such complexity ... Where it has failed to do so, the Crown will not be able to show exceptional circumstances, because it will not be able to show that the circumstances were outside its control.

[38] An example of what constitutes a complex case is found in Tsega, 2017 ONCA 3090. The Court of Appeal described it at paragraphs 78 in this way:

The investigation involved four separate police services. More than 103 witnesses were interviewed, 74 of them made video recorded statements. Part VI authorizations under the Code resulted in 39,129 intercepted communications. Ten production orders were executed capturing phone records from 27 different phones. Nine search warrants were executed involving homes in Ottawa and Toronto and 900 photographs were taken. Several expert witnesses were consulted and retained, including those in the fields of pathology, DNA, firearms, GSR, and cellular phone operations. In all, 308 items were seized or collected, resulting in 130 exhibits. In the end, there were 12 disclosure packages containing over 20,000 pages of disclosure along with electronic media amounting to over 51 GBs of disclosure....

[39] This description stands in stark contrast to Ms. Moquin's matter. I would describe her case as routine and straightforward. It involved a count of cause disturbance and a count of assault police stemming from a single discrete incident. Four witnesses testified, including the accused. Also, as I mentioned, cumulatively, the entire case, including evidence and submissions on the trial as well as a lost evidence application, took less than six hours. Plainly, this case does not meet the usual criteria for what is, at law, considered exceptionally complex.

[40] While the Crown acknowledges that this case does not have the usual hallmarks of complexity, it relies heavily on the authority of Anderson, in support of its argument that an 'administrative complexity' complicated Ms. Moquin's matter. As I understand it, Ms. Moquin's case required an out-of-jurisdiction prosecutor as the accused is or was apparently related to a staff member at the Crown's office.

[41] In Anderson, Justice Chaffe attended a jurisdiction from out-of-region to preside over a lengthy matter with out-of-town staff owing to a conflict with respect to one of the complainants. Justice Chaffe's 11(b) ruling, which was upheld on appeal, relied in part on the complexity of the case to establish exceptional circumstances.

[42] Having reviewed and reflected on the Anderson decision, I conclude that it does not assist the Crown in Ms. Moquin's matter for the following two reasons. First, Anderson bore the hallmarks of a typical complex case. The accused faced 19 charges of a serious nature involving sexual violence against 10 complainants. There were several complicated procedural applications as well as various Charter applications. Any 'administrative complexity' referred to in that case was in addition to these factors (Anderson, at para 32). By contrast, as I have described, Ms. Moquin's matter is uncomplicated and straightforward. It simply cannot be assessed as complex when regarded qualitatively or as a whole.

[43] Second, the 'administrative complexity' in Anderson involved, principally, some difficulty scheduling around holidays and prior court commitments of the various parties and, to some extent, issues with litigation support and disclosure (Anderson, at para 32). None of those issues featured prominently in this case. At best, Crown counsel has articulated two issues related to what was termed 'administrative complexity'.

[44] The first issue argued by the Crown involved scheduling a JPT. Mr. Feldstein was unavailable for two JPT slots offered in May of 2023 as they began at 9:30am, which coincided with his existing trial commitments. Mr. Feldstein complains that his home jurisdiction starts their trials at 930am, which puts him at a disadvantage given that Cornwall's trials start at 10am. With respect, I disagree. Invariably, Court days in this jurisdiction begin at 9am or 930am with other matters, including JPTs. For instance, my Court opened at 9am or 930am on every single one of Ms. Moquin's scheduled trial days, and her 11(b) application was heard between 9-10am on November 10, 2025, in advance of a trial list being called. In short, while Mr. Feldstein may regularly prosecute trials beginning at 930am in his home jurisdiction, the local Crowns in Cornwall also have early Court commitments daily.

[45] The second issue argued by the Crown is that there was some confusion as between the Crowns and defence counsel because of the 'administrative complexities' involving an out-of-jurisdiction prosecutor. At one point, he met with duty counsel for a CPT, and the next day, the accused retained Mr. Langevin, who, in turn, met with a local Cornwall Crown for a CPT. At the time, Mr. Feldstein had been assigned to the matter for nearly a month and Mr. Langevin's agent had been appearing for two months indicating that the retainer was being perfected. While some 18 days of delay elapsed before the two assigned lawyers were able to connect, I am not prepared to attribute these events to exceptional complexity.

[46] While I appreciate that prosecuting matters in a neighbouring jurisdiction may require additional administrative legwork, what is absent from these confusing events is evidence of any 'concrete plan' (Jordan, para 79). The Supreme Court instructed in Jordan that this a precondition to accessing the 'complexity' branch of exceptional circumstances which justify delay. For example, experience suggests that an out-of-jurisdiction prosecutor may benefit from introducing themselves upon assignment to the lawyer appearing in Court on behalf of the accused or by leaving a note-to-file for any local Crowns to forward any pretrial requests or correspondence to the assigned Crown. The bottom line here is that there were minimal measures available to the Crown that could have easily avoided this confusion.

[47] Finally, as part of his overall argument that this case was complex, Mr. Feldstein submits that I should consider as a part of the analysis that I was only judge available in this jurisdiction to hear the case. As he explained in submissions, in addition to the conflict at the Crown's office, the accused also had a connection to a former special constable who worked in the courthouse. Prior to the matter being scheduled for trial, this issue prompted informal determinations that three of the four local judges would be unable to hear the matter due to a conflict of interest. As a result, the trial was set in accordance with my availability. Local staff were employed for the trial and a local defence lawyer acted for Mr. Moquin.

[48] I do not regard the judicial conflicts as significant. First, another local judge was able to deal with JPT in this matter and discuss time estimates without the matter being delayed. Second, there is no evidence that the scheduled trial dates were delayed whatsoever when set with my availability. Third, there is no evidence that, at the time of trial-setting, the Crown was concerned by any delay of this nature such that it sought to pursue the matter further or develop a concrete plan to manage any delays. These steps could have included prioritizing the matter over other scheduled trials or initiating a request to engage judicial resources from out-of-jurisdiction to prevent any undue delay. Instead, the Crown was content to set a trial date beyond the presumptive ceiling. For these reasons, I do not accept the Crown's argument that the judicial conflicts are germane to my determination of whether exceptional circumstances existed in this case due to its complexity.

Conclusion

[49] Having made the identified deductions for defence-caused delay and declined any deduction for complexity, the matter remains above the presumptive ceiling. I find that Ms. Moquin's section 11(b) right to have been violated. In the result, the charges will be stayed.

Released: November 21, 2025

Signed: Justice J.R. Lalande

[^1]: Initially, the Crown sought to deduct 49 days for defence delay relating to the scheduling of JPTs. When reviewing the application record in submissions, Mr. Feldstein fairly conceded that only 13 days of delay ought to be deducted.