Court File and Parties

Court File No.: 998-23-61101719 Date: October 6, 2025 Ontario Court of Justice Central West Region At Orangeville

Between: His Majesty the King — and — David Duke

Heard Before: Mr. Justice Richard H.K. Schwarzl on December 30, 2024; April 23, August 6, and September 5, 2025

Reasons Released: October 6, 2025

Counsel:

• Mr. Vikramjeet Aujla for the Crown
• Ms. Kathryn Doyle for the Defendant

SCHWARZL, J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.0: INTRODUCTION

[1] The defendant, David Duke, faces trial for the alleged offences of dangerous driving and assault causing bodily harm, contrary to sections 320.13(1) and 267(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[2] There is only one issue for each charge. With respect to the dangerous driving, the defence submits that the Crown has not met its heavy burden of proof that the driving was "dangerous." As for the alleged assault, the sole issue is whether the defendant acted in self-defence.

[3] Both parties agree that the resolution, if any, of these two issues relies upon my assessment of the credibility and reliability of the evidence as a whole.

2.0: THE CHARGE OF DANGEROUS DRIVING

2.1: The Facts

[4] The following relevant facts are not in dispute.

[5] December 2, 2023 at around 6:00 p.m., the weather on westbound Hwy 401 and northbound Hwy 427 was dark and raining. The traffic was moderate to heavy both west and north. Mr. Jason Tremblay was driving with his girlfriend, Kelsi Francis, in a Honda Civic. They were driving from Etobicoke to Bolton to have dinner with friends. As they turned north onto Hwy 427 from the 401, Tremblay noticed a Dodge Ram driven by Mr. Duke. Like Tremblay, Duke was driving to Bolton and he, too, was entering Hwy 427 from the 401.

[6] Both cars were parallel to one another going north. While each driver has a different memory of the particulars, both drivers believed the other was trying to jostle for position in the northbound lanes. Tremblay felt that Duke was being aggressive while Duke believed that Tremblay was trying to prevent him from merging safely into Tremblay's lane. Whatever the cause, both drivers were clearly peeved with the other as they continued northbound side by side. Mr. Duke testified that he was aggravated, agitated, and annoyed by Tremblay's behaviour.

[7] During the jockeying, each driver rolled down his window. Words and gestures were exchanged as they sped north on the highway. Tremblay claimed that Duke careened into his car and sideswiped his Honda, whereas Duke said that while they were close enough to yell at each other, Tremblay reached out and broke the passenger side mirror of his pickup truck. Each denied the claim of the other. What is undisputed is that for a short time on Hwy 427 these two drivers were mutually engaged in an unfriendly competition for lane space. Mr. Duke testified that he was verbally aggressive, pissed off, and upset with Tremblay but denied he was angry.

[8] Mr. Tremblay moved ahead and began to drive away from the defendant. He said that Mr. Duke was tailgating him and flashing the high beams of his truck while pursuing him, matching his lane changes as they drove past the other traffic until Tremblay turned off Hwy 427 onto Major Mackenzie Drive, some 20 plus kilometres from where they first encountered each other. Duke agreed that after their confrontation on entering Hwy 427, Tremblay sped away. He agreed that he followed Tremblay, who Duke said "was definitely trying to avoid me" by going in and out of traffic. Duke acknowledged staying two or so car lengths behind Tremblay while flashing his high beams at speeds faster than the other traffic. Mr. Duke said that he wanted Tremblay to pull over so that he could complain about the perceived damage to his mirror, but Tremblay refused. He agreed that he persistently followed Tremblay and flashing his high beams close behind him while "still pissed" until they both exited onto Major Mackenzie Drive. In summary, Mr. Duke followed Tremblay on a 400 series highway for many kilometres at high speeds close to Tremblay's Honda while flashing his high beams into Tremblay's eyes while upset with the purpose of confronting him for the earlier encounter.

[9] A short time later, the vehicles met at the intersection of Albion and Queensgate in Bolton where they stopped, got out and confronted each other face to face. I will come back to what happened at this intersection later in my reasons.

2.2: Positions of the Parties

[10] The defence argued that while Mr. Duke's driving was not ideal, it did not rise to the level of a "marked departure" for someone in his circumstances. They submit that his driving may have been careless, but it was not criminal.

[11] The prosecution submitted that when taking the facts as set out above, and even on taking Mr. Duke's testimony in isolation from the rest of the evidence, the Crown has met its burden of proof on the dangerous driving charge.

2.3: Applicable Legal Principles

[12] With respect to the criminal act (actus reus) of dangerous driving, it must be proven that the driving itself, and not its consequences, when viewed objectively and in context of the surrounding events, was dangerous to public safety. Regard must be given to all the circumstances including the nature, condition, and use of the place at which the motor vehicle was operated, and the amount of traffic that was, or might reasonably be expected, to be at that place: R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 SCR 60, R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 SCR 49. Speed, in and of itself, may, depending on all of the circumstances, be proof of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle: R. v. Marton, [2017] O.J. No. 3392 (S.C.J.); R. v. Laverdure, [2018] O.J. No. 3595 (C.A.).

[13] With respect to the mental element (mens rea) to be proven, there must be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the driving represented a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the Defendant's circumstances. Absent direct evidence of the driver's state of mind, two questions should be asked. The first question is whether, in light of all circumstances, a reasonable person would have foreseen or been aware of the risk to public safety and taken steps to avoid it. If the answer to the first question is yes, then the second question is whether the driver's failure to see and take steps to avoid the risk to public safety was a marked departure from the standard of care expected by a reasonable person in the driver's circumstances: Roy, supra; Beatty, supra. If the answer to both questions is affirmative, then the mental element is proven. If the answer to either question is no, then the mental element has not been proven.

[14] Evidence showing dangerous operation of the vehicle may be a factor in determining the "marked departure" fault element, but that evidence may not be enough standing alone. The trier of fact must go on and examine all of the circumstances relating to the defendant's state of mind at the relevant time: R. v. Richards, 2013 ONCA 433, [2013] O.J. No. 2933 (C.A.).

[15] Momentary lapses of attention or civil carelessness by a reasonably prudent driver cannot prove the mental element: Beatty, supra; Roy, supra. Nevertheless, driving in a manner which is a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonable person can occur within seconds when considering all of the circumstances: R. v. Willock, [2006] O.J. No. 2451 (Ont. C.A.).

[16] In summary, when considering the mental intent element, the trial judge must explain how and in what way the driving went beyond negligence or carelessness and reached the level of a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have exhibited: Roy, supra; Laverdure, supra; R. v. Reynolds, supra.

2.4: Principles Applied to the Facts of this Case

[17] In light of facts, based mainly on Mr. Duke's evidence, I find that his conduct—driving at high speeds on a dark and wet highway, following very closely, in and out of traffic, and repeatedly flashing his high beams into the car ahead for nearly 20 kilometres while angry and intent on confrontation—constitutes the act of dangerous driving and represents a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the circumstances. Such behaviour is the very definition of "road rage" which created a substantial risk to the safety of Mr. Tremblay, his passenger, and other road users. His long-distance chase of Tremblay at high speed, aggressive tailgating, and use of high beams to intimidate or harass another driver on a busy highway, compounded by adverse weather conditions, is not merely careless but dangerous.

[18] Therefore, I find that Mr. Duke's actions meet the threshold for dangerous driving as defined by law. His conduct went well beyond a momentary lapse or error in judgment; it demonstrated a willful disregard for the safety of others. The evidence supports a finding of guilt on the charge of dangerous driving.

[19] Consequently, there will be a finding of guilt on the charge of dangerous driving.

3.0: THE CHARGE OF ASSAULT CAUSING BODILY HARM

3.1: The Facts

[20] Shortly after the chase on Hwy 427, both vehicles turned off the highway and proceeded towards Bolton. Tremblay and Francis were heading to friends for dinner; Duke was going home.

[21] While there is a dispute about the specifics, upon assessing the whole of the evidence I find as a fact that both cars found themselves at the intersection of Albion and Queensgate in Bolton. Aware that Mr. Duke was behind them, Tremblay pulled over to the shoulder whereas Duke stopped on the road. He agreed that he had no reason to turn onto Albion other than to confront Tremblay and that he "was still pissed" at Tremblay but was emphatic that he was not looking for a fight.

[22] The two men got out of their vehicles, but it is unclear who got out first. Tremblay recalled that Duke walked towards him, and he punched Duke in the face before any words were spoken because he said he was afraid Duke would attack him. Duke testified that after checking the side mirror Tremblay came at him and sucker punched him in the face. Both men went to the ground and wrestled. Other than Tremblay's punch it is unclear if either punched or kicked the other after they fell together.

[23] During the fracas, Mr. Tremblay's right tibia and fibula both broke just above the ankle, resulting in the need for surgery to repair the injury and months to recover. Mr. Tremblay was not sure how his leg was injured. A bystander separated Duke and Tremblay at which point Duke took off in his pickup truck.

3.2: Positions of the Parties

[24] The defence submitted that given that Tremblay threw the first and only punch there is a reasonable doubt that the defendant was doing anything other than defending himself from Tremblay. They argued that while it is true that Mr. Duke wanted to confront Mr. Tremblay, Mr. Duke's intentions did not escalate from the verbal to the physical. Finally, they submit that the injury to Mr. Tremblay was accidental and not caused by any deliberate act by Mr. Duke.

[25] The Crown argued that it is beyond any doubt that Mr. Duke intended to pursue and confront Mr. Tremblay. They point out that Mr. Duke admitted to being angry once he stopped and, they say, he was spoiling for a fight as comeuppance to Tremblay for what happened on the highway.

3.3: Analysis

[26] I find that Mr. Duke was extremely perturbed by Tremblay and was clearly the aggressor, which is evidenced by his hot pursuit of him. I find that he confronted Tremblay at the roadside in Bolton to seek satisfaction for the perceived slight on the highway. I also find that Mr. Tremblay was angry with Mr. Duke and, despite his better judgment and the advice of Ms. Francis, decided to get out of his car. Both men had enough of each other.

[27] In the welter of conflicting evidence about a matter that likely only took seconds to ignite and mere moments to finally fizzle out, I am unsure whether the tumult that ensued was not a consensual fist fight. On the criminal standard of proof, I am unable to find the facts as suggested by the prosecution. In addition, I am unable to say with confidence that the injury suffered by Mr. Tremblay was caused by any felonious act or intent by the defendant.

[28] As a result, I must render a verdict of not guilty on the charge of assault causing bodily harm.

4.0: CONCLUSIONS

[29] Based on my reasons above, my verdicts are as follows:

(a) Count 1, Dangerous Driving: Guilty; and

(b) Count 2, Assault Causing Bodily Harm: Not Guilty. That charge is dismissed.

[30] The parties are invited to make submissions as to sentencing on the driving offence.

Richard H.K. Schwarzl, Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice