Court File and Parties

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: August 25, 2025

Court File No.: Cochrane FO-22-0000009-0000

Between:

J.L. Applicant

— And —

K.C. Respondent

Before: Justice G. Jenner

Heard on: August 14, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on: August 25, 2025

Counsel:

• Heather Garfinkel, for the applicant
• Mary Powell, for the respondent

JENNER J.:

I. Introduction

[1] These reasons address two related motions before the court: (i) the applicant father's motion for an order that the respondent mother is in contempt of this court's previous orders with respect to parenting time; and (ii) the mother's motion for retroactive authorization, on a temporary basis, of her relocation with the parties' two daughters from Barrie, Ontario, to Burk's Falls, Ontario.

[2] The parties share two daughters, YG, aged 10, and OG, aged 13. The underlying application before the court was filed in early 2022 while the mother was residing with both children in Smooth Rock Falls, Ontario. That is the reason this matter continues to be heard in the District of Cochrane. As of March 2025, however, the mother was residing in Barrie with both children. The father resides in Orillia, Ontario. The prevailing temporary order provides that the father is to have parenting time on alternating weekends. Despite the order, the father has not had parenting time since October 2024. In simplest terms, the children have been refusing to participate, and the mother has not forced them to.

[3] On April 23, 2025, the mother provided the father with notice that she intended to relocate with the children to Burk's Falls. The father served a formal objection to the relocation on May 23, 2025. The mother nonetheless relocated shortly after providing her notice.

[4] I received and considered the following materials on these motions:

• The mother's affidavits dated August 1, 2025, and August 7, 2025;
• The father's affidavits dated August 6, 2025, and August 8, 2025; and
• The Clinician's Report of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, dated May 9, 2023, which was appended to the father's earlier affidavit.

[5] For the reasons that follow, (i) the father's motion to have the mother found in contempt is dismissed; (ii) the mother is nonetheless found in breach of the order and court will make appropriate adjustments to the temporary parenting order, and (iii) the mother's relocation is authorized on a temporary basis with conditions.

[6] The father's motion also alleged contempt respecting financial disclosure and unanswered requests for information. The father did not comply with this court's direction with respect to filing deadlines. I entertained the contempt motion in any event, given its overlap with the relocation motion, and the urgency of the parenting issues related to the fast-approaching start of school. I reserved the right, however, to defer certain issues to a future hearing. The evidence and submissions on the financial and disclosure issues were very limited, and I have determined those components of the father's contempt motion should be pursued separately, with proper notice.

II. Family and Procedural History

[7] The parents were in a long-term relationship that ended in 2016. On separation, the mother says the parties made a formal agreement for the children to see their father on weekends, with additional possible weekday parenting time. According to the mother, OG wanted to see her father, but YG had little attachment to him as she was 17 months old at the time of separation. The father disputes that his parenting time has been the subject of his consent in the past, suggesting the mother has always made unilateral decisions in that regard.

[8] The father suffered a traumatic brain injury post-separation, which temporarily impacted his ability to parent.

[9] In April 2019, the mother began a new relationship with MH. In March 2020, she, MH, and the two children moved to Smooth Rock Falls, Ontario. The mother indicates she provided the father with appropriate notice. The mother and MH welcomed their own child in September 2020. Their son, CB, is now 4 years old. The mother indicates CB has profound autism, is non-verbal, incontinent, and developmentally delayed. He requires 24-hr supervision and care.

[10] In late 2021 or early 2022, the mother and MH planned a relocation to Nova Scotia. She did not provide notice, though presented the father with a document proposing he terminate his parental rights to permit MH to adopt the children. The father brought the underlying application to prevent that move. In February 2022, Justice Labelle issued an order preventing the planned relocation. The mother and MH ultimately moved back to Barrie in April 2022.

[11] On April 5, 2022, Justice Labelle ordered, on a temporary without prejudice basis, that the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the children and primary residence. The father was provided parenting time on alternating weekends. There was a police enforcement clause included for a six-month period.

[12] In May 2022, Justice Labelle made an order requesting the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer. A clinician was appointed and ultimately delivered a report on May 23, 2023.

[13] On November 15, 2022, Justice Labelle made a new order, on consent, requiring that the parenting time resume as per the order dated April 5, 2022, with an additional requirement that no adults shall have contact with the children during the father's parenting time, excepting immediate family and the father's then-landlord. A specific clause was included precluding any contact with a 'Greyson', who had allegedly acted inappropriately towards OG.

[14] Of late, the father's parenting time has not been occurring. The parties are at odds as to the basis. They agree the children are refusing, but the father blames the mother, claiming alienation and contempt of the order. The parties have been exploring counseling options to address the impasse but have not been able to agree on a course of action, partly due to the financial aspects of the issue.

[15] An order to renew the involvement of the OCL was made earlier this year. The OCL declined to participate.

[16] In March 2025, the mother's relationship with MH ended. The mother indicates that without MH's support, she cannot afford to rent a house in Barrie.

[17] The father currently resides in Orillia, Ontario, with his new partner and her children.

III. Issues and Parties' Positions

[18] I must determine the following issues:

• 1. Contempt: Should the mother be found in contempt of this court's order respecting parenting time?

• 2. Remedy: Depending on the outcome of issue 1, what remedy should issue, if any, either in relation to contempt, or pursuant to this court's jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules?

• 3. Relocation: Is relocation in the children's best interests? This issue includes a threshold question related to burden of proof.

And, depending on the outcome of issue 3,

• 4. Apportionment of Travel Costs: If relocation is authorized, should the court apportion travel costs pursuant to s. 39.4(9) of the Children's Law Reform Act?

[19] The mother stresses she could not afford to keep her residence in Barrie, and needs assistance with her son, CB. If she has that assistance, she says that will benefit her daughters as well. The mother's own parents, the maternal grandparents, are her greatest source of support. She indicates that the subject children are doing well in their new school and that once the conflict between the children and their father is resolved, she will support resumption of the weekend visits with their father. She indicates that as the father resides in Orillia, which is 37km from Barrie, Burk's Falls represents only a further 90km change. She is willing to take on a larger portion of the transport responsibilities.

[20] The father argues the mother has serially attempted relocation with the children, which has disrupted the children's stability, their education, and his parenting time. He suggests the mother's conduct has frustrated his parenting time and alienated the children from him. He is alarmed that the relocation at issue proceeded without prior court authorization. The father opposes the relocation and seeks a police enforcement clause to ensure that the parenting occurs.

IV. Analysis

4.1 Contempt

[21] The focus of the contempt motion was the father's claim that the mother has repeatedly withheld the children from the father's parenting time, contrary to the orders of Justice Labelle dated April 5, 2022, and November 15, 2022. The father claims that in the fall of 2024, when parenting time last occurred, the mother caused a hostile confrontation and made inflammatory and unverified accusations in front of the children and other witnesses. He claims this is part of a pattern of her alienating the children from him. He indicates that when his parenting time occurs, the children enjoy their time. When they return to their mother's, their description of their time with their father changes.

[22] The mother explains that the children are refusing to attend the parenting time. She indicates that OG is the main driver of this position, and that YG follows her lead. She indicates OG has complained that she was touched sexually by a man believed to be called 'Greyson' while in her father's care. She blames her father for not preventing this. Both the police and Children's Aid Society investigated. Neither took further action because the man in question could not be identified. The mother believes OG. Parenting time resumed for some period after the allegation came about. The mother explains that the children visited their father because the mother was threatened with a contempt motion.

[23] The father claims not to know any "Greyson". He relies on the fact that no claims were ever verified.

[24] The mother indicates that she continues to drive the children to the exchange point every second Friday, but the girls refuse to get into the father's vehicle. The mother does not force them to go. She explains that at the exchange point on July 25, 2025, OG called the father a liar. The father's sister-in-law was present and videorecording. OG was crying. She called her father a loser, which the mother says she admonished.

[25] Both parents suggest they desire a solution to the impasse around parenting time. The mother is not seeking to change the order to remove parenting time. The father has suggested therapy. Specifically, the father indicates he has been asking for the children to participate in family intervention or reconciliation therapy and has put forward options. The programs he has found, however, range from $200 to $500 per hour. The mother indicates that she and the children have begun counseling with New Path in Barrie, which is a free service offered by the Ministry of Health. They see the same counselor, via Zoom, but their sessions are separate. She says the father's proposals are financially impractical.

[26] As set out in Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, at para. 10, the test for civil contempt in family law proceedings requires the moving party, in this case the father, to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

• The order alleged to have been breached is clear and unequivocal;
• The person alleged to be in contempt had actual knowledge of the order; and
• The breach of the order was deliberate and willful.

[27] In the same paragraph, the court added the following observations:

Exercising the contempt power is discretionary. Courts discourage the routine use of this power to obtain compliance with court orders. The power should be exercised cautiously and with great restraint as an enforcement tool of last rather than first resort. A judge may exercise discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice. As an alternative to making a contempt finding too readily, a judge should consider other options, such as issuing a declaration that the party breached the order or encouraging professional assistance.

When the issue raised on the contempt motion concerns access to children, the paramount consideration is the best interests of the children. [Citations omitted.]

[28] In McKinnon v. McKinnon, 2018 ONCA 596, the court observed, as follows, at para. 36:

A judge retains an overriding discretion to decline to make a contempt finding … where it would be unjust to do so, such as where the alleged contemnor has acted in good faith to take reasonable steps to comply with the relevant court order

[29] In Antoine v. Antoine, 2024 ONSC 1397, at para. 35, the court reinforced that contempt is an enforcement method of last resort, and offered a number of alternative solutions that ought to be considered, including, (i) a motion for an order declaring a party to be in breach, and requiring compliance, (ii) a motion for directions, (iii) a motion to change or clarify the terms of the order, and (iv) arranging professional services or assessments to address underlying problems that have triggered enforcement problems. The court also endorsed consideration of the remedies available under r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules: para. 36.

[30] The mother agrees that Justice Labelle's order is clear and unequivocal, and that she had actual knowledge of it. The question of contempt turns on whether she was in breach of the order, whether such breach was deliberate and willful, and whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise the court's discretionary contempt power.

[31] In Szyngel v. Rintoul, 2014 ONSC 3298, at para. 24, the court observed as follows:

There are situations where the reasons for the breaches provide a legitimate excuse. In order to make out a defence, however, the party asserting it needs to have a reasonably held belief that there was a good reason to disobey the order.

[32] In McCarthy v. Murray, 2022 ONSC 855, at paras. 30-35, the court catalogued a number of principles applicable to cases where children are refusing to participate in court-ordered parenting time, including the following:

• Once the court has determined that parenting time is in the child's best interests, a parent cannot leave the decision to comply with the order up to the child. A parent has a positive obligation to ensure that a child who resists contact with the other parent complies with the order.

• A parent need not force a child to go for parenting time but should require the child to go.

• A failure to require the child to attend parenting time can be considered contempt.

• Parents are not required to do the impossible in order to avoid a contempt finding but are required to do all that they reasonably can.

• Analogy can be drawn to a child's refusal to attend school or the dentist. There are levers on which a parent can apply pressure, including withholding privileges, or employing disciplinary measures, short of calling police to physically remove the children.

• Compliance with the order may require proactive steps on the part of a parent, including discussions with the child and engaging with the other parent and other persons involved with the family to consider resolutions.

See also Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568.

[33] Courts have also observed that, even where breach of a court order is established, it would be an unusual case to call for a finding of contempt on a first non-compliance. A warning, admonition, or costs order may be more appropriate: Halas v. Halas, 1998 CarswellBC 1403 (C.A.); Jean v. O'Callaghan, 2017 ONSC 4027, at para. 11.

[34] Applying these principles to this case, I decline to find the mother in contempt. Contempt is an extreme remedy that is not justified for these parents at this stage in the proceedings. The mother is not flouting the order entirely. She continues to drive the children to the exchange point. She has engaged services to try and address the root cause of the children's refusals. I agree with the father that the mother has fallen short of what is required of her under the order. Her position that she will not "require" the children to go with their father, is inconsistent with her obligation to use the reasonable tools at her disposal as a parent to facilitate the parenting time. She has not satisfied me she has exerted the disciplinary pressures or incentives she would have available to her as primary parent, as contemplated by the jurisprudence discussed above.

[35] I am, therefore, prepared to make a finding the mother is in breach of the order, and I am satisfied that other remedies short of contempt are appropriate to meet the situation.

4.2 Remedy

[36] Short of contempt, r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules broadly empowers a court to respond to a party's failure to obey an order and sets out a non-exhaustive list of tools. It requires, as a triggering event, the breach of a court order. That event is made out here. It does not require the breach of a court order to be intentional: Ahmed v. Shaikh, 2021 ONSC 6648, at para. 21. The court's jurisdiction under r. 1(8) includes the discretion to change an existing parenting order even in the absence of a motion to change: Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, at para. 51. The court may, further, grant relief related to the breach notwithstanding that the relief was not the specific subject of the motion. The court need only be satisfied the relief is appropriate and consistent with the objective of the Rules: Pan v. Zhao, 2024 ONSC 5082, at para. 9.

[37] The two key remedies relating to parenting time sought by the father are (i) police enforcement of the parenting time, and (ii) make-up parenting time.

[38] In advocating for police enforcement, the father cites that police enforcement has been ordered in the past in this matter, which succeeded in temporarily ensuring the parenting time occurred. Once that police enforcement clause lapsed, parenting time fizzled.

[39] I am not prepared to order police enforcement at this time. Such clauses ought to be granted rarely, in exceptional circumstances, based on concrete evidence of necessity: Bouchard v. Sgovio, at para. 119. The mother will have the benefit of these reasons to guide her conduct. It is premature to conclude that police enforcement is necessary to persuade the mother to newly apply her parental tools to require the children to attend for parenting time. Moreover, I am greatly concerned that police enforcement will be interpreted by the children as a heavy-handed measure visited on them by their father and the court, and will exacerbate, rather than relieve against the current impasse.

[40] The father's request for make-up parenting time is understandable given the 10 months since his last meaningful visit with the children. From the paradigm of making him whole, it makes good sense. I am not, however, persuaded that increasing his parenting time at this time, even on a temporary basis, would serve his interests or the children's. Both parties agree that reintegration is the goal. In my view, a gradual approach to reintegration is more likely to succeed. The father must go slow to reach his destination, lest the children recoil further. I will order that the parenting time resume but that for the first two of the father's alternating weekends, the parenting time be for one day for a period of four hours. For the next two of his parenting time weekends, the parenting time shall be for one overnight. Thereafter the previous schedule shall resume, but the father will additionally benefit from an extra day where, on his parenting time weekends, there is a PD day or holiday falling on the Monday or Friday.

[41] I will also impose a term that the mother employs all reasonable parenting tools at her disposal to (i) encourage the children's relationship with the father; (ii) prioritize the development of that relationship; and (iii) require the children to attend for the father's parenting time. This term will make explicit the mother's implied duty under the previous orders. It should also serve to remind her that while the court has not found her in contempt at this time, future breaches could well lead to such a result.

[42] Would it be sensible, as an enforcement mechanism, to make an order requiring the parties to participate, with the children, in reconciliation/reunification therapy with the goal of repairing the father's relationship with the children? I agree with the father that such therapy would be both responsive to the breach and would target the root cause of the non-compliance. The father has provided concrete options to the mother. I am alive to her concerns with respect to affordability, though she has not put solid evidence before the court with respect to her financial means. In the circumstances I will make an order for therapy but impose a limit on her contribution, which may be revisited on further order of the court.

[43] I will, finally, include terms requiring the parties to participate in mediation, which may assist the parties in improving their communication, including around their mutual support of the father's resumption of parenting time.

4.3 Relocation

Legal Framework

[44] Relocation is defined in s. 18(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) as,

a change in residence of a child, or of a person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child, that is likely to have a significant impact on the child's relationship with,

(a) another person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child, or

(b) a person who has contact with respect to the child under a contact order;

[45] That the move from Barrie to Burk's Falls is a relocation within the meaning of s. 18(1) was not contested in this motion. The motion concerns a temporary order. If the current parenting schedule was not going to be challenged on a final basis in the underlying application, then I would have some concern that the move might not be likely to have a significant impact on the children's relationship with the father. I would not assume that, for parenting time exercised on alternating weekends, the difference between traveling from Barrie to Orillia and from Orillia to Burk's Falls—a difference of 90km—would necessarily qualify. More information would be required. But, given that parties will ultimately be contesting that schedule, and given the impact that a temporary order may have on the ultimate outcome, I accept the parties' positions that the move qualifies as a relocation.

[46] The process for relocation is addressed by s. 39.4 of the CLRA, which reads as follows:

Authorization of relocation

39.4 (1) In this section,

"family arbitration award" has the same meaning as in the Arbitration Act, 1991.

Same

(2) A person who has given notice of a proposed relocation in accordance with section 39.3 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if,

(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or

(b) no objection to the relocation is made in accordance with subsection 39.3 (5) and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.

Best interests of the child

(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child's life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

Factor not to be considered

(4) In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child's relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.

Burden of proof

(5) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

Same

(6) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

Same

(7) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

Burden of proof, exception

(8) If an order referred to in subsection (5) or (6) is an interim order, the court may determine that the subsection does not apply.

Costs of relocation

(9) If a court authorizes the relocation of a child, it may provide for the apportionment of costs relating to the exercise of parenting time by a person who is not relocating between that person and the person who is relocating the child.

[47] To summarize, the provision permits a party to relocate if their notice has not been objected to or if they obtain authorization from the court. Authorization is to be determined accounting for the best interests of the child, considering the standard factors set out in s. 24 of the CLRA, augmented by the factors set out in s. 39.4(3). The court may not consider whether the authorization-seeking parent would relocate without the children if unsuccessful. The burden of proof is context-dependent and governed by ss. 39.4(5)-(8). If relocation is ordered, the court can apportion travel costs related to parenting time.

[48] Initial uncertainty concerning whether s. 39.4 governs temporary relocation pending a trial was recently dispelled by the Divisional Court in Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106. Though Diallo was concerned with relocation under the Divorce Act, the CLRA's relocation provisions mirror those in the Divorce Act. See also Gomez v. Isaza, 2025 ONCJ 324 for a recent application of this development applied to the CLRA.

[49] Diallo also recognized, at para. 47, that temporary relocation motions can be particularly consequential, and might justify a more expansive process for determination than a typical motion. Relocations are hard to reverse without causing major disruption to children. They have "an air of finality which makes it appropriate to consider whether they should be decided by way of a process designed to make final decisions." Here, I am satisfied that the process enables me to make a just decision as to temporary relocation. The process selected must balance several considerations, including finite judicial resources, and the urgency to have a decision made prior to the commencement of the children's school year. Had that urgency been absent or had the relocation in question been of greater magnitude, I might have reached a different conclusion and insisted on a different process.

Who bears the onus?

[50] With respect to onus, both parties took the position that the father had the burden of proof, presumably by operation of s. 39.4(6). I disagree. While there is an order in place under which the children are meant to spend the vast majority of time in the mother's care, that order is not being substantially complied with. The father's parenting time is not occurring and has not been for many months. In any event, that order is temporary and made on a without prejudice basis. I would exercise my discretion pursuant to s. 39.4(8) to relieve against the application of s. 39.4(6). Both parties have the burden of proving the relocation is or is not in the children's best interests.

Is relocation in the children's best interests?

[51] In consideration whether relocation is in the children's best interests, I have considered all factors set out in ss. 24 and 39.4 of the CLRA. Some bear more heavily than others in the circumstances of this case. I have organized my thoughts around the following themes:

The children's needs (s. 24(3)(a))

The children are aged 10 and 13. They require stability. They are at an important age to make meaningful and sustained social connections with peers.

The father expresses concern over the children's academic progress. He indicates the mother homeschooled the girls for some time despite her focus and attention being required for her high-needs son. At this time, however, the subject children are enrolled in school full time, and YG, who is behind her peers, has an individualized education plan.

The children's needs can be met in either community. Having been moved already, however, the need for stability is better served by leaving the children in place rather than ordering a return.

The reasons for the relocation (s. 39.4(3)(a))

The mother offers two reasons for the relocation. The first is financial and the second relates to her son, CB. The mother's claim that she cannot afford to rent an apartment in Barrie is a bald assertion unsupported by any financial information or reasoning. The father resides in Orillia, approximately 30 minutes' drive from Barrie. This suggests a wide radius in which the mother could seek housing without putting more distance between the children and their father. I am not prepared to find that there is a compelling financial reason for the relocation, without detailed information about the mother's efforts in this regard.

With respect to CB, there does not appear to be a dispute between the parties, at least for the purpose of this motion, as to the fact that he presents with significant challenges and needs. Courts have recognized that the economic and financial benefits of moving to a community where the parent will have supports is properly considered in assessing whether or not the move is in the child's best interests: MacKenzie v. Newby, 2013 ONCJ 541, at para. 53. That being said, the mother has not provided any detail with respect to the level of support she is receiving from her parents in the Burk's Falls area. She does not detail the role, if any, played by CB's father, who is not a party to this proceeding. She does not detail what level of support she could receive, either from her parents or another source, in the Barrie area.

The lack of compelling reasons supported by evidence cuts against the court authorizing the relocation.

The impact of the relocation, and its potential reversal, on the children (s. 39.4(3)(b))

The children have already moved to Burk's Falls. They have started school there. They have, at least to a degree, connected with the community. According to the mother, they have made friends and are looking forward to resuming school in September. No doubt being forced to relocate back to Barrie will involve short-term disruption. This is far from ideal and is among harms sought to be avoided by requiring notice and authorization before a move is undertaken.

The disruption is not trivial. But I must also be mindful that the children have been attending school in Burk's Falls for less than three months. Prior to that the children resided in Barrie for longer. Reversing the relocation at this time would return the children to a community that is familiar to them.

I reject the father's claim that Burk's Falls is geographically and socially isolated. He provides no evidence to support this claim.

What of the impact on parenting time resulting from geographic distances involved? This is a critical factor and involves a comparative analysis. I have been provided no specific addresses so will assume a central location in each community. If the children are returned to Barrie, that would be 36km from Orillia, or roughly 30 minutes of driving between homes. If the children remain in Burk's Falls, that is 127 km from Orillia, or roughly 1 hour and 15 minutes of driving. Traffic conditions could increase both driving times.

Though I accept, for reasons provided above, that there has been a relocation as defined in the Act, it is of relatively modest magnitude. Indeed, it is telling that the father, in both his notice of motion and draft order, seeks only a term that the mother not relocate outside of Simcoe County. Simcoe County spans a wide geographic area. There are parts of Simcoe County that are in excess of 1 hour and 15 minutes' drive away from Orillia and roughly equivalent of the distance from Orillia to Burk's Falls.

I must also consider the impact that my order will have on the children's attitudes towards parenting time with their father. I will explore the children's view and preferences, to the extent they are known, below. But there appears to be a real risk that if I order a further disruption to the children's lives, and return them to Barrie, they could blame both the court and their father, and become more hostile to participating in any parenting time.

Though complex, this factor tends to favour retroactive authorization of the relocation.

The history of care, the nature and strength of the relationships, and the time spent and involvement of each parent (ss. 24(3)(b) and d), and 39.4(3)(c))

While the father has been victim to circumstances—his injury and the mother's unilateral approach to relocation in past—the evidence is clear the children have been living primarily with their mother for the past 9 years. She has been responsible for their needs for this entire period. They have had limited parenting time with their father. YG, in particular, was less than two years old when the parties separated. They children are now 10 and 13 years of age. A final disposition as to decision-making responsibility and parenting time is outside the ambit of this motion, but the prospect of a role reversal is remote. This factor tends to support authorization of a relocation, so long as it is not overly disruptive to the father's parenting time, which both parties agree is important.

I am concerned about the frequency with which relocation has been contemplated or pursued for these children. I agree with the father that relocation can inject significant instability into their lives. I am concerned the mother approach to this issue is restless and impulsive. This is a proper consideration in determining whether the relocation ought to be authorized, but may also bear on what corollary conditions, if any, should be imposed in the event relocation is authorized.

Compliance with legal obligations, including notice of relocation (ss. 39.4(3)(d) and (g))

There is no dispute the mother did not comply with her legal obligations respecting the relocation. While she provided notice, that notice was met with an objection. Rather than waiting for the court to hear her motion, she went ahead with the move. She was not under any time pressure to do so before this motion could be heard. The mother acknowledged, through counsel's submissions, that she was not going to lose her residence in Barrie until November of this year. What is more, the mother did not tell the father about the move. He learned of it when the mother filed materials on this motion, months later. This is very concerning to the court.

I would not go so far as to find the mother's move was in breach of Justice Labelle's previous endorsement, as the father suggests. On March 28, 2023, Justice Labelle endorsed that "[t]he mother is planning to move to North Bay and she will provide proper notice before doing so, and for motion to be heard." I read this endorsement as being related to the contemplated North Bay move, not the present relocation. This hardly excuses the mother's conduct. She acted contrary to the spirit of Justice Labelle's endorsement, and of course, to the relocation provisions of the Act. The mother has been warned, on several occasions, about the destabilizing effect of relocation on the children. I find she knew what was expected of her and chose to ignore it.

This factor is something of an outlier in ss. 21 and 39.4. In focusing on compliance with the notice requirement, its connection to the best interests of the children is less direct than other factors. There can be indirect connection. Parents who flout legal requirements to engage in self help raise questions about their judgment and parenting skills: Darghawth v. Jaffer, 2025 ONCJ 104 at paragraph 54. The court must, however, be careful not to shift the relocation analysis from one focused on the best interests of the children, to one focused on fashioning a remedy for a parent's non-compliance with notice requirements. Courts should not sanction self-help in circumstances where the best interests of children may potentially have been jeopardized: Darghawth, at para. 54. But nor should courts sanction non-compliance in a manner that would itself jeopardize the best interests of the children.

The parents' willingness and reasonableness in supporting the children's relationship with the other, including adaptiveness to any relocation (ss. 24(3)(c) and 39.4(3)(f))

The mother's various earlier relocations, both proposed and realized, have been the source of significant conflict for the parents and children. They demonstrate the mother's tendency to ignore the importance of the children's relationship with their father. Her callousness towards this relationship, demonstrated by her attempt to have him 'sign away' his parental rights, and her keeping the latest relocation from him, is very concerning to the court.

The father has been given very little opportunity to demonstrate his stance towards the children's relationship with the mother. That said, his opposition to the present relocation seems more focused on obstructing the mother's agenda, rather than improving his relationship with his daughters. The present barrier between him and the children is not geographic, even with the children in Burk's Falls.

The children's views and preferences (s. 24(3)(e))

I have no direct evidence before of the children's views and preferences with respect to relocation specifically. It appears clear the children do not wish to have parenting time with their father, at least not under the terms of the current order. The degree to which their mother is influencing them is disputed, and untested affidavit evidence does not provide me with a sound basis to make a reliable finding in that regard. The OCL clinician's report, however, provides some helpful insight. It is dated and must be approached with some caution as a result.

The report indicates that at the time (Spring 2023), OG had concerns about her father speaking badly of her mother. She said he became more aggressive and less caring after his injury, and that she was frustrated by his sudden interest in spending time with her. She expressed several concerns about the conditions of the farm they visited their father at. She was happy she no longer needed to go, and conveyed she has not had a good relationship with her father for some time. She described him as rude, and not accepting of her feelings.

The report indicates YG also raised concerns about the conditions where parenting time was occurring. YG was asked why she had not seen her father in several weeks and indicated that their mother does not want them to go, though she was not sure why. She added that she too does not want to go. She does not enjoy her time at his father's.

Both children provided very clear indication that, long-term, they wish to live with their mother. They appeared unconcerned with whether that might mean they no longer have visits with their father.

This evidence has to be considered in context; a context which includes the children being told of, and getting excited about, a move to Nova Scotia, where they would "get a 15-acre lot on a lake….with a barn for the dogs and horses" and "trails close to the ocean." OG explained the only reason they are not yet living there is because of the need to spend time with her father. That these idyllic-sounding plans were discussed openly with the children before critical issues such as the father's relationship with the children were considered is troubling, and likely contributed to the girls' disdain for their father.

The following passage from the report captures this interplay:

The writer appreciates [the mother]'s devotion to the [children], and acknowledges her belief that relocating would provide them a better life. However, her historic and proposed relocations are problematic, particularly with respect to the children's relationship with their father. Not surprisingly, her lack of support for the relationship has produced two children who state they do not want the relationship, and who see [the father] as the obstacle in the way of them having a happy life.

[52] This is challenging case. Relocation determinations often are. On the one hand, the mother's ever-changing plans to relocate to various communities drives conflict in this matter and undermines the children's relationship with their father. Moreover, the move appeared unnecessary on the evidence, was made without prior authorization and, most troublingly, was undertaken in secret. On the other hand, the move is made. Unwinding it will create further instability for the children, and likely drive a further wedge between them and their father, who they may be inclined to blame. The move is of relatively modest magnitude and will minimally impact the father's parenting time. I am mindful of the 'air of finality' associated with even temporary relocations, and that authorizing this relocation mounts a further hurdle for the father's argument that he should have greater parenting time than is currently ordered. But given the history of care, the children's ages, and their views, it is difficult to envision a court ordering a shift to shared parenting or a role reversal. Considering the entire constellation of factors, I conclude that authorizing the relocation on a temporary basis in in the children's best interests.

[53] This determination should not be interpreted as vindication of the mother's course of action, or as a signal to others who might contemplate a similar approach. The mother's decision to relocate prior to this motion being heard was completely inappropriate and may be a significant consideration with respect to costs. It will also bear on the analysis with respect to corollary aspects of the order.

4.4 Apportionment of Travel Costs

[54] As noted, s. 39.4(9) of the CLRA permits the court, on authorizing a relocation, to apportion costs related to the exercise of parenting time by the parent who is not relocating. The relocation I have authorized is temporary. It was also, on the evidence, poorly justified, and made without notice. I am inclined to require the mother to bear the full costs of the transportation for the father's biweekly parenting time pending final determination of the underlying application.

V. Conclusion and Order

[55] The court declines to find the mother in contempt of the orders of Justice Labelle dated April 5, 2022 and November 15, 2022. The court finds she is in breach of those orders with respect to parenting time. The court exercises its authority under r. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to make a revised parenting order. The court grants the mother's motion for temporary relocation, with conditions.

[56] An order shall issue with the following terms on a temporary basis:

1. On a continuing without prejudice basis, the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility and primary parenting/residence of the children.

2. The mother shall provide the father with the name and contact information for all health, education, or service providers for the children, including the children's school. The father shall be entitled to contact those service provides.

3. The father shall continue to have parenting time with the children on alternating weekends from Friday after school, accounting for travel time (or at 5:00pm when school is not in session), to Sunday at 6:00pm. If the father's parenting time weekend coincides with a PD day or holiday, it shall be extended to include that day. This schedule is subject to the following temporary exception:

   (a) For the first two weekends where the father would have parenting time, the parenting time will be for on Saturday only from 10am to 2pm.

   (b) For the second two weekends where the father would have parenting time, the parenting time will commence on Friday after school, and shall terminate on Saturday, at 4:00pm.

   (c) The parenting time shall thereafter resume on the normal schedule.

4. The mother shall be responsible for the costs of transporting the children between Burk's Falls and Orillia. The father may elect to have the mother drive the children to and from Orillia. He may, alternatively, require that the mother meet him at a public location of his choosing along the route, should he wish to take advantage of the additional parenting time afforded him in transit. In that case the mother shall be responsible to reimburse the father for his mileage at the rate of $0.72 per kilometer of his travel. The father must communicate his selection no later than Sunday evening prior to the exchange, at 10:00pm.

5. The mother shall employ all reasonable parenting tools at her disposal to (i) encourage the children's relationship with the father; (ii) prioritize the development of that relationship; and (iii) require the children to attend for the father's parenting time.

6. The parents shall communicate using an online communication tool, such as Our Family Wizard or Appclose. The parties shall clearly and concisely communicate with respect to the following:

   (a) the parenting time schedule;

   (b) the children's schedules, including appointments and activities;

   (c) names and contact information for service-providers; and

   (d) brief updates with respect to the children's status and needs before the exchanges.

7. Neither parent shall expose the children to adult conflict.

8. The parents shall be at liberty to have reasonable telephone or video conference contact with the children during the other parent's parenting time, subject to the children's wishes, and without obstructing the other parent's parenting time.

9. The mother shall not change her residence except in exigent circumstances, without the consent of the father, or without bringing the matter to the court's attention by way of motion, so that the continued appropriateness of this order can be re-addressed. If her residence is changed in exigent circumstances, she must seek the father's consent or notify the court by way of motion as soon as is practicable, and in any event within 5 business days of the change.

10. The parties shall participate in and share the costs of mediation through the Barrie Mediation Centre, subject to availability.

11. The parties shall arrange and participate in reunification/reconciliation therapy. The parties shall share the costs of the service equally, after the application of any benefits available to them. Neither party shall be required to expend more than $2,500 inclusive of HST without further order of the court. In such an event, the other parent may choose to continue to cover the entire costs of the therapy so that it may continue.

[57] The terms in Justice Labelle's order pertaining to child support and financial matters are unaffected by my order.

[58] At the outset of the motion, the parties were canvassed as to whether, as a next step following the motions, the application should be transferred to Barrie. There has not been any connection between the parties, children, or any service providers and the Cochrane District in several years, and there is no realistic prospect of a renewed connection pending final disposition of the issues. The parties indicated they would consent to such a transfer. An order shall therefore go, to follow the above order, transferring the application to the court of competent jurisdiction in Barrie, in the County of Simcoe, pursuant to r. 5(8) of the Family Law Rules.

[59] To mitigate any delay in the transfer of this matter, the parties are instructed to take out the orders promptly, and in any event no later than 10 business days from the release of this judgment.

[60] I will remain seized of the issue of costs of this motion. If the parties cannot agree as to costs, they shall address the issue in writing. The parties shall serve and file their bill of costs and other relevant documents within 15 days of the release of this decision. They may be accompanied by written submissions not exceeding three pages. Each may serve a one-page reply no later than 20 days from the release of this decision.

Released: August 25, 2025

Signed: Justice G. Jenner