Court Information
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: October 24, 2025
Court File No.: Central West – Brampton – 3111 998 24-31109171
Parties
Between:
His Majesty the King
— And —
Mohammad Ayoubi
Reasons on s.11(b) Application
Before: Justice A. Neil Singh
Heard on: October 2, 2025
Reasons for Judgment on s.11(b) released on: October 24, 2025
Counsel:
- Simran Singh, Counsel for the Respondent/Crown
- Virgil Cojocaru, Counsel for the Applicant/Defendant Mohammad Ayoubi
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Factual Background
- The Jordan Framework
- Positions of the Parties
- Analysis & Discussion
- Total Delay
- Defence Delay
- Net Delay
- Delay Below the Presumptive Ceiling
- Conclusion
Introduction
[1] The Applicant seeks a declaration that their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) has been breached. He applies under s.24(1) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings. The Respondent opposes the application.
[2] On July 23, 2024, the Applicant was charged with sexual assault. The information was sworn August 8, 2024. The presumptive Jordan ceiling is February 8, 2026. The trial is scheduled to be completed January 29, 2026. The Applicant seeks to meet his onus for a below-the-ceiling stay.
[3] These are my reasons:
The Factual Background
[4] To properly assess whether a s.11(b) breach has been established, a summary of the factual background is necessary. While this is not meant to be exhaustive, I have considered the entire evidentiary record before me. The following are simply the key factual circumstances necessary to understand the issues and the Court's ultimate determination of this application.
| Date | Facts |
|---|---|
| July 23, 2024 | Mr. Ayoubi is arrested by the Peel Regional Police Service on a charge of sexual assault. He is released on an undertaking and given a first appearance date of August 14, 2024. |
| July 26, 2024 | Counsel for Mr. Ayoubi sends a written request for disclosure to the Brampton Crown Attorney's office. |
| August 7, 2024 | Counsel for Mr. Ayoubi schedules a Crown Pretrial (CPT) for August 23, 2024. |
| August 8, 2024 | The information is sworn. |
| August 21, 2024 | A first appearance was held. Disclosure is noted as outstanding by the defence. The Crown acknowledged and stated that disclosure was still being vetted. A JPT was scheduled by counsel for September 10, 2024. |
| August 23, 2024 | The initial CPT was held. |
| September 10, 2024 | An initial JPT was held. The issue of obtaining a certified translation of the complainant's statement was raised. A continuing JPT was determined to be necessary. |
| October 16, 2024 | The Applicant scheduled a continuing JPT for November 12, 2024. |
| October 28, 2024 | The Crown disclosed the statement of the complainant. The complainant's statement is translated by an officer in real-time during the statement. |
| November 5, 2024 | The Respondent formally requested certified translations of the video statement. |
| November 7, 2024 | Defence counsel contacted the Trial Coordinator's office and cancelled the November 12, 2024, JPT due to the lack of translated disclosure. |
| November 8, 2024 | The defence rescheduled the JPT for December 3, 2024. |
| November 14, 2024 | The Crown communicated to counsel that they would not be providing certified translations. The Crown took the position that the real-time translation provided by the officer was sufficient. |
| December 3, 2024 | The continuing JPT was held. A trial time estimate was confirmed. Timelines were discussed for pretrial motions pursuant to s.278.92 of the Criminal Code. Counsel booked a trial scheduling conference and secured the first available date: December 13, 2024. |
| December 13, 2024 | At the trial scheduling conference, the earliest date offered that accommodated the pretrial motion timelines were the trial dates of January 26-29, 2026. |
| February 18, 2025 | A further trial scheduling conference was held. Dates for a Stage 1 and Stage 2 hearing were secured in accordance with the discussed timelines. A s.11(b) motion was also secured as well. |
| July 8, 2025 | The Crown advised the defence that it revised its position and would be providing certified translations of the complainant's statement. |
| July 23, 2025 | The certified translations were completed. |
| September 18, 2025 | The certified translations were disclosed to the defence. |
[5] The total time from the date the information was sworn to the anticipated end of the scheduled trial is 539 days or 17.7 months.
The Jordan Framework
[6] In determining whether an Applicant's right under s.11(b) of the Charter has been breached, Application Judges are required to employ the framework established by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Jordan. For a matter proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice, the Supreme Court established a ceiling of 18 months from the swearing of the information, after which the delay is considered presumptively unreasonable.
[7] In R v. Coulter, the Ontario Court of Appeal helpfully distilled the framework down to the following steps:
Calculate the total delay, which is the date of the swearing of the information to the actual end or anticipated end of trial (i.e., the end of the evidence and closing arguments).
To calculate the net delay, subtract defence delay, including delay that is waived by the defence, from the total delay.
Compare the net delay to the presumptive Jordan ceiling.
If the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the delay is presumptively unreasonable. The onus is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay by establishing the presence of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown is unable to do so, a stay will follow. Exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.
To calculate the remaining delay, subtract, from the net delay, delay caused by discrete events.
If the remaining delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, consider whether the case was particularly complex, so as to justify the time the case has taken and lead to a conclusion that the delay is reasonable.
If the remaining delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is, in any event, unreasonable.
[8] To establish a below-ceiling breach of an Applicant's s.11(b) Charter right, the Applicant must satisfy both of the following criteria: (1) that the defence took meaningful steps demonstrating a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and (2) that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Their onus is assessed on a balance of probabilities.
[9] It should be noted that a stay within the presumptive ceiling should be considered as rare and limited to "clear cases."
[10] The burden at this stage is on the Applicant to show that they took meaningful, sustained steps to expedite the proceedings. The Court is to consider what the defence could have done, and what it actually did to get the case heard as quickly as possible. Substance matters, not form. The defence are expected to act reasonably, not perfectly.
[11] In determining whether the case took markedly longer than it otherwise reasonably should have the Court is to look at a number of factors including (i) local considerations, (ii) the complexity of the case, and (iii) the Crown's efforts to expedite the proceedings.
[12] In assessing local considerations, trial judges should "employ the knowledge they have of their own jurisdiction, including how long a case of that nature typically takes to get to trial in light of the relevant local and systemic circumstances." Trial judges are supposed to take a step back from the minutiae and adopt a bird's-eye view of the case. It is unlikely that the time requirements of a case will have been markedly exceeded if the Crown has done its part to ensure the matter proceeded expeditiously.
[13] Ultimately, the issue is whether the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. In assessing a below-the-ceiling stay, the Court is to start from the position that the state brought the Applicant to trial within a presumptively reasonable time, and from there, ask whether the presumption of reasonableness has been rebutted.
Positions of the Parties
[14] The Applicant submits that although the presumptive Jordan ceiling has not been breached, he has nevertheless established a breach of his s.11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable period of time. The Applicant submits that he has made sustained efforts to expedite the matter, and the matter took markedly longer than it otherwise should have.
[15] The Respondent has opposed the application. The Respondent submits that the Applicant has failed to meet their onus on either step of the test for an under-the-ceiling stay. The Respondent submits that the Applicant's delay in scheduling and cancelling JPTs establish that their efforts were not meaningfully sustained. In addition, the matter did not take markedly longer than it otherwise reasonably should have.
Analysis & Discussion
Total Delay
[16] The total delay from the swearing of the information (August 8, 2024) to the anticipated end of trial (January 29, 2026) is 539 days, or 17.7 months. This is below the presumptive Jordan ceiling. The onus thus remains with the defendant to establish a breach of his s.11(b) right within the presumptive Jordan timeframes.
[17] While the total delay is within the Jordan timeframes, it is necessary to consider the net delay in the matter. Any defence delay may become relevant in assessing whether the efforts they made to expedite the matter were meaningful and sustained.
Defence Delay
[18] The Applicant submits they are not responsible for any delay. They never waived their s.11(b) right at any time, nor did their actions cause any of the delay in this matter.
[19] The Respondent, however, submits that there are two discrete areas of defence delay.
[20] First, the Respondent submits that the defence inexplicably delayed scheduling the JPT continuation after the first JPT. The Respondent submits that the defence is responsible for 36 days of delay between September 10, 2024, and October 16, 2024.
[21] Second, the Respondent submits that the defence is responsible for a period of 26 days from the unilateral cancellation and rescheduling of the second JPT. The Respondent submits that the period from November 12, 2024, to December 3, 2024, is defence delay.
Delay in Scheduling JPT Continuation
[22] It must be remembered that the initial JPT was scheduled without the defence having the benefit of disclosure. The initial JPT was held with counsel not having the complainant's statement to the police. The statement of the complainant existed at the time of Mr. Ayoubi's arrest. It is the complainant's statement that furnished the grounds for his arrest. Disclosure issues were discussed at the JPT. It was determined that a continuing JPT was required. A trial estimate was not fashioned at the initial JPT.
[23] While it was known that a continuing JPT was required, it was incumbent on the parties to ensure that the JPT was going to be a meaningful one. It appears that the Court did not find it appropriate to furnish a trial estimate after the first JPT.
[24] Based on the timeline in this matter, had the defence set a JPT on September 10, 2024, as the Crown submits they ought to have, a JPT would have been scheduled in early October 2024. This would have been approximately 3-weeks prior to receiving the critical disclosure that was outstanding.
[25] It was reasonable for the defence to wait some time to receive the outstanding disclosure prior to setting the continuing JPT to ensure it would be a meaningful one. The outstanding disclosure was critical to advancing the case and obtaining trial time estimates at the JPT. Disclosure issues had already been discussed at the first JPT. When disclosure did not appear to be forthcoming after a reasonable waiting period, the defence nevertheless moved to set the continuing JPT without it.
[26] This is not defence delay. The statements had been in the hands of the Crown since, at the time of his arrest, or shortly thereafter. The defence had already conducted a JPT without the benefit of this disclosure. Disclosure issues were canvassed at the initial JPT. The defence waited a reasonable period to receive the disclosure and then moved to set a continuing JPT without it.
[27] Had the defence done as the Crown submitted, it is entirely probable that the second JPT would have occurred before the Crown disclosed the statements. Nothing would stand to be accomplished at the JPT other than to remind the Crown of their outstanding Stinchcombe disclosure obligations. The matter would have been adjourned and rescheduled, yet again. The Court should not serve as a reminder system for the Crown's disclosure obligations.
[28] The delay in scheduling the continuing JPT was not occasioned solely by the defence. It was largely occasioned by the Crown not disclosing critical disclosure sooner.
Unilaterally Rescheduling the Continuing JPT
[29] Once in receipt of disclosure, the defence rescheduled the JPT. This decision was unilateral. It resulted in the rescheduling of the JPT from November 12, 2024, to December 3, 2024. The reason stated for rescheduling the JPT was due to the outstanding certified translations of the complainant's statement.
[30] This was not required. It is trite law that the defence need not every piece of disclosure to move a case forward. The statement was provided to the Applicant. It was translated on video by an assisting officer who spoke the same language as the complainant.
[31] The defence conducted the JPT on December 3, 2024, absent the translations. They were successful in obtaining a trial time estimate. There have been no suggestions by the Applicant that since receiving the certified translations that (i) the officer's translations were substantively inaccurate, or (ii) that the trial time estimate needed to be revised.
[32] Getting a certified translation of a statement can take some time. The Crown is often at the mercy of the retained translator and their schedule. What is important is whether the defence has been furnished with enough information to move the matter forward. Once in receipt of the video statements, the clear answer from the evidentiary record is, yes.
[33] I also find that the Crown's initial position that they would not provide certified translations, is immaterial to my analysis. What matters for my task at hand is whether the defence could have moved the matter forward. Even if the Crown took the position that they would provide certified translations from the get-go, the defence had enough to move forward. It was incumbent upon them to do so, and not wait on the translations. The defence had sufficient information to conduct a JPT and set trial dates.
[34] Accordingly, I find 21 days of defence delay from the rescheduling of the continuing JPT.
Net Delay
[35] There are no further deductions. The case is not complex, nor are there any discrete exceptional circumstances. The net delay and remaining delay are the same: 518 days or 17 months.
Delay Below the Presumptive Ceiling
[36] To be eligible for a below-the-ceiling stay, the Applicant must meet their onus on both prongs of the test. First, they must establish that the Applicant took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings. Second, they must establish that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
(i) Sustained Effort to Expedite the Proceedings
[37] The Applicant submitted that at all stages of the proceeding, they exhibited a sustained effort to expedite the matters. The Respondent says that the delays occasioned by the Applicant rebut any such submission.
[38] In assessing the defence efforts, I remind myself of Justice Moldaver's instructions in Jordan that I am to consider what the defence could have done, and what it actually did to get the case heard as quickly as possible. Substance matters, not form. Further, the defence must show that they attempted to set the earliest possible hearing dates, was cooperative and responsive to the Crown and the Court, put the Crown on timely notice when delay was becoming an issue and conducted all applications reasonably and expeditiously. I also remind myself not to take this opportunity, with the benefit of hindsight, to question every decision made by the defence. The standard is one of reasonableness, not perfection.
[39] The Applicant was proactive throughout the proceedings. Before the information was sworn, counsel was retained, disclosure requested, and a CPT scheduled. A JPT was scheduled in advance of any disclosure being received, on the date of the first appearance.
[40] The first JPT was conducted. Disclosure was outstanding, in particular the statement of the complainant, her husband, and the Applicant himself. A trial time estimate was not arrived at on that date, and the JPT concluded on the understanding that a continuing-JPT would need to be scheduled.
[41] Counsel reasonably waited to receive the critical disclosure. When it was not forthcoming, they scheduled the continuing-JPT. Once in receipt of the disclosure, they rescheduled the JPT to allow time to have the statements properly translated.
[42] Once the defence was advised by the Crown's office that they would not be translating the statements, they conducted the JPT, obtained trial time estimates, and promptly secured trial dates.
[43] The Applicant's actions were reasonable. They were meaningful. They were sustained. All their actions were geared towards moving the matter forward towards trial expeditiously. While I have found the defence responsible for 21 days of delay from rescheduling the continuing-JPT, that does not mean their efforts were not meaningful and sustained.
[44] In the context of this case, the action in rescheduling the JPT was reasonable, albeit imperfect. The key is the purpose. The purpose here was to allow the Crown time to provide translated statements and to save the Court time from having to conduct a meaningless JPT. This was after translations were discussed at the initial JPT, and before the Crown formally communicated to counsel that they would not be providing any.
[45] While the defence caused a delay in rescheduling the JPT, the efforts were geared at proceeding efficiently and advancing the matter expeditiously. The actions of the defence clearly demonstrate that they were interested in progressing the matter and setting the earliest trial dates possible.
[46] Jordan recognizes that an under-the-ceiling stay can occur even where there is defence delay. At paragraph 48 of Jordan, the Court stated, "If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay or a period of delay attributable to exceptional circumstances) falls below the presumptive ceiling, then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable." The standard the defence is held to is one of reasonableness, not perfection.
[47] The Supreme Court clearly found that an unreasonable delay below the presumptive ceiling can be found where there is defence delay. Otherwise, the Court would have foreclosed such a possibility. They did not do so, and in fact specifically allowed for such a possibility.
[48] It is also relevant to understand that this situation was largely created by the Crown's delay in providing disclosure. In March 2024, Justice Harris of the Superior Court of Justice in this courthouse observed, in a case involving analogous disclosure issues, that the relevant video evidence could have been provided on the day of the accused's arrest, as it had already been recorded by that time. His Honour, however, permitted the Crown an allowance of one-month to provide the disclosure.
[49] In this case, providing the video disclosure in a timely fashion would have been at the same time initial disclosure was provided, on August 23, 2024. I pause to note that there is no evidence before me that there were any particular issues with the disclosure that necessarily would have delayed its delivery – for instance the need to redact the materials for personal information, investigative privilege, etc.
[50] Had the police and/or Crown heeded Justice Harris' words, the parties would have all been able to arrive at a trial time estimate at the initial JPT on this matter on September 10, 2024 (49 days after the Applicant's arrest). The Crown's failure to do so set into motion everything that occurred after the initial JPT. The Applicant's resultant actions were, in all the circumstances, reasonable.
[51] For these reasons, I find as a fact, that the Applicant took meaningful sustained efforts to expedite the matter.
(ii) Markedly Longer
[52] At this stage, the Court is required to assess whether this case took markedly longer than it otherwise reasonably should have. The analysis requires that I take a bird's eye view and resist the urge to focus too narrowly on the minutiae of the case. The Court must assess (i) local considerations, (ii) case complexity, and (iii) whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings.
Local Considerations
[53] One of the most often repeated refrains in this Courthouse is that Brampton is one of the busiest jurisdictions in the country.
[54] I do not, however, have any evidence that Brampton is under-resourced compared to other jurisdictions. Just because a jurisdiction is busy, it does not mean it will necessarily suffer from systemic delays. A busy jurisdiction can be fully served by its system of justice. In fact, it ought to be.
[55] As Justice Harris stated in R v. A.(C.), "the decades long chronic delay in Brampton exacerbated the situation and should not lead to greater tolerance for delay, but less." The police had complete (or at least nearly complete) disclosure from the date of arrest. Further, the Crown took no steps to expedite the matter.
Case Complexity
[56] This is a straightforward case. It is an allegation of sexual assault. There is nothing complex about it. There are pretrial motions in relation to s.278.92, but in the context of this case, the records at issue are discreet and not voluminous. It certainly does not add significant complexity to this matter. No one has submitted otherwise.
[57] In terms of trial scheduling, it is important to note that the pretrial motions did not impact the dates offered. The record shows that trial dates were offered and secured first. The pretrial motion dates were obtained afterwards, in accordance with the timelines established by the Court at the JPT. They were scheduled efficiently, and did not contribute to delay in this matter.
[58] In terms of disclosure, the vast majority (if not all) of the disclosure had crystallized at the time of the offence. While most of the disclosure could have been provided to the Applicant on the date of the arrest, a reasonable allowance for its provision to the defence ought to be afforded. As I have stated above, a conservative allowance for a straightforward case such as this would be one month.
Crown Efforts to Expedite
[59] I find that the Crown did not undertake efforts to expedite this matter. There is no evidence that they did anything to expedite this case at any stage of the proceedings. They did not seek to expedite disclosure, and once s.11(b) was raised by the defence, well in advance of the trial dates, they did not attempt to secure earlier dates. They could have sought to have this matter stacked on a list with other cases and then prioritize it. They did not do so. My experience in this jurisdiction has shown me that had the Crown chosen to prioritize this matter, the Court certainly would have been able to offer earlier trial dates.
Conclusion on Step 2: This Case Took Markedly Longer Than It Reasonably Should Have
[60] When factoring in local considerations and case complexity, I find that this case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. Taking a bird's eye view of this situation, this jurist sees a few issues.
[61] This is not a complex case. Once disclosure was provided, the matter moved quickly through the system. The delay here was three-fold: the Crown's failure to provide the video statements in a timely fashion, the Court's failure to offer earlier dates at first instance, and the Crown's failure to try to expedite.
[62] The disclosure here existed at the time of the arrest, or shortly thereafter. The information was not sworn for another 16 days. The Crown had a head start before the Jordan clock started to tick. Yet somehow, and without explanation, the statements were provided 97 days after the Applicant's arrest.
[63] We all know that a defendant cannot be complacent and reap the benefits of accumulating delay. Similarly, the Crown cannot be complacent in its constitutional disclosure obligations and then benefit from it by asserting that the timeframe for the case-at-bar is what is typical in this jurisdiction.
[64] In R v. R.M., my brother Justice Bernstein found a delay of 505 days (16.6 months) for a 5-day, non-complex sexual assault trial to be markedly longer than it should have taken. In another R v. A.(C.), Justice Harris of the Superior Court of Justice found 17-months to be markedly longer than it should have been for a straightforward 3-day trial in the Ontario Court of Justice. In both cases, the delay in the matter proceeding sooner, was as a result of Crown disclosure issues. When I consider the entire evidentiary record before me and adopt a bird's eye view of the case, I come to the similar conclusion with some additional factors contributing.
[65] The Jordan-Compliant Trial Scheduling Practice Direction of the Ontario Court of Justice has been in place since November 2023. It expects that the Court offer trial dates that are expected to complete within 15 months of the information being sworn. It is also expected that the parties will be ready to set trials within 6 months of the swearing of the information date.
[66] Had the Crown provided disclosure in a timely fashion such that a trial time estimate could have been arrived at on the initial JPT date, the Trial Coordinator would have been likely been able to provide trial dates within that 15-month time frame.
[67] Factoring in the defence delay, the parties would have been ready to set dates in this matter well within 6 months, at just over 3 months. The first feasible dates offered by the Court were 13 months out, taking it beyond the 15-month target.
[68] The combination of delayed disclosure and the inability of the Court to offer any dates earlier than 13 months into the future collectively operate to make the delay in this case markedly longer than it reasonably should be.
[69] There is no explanation as to why disclosure wasn't provided sooner, or why trial dates could not be offered less than 13-months away. Additionally, the Crown did not seek to prioritize this case when s.11(b) concerns were raised.
[70] I am mindful that under-the-ceiling stays are restricted to "clear cases." That is to ensure that borderline cases are not stayed, given the significant public interest in seeing a criminal matter resolved on the merits.
[71] Based on my reasons above, this is not a borderline case. It is a clear one.
[72] This is a straightforward matter that was the subject of delayed disclosure and an inability of this Court to offer timely dates. Additionally, the Crown did not take steps to expedite the matter. To repeat the words of Justice Harris in R v. A.(C.), "the decades long chronic delay in Brampton exacerbated the situation and should not lead to greater tolerance for delay, but less." I couldn't agree more.
Conclusion
[73] The Applicant has met their onus, on a balance of probabilities, for a below-the-ceiling stay. They undertook meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings, and the matter took markedly longer than it otherwise should have. Mr. Ayoubi's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time has been infringed.
[74] Sexual violence is one of our society's most insidious evils. The damage and trauma it inflicts is far-reaching and ever lasting. It is a stain on the fabric of our community.
[75] I acknowledge, without commenting on the merits of the case, that police and Crown have put forth considerable efforts into this matter. The complainant has shown remarkable bravery.
[76] A trial on the merits is always the preferred route, but it cannot come at the cost of our collective rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter.
[77] The charges will be stayed. All future dates will be vacated.
Released: October 24, 2025
Signed: Justice A. Neil Singh