Court Information

Date: 2025-11-04 Court File No.: 4810 998 24 48118568 Ontario Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King And: Yafet Banjaw

Before: Justice David Porter Heard on: September 29, October 1 and 3, 2025 Decision and Reasons dated: November 4, 2025

Counsel: B. Moreira - for the Crown A. Goodman - Amicus Yafet Banjaw - Self-represented

Decision

Porter J.:

[1] Yafet Banjaw ("Mr. Banjaw") is charged in an 11-count information with the careless storage of numerous firearms and ammunition in his apartment on June 12, 2024, contrary to s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code.

[2] Section 86(1) of the Criminal Code states, "Every person commits an offence who, without lawful excuse, uses, carries, handles, ships, transports or stores a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited ammunition in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for the safety of other persons."

[3] The first issue in the trial was whether, in the course of obtaining and executing a search warrant, there was a breach of Mr. Banjaw's s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. If the search was lawful, the trial issue was whether the Crown had proven that the storage of the firearms and ammunition, which Mr. Banjaw acknowledged he owned, was careless in breach of s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code.

[4] To assist Mr. Banjaw in preparing and presenting his section 8 Charter argument, and his defence at trial, A. Goodman was appointed as Amicus. Mr. Goodman was of great assistance to the court, and to Mr. Banjaw, in advocating Mr. Banjaw's position on the Charter voir dire and the trial.

[5] The fundamental issue in the section 8 Charter application was whether the observations of ammunition made by the resident manager, Milton Grant, at the apartment building at [...] Bamburgh Circle, Unit [...], Toronto where Mr. Banjaw lived, combined with an opinion from a police officer at the Guns and Gangs Unit of the Toronto Police Service formed the proper basis for the issuance of the search warrant executed on June 12, 2024, and which resulted in the seizure of the firearms and ammunition which were the subject of the charges before the court.

[6] Milton Grant testified on the blended voir dire that in June 2024 he was the resident manager of the building at [...] Bamburgh Circle. The building is a 20-storey multi-unit residential building. He was responsible for contact with building tenants with respect to organizing repairs performed by contractors hired by the building owners to perform maintenance on the apartments in the building.

[7] He has had that position for four years and identified Mr. Banjaw as living in unit [...] in that building. He testified that the leaseholder of the unit is Mr. Banjaw's mother, but that Mr. Banjaw was living in the unit in June 2024.

[8] In June 2024, the annual cleaning of the air conditioner ducts and grills was due and, as part of his responsibilities, Mr. Grant organized the cleaning schedule with the contractor retained to perform the service. The schedule provided that floors 14, 15, 16 and 17 would have the work performed on June 7.

[9] Mr. Grant, along with a co-worker Neil Bryan, prepared notices for the tenants which were distributed by Mr. Bryan and Mr. Grant to each of the units on those floors about one week before the scheduled maintenance to inform the residents of the scheduled maintenance.

[10] He testified that he and Mr. Bryan together placed the notices on the tenants' doors advising the tenants of the scheduled maintenance. He could not recall on which floor he distributed the notices, and on which floor Mr. Bryan distributed the notices, but it was his evidence that between the two of them, notices were provided to all of the tenants in each of the units on those floors that the scheduled maintenance would occur on June 7, 2024.

[11] Mr. Grant testified that on June 7 he attended Mr. Banjaw's unit with the air conditioner technician to perform the scheduled maintenance. No one was present in the unit when they attended. While he was leaving to knock on the unit next door to advise them of the upcoming service, Mr. Grant was summoned by the air conditioner technician to see what the technician had seen in front of the air conditioner unit.

[12] Mr. Grant testified that what he saw was what he believed to be the ammunition magazine for a firearm with one bullet in the magazine protruding. He took a photograph of the ammunition magazine which was filed in evidence as Exhibit 5.

[13] He saw a few boxes on the floor around the magazine. After he took the photograph Exhibit 5, he noticed another box to the right of the ammunition magazine that appeared to have 2 handgun ammunition magazines. He saw this box on the floor next to the couch. He testified that he saw two magazines in that box without being able to see ammunition.

[14] After taking the photograph, he saw a computer in the room, with a camera attached to the top of it, which he thought might be filming his actions in the apartment so he took no more pictures.

[15] Mr. Grant testified he was not familiar with firearms so he was not certain that the magazine was real. He contacted his property manager and she instructed him to contact the police which he did.

Evidence of Officer Wells

[16] Officer David Wells testified that on June 10, 2024 he received the dispatch to attend at [...] Bamburgh Circle regarding a suspicious incident. He spoke with Milton Grant and, after referring to his notes, testified that Mr. Grant indicated that while present in the apartment with a maintenance worker on June 7, he observed a firearm magazine which he photographed. He was shown the photograph Exhibit 5 taken by Mr. Grant and testified that he gave Mr. Grant the link to provide the photograph to the police by uploading it on to evidence.com. He testified that when he saw the magazine in the photograph, he thought it appeared to have a real bullet and based on the photograph, it appeared to not be safely stored given its location on the floor. He testified that based on the presence of the magazine he thought there may be a firearm in the apartment.

[17] By referring to his notes in cross-examination, he testified that the information from Mr. Grant he had noted was that Mr. Grant observed "4 to 5 handguns and magazines, possibly extended". He testified that he was told that there were guns lying around not just the magazines.

[18] He testified that he prepared a report with the information he received and sent it to Detective Constable ("DC") Shafiq.

The Information to Obtain and Evidence of Sergeant Melissa Cohen

[19] Sergeant Cohen has been a police officer with the Toronto Police Service for 19½ years. She was a Detective Constable in 2024 when she prepared the Information to Obtain ("ITO") for the search warrant executed in this case. She was the affiant of the ITO in this case and has previously prepared at least 50 applications for search warrants.

[20] The ITO was filed as Exhibit 7 in the blended voir dire and contains a summary of the information received from Mr. Grant including information that he observed a rifle magazine with ammunition in it on the floor in unit [...] at [...] Bamburgh Circle on June 7, 2024, along with "some extended overcapacity magazines for handguns observed on the floor".

[21] The photograph marked Exhibit 5 taken by Mr. Grant was attached to the ITO. It clearly shows the large firearm magazine with the bullet at the end lying on the apartment floor surrounded by several boxes and envelopes.

[22] The ITO contained information that the apartment was occupied by Yafet Banjaw (DOB 1994-12-10), and that a Canadian Firearms Registry online check revealed that he had a firearms licence for three registered firearms which may be stored both at an alternative location and at his registered address of [...] Bamburgh Circle, Scarborough.

[23] At paragraph 9 of the ITO, DC Cohen states:

"At approximately 7:09 PM, DC Shafiq received information form [sic] an officer at Guns and Gangs Task Force that the rifle magazine picture[sic] on the floor in the photo is a Prohibited Device."

[24] The ITO states at paragraph14:

"Although the affiant is aware that Banjaw is licensed to possess 3 registered firearms, there is a believe[sic] that there are prohibited devices inside his unit at [...] Bamburgh Circle that he is not legally allowed to possess."

[25] The affiant deposes in paragraph 15 that she has reasonable grounds to believe that Banjaw is in possession of a prohibited device, namely the rifle magazine and the extended handgun magazines that were observed on the floor in the living room inside the apartment.

[26] The search warrant marked as Exhibit 10 was issued granting the authority to search the apartment for the stipulated rifle and handgun magazines, in relation to an alleged offence of the possession of a prohibited device contrary to section 92(2) of the Criminal Code.

[27] Detective David Fisher, who was the officer-in-charge of the execution of the search warrant, testified that after the numerous items seized in the execution of the search warrant were examined, it was determined that the large black firearm magazine photographed in Exhibit 5 had been modified internally with a pin to hold only five bullets. It appeared to be capable of holding more than five bullets, which made its appearance in Exhibit 5, when seen by Mr. Grant and subsequently by the investigating officers, to be an overcapacity magazine which would have been a prohibited device.

[28] After examining the firearms and the magazines seized in the execution of the warrant, it was determined that none were prohibited devices, and while Mr. Banjaw was initially arrested for possession of prohibited devices, he was advised while at the police station shortly after his arrest, that the charges he was facing would be careless storage of ammunition and firearms contrary to section 86(1) of the Criminal Code.

[29] The defence called no evidence on the s. 8 Charter voir dire or on the trial.

The Law on a Garofoli Application

[30] MacPherson J.A. summarized the standard of review on a Garofoli application in R. v. Ebanks, 2009 ONCA 851, 97 O.R.(3d) 721 (Ont. C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed. He stated at para. 20:

"Judges reviewing wiretap affidavits, or any materials in support of prior judicial authorizations, work within a narrow jurisdictional compass. In R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 Sopinka J. summarized the standard of review at p.1452:

"The reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge. If, based on the record which was before the authorizing judge as amplified on the review, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization, then he or she should not interfere. In this process, the existence of fraud, non-disclosure, misleading evidence and new evidence are all relevant, but, rather than being a prerequisite to review, their sole impact is to determine whether there continues to be any basis for the decision of the authorizing judge."

[31] As MacPherson J.A. noted in R. v. Ebanks, supra, at para. 21:

"The sole function of the reviewing court is to assess the record that was before the issuing judge, as amplified on review, and determine whether the authorization could have issued. This review has nothing to do with whether the reviewing court would have issued the authorization, as a Garofoli application at trial must not become a hearing de novo: see Garofoli at p. 1452."

[32] The limited scope of the review jurisdiction is the same whether the attack on the warrant is limited to a facial validity challenge or whether it is a sub-facial challenge which goes behind the form of the Information To Obtain ("ITO") to attack or impeach the reliability of its content.

[33] As Watt J.A. states in R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, [2014] O.J. No. 376 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 37-38:

"A facial validity challenge requires the reviewing judge to examine the ITO and to determine whether, on the face of the information disclosed there, the justice could have issued the warrant: R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992 at para. 19. The record examined on a facial review is fixed: it is the ITO, not an amplified or enlarged record: R. v. Wilson, 2011 BCCA 252 ....at para. 39.

Sub-facial challenges go behind the form of the ITO to attack or impeach the reliability of its content: Araujo, at para. 50; and Wilson, at para. 40. Sub-facial challenges involve an amplified record, but do not expand the scope of review to permit the reviewing judge to substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judicial officer: Araujo, at para. 51; and R. v. Garofoli, .... at p.1452. The task of the reviewing judge on a sub-facial challenge is to consider whether, on the record before the authorizing justice as amplified on the review, the authorizing justice could have issued the warrant: Araujo, at para. 51; and Garofoli, at 1452. The analysis is contextual: Araujo,at para. 54. The reviewing judge should carefully consider whether sufficient reliable information remains in the amplified record, in other words, information that might reasonably be believed, on the basis of which the enabling warrant could have issued: Araujo, at para. 52."

The Nature of Sub-Facial Challenges to an ITO

[34] In R. v. Phan, 2020 ONCA 298 Strathy C.J.O. stated the following with respect to the sub-facial challenge of a warrant or authorization at para. 49:

"Typically, on a sub-facial challenge, the accused argues that misleading or inaccurate portions of the ITO must be excised, and the validity of the authorization is determined by what remains. The accused may also argue that 'the augmented record placed before the reviewing judge demonstrates that the affiant deliberately, or at least recklessly, misled the issuing judge, rendering the entire ITO unreliable as a basis upon which to issue a warrant': R. v. Shivrattan, 2017 ONCA 23, 346 C.C.C. (3d), at para. 26, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No.93."

[35] In R. v. Phan, supra, the Court of Appeal has emphasized the importance of not permitting a Garofoli application to turn into a trial of the accuracy of the informant's allegations. As C. J. Strathy stated at paras. 51-52:

"As the determination of whether the statutory conditions have been met focuses on the affiant's reasonable belief, the Garofoli analysis does not determine whether the allegations in support of the authorization were ultimately true. It determines whether the affiant had 'a reasonable belief in the existence of the requisite statutory grounds': Pires; Lising, at para. 41. And this turns on what the affiant knew or ought to have known at the time the affidavit in support of the authorization was sworn. The parties agree that the applicable test is set out in World Bank, at paras. 122-3:

'an error or omission is not relevant on a Garofoli application if the affiant could not reasonably have known of it. Testing the affidavit against the ultimate truth rather than the affiant's reasonable belief would turn a Garofoli hearing into a trial of every allegation in the affidavit, something this court has long sought to prevent.

When assessing a sub-facial challenge, it is important to note that affiants may not ignore signs that other officers may be misleading them or omitting material information. However, if there is no indication that anything is amiss, they do not need to conduct their own investigation [Citations omitted]'.

Typically, evidence that the affiant knew or ought to have known was false, inaccurate, or misleading will be 'excised' from the ITO when determining whether the authorization was lawfully issued. If there is additional evidence that the affiant knew or ought to have known was required for full and frank disclosure, it should be added back: World Bank, at para.121; Booth, at para. 59."

Analysis of the s.8 Charter Application

[36] In his able submissions, Mr. Goodman, Amicus, submits that it was clear that, as Mr. Banjaw was a licensed firearm owner, there was no urgency facing the police when they learned that a magazine was observed in the apartment unit which the police believed was solely occupied by the licensed gun owner. Mr. Goodman suggested that the police failed to take reasonable steps to conduct a further investigation such as interviewing Mr. Banjaw before jumping to the conclusion that the magazine observed was a prohibited device, when in fact it was not.

[37] Mr. Goodman submits that there was no detailed description of the terms of Mr. Banjaw's authorization to clarify whether he was authorized to possess a prohibited device, and the ITO was deficient in this regard.

[38] I do not accept that the police were required to conduct an interview of Mr. Banjaw before seeking a search warrant to pursue the investigation in the circumstances. No evidence was called on the voir dire to suggest that there was any legal basis on which Mr. Banjaw could lawfully possess a prohibited device.

[39] In my view, it was open to the issuing justice to find that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the firearm magazine, observed by Mr. Grant, and photographed in a photograph contained in the ITO, which a police officer from the Guns and Gangs unit opined was a prohibited device, was a prohibited device providing a proper basis for the issuance of a search warrant to search for the itemized alleged prohibited devices named in the search warrant, in relation to the alleged offence of possession of a prohibited device, contrary to section 92 (2) of the Criminal Code.

[40] In my opinion, the justice of the peace was entitled to issue the search warrant based on the information provided to him in the ITO, and the search warrant was properly issued.

[41] Accordingly, the police were lawfully present in the unit when the search warrant was executed, and the observations made of the firearm and ammunition, and the manner in which they were stored, were lawfully obtained and form the basis of this prosecution for careless storage of the firearms and ammunition found in in the apartment.

The Evidence of Careless Storage

[42] An entry video of unit [...] was filed as Exhibit 8 in the trial showing the state of the apartment upon the entry of the police when executing the search warrant on June 12, 2024.

[43] Sergeant Cohen was one of the search officers and testified as to her observations during the execution of the search warrant. The entry video shows that unit [...] was a very small apartment overwhelmingly cluttered, disorganized, and covered throughout with boxes, envelopes, domestic paraphernalia, and scattered throughout the apartment were numerous easily accessible firearms, and ammunition, located in both the living room and in the bedroom of the apartment.

[44] In an Agreed Statement of Facts, it was admitted that Mr. Banjaw is the sole occupant of Unit [...] at [...] Bamburgh Circle.

[45] It was also admitted that he is the owner of all of the firearms and ammunition seized by the police during the execution of the search warrant. The following is a list of the firearms and ammunition he admitted owning:

1. Glock 20 Gen4 Hand gun;
2. CZ P-10 C Hand gun;
3. Hi-Point Model JMP hand gun;
4. T81SA Cal.7.62mm Semi-Auto rifle;
5. Savage Arms 64 22 Cal rifle
6. Hunt Group Arms Sem-Auto Shotgun

Ammunition:

1. 10mm Blazer ammunition;
2. 9mm Luger ammunition;
3. .45 cal. ammunition
4. 7.62 mm ammunition
5. 22 cal. rim ammunition.

[46] Mr. Banjaw admitted that all of the firearms and ammunition tested as being in proper working order.

[47] The certificate of analysis of Philip Butler of the Gun and Gang Task Force-Firearm Investigation and Analysis Unit, filed on consent as Exhibit 13, establishes that each of the three handguns found in Mr. Banjaw's apartment meet the definition of a "restricted firearm" and each of the rifles and the shotgun meet the definition of "non-restricted firearm" under s. 84 of the Criminal Code.

[48] All of the cartridges seized were in proper working order. There were 45 cartridges seized that worked in the Hi-Point handgun, 393 that worked in the Glock handgun, and 50 for the CZ P-10 C handgun.

[49] There were 50 cartridges seized that were operational in the Savage rifle and 20 for the Type 81 SA rifle.

[50] Two of the handguns, the Glock and the CZ P-10 C had trigger locks, but otherwise were easily accessed in the apartment bedroom. The Glock was leaning up against the wall in the bedroom. The CZ P-10 C handgun was in a box in the bedroom closet.

[51] The Hi-Point firearm was in the bedroom closet with a zip-tie through the trigger but had no trigger lock.

[52] The T81 SA Cal 7.62 Semi Auto rifle was standing up in the front closet just inside the front door of the apartment. The Savage Arms rifle was standing up in an alcove in the bedroom, and the Hunt Group Arms semi-auto Shotgun was standing up in front of the table in the living room.

[53] The numerous firearm magazines were found throughout the apartment including 2 on the floor beside the kitchen island, 3 on the floor by the bedroom window, and 4 on the bedroom floor behind the bed headboard. Each of these had visible cartridges (ammunition) protruding from the magazine and had ammunition inside.

[54] A 10-round loaded magazine was found in a box in the bedroom closet. A total of 7 magazines were found on top of a box in the living room near an ammunition loader. The extended magazine seen by Mr. Grant was found on the floor in the living room near the balcony door, and contained ammunition. A box with 13 loose cartridges (loose ammunition) was found in the living room on the floor.

[55] The offence of careless storage of a firearm requires that the Crown prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the accused showed a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances: R. v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76, at paras. 29 and 58; R. v. Finlay, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103, at page 117.

[56] In R. v. Blanchard, Justice Manson of the Territorial Court of the Yukon considered the relevance of regulatory requirements for the storage of firearms on a Criminal Code charge of careless storage and stated:

"I conclude that the federal firearm storage regulations are relevant in determining the appropriate standard for those who are transporting or storing guns to the same degree that the rules of the road would be relevant in determining the basic standard of conduct for drivers. Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, the court can commence the analysis of the accused's conduct even without any evidence establishing the appropriate standard."

[57] To the same effect, see Williams v. R., 2019 NBCA 51, per Green J.A. (N.B.C.A.)

[58] The Firearms Act Storage, Display, Transportation and Handling of Firearms by Individuals Regulations SOR/98-209, as amended state as follows:

Storage of Non-Restricted Firearms

5(1) An individual may store a non-restricted firearm only if

(a) it is unloaded;

(b) it is

(i) rendered inoperable by means of a secure locking device,

(ii) rendered inoperable by the removal of the bolt or bolt-carrier, or

(iii) stored in a container, receptacle or room that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken open or into; and

(c) it is not readily accessible to ammunition, unless the ammunition is stored, together or separately from the firearm, in a container or receptacle that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken open or into."

Storage of Restricted Firearms

6. An individual may store a restricted firearm only if

(a) it is unloaded;

(b) it is

(i) rendered inoperable by means of a secure locking device and stored in a container, receptacle or room that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken open or into, or,

(ii) stored in a vault, safe or room that has been specifically constructed or modified for the secure storage of restricted firearms and that is kept securely locked; and

(c) it is not readily accessible to ammunition, unless the ammunition is stored, together with or separately from the firearm, in

(i) a container or receptacle that is kept securely locked and that is constructed so that it cannot readily be broken open or into, or

(ii) a vault, safe or room that has been specifically constructed or modified for the secure storage of restricted firearms and that is kept securely locked."

[59] Breach of these regulations does not, in and by itself, prove the offence of careless storage of ammunition or firearms: R. v. Gorr, [2003] O.J. No. 3252, at para.19; R. v. Critch, 322 Nfld. and P.E.I. R. 126, at para.24 (Nfld. and Labrador Prov. Court).

[60] Section 86(2) of the Criminal Code is a separate offence charging a breach of regulations under the Firearms Act for the storage of firearms.

[61] In R. v. Finlay, supra, the Supreme Court interpreted the "careless storage" offence at the time, s.86(2) at that time, which stated:

"Everyone who, without lawful excuse, uses, carries, handles, ships, or stores any firearm or ammunition in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for the safety of other persons,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment

(i) in the case of a first offence, for a term not exceeding two years, and

(ii) in the case of a second or subsequent offence, for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction."

[62] In R. v. Finlay, supra, Lamer, C.J. stated with respect to Parliament's intention in passing firearm control legislation at pp. 115-117:

"By enacting s. 86(2), Parliament has seen fit to impose on all people owning or using firearms a specific and rigorous duty of care. It is a basic tenet of the principles of fundamental justice that the state not be permitted to punish and deprive of liberty the morally innocent. Those who have the capacity to live up to a standard of care and fail to do so, in circumstances involving inherently dangerous activities, however, cannot be said to have done nothing wrong. The Law Reform Commission of Canada emphasized this point in the following passage from Workplace Pollution, Working Paper 53 (1986), at pp. 2-73:

Certain kinds of activity involve the control of technology (cars, explosives, firearms) with the inherent potential to do such serious damage to life and limb that the law is justified in paying special attention to the individuals in control. Failing to act in a way which indicates respect for the inherent potential for harm of those technologies, after having voluntarily assumed control of them (no one has to drive, use explosives, or keep guns) is legitimately regarded as criminal. [Emphasis in original.]]

This Court has, in the past, acknowledged Parliament's rationale in enacting gun control offences. Writing for the majority in R. v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443, at p. 483, McIntyre J. stated the following:

The Code has included provisions for the control, use and possession of firearms since the enactment of the 1892 Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 105. That section prohibited the possession of pistols and air guns at other than specific places and, as well, provided for exemptions from the operation of the section. Since that time, there have been successive amendments which without exception have strengthened the controls upon possession and use of firearms.

It is evident that the strict control of handguns has been and remains an essential feature of the Canadian gun control laws.

It is clear that the overall intent of Parliament in enacting Part II.1 of the Criminal Code was to prohibit the acquisition and use of weapons save in accordance with the strict controls it prescribed.

In s. 86(2), Parliament has addressed the threat posed by the use and storage of firearms by rendering those whose conduct shows a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person subject to criminal liability and possible imprisonment. The nature of the objective standard for the determination of fault was concisely stated by McLachlin J. in the case of R. v. Hundal, supra, in which she stated the following (at p. 872):

... the question is not what was in the accused's mind but the absence of the mental state of care. This want of due care is inferred from conduct of the accused. If that conduct evinces a want of care judged by the standard of a reasonable person in similar circumstances, the necessary fault is established. The relevant circumstances may include circumstances personal to the accused, relating to whether the accused lacked the capacities or powers necessary to attain the mental state of care required in the circumstances.

In Hundal, this Court was unanimously of the view that, in the appropriate context, negligence can be an acceptable basis of liability which meets the fault requirement of s. 7 of the Charter.

The objective test for negligence is discussed in R. v. Gosset, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76, released this same day. In Gosset, I found that the proper interpretation of the fault element under s. 86(2) is conduct that constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person. If a reasonable doubt exists either that the conduct in question did not constitute a marked departure from that standard of care, or that reasonable precautions were taken to discharge the duty of care in the circumstances, a verdict of acquittal must follow...."

[63] On the facts of this case, the evidence is clear that, apart from the trigger locks on 2 handguns, nothing was done within the apartment where the firearms and ammunition were located, to make them inaccessible to a person who entered the apartment, either to perform repairs, as was the case on June 7, or who entered the apartment as an invitee, or otherwise.

[64] With respect to the Hi-Point handgun referred to in count three, and each of the rifles referred to in counts 4, 5, and 6, the firearms were totally accessible in the small apartment, along with voluminous ammunition that was operable in each of the firearms.

[65] Nothing was locked in any sort of secure cabinet, or gun case, or ammunition case. This presented a real risk that the available ammunition could be inserted into the available firearm by anyone who accessed the apartment, whether invited or not, creating a substantial risk to the public the provision was designed to prevent.

[66] This is particularly the case given the fact that the apartment was one of several hundred in a high-rise residential apartment building, with other residential units on 19 floors, creating a substantial risk to members of the public, including employees of the landlord, or persons required to enter the apartment to make repairs, who may be present from time to time in the apartment, as was the case on June 7, 2025.

[67] The fact that each of the above firearms and ammunition were present in that the apartment, with none being located in a locked case, when each of the firearms was operable with operable ammunition present nearby in the apartment, in magazines or boxes throughout the apartment, without any protection from access by any person present, in my opinion amounts to a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonably prudent person would take to ensure that these lethal weapons, with ammunition, were reasonably inaccessible to persons who may access that apartment whether invited or uninvited.

[68] With respect to the Glock handgun in count 1 in the information, and the CZ P-10C handgun in count 2, each of these restricted firearms had a trigger lock. The Crown called no evidence to suggest that such locks could be easily removed or otherwise rendered ineffective.

[69] On the totality of the evidence, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the storage of these 2 firearms, with a trigger lock on each, amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person living alone in a small apartment.

[70] Accordingly, Mr. Banjaw is acquitted on counts 1 and 2.

[71] However, no other firearms had trigger locks, they were all easily accessible, and they were in working order, with operational ammunition nearby, that was also easily accessible. Mr. Banjaw admitted that he was the sole occupant of the apartment and the owner of the firearms and ammunition found in the apartment. I find that he was responsible for the manner in which they were stored in his apartment.

[72] In respect of the remaining firearms and ammunition, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Banjaw's storage of these items showed a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person, and in relation to these firearms and ammunition no reasonable precautions were in place for the safety of other persons.

[73] Accordingly, I find Mr. Banjaw guilty of the offences charged in the information in counts 3-11 inclusive.

Dated: November 4, 2025

Justice David Porter