WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: August 22, 2025

Court File No.: 23-91109493-01

Central East Region - Newmarket

Between:

His Majesty the King

— and —

Keyron Moore

Before: Justice M. Townsend

Submissions on Sentence Heard: June 26, 2025

Reasons for Judgment Released: August 22, 2025

Counsel:

• K. Batorska, counsel for the Crown
• A. Sobcuff, counsel for the accused Keyron Moore

Reasons for Judgment

TOWNSEND J.:

Conviction and Preliminary Matters

[1] On March 13, 2025, I convicted Mr. Moore of a number of serious offences. The facts underlying those convictions are extensively outlined in the judgment on trial (R. v. Moore, [2025] O.J. No. 2415) and I do not intend to go over those facts in detail in this judgment.

[2] At the outset of submissions on sentence, it was brought to my attention that with respect to Count #7, the wording of that count in the Criminal Code prohibits a finding of guilt on that count together with a finding of guilt on Count #2. Based on a fair reading of those counts in connection with one another, and the facts underlying those findings, the proper disposition on Count #7 is to have it marked dismissed. The Information will be changed to reflect this new disposition.

[3] As such, Mr. Moore is sentenced on the following counts:

Count #2 – that Mr. Moore did use a firearm to wit a handgun in kidnapping A.T., with intent to cause her to be confined against her will, contrary to section 279, subsection (1.1), clause (a.1) of the Criminal Code.

Count #3 – that Mr. Moore did, without lawful authority confine A.T., contrary to section 279, subsection (2) of the Criminal Code.

Count #4 – that Mr. Moore did, in committing a sexual assault on A.T., carry a weapon, namely a firearm, contrary to section 272, subsection (1), clause (a) of the Criminal Code.

Count #8 – that Mr. Moore did discharge a firearm, while being reckless as to the life or safety of another person, contrary to section 244.2, subsection (1), clause (b) of the Criminal Code.

Exhibits on Sentence

Criminal Record of Mr. Moore

[4] Mr. Moore comes before the Court with a prior criminal history. While none of the offences included on Mr. Moore's criminal record rise to the calibre of the offences upon which I found him guilty, he does not come before me with a clean slate.

[5] Mr. Moore's criminal history is relatively dated and stems primarily from convictions in 2012. This will be his first significant jail sentence. He is alleged to have committed further criminal offences while on bail for these offences, and there was an occurrence in Toronto that pre-dates these offences. I understand that some outstanding Newmarket charges have been withdrawn, and he has been convicted of some Toronto offences and is awaiting sentence for those.

Victim Impact Statement of the Complainant (A.T.)

[6] The Victim Impact Statement (VIS) of the complainant A.T. was filed as an exhibit on sentence. In that VIS, A.T. reiterated what she testified to at the trial. That the events she endured throughout these offences were traumatic, terrifying, physically painful, and emotionally draining. Among other things she stated the following that is worth repeating:

I don't go outside alone. The fear is too overwhelming. I feel like I have a target on my back, like someone is always watching, waiting for the right moment. My heart races at the thought of being approached, followed, or taken.

Every time I see headlights in the dark, I feel like I am back in that moment. My body reacts before my mind can catch up. Panic sets in, my breath becomes shallow, and I feel like I am seconds away from being dragged away. …

Even inside my home, where I should feel safe, I don't. My mind plays tricks on me. I see people trying to get in, trying to force open the door, trying to climb onto my balcony even though I know it's impossible. The fear is so real that I find myself waiting for something to happen. Every sound feels like a threat. My heart jumps at the smallest noise, and I have to remind myself that I am safe, but it never feels like I am. …

I feel disconnected from everyone. I don't know how to explain what I'm going through, and even if I could, I don't know if they would understand. I keep people at a distance because I don't want them to see how much this has broken me. I don't want their pity. …

Everything feels meaningless compared to the trauma I am living with. My brain is stuck in survival mode. I live in a constant state of fear. Even when I know I'm safe, my body refuses to believe it. …

This didn't just happen to me once it is happening to me every single day. No matter where I go, no matter what I do, the fear is there. And I don't know how to make it stop.

The trauma I experienced left lasting physical effects that I still feel every day. Although my injuries have healed, my body continues to carry the impact in ways that most people don't understand.

The pain was intense, and even though the external wounds are gone, the effects remain. The forceful impact on my knees, hands, and feet has led to lingering joint pain, stiffness, and sensitivity. The pressure and repeated blows may have caused nerve damage, leading to numbness, tingling, and unpredictable pain in my extremities. Even now, holding objects for too long can cause discomfort, and prolonged standing or walking triggers sharp pain in my knees. …

Even though my body has physically healed, I still experience phantom pain sensations in areas that are no longer injured but still register as painful due to how trauma imprints on the nervous system. The body remembers suffering, even when the visible scars fade. …

The physical toll of this experience extends far beyond the initial injuries. Even though time has passed, my body continues to respond as if the trauma is still happening. The healing process is ongoing, and the impact is something I manage every single day. The trauma I endured didn't just affect me emotionally it left lasting physical scars that I still feel every day.

I can still hear the gunshot that was fired at the man who tried to help me. The sound is imprinted in my brain, in my ears at random moments. Even in silence, it plays on repeat in my mind, an endless reminder of that night. My ears still ring from the impact, a constant reminder that my body remembers even when I try to forget I can still hear the ringing in my ears from when I was struck in the face with the bottom of the gun. …

The fear of unexpected contact is overwhelming. The thought of encountering the wrong person, or someone who knows about what happened, sends me into a panic. This weighs on me every day. No matter how much time passes, the fear does not go away. My sense of security has been permanently altered, and I don't know if I will ever feel truly safe again.

Letters of Support for Mr. Moore

[7] The following individuals provided letters of support for Mr. Moore:

• Oneka Moore (Sister of Mr. Moore)
• Paul Hagley (Friend of Mr. Moore)
• Vanessa Prince (Friend of Mr. Moore)
• Floretta Moore (Mother of Mr. Moore)
• Leevaighnia Moore (Sister of Mr. Moore)
• Micole Moore (Sister of Mr. Moore)
• Keira Alexander (Daughter of Mr. Moore)
• Selita Moore (Sister of Mr. Moore)
• Laverne Lewis (Friend of Mr. Moore)
• Ashley Broomes (Partner of Mr. Moore)

[8] Throughout these letters, it is clear that Mr. Moore has a very loving and supportive family, and there are many people in the community who care deeply for Mr. Moore. He is a devoted father, partner, son, and brother. He gives back to the community when he is able, and at times he has been diligent in looking for work.

[9] Some of the individuals that provided letters supporting Mr. Moore were also present throughout the many days of trial and understand the seriousness of the offences he has been convicted of. In spite of Mr. Moore's criminal antecedents, they continue to hold out hope for his expected rehabilitation and continue to express to him their support and that they will be there for him when his sentence is complete.

Pre-Sentence Custody and Lockdown Records

[10] The calculation of pre-sentence custody for this matter is no simple task. There are a number of time periods involved, two separate institutions at which he spent time in pre-sentence custody, release orders that were cancelled, and new offences incurred while on bail.

[11] While the breach of a release order related to this offence, and subsequent new charges are not relevant to me on this sentencing hearing, reference to them is important only for the purpose of calculating eligible pre-sentence custody.

[12] The following dates are relevant to the calculation of pre-sentence custody:

1. Mr. Moore was arrested on November 2nd, 2022, for these offences and released on bail on November 25th, 2022. This equals 24 real days.

2. On March 20th, 2024, Mr. Moore was arrested for breaching his release order, and on new charges. He has remained in custody until today (August 22, 2025). This equals 521 real days.

3. From April 11th, 2023, to June 16th, 2023, Mr. Moore was also in custody on charges arising from Toronto. He eventually got bail on those charges. During submissions, counsel for Mr. Moore asked that those dates also be included in Mr. Moore's pre-sentence custody. I indicated to counsel that I would not be applying that time in pre-sentence custody to the charges before me as they are not at all related, and Mr. Moore continued to have a valid release order on the charges before me. It would not be proper to include pre-sentence custody for an unrelated charge into the calculation of pre-sentence custody on these charges.

[13] Applicable to the charges before me, Mr. Moore is entitled to credit for 545 real days. Pursuant to R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, Mr. Moore is entitled to enhanced credit on a basis of 1.5 days for every day, resulting in Summers credit of 818 days or 27.25 months.

[14] Many lockdown records, as well as an addendum to those lockdown records explaining some of the terminologies have been provided. At times, Mr. Moore was housed at the Toronto South Detention Centre, and the Central East Correctional Centre. Anecdotally, I will add that both those institutions are notoriously among the worst correctional facilities in the province in so far as the treatment of accused persons. Frequently, more than two people are placed in a cell designed for two people. This leads to a phenomenon referred to as "triple bunking", although what it really means is that two people get a proper bed, and a third person sleeps on a mat on the floor. Often right beside the toilet.

[15] Lockdowns in these two institutions are almost a daily occurrence. The reason for the lockdowns is frequently characterized as "staffing issues." There are, however, other reasons for lockdowns like medical emergencies on the range, or contraband found on the range.

[16] When addressing the amount of credit or mitigation to be given to an offender for harsh pre-sentence incarceration conditions, I must keep in mind the decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 and R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754.

[17] In explaining the interplay between these two cases, Justice Schreck in R. v. Ahmed, 2021 ONSC 8157 stated the following at paragraph 42:

Prior to Marshall, courts usually specified a specific amount of time when giving a "Duncan" credit. More recently, some courts have read Marshall to mean that this practice should be discontinued: R. v. Lee, 2021 ONSC 7672, at para. 36; R. v. Suppiah, 2021 ONSC 3871, at para. 26. However, in Marshall, at para. 53, Doherty J.A. explained that quantifying the amount of "Duncan" credit is "not necessarily inappropriate" provided that doing so does not "skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence" and provided that the "Duncan" credit is treated as but one of several factors. Unlike with most mitigating factors such as youth or remorse, the mitigating effect of harsh presentence conditions can be easily quantified as it is directly related to the amount of time the offender has spent subject to such conditions. Quantifying the amount of "Duncan" credit promotes transparency in the sentencing process and also allows the state to know what effect its failure to maintain appropriate custodial conditions has on a sentence. However, in light of Marshall, there is no need for a court to adopt any specific formula.

[18] Many courts before me have commented on the particularly harsh and unfit conditions at both the Toronto South Detention Centre and the Central East Correctional Facility. At times inmates are not permitted showers, use of the telephone, time outside their cell, proper meals, and proper time visiting with counsel and family members. Over and over again courts provide enhanced credit to offenders for the time spent in pre-sentence custody, and hopefully one day these correctional facilities will recognize that this practice will stop when those correctional facilities stop treating their inmates like animals. When judgments of the Superior Court of Justice here in Ontario have to cite adverse findings from investigations by of the Ontario Human Rights Commission (see: R. v. Shaikh, [2024] O.J. No. 1434 at para. 79) one would think that correctional facilities would get the message – alas they have not.

[19] Pursuant to R. v. Marshall and R. v. Duncan, I am prepared to note an additional 8.75 months credit for the unduly harsh pre-trial conditions that Mr. Moore endured while incarcerated at the Toronto South Detention Centre and the Central East Correctional Facility.

[20] As such, the total pre-sentence custody credit for Mr. Moore will be noted as 545 real days, enhanced to reflect credit for 36 months or 1080 days.

Positions of the Parties

[21] The Crown points out that some mandatory minimum sentences apply. With respect to Count #2 (Kidnapping with a firearm – s.279(1.1)(a.1)) there is a mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years. Similarly, with respect to Count #4 (Sexual Assault with a firearm – s.272(2)(a.1)) there is a mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years. Neither Count #3 nor Count #8 carry mandatory minimum sentences.

[22] The Crown seeks a global sentence of 16 years in custody for Mr. Moore, less the time that he has spent in pre-sentence custody. This Crown position is based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case, Mr. Moore's involvement in the offence, and an overview of applicable caselaw.

[23] The Crown submits that an appropriate apportionment of the sentence could either be by way of a global sentence of 16 years for all charges, or through the imposition of consecutive sentences. If the latter the Crown submits that an appropriate sentence for each of the sexual assault with a firearm and the kidnapping with a firearm is 10 years or more, and the other offences are slightly less than that. Given that that works out to decades, the Crown submits that the sentence ought to be reduced for totality to 16 years.

[24] Mr. Sobcuff on behalf of Mr. Moore submits that taking into account the mitigating factors relating to Mr. Moore, his loving and supportive family, his prospect of rehabilitation, his particular role in the offences, and his personal circumstances an appropriate sentence would be one of 6.5 years.

[25] Counsel breaks this down in terms of a global concurrent sentence. 6.5 years for the kidnapping with a firearm, 1 year concurrent on the forcible confinement, 5 years concurrent on the sexual assault with a firearm, and 5 years concurrent on the reckless discharge of a firearm. This is also less the time that Mr. Moore spent in pre-sentence custody.

[26] In addition to the enhanced credit discussed above, counsel for Mr. Moore seeks credit for time that Mr. Moore spent on strict bail as per R. v. Downes. I decline to give any further enhanced credit for the time that Mr. Moore spent on bail prior to his reincarceration. His bail conditions reflected the seriousness of the offences for which he was charged, and his bail conditions were not so strict that he was prevented from breaching his bail, and allegedly committing further offences while on bail.

Personal Circumstances of Mr. Moore

[27] Mr. Moore is 39 years of age; he will be 40 in November. He has three children, two girls and one boy. When not in custody, he was living with his mother and one of his children (his 15-year-old daughter) in North York.

[28] Mr. Moore last worked in 2022 doing deliveries and occasional factory work. To his credit, and as outlined in the letters of support, Mr. Moore has a loving relationship with all of his children and when he is able, he provides financial support to them.

[29] Mr. Moore came to Canada from Grenada in 2006 when he was 20, by himself. He obtained refugee status in 2008 or 2009 as he was attempting to escape gang violence in Grenada. He is now a permanent resident. In Grenada he finished high school and began working construction, all prior to his arrival in Canada.

[30] With respect to his work history in Canada, Mr. Moore has experienced a wide variety of employment from deliveries to cleaning companies, he was a forklift driver and was involved in construction and demolition. He was able to obtain his licence as a forklift driver.

[31] Mr. Moore has been in a relationship with Ashley Broomes for several years, and the strength of their relationship is evident in Ms. Broomes' letter of support. When Mr. Moore is eventually released from jail the hope is that he will continue his relationship with Ms. Broomes and obtain full time employment hopefully in the construction industry.

[32] As outlined earlier, the letters of support show a loving and supportive network of family, friends, and community members for Mr. Moore. The strength of these relationships, and the support of those close to him will surely assist in Mr. Moore's rehabilitation.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors on Sentence

[33] The offences for which I found Mr. Moore guilty are extremely serious, violent, and no doubt traumatic for the complainant. While I do not propose to go into detail with respect to factual findings that I made at trial, there are some facts worth repeating. Mr. Moore, while armed with a firearm, drove the vehicle with his accomplice "Orange Hoodie Guy" (OHG) (note: OHG was never located or identified) who was also armed with a firearm. OHG got out of the vehicle, grabbed A.T. off the street, shot at a Good Samaritan trying to assist A.T., and once she was inside Mr. Moore drove the vehicle away. Knowing what was likely to happen, and being armed himself, Mr. Moore is just as responsible for the shooting at the Good Samaritan as was OHG, the one who pulled the trigger.

[34] Mr. Moore then proceeded, sometimes at the direction of OHG, to drive A.T. around for hours in the vehicle, again all while armed with a firearm. A.T. could clearly see that Mr. Moore was armed. At one point Mr. Moore stopped the vehicle, got into the back seat with A.T. and forced her – at gunpoint – to perform oral sex on him. A.T. recalled feeling the firearm pressed on her head while she was performing the sex act on Mr. Moore.

[35] Mr. Moore continued to drive A.T. around in his vehicle, until it was decided – again with the assistance of OHG – that they would travel to an address in Barrie. Again, A.T. was in that car with Mr. Moore, both before and after performing oral sex on him at gunpoint, for hours. While in the vehicle, A.T.'s hands and mouth were bound at times with duct tape.

[36] When at the address in Barrie, Mr. Moore stood by and at times watched as A.T. was stripped naked, tied to a chair in the garage, and physically assaulted by a number of other men. Her hands and feet were "smashed" with a hammer, her legs were hit with the same hammer, her hair was burnt, and at one point a syringe with what is thought to have been heroin was dragged up and down her arm.

[37] All while this was happening Mr. Moore either stood by and watched, left the garage to go smoke, or was indifferent as to what was happening to A.T. in the garage. At no time in the hours long interaction with A.T. did Mr. Moore ever tell her she was free to go, assist in her escape, attempt to minimize the physical harm that was done to A.T., or attempt to get A.T. some help.

[38] In addition to the factual findings made at trial, there are a number of other aggravating factors specifically worth emphasizing:

• This was a planned kidnapping. Mr. Moore had to have been involved in the planning of this kidnapping. He knew where to go, where to drive, where to take A.T., and what to do with A.T. when he got there. While I accept that Mr. Moore may not have been the "mastermind" behind this plan, I am certainly prepared to find that he was an integral participant in the carrying out of this planned kidnapping.

• Throughout his participation in this planned kidnapping, Mr. Moore was armed with a firearm. He was armed with a firearm while both inside his vehicle and outside his vehicle in a public place. The "taking" of A.T. occurred in a public place, the vehicle was parked at times in a public place, and A.T. was eventually taken to a residential area in Barrie. All locations which ought to be spared from the presence of a firearm.

• A.T. was a lone woman, walking in a parking lot at night, overpowered by physical force and dragged to a vehicle. She was a particularly vulnerable victim.

• The firearm that was carried by OHG – which Mr. Moore knew about – was discharged at that Good Samaritan attempting to help A.T. It was discharged at or in the direction of that Good Samaritan in a very public and arguably busy parking lot. It is by good luck not good planning that nobody was injured or killed.

• That same firearm, and the one carried by Mr. Moore was used throughout the night to threaten and intimidate A.T.

• The circumstances under which Mr. Moore forced A.T. to perform oral sex are particularly aggravating. It was accompanied by threats to shoot her, and the firearm was held to her head.

• At times both in the vehicle with Mr. Moore and in the garage A.T. was bound with duct tape and rope.

• Mr. Moore was present for the various assaults on A.T. while she was bound in the garage. Throughout some of these assaults A.T. was forced to strip naked. Numerous injuries were suffered by A.T.

• A.T. was held captive by Mr. Moore and his associates for close to 12 hours before she was able to escape. Most of that time she was in the sole presence of Mr. Moore.

• The firearm used by Mr. Moore and the firearm used by OHG were never recovered.

[39] The impact of these offences on A.T. has been profound, all of which is outlined in discussion of her victim impact statement above.

[40] By way of mitigation, Mr. Moore has spent a significant amount of time in pre-sentence custody. Mr. Moore is a relatively young man, 39, and comes before the Court with a relatively unrelated criminal record.

[41] Mr. Sobcuff submits that given the family and community support for Mr. Moore, his prospects of rehabilitation are high, and given that this will be his first significant jail sentence, the principles of specific and general deterrence and denunciation are met with a jail sentence of any length.

[42] Mr. Sobcuff urges that the sentence ought not be one of such a length that it would be crushing for Mr. Moore and asks me to consider restraint when considering the overall length of the sentence.

[43] Further, by way of mitigation, Mr. Sobcuff reiterates that Mr. Moore was not the mastermind behind this kidnapping. He suggests that Mr. Moore was not involved in any of the planning that went into these offences. While I am prepared to find that Mr. Moore may not have been the mastermind, he certainly was an active participant in these offences.

Analysis

General Principles

[44] Imposing a fit sentence is often the most difficult task faced by a trial judge. This is a highly individualized process, and one that rarely comes down to a mathematical calculation. The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the offender. The court must weigh both the aggravating and mitigating factors present in every case, before determining what it feels to be a fit sentence.

[45] A sentencing judge must always remember that the fundamental purpose of sentencing, as outlined in section 718 of the Criminal Code, is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing just sanctions.

[46] Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the objectives a sentencing judge is to consider:

a. to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

b. to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

c. to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

d. to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

e. to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

f. to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[47] Other sentencing principles, applicable to the case before me, are outlined in section 718.2 of the Criminal Code:

A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:

(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation,

shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;

(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

[48] In R. v. Senior, [2022] O.J. No. 321 Christie J. made the following comments beginning at paragraph 26:

[26] Pursuant to section 718.1, a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Proportionality is a cardinal principle of sentencing, therefore, whatever weight a judge gives to the objectives listed above, the ultimate sentence imposed must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality. See R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, paras. 41-43; R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089; R. v. Omoragbon, 2020 ONCA 336, para. 28

[27] In R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, the Supreme Court of Canada recently stated:

[9] This Court has repeatedly expressed that sentencing is "one of the most delicate stages of the criminal justice process in Canada" (R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 1). More of an art than a science, sentencing requires judges to consider and balance a multiplicity of factors. While the sentencing process is governed by the clearly defined objectives and principles in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code, it remains a discretionary exercise for sentencing courts in balancing all relevant factors to meet the basic objectives of sentencing (Lacasse, at para. 1).

[10] The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction. Proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal. Unlike other principles of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code, proportionality stands alone following the heading "Fundamental principle" (s. 718.1). Accordingly, "[a]ll sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender" (R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 30). The principles of parity and individualization, while important, are secondary principles.

[12] As to the relationship of individualization to proportionality and parity, this Court in Lacasse aptly observed:

Proportionality is determined both on an individual basis, that is, in relation to the accused him or herself and to the offence committed by the accused, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [para. 53]

Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. Whereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, each offence is "committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile" (para. 58). This is why proportionality sometimes demands a sentence that has never been imposed in the past for a similar offence. The question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender's degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case (para. 58).

[28] While previous sentencing decisions are helpful to consider, each sentencing a court is tasked with must be conducted by considering the specific offence and specific offender in that particular case. Only in this manner will proportionality be respected. Every case is unique in some way.

[49] With respect to the applicability of "ranges of sentence," the comments of Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Rowe in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 are always important to bear in mind:

[108] Courts can and sometimes need to depart from prior precedents and sentencing ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence. Sentencing ranges are not "straitjackets" but are instead "historical portraits" (Lacasse, at para. 57). Accordingly, as this Court recognized in Lacasse, sentences can and should depart from prior sentencing ranges when Parliament raises the maximum sentence for an offence and when society's understanding of the severity of the harm arising from that offence increases (paras. 62-64 and 74).

[50] Even though Friesen dealt with sexual offences against children, the comments relating to the use of "ranges" are applicable across the board:

[111] We thus wish to express our concern about sentencing ranges based on precedents that appear to restrict sentencing judges' discretion, for example, by imposing a cap of three to five years on sentences that can only be exceeded in exceptional circumstances. For instance, the British Columbia Court of Appeal has set a range for sexual interference of one to three years and has suggested that only in "rare circumstances" would a sentence above three years be justified (R. v. Williams, 2019 BCCA 295, at para. 71). Similarly, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal has held that the range for sexual assault of a child involving both "intercourse" and abuse of a position of trust is three to five years and that "special circumstances" are required to depart from this range (R. v. Vokey, 2000 NFCA 14, 186 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, at para. 19).

[112] It is inappropriate to artificially constrain sentencing judges' ability to impose a proportionate sentence in this manner. As this Court's decision in L.M. makes clear, sentencing judges must have the ability to impose substantial sentences for sexual offences against children when the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender so demand (para. 30). There is no requirement for there to be rare or special circumstances in order to impose a substantial sentence where that substantial sentence is proportionate.

Range of Sentence

[51] The Crown provided several cases useful in understanding the appropriate range of sentence for these types of offences.

[52] In R. v. Bellissimo, 2009 ONCA 49 the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the proper range of sentence for "serious gun-related offences" is between seven and eleven years. This was an attempt murder, involving an accused person who fired shots into a busy restaurant narrowly missing a number of people, and significantly injuring one.

[53] In R. v. Dhaliwal, [2019] O.J. No. 2514 the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced a seven-year sentence to six years for an offender who fired a single gunshot into the ceiling of the hallway in a mixed-use building. This is the type of offence that appears to be at the lower end of the Bellissimo range.

[54] The Crown argues that on the facts before me, there is ample evidence that OHG attempted to injure the Good Samaritan, in that he fired directly (or almost directly) at him from a very short distance away. I agree with that assessment. The firearm was not discharged in the air, it was not discharged into the ground, it was discharged at the Good Samaritan. All, in my opinion, with the full actual or likely knowledge of Mr. Moore that this could happen.

[55] Justice Schreck in R. v. Jama, 2021 ONSC 4871 notes:

[42] Crimes involving handguns are far too common in the Greater Toronto Area. Handguns have but one purpose: to kill or seriously injure human beings. Because of the prevalence of these types of offences, courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for sentences designed to meet the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation. I am well aware that there are questions about the efficacy of general deterrence. However, that does not change the fact that there is clear appellate direction requiring sentencing courts to impose "exemplary" sentences: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, 205 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773, at para. 82; R. v. Dufour, 2015 ONCA 426, 326 C.C.C. (3d) 52, at para. 8; R. v. Brown, 2010 ONCA 745, 277 O.A.C. 233, at para. 13: Delchev, at para. 20.

[43] Had the defendants simply possessed a loaded handgun, they would have been liable to a sentence in the range of three to four years. Had they used the handgun to threaten another person, the sentence would have been higher. Had they discharged the handgun once in the heat of argument, it would have been even higher. But they did more than that. They discharged it at least three times. This was not a momentary lapse in judgment. It was a planned and deliberate act.

[44] The Crown relies on R. v. Bellissimo, 2009 ONCA 49, at para. 3, where the Court referred to a range of seven to 11 years for "serious gun-related offences." Bellissimo is a short endorsement and it is unclear what offence the accused had been convicted of, although it is clear that he fired several shots inside a restaurant and injured two people, one significantly. The range in that decision has been applied in discharge firearm cases: R. v. Campbell, 2021 ONSC 4193, at paras. 10-14; R. v. Charley, 2019 ONSC 45, at para. 45. However, it is most often applied in cases involving injuries or attempts to cause injuries, such as cases of aggravated assault or attempted murder: R. v. Johnston, 2021 ONCA 331, at para. 19, aff'g 2020 ONCJ 272, at paras. 116-117; R. v. Hanan, 2020 ONSC 1209, at para. 141; R. v. Abdirahim, 2019 ONSC 2617, at para. 31; R. v. Weeden, 2019 ONSC 773, at para. 41; R. v. Reis, 2017 ONSC 1961, at para. 29; R. v. Ali, 2016 ONSC 8190, at para. 4; R. v. Nadon, 2016 ONSC 3518, at para. 33; R. v. Murphy, 2016 ONCJ 67, at para. 15; R. v. Persaud, 2014 ONCJ 322, at para. 16; R. v. Jefferson, 2014 ONCA 434, at para. 14. In my view, the Bellissimo range may be properly applied only to cases of intentional shootings where someone is injured or there was an attempt to injure someone: R. v. Dhaliwal, 2019 ONCA 398; R. v. Haque, 2019 ONCJ 466, at para. 45; R. v. Larmond, 2011 ONSC 7170, at para. 26.

[45] It follows from the foregoing review that the appropriate sentencing range for discharging a restricted or prohibited firearm without causing or attempting to cause an injury to another person is higher than the three-to-four year range for possession of such a firearm and lower than the seven-to-11 year range in Bellissimo. Given the dangerousness inherent in discharging a firearm where others are present, in my view the appropriate range is closer to the Bellissimo range than it is to the possession range. I therefore conclude that the appropriate range for s.244.2 offences using a restricted or prohibited weapon is five to seven years. I draw this conclusion without considering the mandatory minimum penalty.

[56] The Crown argues that on the facts before me, there is ample evidence that OHG attempted to injure the Good Samaritan, in that he fired directly (or almost directly) at him from a very short distance away. I agree with that assessment. The firearm was not discharged in the air, it was not discharged into the ground, it was discharged at the Good Samaritan. All, in my opinion, with the full actual or likely knowledge of Mr. Moore that this could happen.

[57] Justice Fuerst in R. v. Abderezak, [2022] O.J. No. 5297 notes:

[72] Sentencing ranges are primarily guidelines, and not hard and fast rules: Lacasse, at para. 60. While I acknowledge the range identified by Schreck J. as generally applicable for the offence of reckless discharge, seven years is not an absolute ceiling. Sufficiently aggravating factors may move the top end of the range higher.

[73] The objectives of denunciation, general deterrence, and protection of the public are paramount in sentencing for firearms offences, particularly those involving the unlawful possession of loaded handguns in public places: see, R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, at para. 71; R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, at para. 49.

[58] The Crown position with respect to the range for the offence of reckless discharge of a firearm is that if I accept that there was an attempt to injure the Good Samaritan, then the range is seven to eleven years. If I do not accept that then the range is five to seven years, but it is not capped at seven years. Ms. Batorska argues that the significant aggravating factors take this at the very least to the level of eight years.

[59] R. v. L.D., [2002] O.J. No. 4695 is a case of a carjacking of a husband and wife turned kidnapping. After being kidnapped the two were assaulted, robbed, and held for eleven and a half hours. They were held initially in their car and then taken to an apartment. The accused in this case were career criminals, and the facts were described by the trial judge as "one of those few examples of a crime that goes beyond pure horror."

[60] The Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to one in a range of 14 to 16 years. L.D. had aspects of kidnapping, but without the discharge and without the sexual assault like exists in the case before me.

[61] In R. v. Levy, [2024] O.J. No. 1091 on a case with far more serious facts than the case before me, Justice Forestell makes the following comments with respect to the offence of kidnapping:

[20] In sentencing for kidnapping, denunciation, deterrence, and the protection of the public must be the primary objectives.

[21] As the British Columbia Court of Appeal explained in R. v. Poon:

...kidnapping strikes at the heart of the community's sense of safety and security. It is an offence that is intended to incite fear and terror in not only the person kidnapped, but also his or her family and friends, many times using that fear to extort money in return for that person's safe return. Even when the victim is released without having sustained any permanent physical injuries, the psychological and emotional scars may be slow to heal, if they ever do.

[22] There is a wide range of sentence for kidnapping, ranging from 6 years to life imprisonment. Sentences in the 6 to 10-year range are considered to be at the low end of the range and are reserved for cases that do not have aggravating features like gratuitous violence and for offenders who played a lesser role. Sentences in the mid-range of 10 to 14 years have been imposed for serious kidnapping cases involving ransom. Even youthful first offenders have received sentences in this range. A minimal role in the offence and mitigating personal circumstances may, exceptionally, bring the sentence below the 6 to 10-year range.

[23] Generally, the cases in which sentences at the higher end of the range have been imposed - 16 years to life imprisonment - have involved offenders who participated in the planning of the kidnapping and who have criminal records and circumstances that include assaulting and threatening the victims.

[24] In R. v. Brar, the British Columbia Court of Appeal identified criteria that are indicative of the gravity of the offence of kidnapping. These are:

(a) The purpose of the kidnapping, specifically whether it is carried out for ransom or as a means of extorting a payment or repayment from the victim;

(b) The extent to which there is planning and premeditation;

(c) The length and conditions of the confinement;

(d) The extent to which there is violence, torture, or significant physical injuries;

(e) Whether third parties are threatened;

(f) Whether guns are used;

(g) Whether there is gang involvement;

(h) Whether the kidnapping occurs in the course of the commission of another offence; and

(i) The circumstances in which the kidnapping ends.

[62] The Crown argues that applying the facts before me to the list outlined by Justice Forestell above, Mr. Moore is at the higher end of the range identified. The offence here, and the level of violence inflicted on A.T. borders on torture.

[63] When sentence ranges are as high as those often referred to in the case of kidnapping, sentencing judges also need to look at whether to impose a global sentence for kidnapping, and then include other offences concurrently within that range, or to impose consecutive sentences.

[64] The Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Cook, [2014] M.J. No. 77 provides some discussion:

[29] The rationale of the judge to focus on the kidnapping offence as the "overarching charge" (at para. 8) was correct given the nature of the crime of kidnapping.

[30] Kidnapping is a continuing offence. It is an aggravated form of unlawful confinement. The kidnapping began when the victim was forcibly taken on Main Street. It continued throughout the major sexual assault and accompanying choking. The kidnapping did not end until the victim's unlawful confinement was over, when she escaped on her third try (R. v. Vu, 2012 SCC 40 at para. 25, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 411).

[35] Once the judge determined it was proper to impose sentences for the two other offences concurrent to the kidnapping sentence, he was entitled to impose a higher sentence for the kidnapping offence to reflect the fact that a number of separate serious offences were committed together (R. v. Maroti (M.), 2010 MBCA 54 at para. 28, 255 Man.R. (2d) 115; R. v. Duerksen (J.A.), 2012 MBCA 41 at para. 5, 280 Man.R. (2d) 84; R. v. Taylor (M.A.), 2010 MBCA 103 at paras. 12-13, 262 Man.R. (2d) 43; and R. v. G.W.R., 2011 MBCA 62, 268 Man.R. (2d) 204). In Wozny, MacInnes J.A. explained (at para. 70):

As I have already stated, it is a legitimate sentencing requirement when imposing a concurrent sentence to impose a more severe penalty given multiple offences and their number than one might give for the same offence individually or as compared with a couple or a few offences.

[36] In summary, the judge was correct to see the sentence for kidnapping being longer than for the offences committed during the kidnapping. The Vu decision makes it clear that the kidnapping began with the victim's forcible taking, it continued during her captivity while other serious crimes occurred, and it only ended upon her successful escape. The assessment of proportionality for the purposes of s. 718.1 of the Code, therefore, had to take into account two features of this case. The maximum punishment for the principal offence at the core of the inter-related criminal event was life imprisonment. As well, any sentence imposed for kidnapping should be more significant due to the fact that the offences of sexual assault and overcoming resistance to commit an offence by choking occurred during the kidnapping and concurrent sentences for those offences were imposed.

[65] In the offence before me, it is clear that the kidnapping is the overarching offence. The reckless discharge of a firearm, the sexual assault with a firearm, and the continued forcible confinement of A.T. all occurred throughout the kidnapping with a firearm. Under the horrific umbrella of the continuing offence of kidnapping with a firearm, A.T. was held captive for almost 12 hours, sexually assaulted at gunpoint, and the Good Samaritan trying to save her was shot at.

[66] Justice Nishikawa's decision in R. v. Burke, [2022] O.J. No. 2592 was submitted by the Crown, in so far as it provides a helpful summary of the range of cases for the offence of sexual assault with a firearm. In Burke, the Court found the range to be close to that of kidnapping.

[67] Counsel for Mr. Moore submits that almost all these cases can be distinguished on their facts. He is correct. The benefit however to a review of the caselaw is that it provides a sentencing judge with potential range with which to slot the facts of any particular case into.

[68] While these ranges are very helpful, they are not, as pointed out above, a straitjacket to confine judicial decision making. In order to get to the higher end of the ranges, and sometimes even just to fit into the range the facts need to reflect the seriousness of those offences which attract significant custodial sentences.

[69] Considering the facts before me, the participation of Mr. Moore in the offences committed, and the impact of the offences on the physical and emotional health and well being of the complainant, Mr. Moore must be at the higher end of the sentencing range for kidnapping as outlined in L.D. and Levy. I find that the range of sentence for kidnapping with a firearm for someone with Mr. Moore's participation, with the added significantly aggravating offences of sexual assault with a firearm and reckless discharge of a firearm is 12 to 16 years.

[70] The horrific, degrading, violent and disgusting acts that Mr. Moore and his associates put A.T. through warrant a significant custodial sentence. Whether Mr. Moore was the "man behind the curtain" pulling all the strings or not, he was a willing and active participant in some terrifying criminal activity.

[71] Imagine being A.T., imagine being grabbed, shoved into a car with gunfire ringing alongside your confinement, held in that car by armed men for hours, only to have one of them force you to give him oral sex while tapping you on the head with a gun. Then imagine being stripped naked and tied to a chair in the garage while other men burn you with a lighter, assault you with a hammer, a screwdriver, and a needle full of heroin. All the while, imagine that the man who brought you to that garage is standing by smoking and watching.

[72] If only that scenario were the unimaginable. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened to A.T., and Mr. Moore had a hand in all of it. Offences like this cry out for a sentence that reflects the principles of specific and general deterrence, but most of all denunciation for the disgusting display of criminality that it is.

Conclusion

[73] Taking into account Mr. Moore's role in the offences, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances outlined above, the appropriate ranges of sentence as discussed in the caselaw, the impact of the offence on the victim, the principles of sentencing as outlined in the Criminal Code, and the personal circumstances of Mr. Moore, the sentence imposed is as follows:

• Count number 2, Kidnapping with a Firearm – 13 years in jail, less three years spent in pre-sentence custody, for a total of 10 years remaining.

• Count number 3, Forcible Confinement – 3 years concurrent to Count number 2.

• Count number 4, Sexual Assault with a Firearm – 6 years concurrent to Count number 2.

• Count number 8, Reckless Discharge of a Firearm – 7 years concurrent to Count number 2.

[74] In addition, there will be a DNA order pursuant to section 487.04 of the Criminal Code on the primary designated offence of kidnapping (Count #2). There will be a SOIRA Order imposed on Count #4 for 20 years pursuant to section 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code. A section 109 weapons prohibition for life will be imposed on Count #8, and an order pursuant to section 743.21 of the Criminal Code will issue prohibiting Mr. Moore from communicating directly or indirectly while in custody with A.T., Michael Rocco, or the young person S.M.

Released: August 22, 2025

Signed: Justice M. Townsend