DATE: June 12, 2025
COURT FILE NO. D45822/24
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
JENNY LYN TEH GOMEZ
Jennifer Macabenta, for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and -
FELIPE RESTREPO ISAZA
Grace-Ann Roberts, for the RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT
HEARD: May 2, 9, and 29, and June 10, 2025
JUSTICE: S.B. Sherr
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
[1] There are two motions before the court regarding temporary parenting and child support for the parties’ two children (the children). The parties’ child A. is 13 months old. Their child B. was born on May 15, 2025. The children presently reside with the applicant (the mother) in Toronto. The respondent (the father) lives in St. Catharines. The parties lived together with A. in St. Catharines until the mother relocated with A. to Toronto in September 2024.
[2] The mother seeks a temporary order permitting her to relocate with the children to the Philippines. She asks for temporary primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for the children. She seeks temporary orders that the respondent (the father) have virtual parenting time with the children. She is prepared to bring the children to Canada for two weeks each year for the father to have supervised parenting time with them. She also proposes to facilitate supervised parenting time for the father in the Philippines.
[3] In the alternative, if the mother is not permitted to relocate with the children to the Philippines, she seeks an order that the father’s temporary in-person parenting time be supervised at Access for Parents and Children in Ontario (APCO).
[4] The mother asks for police enforcement of this order.
[5] The mother also seeks temporary child support from the father. She asks to impute an annual income of $34,400 to him and require him to pay the table amount of child support to her for A., starting on October 1, 2024, and for the two children, starting on June 1, 2025, pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines).
[6] The father also seeks temporary primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for the children. He proposed that the mother have specified parenting time with them. He seeks table child support from her for the children, starting on June 1, 2025.
[7] In the alternative, the father asks that the mother be required to return the children to reside in St. Catharines and that he be granted temporary joint decision-making responsibility for them and generous unsupervised parenting time with them.
[8] The father opposes the mother’s request to relocate with the children to the Philippines. He seeks an order that the mother not be permitted to remove the children from Ontario, without his written consent or a prior court order.[1]
[9] Until recently, the father has been exercising in-person parenting time supervised by the maternal grandmother in Toronto.
Part Two – Process and issues to determine on the motions
[10] The parties agreed that these motions would be heard based on affidavit evidence and cross-examinations of the parties for up to 45 minutes each.
[11] The mother filed three affidavits and the maternal grandmother filed two affidavits. The father filed an affidavit and one affidavit each from his mother (the paternal grandmother), brother (the brother) and his present partner (CD). The parties were both cross-examined on May 2, 2025. Both parties filed helpful statements of law.
[12] The parties made submissions on May 9, 2025. The mother was scheduled to give birth the following week. The parties agreed that the motions should be adjourned so that the new child could be included in these motions.
[13] B. was born the following week. She is a healthy girl and is residing with the mother.
[14] On May 29, 2025, the parties orally agreed to amend the mother’s application, the father’s answer/claim and their respective notices of motion to include claims for B. that mirror the claims they made for A. The parties made further submissions that day. The court reserved its decision.
[15] Shortly after submissions were completed, the decision in Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106 (Divisional Court) was posted on the legal databases. The parties had relied upon the temporary relocation principles set out in Plumley v. Plumley, [1999] O.J. No. 3234 (S.C.J.) in their closing submissions.[2] In Diallo, the court wrote at paragraph 44 that the factors set out in Plumley have been overtaken by the relocation amendments in the Divorce Act. These amendments are mirrored in the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act).
[16] The court further stated at paragraph 44 that the test on temporary relocation motions is now whether the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests. The “no genuine issue for trial” test, set out in Plumley, is a summary judgment test and not the test on a temporary relocation motion.
[17] Procedural fairness dictated that the parties be given the opportunity to make additional submissions regarding the Diallo decision. On June 2, 2025, the court released an endorsement offering counsel this opportunity.
[18] The parties took this opportunity and made additional submissions on June 10, 2025. The mother submitted that it is in the best interests of the children to determine the relocation issue based on the process used on these motions. The father disagrees. He submits it is in the best interests of the children to decide the relocation issue with a trial, where the evidence can be fully tested.
[19] The issues for the court to determine are as follows:
a) What temporary parenting orders are in the children’s best interests? In particular:
i) Who should have primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children?
ii) If the court orders that the children’s primary residence shall be with the mother, should they be returned from Toronto to St. Catharines?
iii) If the children are to remain with the mother, should they be permitted to relocate with her to the Philippines? In determining this issue, the court will consider if it is in the children’s best interests to decide this issue based on the process used on these temporary motions, or whether it should be decided by way of a process designed to make final decisions, such as a trial of an issue.
iv) What parenting time orders are in the children’s best interests? If the children remain in the mother’s primary care, should the father’s parenting time be supervised, and if so, on what terms?
v) What other incidents of parenting are in the children’s best interests?
b) What temporary child support orders should be made? In particular, should income be imputed to the father, and when should child support start?
Part Three – Background
[20] The mother is 28 years old. The father is 30 years old.
[21] The mother is a citizen of the Philippines. She obtained a post-graduate work permit in Canada. It expired on September 15, 2024. She obtained a Canadian visitor record that is valid until November 14, 2025.
[22] The mother resides in Toronto, Ontario with the children.
[23] The father is a Canadian citizen. He resides in St. Catharines, Ontario. He has been living with CD for about one month.
[24] The parties cohabited from May 21, 2021, until October 8, 2024 in St. Catharines.
[25] The parties are the biological parents of the children.
[26] The parties initially separated on September 24, 2024. The mother and the child moved to Toronto. The father remained in St. Catharines.
[27] The father had signed a travel consent, six days before the separation, for the mother to travel with A. to the Philippines.
[28] The father advised the mother, on or about September 26, 2024, that he was withdrawing his consent. He contacted the police and Canada Border Services to advise them that he was concerned the mother would attempt to leave Canada with A.
[29] The mother attempted to travel with A. based on the father’s written consent. On September 29, 2024, she was stopped at Pearson airport by the police prior to boarding a flight with A. to the Philippines.
[30] The parties reconciled the following day. The reconciliation did not last long. The father was charged with assaulting the mother on October 8, 2025. He has a criminal release term stating that he cannot have direct or indirect contact with her.
[31] The mother and A. continued to live in Toronto after the separation. The father has remained in St. Catharines.
[32] The father only saw A. a few times prior to the mother starting this court case.
[33] The parties spent two nights together in November 2024 to work on their relationship. This contravened the father’s criminal release terms.
[34] The mother issued her application on January 29, 2025.
[35] On February 25, 2025, the parties agreed, on a temporary without prejudice basis, that the father would have supervised parenting time with A. weekly for two hours at APCO. They agreed that until APCO could start the visits, an agreed-upon family member would supervise visits at a public venue twice weekly. The parties agreed on daily virtual parenting time for up to 15 minutes.
[36] The father filed his answer/claim on March 17, 2025.
[37] On March 24, 2025, the court organized the hearing of these motions.
[38] The mother completed her intake for APCO. The father did not.
[39] Until recently, the maternal grandmother supervised the father’s in-person and virtual parenting time with A. She has stopped doing this for reasons that will be discussed below.
[40] On May 29, 2025, the court ordered that pending the release of its motions decision, the maternal grandmother was not required to supervise the father’s in-person parenting time. It ordered that the father had to retain a professional parenting time supervisor, such as Renew Supervision Services, or Brayden Supervision Services, to supervise his parenting time.
[41] The father has not paid any child support to the mother. He says he lost his job shortly after the parties separated. He advised the court he is starting a new full-time job on June 2, 2025.
Part Four – The parties’ narratives
4.1 The mother
[42] The mother’s evidence is summarized as follows:
a) She was A.’s primary caregiver when she lived with the father.
b) The father had little involvement with A. He would sleep or play video games all day.
c) The father was in and out of jobs and provided her with little financial assistance. She was the sole financial provider during the relationship. She paid most of his legal fees for his drunk while intoxicated (DUI) criminal case. He also used her debit card, without her consent, when he was angry at her.
d) The father was physically and emotionally abusive to her.
e) The father showed little interest in seeing A. until this court case started.
f) The father has not exercised all the parenting time given to him. He has exercised it sporadically and when it suits him. He refused to complete the APCO intake process.
g) She will have no legal status in Canada after November 14, 2025. She could not afford to take the medical test required to extend her stay in Canada. She is at risk of deportation.
h) Her family is in the Philippines. She will have much more family and community support and security there.
i) She is struggling in Canada. She is unable to work and does not have stable housing.
j) The maternal grandmother has been assisting her to care for the children in Canada. However, the maternal grandmother is only in Canada on a tourist visa and will need to return to the Philippines. The mother plans to live in her parents’ home in the Philippines.
k) Her Canadian employer has agreed that she can work remotely from the Philippines. She provided a letter from her employer confirming this.
l) She has a Bachelor of Science degree in Hospitality and Tourism from the Philippines and can easily find work in the tourism industry there, if necessary.
m) She will have a lower cost of living in the Philippines and be better able to support the children.
n) She will have more time to spend with the children in the Philippines.
o) She will have medical coverage in the Philippines.
p) The father did not follow through on his promise to sponsor her to Canada.
q) The father consented to her relocating to the Philippines with A. on September 18, 2024.
r) If she can leave Canada with the children before her visitor record is revoked, she will be able to return to Canada with the children without any legal issues.
s) The father has paid no child support. She believes he has been intentionally unemployed.
t) She denied the allegations made by the father and his supporting witnesses that are set out below.
[43] The maternal grandmother deposed that:
a) Her family owns a home in the Philippines without a mortgage. It is located in a compound where her siblings also live. She owns an empty lot where the mother can build a home someday.
b) She has supervised the father’s parenting time.
c) She is no longer willing to supervise the father’s in-person parenting time because he is verbally aggressive and disrespectful to her.
d) The father is not following her reasonable requests during his parenting time. For instance, he disregarded her request that A. not crawl on the pavement of a parking lot.
e) She had to cancel a visit because she was ill and the father threatened to call the police.
f) On April 28, 2024, while she was supervising a visit, the father and the brother took A. in their car and drove away. She contacted the mother and her counsel and A. was eventually returned.
g) The father is making inappropriate comments during his video parenting time about her and the mother in front of A. She is willing to continue to supervise the video calls but only if the father acts appropriately.
4.2 The father
[44] The father’s evidence is summarized as follows:
a) He denies the allegations made by the mother and the maternal grandmother.
b) He primarily cared for A. while the parties cohabited and primarily took the child to her doctors.
c) The mother was often depressed and stayed in her room.
d) He is an excellent parent.
e) He is better capable of looking after the children than the mother.
f) He feels he has better parenting judgment than the mother and is better suited to make major decisions about the children.
g) He feels he is more willing to facilitate the children’s relationship with the mother than she is with him.
h) He has significant family support. The paternal grandmother and the brother filed affidavits confirming this assistance.
i) The mother and the maternal grandmother have frustrated his ability to see the children. They constantly find excuses to cancel visits.
j) There is no need for his visits to be supervised.
k) He did not come to court earlier to seek parenting orders because he was focused on his criminal case.
l) He denies committing any family violence against the mother. He attached letters from the mother where she recanted her abuse allegations to his counsel and to his brother.
m) The incident on October 8, 2024 that resulted in the assault charge started because the mother was breastfeeding A. while intoxicated. He was trying to stop her from doing this. CD gave the same evidence. The father said it was the second time the mother had done that.
n) He claims the mother has been physically and emotionally abusive to him.
o) The mother relocated to Toronto on September 24, 2024 without his consent.
p) In October 2024, the parties were both involved in a sexual relationship with CD.
q) The mother told the father she would only permit him to see A. if he brought CD to Toronto from Niagara Falls, let her assault her and strand her in Toronto. Later, the mother said she wanted him to bring CD to Toronto and sexually humiliate her while she watched. When he refused to do this, the mother cut off his parenting time with A.
r) The mother feigned a desire to reconcile to persuade him to sign a consent for her to travel with A. to the Philippines. He thought he had consented to a short trip.
s) On September 26, 2024, he withdrew his consent for the mother to travel with A. to the Philippines. The mother tried to leave anyway and was stopped at the border. He fears she might try to leave with the children again.
t) If the mother is permitted to relocate to the Philippines, the children will not have a relationship with him or his family.
u) The mother has failed to take available steps to obtain permanent resident status in Canada.
v) The mother proposes to live with her parents in the Philippines. She has a very poor relationship with her father. He is an alcoholic who physically abused her.
w) He feels the Philippines is unsafe for the children and they will have a lower standard of living there.
x) He feels the standard of medical care is better in Canada.
y) He was fired from his job in October 2024 after missing several days of work, due to the stress of the separation and his criminal charges.
[45] The brother, paternal grandmother and CD all deposed that the father was a very good parent to A. and fully involved in caring for her.
[46] The brother deposed that the mother has extreme “emotional and violent reactions”. He said she has damaged walls and once pulled a knife and threatened to use it on them. He feels the mother is “dangerously emotional to herself and others”.
[47] The paternal grandmother testified that she once called the police to have the mother removed from her home because of her conduct.
[48] CD deposed that shortly after the parties separated, she started receiving abusive messages from the father’s account. She believed the mother was sending these messages, as the mother was with the father when she received them. CD threatened to call the police if the harassment continued. She said she is afraid of the mother.
Part Five – Assessment of the evidence and findings of material facts
[49] Both parties were cross-examined for approximately 45 minutes. This was not enough time for the court to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the evidence. However, it provided the court with a snapshot of the parties and much more information about the facts in dispute than if it had just relied on the affidavit material.
[50] Neither party came off well during their cross-examinations. They both presented as immature and impulsive. Both have serious credibility and reliability issues. Both were evasive and gave contradictory evidence.
[51] The mother initially deposed that she was unaware the father had withdrawn his consent for her to travel with A. to the Philippines. She then acknowledged he told her he was no longer consenting to her traveling with A. on September 26, 2024. She tried to leave anyway.
[52] In the mother’s narrative, the father showed no interest in seeing A. between October 8, 2024 and the first case conference in February 2025. This was not the case. She neglected to mention that the father had made requests to see A. and they had spent two nights together in November 2024, trying to see if they could repair their relationship.
[53] The mother, in providing her version of the October 8, 2024 incident, failed to mention that she was breastfeeding A. while intoxicated. She admitted this at the hearing.
[54] The mother also failed to mention in her affidavit material that she had recanted her allegations of the assault to the brother and to the father’s lawyer. When shown these letters, she claimed she did this because she was pressured by the father and did not want to see him get a criminal record. She claimed she never sent the letter to the father’s criminal lawyer – she just sent it to the father. This raises serious questions about her credibility.
[55] The father did not fare any better. He had an excuse for everything. Most of these excuses were poor. He had excuses why he couldn’t work, or look for work, for why he was paying no child support, why he didn’t respond to the mother’s lawyer’s request to negotiate a separation (including parenting time) in October 2024, why he didn’t pursue a request for parenting time, and why he has breached the court order to complete the intake process at APCO.
[56] The father externalized blame for his problems on the mother. For instance, he blamed her for his DUI because she called him to pick her up when he was intoxicated.
[57] The court finds that the father exaggerated his involvement with A. while they lived together.
[58] The father demonstrated little parenting insight during the hearing. He feels it is in the best interests of the children, who do not really know him, to be removed from their primary caregiver and be placed in his care.
[59] The father has shown little regard for court orders. He breached his criminal release conditions by staying with the mother for two nights in November 2024 (and the mother facilitated this). He has still not signed up for APCO despite the court order. He did not deny that he drove off with the child, on April 28, 2025, contrary to the court order.
[60] The parties were both in a complicated relationship with CD in late September and October 2024. It is very likely this contributed to the dissolution of their relationship, the mother’s desire to relocate, first to Toronto, and then to the Philippines, and the complications around the father’s parenting time.
[61] The court treated the evidence of the collateral witnesses with caution, as they were clearly aligned with the respective parties.
[62] The court makes the following findings of fact, for the purpose of these motions:
a) The mother was the primary caregiver of A. during the parties’ relationship.
b) The mother has been the sole caregiver of A. since October 8, 2024.
c) The mother has been the sole caregiver of B.
d) The children are doing well in the mother’s care. She is meeting their physical and emotional needs.
e) The parties had a dysfunctional relationship. It was complicated by their sexual relationship with CD.
f) Neither party protected A. from parental conflict.
g) The parties are unable to communicate with each other effectively.
h) The mother relocated with A. to Toronto in September 2024, without providing the father with the notice required in subsection 39.3 (2) of the Act.
i) The mother tried to leave Canada with A. on September 29, 2024, even though she was aware the father had withdrawn his consent.
j) The father made limited attempts to see A. prior to the case conference on February 25, 2025. By his own admission, he was focused on his criminal case.
k) The father has had sporadic parenting time with A. since the case conference on February 25, 2025. He failed to complete the intake for supervised visits to take place at APCO.
l) The father does not have a meaningful relationship with the children at this time.
m) The father provided no objection to the mother moving to Toronto until closing submissions were made on these motions. He provided no evidence that he objected to this relocation in his affidavit material or in his oral evidence – he only said she left without his prior consent.
n) The father has failed to adequately support the children.
[63] The court is unable to make findings about the following material facts in dispute based on the evidence filed:[3]
a) Whether either party has perpetrated family violence against the other, and if so, the extent of the violence.
b) The extent to which each party, and the maternal grandmother, are responsible for the father’s sporadic parenting time.
c) The father’s commitment to the children. He has not financially supported them. His parenting time has been sporadic. He did not attend at APCO for its intake process.
d) The father’s parenting ability.
e) The mother’s commitment to the father having a relationship with the children. On the one hand, the mother has facilitated the father’s parenting time even though he has not complied with the court order to go to APCO. However, there is evidence that she devalues the children’s relationship with the father, as:
i) She attempted to leave with A. to the Philippines without his consent.
ii) She did not encourage parenting time for him prior to the case conference held on February 25, 2025.
iii) Her parenting time proposal on these motions is that the children can only visit the father in Canada with her being present until they are five years old. She proposed to visit Canada for two weeks each year.[4]
f) The willingness and ability of the parents to protect the children from adult conflict going forward.
g) The willingness of the father to financially support the children going forward.
h) The father’s ability to earn income from October 1, 2024 until May 31, 2025. Should income be imputed to him for this period?
[64] A trial judge will be in a better position to make these findings of fact after hearing more comprehensive evidence.
Part Six – Primary residence and decision-making responsibility
6.1 Legal considerations
[65] Subsection 24 (2) of the Act provides that the court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being in determining best interests.
[66] Subsection 24 (3) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider related to the circumstances of the child. It reads as follows:
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
[67] Subsection 24 (6) of the Act addresses parenting time and day-to-day decisions. It reads as follows:
Parenting time, day-to-day decisions
(6) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom the court allocates parenting time with respect to a child has exclusive authority during that time to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child.
[68] Subsection 33.1 (2) of the Act addresses the importance of the parties protecting children from conflict. It reads as follows:
33.1 Protection of children from conflict
(2) A party to a proceeding under this Part shall, to the best of the party’s ability, protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding.
[69] A temporary motion is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at a trial. The status quo should be maintained until trial unless there is material evidence that the child’s best interests require an immediate change. See:
- Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002
- Costello and McLean, 2014 ONSC 7332
- Munroe v. Graham, 2021 ONCJ 253
- Sain v. Shahbazi, 2023 ONSC 5187
[70] The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. See:
- White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41
- Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736
It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.
[71] A starting point to assess a child’s best interests when making a parenting order is to ensure that the child will be physically and emotionally safe. It is also in a child's best interests when making a parenting order that his or her caregiver be physically and emotionally safe. See:
- I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615
- Armstrong v. Coupland, 2023 ONSC 5451
- J.N. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 5292
- A.L.M. v. V.L.S., 2020 ONCJ 502
[72] Family violence is defined in subsections 18 (1) and (2) of the Act. Subsection 24 (4) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider related to family violence.
[73] A party's failure to protect a child from conflict may be an important consideration in granting primary residence or decision-making responsibility to the other parent. See:
- Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510
- I.A. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 523
[74] Financially supporting one’s children in a responsible manner is an important part of being a parent. The failure to do so is a factor militating against a joint custody order as it demonstrates poor judgment and an inability to prioritize the child’s interests. See:
- Jama v. Mohamed, 2015 ONCJ 619
- T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022
- McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610
- J.T. v. E.J., 2022 ONSC 4956
- Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057
[75] In considering a child’s best interests, it will often be important to determine if a parent will follow the terms of a court order. See:
- Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201
- Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501
- Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148
[76] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, [2005] O.J. No. 275 (OCA), sets out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:
- There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
- It can’t be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.
- Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.
- The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.
- No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.
- The younger the child, the more important communication is.
[77] In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the court is required to consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. See:
- Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208 (S.C.J.)
- Koliniati v. Manolessos, 2025 ONSC 3274
6.2 Analysis
[78] It is in the children’s best interests that their temporary primary residence be with the mother.
[79] It is in the children’s best interests to make a temporary decision-making responsibility order. The children are very young. Major decisions may need to be made on a temporary basis regarding their medical care. The court finds it is in the children’s best interests that the mother has this sole responsibility.
[80] The court is making these orders for the following reasons:
a) The mother has been the children’s primary caregiver.
b) The children are doing well in the mother’s care. She is the parent arranging their medical care.
c) The father does not presently have a meaningful relationship with the children.
d) The father has had sporadic parenting time with the children.
e) The father has provided no financial support for the children.
f) The father showed poor parenting judgment by breaching the court order on April 28, 2025, when he drove away with the child when his parenting time was being supervised by the maternal grandmother.
g) The father has criminal release terms preventing him from having contact with the mother.
h) The father’s request for primary residence of the children and removal from their primary caregiver reflects a serious lack of understanding of child development.
i) The dysfunction and communication between the parties is far too poor for any joint decision-making responsibility order to work. Effective communication is even more important when we are dealing with such young and vulnerable children.
Part Seven – Relocation
7.1 Legal considerations
[81] Diallo states that temporary relocation decisions must be based on a child’s best interests. Courts should consider the relevant best interests considerations set out in subsections 24 (2) to (6) of the Act and the additional relocation best interests considerations set out in subsection 39.4 (3) of the Act.
[82] Section 39.4 of the Act reads as follows:
Authorization of relocation
39.4 (1) In this section,
“family arbitration award” has the same meaning as in the Arbitration Act, 1991.
Same
(2) A person who has given notice of a proposed relocation in accordance with section 39.3 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if,
(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or
(b) no objection to the relocation is made in accordance with subsection 39.3 (5) and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
Best interests of the child
(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
Factor not to be considered
(4) In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child’s relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.
Burden of proof
(5) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.
Same
(6) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.
Same
(7) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
Burden of proof, exception
(8) If an order referred to in subsection (5) or (6) is an interim order, the court may determine that the subsection does not apply.
Costs of relocation
(9) If a court authorizes the relocation of a child, it may provide for the apportionment of costs relating to the exercise of parenting time by a person who is not relocating between that person and the person who is relocating the child.
[83] The Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the legislative relocation provisions in Barendregt v. Grebliunis, 2022 SCC 22. Although it was a final relocation decision the following considerations set out by the court are applicable to temporary relocation motions:
a. In all cases, the history of caregiving will be relevant. And while it may not be useful to label the attention courts pay to the views of the parent as a separate “great respect” principle, the history of caregiving will sometimes warrant a burden of proof in favour of one parent (par. 123).
b. The court should avoid casting judgment on a parent’s reasons for moving. A moving parent need not prove the move is justified. And a lack of a compelling reason for the move, in and of itself, should not count against a parent, unless it reflects adversely on a parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child. Ultimately, the moving parent’s reasons for relocating must not deflect from the focus of relocation applications — they must be considered only to the extent they are relevant to the best interests of the child (pars. 129-130).
c. Relocation that provides a parent with more education, employment opportunities, and economic stability can contribute to a child’s wellbeing. These considerations all have direct or indirect bearing on the best‑interests‑of‑the‑child assessment (par. 171).
[84] Diallo sets out that it is appropriate for courts to consider on temporary relocation motions whether they should be decided based on the process used on the temporary motion or by way of a process designed to make final decisions, such as a trial of an issue. The court wrote at paragraph 47:
I pause here to note that Plumley’s reference to the need to find that there is no genuine issue for trial is a recognition of the fact that relocation decisions are hard to reverse at trial without causing major disruption to the children. For that reason, as the panel granting leave in this case appears to have implicitly recognized, they have an air of finality which makes it appropriate to consider whether they should be decided by way of a process designed to make final decisions, such as a summary judgement motion or a trial of an issue. In this case, as the motion judge noted, there was an expanded process that allowed for the giving of oral evidence and cross-examination on that evidence. However, it was still a process aimed at making an interim, not a final decision.
7.2 Onus
[85] Subsection 39.4 (6) of the Act creates an onus on the person opposing the relocation if the child spends the vast majority of their time with the other person.
[86] Subsection 39.4 (8) of the Act also permits the court to disregard the onus provisions in 39.4 (5) and (6) of the Act on a temporary relocation motion.
[87] There is no issue that the children are with the mother the vast majority of the time.
[88] The court finds this is an appropriate case to disregard the onus provisions in subsections 39.4 (5) and (6) of the Act for the following reasons:
a) B. is a newborn. No court order has been made regarding her yet. The father has not had an opportunity to parent her. It would be unfair to apply the statutory onus regarding her in these circumstances.
b) There is a material fact in dispute regarding whether the mother has frustrated the father’s relationship with A., resulting in her having the child with her the vast majority of the time. A party should not be able to use their own misconduct to establish the onus in their favour. See: N.P. v. D.H., 2022 ONCJ 535.
c) The mother tried to remove A. from Canada to the Philippines even though she knew the father had withdrawn his consent. This conduct should not be condoned.
d) Permitting a temporary relocation to the Philippines will have profound consequences on the children and likely deprive them of a meaningful relationship with the father and the paternal family. More caution is dictated on a temporary motion.
[89] The court finds that both parties bear the onus of proving whether temporary relocation is in the child’s best interests. See:
- Aspden v. Blinn, 2022 ONCJ 507
- N.P. v. D.H., supra
7.3 The relocation of A. to Toronto
[90] The court finds there is no merit to the father’s request for a temporary order requiring the mother to return the children to St. Catharines. The court finds this would not be in the children’s best interests. The court can make this finding based on the process used on these temporary motions.
[91] B. was born in Toronto. The law regarding temporary relocation does not apply to her. It only applies to A.
[92] Where one parent moves to another city or community with a child without notice to the other parent, the other parent may apply to have the child returned to the home community. See: Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 2012 ONSC 5069. However, this opportunity will be lost if the other parent delays in bringing the matter to court. See:
- Rifai v. Green, 2014 ONSC 1377
- Abbott-Ewen v. Ewen, 2010 ONSC 2121 – where the court did not order a child returned after a 4-month delay in coming to court.
The longer the child has been in a new situation (or city) - however it may have been created - the more closely the court will have to focus on the child's best interests, as opposed to any violation of parental rights. See: Sodhi v. Sodhi, 25 R.F.L. (5th) 420 (Ont. C.A.).
[93] Here, the father has waited far too long to seek an order that the mother return with A. to St. Catharines. He provided no evidence that he objected to this move prior to this case starting in January 2025. He did not raise this issue in his answer/claim – he only asked for an order that A. be placed in his care. He did not claim this relief in his notice of motion. He did not raise this issue in his affidavit material. He only raised it in closing submissions on May 29, 2025 – seven months after the mother had moved to Toronto.
[94] Further, the father has not asked to transfer this case to St. Catharines on the basis that it is A.’s ordinary residence.
[95] The mother and A. are now settled in Toronto. They have housing in Toronto. They would not have housing in St. Catharines. The mother has supports in Toronto, none in St. Catharines. The children are getting medical care in Toronto. This should not be disrupted. It would be destabilizing to the children to grant the father’s claim. It is dismissed. The mother’s relocation with A. to Toronto is permitted on a temporary basis.
7.4 The mother’s request to relocate with the children to the Philippines
7.4.1 Best interests
[96] The court relies on the legal considerations and best interests analysis set out in Part Six above.
[97] The court adds the following findings of fact regarding the best interests considerations under subsections 24 (2) and (3) of the Act:
a) It is in the children’s best interests to have meaningful relationships with both the maternal and the paternal family.
b) If the children are permitted to relocate to the Philippines, it is unlikely the children will have a meaningful relationship with the father and the paternal family. This could have an adverse impact on their long-term emotional development and sense of identity.
c) It would be destabilizing to the children to permit them to relocate with the mother to the Philippines on a temporary basis and then have the trial judge order them returned to Toronto after a trial. There is also no assurance the mother would return the children to Toronto.
d) The paternal family have expressed a commitment to have a positive relationship with the children.
e) The father breached his criminal release terms. The mother facilitated this breach. The father breached the order to complete the intake process at APCO. He also breached the court order by driving away with the child from the maternal grandmother on April 28, 2025.
[98] The court makes the following findings of fact regarding the additional best interests considerations (that have not already addressed in this decision) set out in clause 39.4 (3) of the Act:
a) The merits and sincerity of the mother’s stated reasons for the proposed relocation remain in issue. Is she asking to relocate with the children to the Philippines to avoid dealing with the father? Is she relocating because she must for immigration reasons? Is she relocating because it will improve the children’s lives?
b) The proposed relocation will have a significant long-term impact on the children. There is a good chance they will not have a meaningful relationship with the father or the paternal family if they relocate to the Philippines.
c) The mother did not comply with the relocation provisions in the Act. She also tried to remove A. from Canada on September 29, 2024 without the father’s consent. It is possible the mother planned this to be a permanent move.
d) The mother has proposed limited parenting time for the father if she relocates with the children to the Philippines. Video parenting time at these children’s ages has minimal value. She proposes to bring the children to Canada for two weeks each year for supervised parenting time. There is no assurance she will even do this.
7.4.2 Should the relocation issue be decided based on the process used on these motions or should it be decided by way of a process designed to make final decisions?
[99] Diallo sets out at paragraph 47 that it is appropriate for courts to consider whether the relocation issue should be decided based on the process used on these temporary motions or whether it should decide the issue by way of a process designed to make final decisions. This determination should be made in accordance with the children’s best interests.
[100] The mother submitted it is appropriate to decide the relocation issue based on the expanded process used on these temporary motions. The father disagrees and submits the relocation should be decided by way of a trial.
[101] Here, the court permitted limited cross-examinations of the parties (up to 45 minutes each) on the temporary motions. While this process assisted the court in determining temporary issues regarding primary residence, decision-making responsibility, incidents of parenting and permitting the mother to remain in Toronto with the children, the process was insufficient to properly determine whether the mother should be permitted to relocate with the children to the Philippines. As stated in Diallo, this was a process aimed at a temporary decision, not a final decision. A trial, with a testing of the evidence, is required to fairly decide whether the mother should be permitted to relocate with the children to the Philippines.
[102] The Supreme Court of Canada wrote about the challenges faced with longer geographic distances in relocation cases in paragraph 8 of Barendregt, as follows:
Determining the best interests of the child is a heavy responsibility, with profound impacts on children, families and society. In many cases, the answer is difficult — the court must choose between competing and often compelling visions of how to best advance the needs and interests of the child. The challenge is even greater in mobility cases. Geographic distance reduces flexibility, disrupts established patterns, and inevitably impacts the relationship between a parent and a child. The forward-looking nature of relocation cases requires judges to craft a disposition at a fixed point in time that is both sensitive to that child’s present circumstances and can withstand the test of time and adversity
[103] The procedure used on these motions may be appropriate to decide temporary relocation issues when there is not as significant a geographic distance as there is between Toronto and the Philippines. In fact, the court has found that the process used to determine the temporary relocation of A. from St. Catharines to Toronto was sufficient to make that decision.
[104] The reality however, is that if the mother is permitted to relocate with the children to the Philippines on a temporary basis, it will be tantamount to a final decision. The consequences to the children of authorizing the requested temporary relocation are profound. There is a good chance they would not have a meaningful relationship with the father or the paternal family.
[105] It would also be destabilizing to the children, to permit them to move with the mother on a temporary basis to the Philippines, if the trial decision ordered them to be returned to Toronto, particularly since the father would not have much temporary parenting time with the children in this scenario. There is also no assurance the children would return to Canada, even if this was ordered after a trial.
[106] Courts are more cautious about permitting a temporary relocation where there are material facts in dispute that would likely impact on the final outcome that cannot be determined on a temporary motion. See:
- Fair v. Rutherford-Fair, 2004 CarswellOnt 1705 (Ont. S.C.J.)
- Schul v. Schmidt, 2023 ONCJ 30
The reality is that courts do not like to create disruptions in the lives of children by making an order that may have to cause further disruption later if the order has to be reversed. See: - Goodship v. McMaster, [2003] O.J. No. 4255 (OCJ)
- Schul, supra
This caution is consistent with the best interests factors relating to a child’s stability set out in clause 24 (3) (a) of the Act and the impact of relocation on a child set out in clause 39.4 (3) (b) of the Act. It is also consistent with the comments made at paragraph 47 in Diallo, set out above.
[107] The court finds there remain many material facts in dispute that will likely impact on the final outcome of the relocation issue. These material facts should be determined by a process where there is a full presentation and testing of the evidence. They should be decided after a trial.
[108] In addition to the material facts in dispute that the court has found should be decided by a trial court set out in paragraph 63 above, the court finds that the trial court is best situated to determine:
a) The merits of the mother’s plan to relocate with the children to the Philippines as opposed to the father’s plan to have the children remain in Canada. In particular:
i) Will the mother have more emotional support in the Philippines than in Canada?
ii) Will the mother be more financially secure in the Philippines than in Canada?
iii) Will the children have a better standard of living in the Philippines than in Canada?
iv) Will the children receive better health care in the Philippines or in Canada?
v) What, if any, risk does the maternal grandfather pose to the children?
b) The ability and willingness of the mother to obtain legal status in Canada.
c) The ability and willingness of the mother to support herself in Canada.
d) Will the mother’s ability to re-enter Canada with the children be compromised if she does not leave Canada by November 14, 2025, as she claims?
e) The merits and sincerity of the mother’s reasons for her proposed relocation.
f) An assessment of the mother’s maturity and impulsivity. Will she cut off the father from the children if she is upset with him? Will she relocate elsewhere, after, and if, she is permitted to relocate to the Philippines?
[109] The court finds that it is not appropriate to decide the mother’s request to relocate with the children to the Philippines based on the process used on these temporary motions. This issue should be determined by way of a trial. The court finds that it is not in the children’s best interests to permit the mother to temporarily relocate with them to the Philippines.
[110] The court wishes to emphasize to the parties that this decision does not mean that the mother will not be permitted to relocate with the children to the Philippines after a trial.
[111] The court will order that the case be placed on the next available trial sittings.
Part Eight – Incidents of parenting
[112] The court will order that the mother is not to change the children’s residence from the City of Toronto without a prior court order.
[113] The court will also order that the mother is not to remove the children from the Province of Ontario without a prior court order.
[114] The mother’s request to obtain government documents for the children and to travel internationally with them without the father’s consent is dismissed. The mother has already tried to remove A. from Canada without the father’s consent. The evidence indicates she is impulsive. There is a flight risk here. Similarly, the mother’s request to travel internationally with the children outside of Canada pending trial is dismissed. The trial judge will be in a better position to determine these claims.
[115] The court will not make communication orders requested by the mother on a temporary basis. The court expects the father will act in a civil and respectful manner. If he fails to do so, this will be an important factor in making any final parenting decisions.
Part Nine – Parenting time
9.1 Legal considerations
[116] In determining the father’s temporary parenting time, the court repeats the legal considerations and best interests analysis set out in Part Six above.
[117] Subsection 24 (6) of the Act states that in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
[118] The most appropriate allocation of time in any given situation will depend on many factors including; the child's age; temperament; stage of development; the relevant schedules and commitments of the child and each parent; and any other considerations relevant to the determination of the child's best interests. The parenting schedule must accord with the child's best interests. See:
- McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610
- Drodge v. Gadjadhar, 2025 ONSC 244
[119] A custodial parent must not just accommodate parenting time, they must facilitate it. See:
- Scrivo v. Scrivo, 2012 ONSC 2727, 2012 CarswellOnt 5545
- Tran v. Chen, 2012 ONSC 3994, 2012 CarswellOnt 8551
- D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279
[120] The party who seeks to reduce normal parenting time will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See:
- M.A. v. J.D., [2003] O.J. No. 2946 (OCJ)
- Dayboll v. Biyag, 2022 ONSC 6510
[121] The person seeking supervised parenting time bears the burden of establishing that supervision is necessary. See:
- Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451
[122] Supervised parenting time is not intended to be a long-term arrangement for a child. It is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger of physical or emotional harm. See:
- I.O. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 520
- Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374, [2004] O.J. No. 5472 (OCJ)
9.2 Analysis
[123] The court finds that it is in the children’s best interests that the father’s parenting time with them be supervised by a professional parenting time supervisor for the following reasons:
a) The children are very young and vulnerable.
b) The father has only had sporadic parenting time with A. The children do not yet have a meaningful relationship with him. They need to get to know him in a safe setting.
c) The mother is breastfeeding B. B. cannot be separated from the mother for very long at this time.
d) The court is not ruling out that the father has perpetrated family violence against the mother in A.’s presence. It is also concerned that he may have been verbally abusive and disrespectful to the maternal grandmother. The court has concerns about his maturity and impulse control – specifically his ability to act appropriately at visits.
e) The court has concerns about the father’s commitment to the children. It will want to see independent records to see that he is attending his visits on time and acting responsibly at visits. It will want to see parenting time observation notes to assess the quality of his visits.
f) The court has concerns about the father’s ability to follow court orders, as set out above. Very importantly, he breached this court’s order by driving away with A. when the maternal grandmother was supervising his parenting time on April 28, 2025 – just before these motions were about to be argued. This demonstrated poor judgment. He has to earn this court’s trust before his parenting time can be unsupervised.
[124] A. and B. have different needs at this time, as B. is a newborn and is breastfeeding. Her separation from the mother needs to be shorter than it is for A. The order will reflect their different developmental needs.
[125] Subsection 34 (2) of the Act sets out that the court cannot direct the maternal grandmother to supervise parenting time without her consent. Further, at this time, the court needs unbiased professional observation notes to move forward with the father’s parenting time. This is why the parenting time will be supervised by an independent professional.
[126] The court will order that the father have weekly parenting time in Toronto with the children together for one hour.
[127] The court will also order that the father may have weekly parenting time in Toronto with just A., on a different day, for up to three hours.
[128] The father’s parenting time is to be completely supervised by a professional supervised parenting time program, such as APCO, Renew Supervision Services or Braydon Supervision Services.
[129] APCO will only supervise one visit each week. It will not supervise three-hour visits. Accordingly, if the father decides to exercise parenting time at APCO, it will only be for the visits with both children. The additional visit with A. will need to be supervised by a private program.
[130] The father shall pay all fees charged by the professional supervised parenting time programs. This will be a consideration when the court determines the issue of temporary child support.
[131] The court will not order that virtual parenting time take place every day, as set out in the current without prejudice order. This has already led to too much conflict. The order will provide that virtual parenting time take place every other day for up to 20 minutes. The father is fortunate that the maternal grandmother is still prepared to supervise his virtual parenting time. The court will grant the mother’s request that the maternal grandmother may terminate any virtual visit if the father acts inappropriately.
[132] The court notes that if the father had complied with the court’s order to complete the APCO intake process, his visits would have already started, and he might have been in a much better position to start unsupervised parenting time. It strongly encourages him to complete the APCO intake process immediately.
[133] The court declines to make the police enforcement order sought by the mother. The father’s parenting time shall be fully supervised by professionals.
Part Ten – Child support
[134] The mother seeks temporary child support from the father retroactive to October 1, 2024. She seeks to impute an annual income of $34,400 to him for the purpose of the calculation. She asks that he pay the guidelines table amount of child support for one child up until May 31, 2025, and for two children, starting on June 1, 2025.
[135] The father asks the court to only order ongoing child support starting on June 1, 2025. He did not set out what income he wants to base his support on.
[136] The father advised the court he will work full-time for a real estate company, starting on June 2, 2025. He will be paid to prepare homes for sale. He was unsure how much money he will make at this job.
[137] For the purpose of his temporary ongoing support obligation, the court will assess the father’s annual income based on the minimum wage for a full-time job ($35,770). His employer will be required to pay him at least this much if he is working full-time. This amount can be adjusted at trial when further financial disclosure is provided. The guidelines table amount for two children at this income is $543 each month.
[138] The father earned no income from October 1, 2024, until May 31, 2025. It appears he was fired for missing days of work. The evidence presented indicates he made nominal efforts to look for other work. The mother appears to have a good claim for child support to start on October 1, 2024 and to have some income imputed to the father for support purposes.
[139] That said, the court will exercise its discretion and not order temporary child support to start prior to June 1, 2025. The court is taking into consideration that it is requiring the father to pay all the costs of his supervised parenting time. The cost of private supervision is expensive, and the father is of modest means. Exercising this parenting time should be the major focus at this time so the children can begin to develop a meaningful relationship with the father and the trial judge can have a better evidentiary basis to determine these important parenting issues. Further, the trial judge will be in the best position, after hearing cross-examinations, to conduct the retroactive support and imputation of support analysis.
[140] The court strongly advises the father to comply with this child support order. It is important for him to understand that if the mother cannot afford to live in Canada because he is not paying child support this supports the mother’s position to relocate with the children to the Philippines.
Part Eleven – Conclusion
[141] The court orders the following on a temporary basis:
a) The children shall have their primary residence with the mother.
b) The mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the children.
c) The children’s residence shall remain in the City of Toronto, pending further court order. The father’s claim to have the children returned to St. Catharines is dismissed.
d) The mother’s claim for temporary relocation of the children to the Philippines is dismissed.
e) The mother shall not remove the children from the Province of Ontario without a prior court order.
f) The father shall have his parenting time fully supervised by a professional supervised parenting time program, such as APCO, Renew Supervision Services or Braydon Professional Services.
g) The father shall pay all costs charged by the professional parenting time program.
h) The father may have weekly parenting time for one hour with both children each Saturday. If the parties cannot agree on the time, it will be from noon to 1 p.m. Since APCO has a waiting list, these visits will need to be supervised by one of the private professional supervised parenting programs until such time as APCO can facilitate the visits.
i) The father may have an additional weekly visit with A. each Wednesday. If the parties cannot agree on the time, it will be from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. Since APCO does not supervise visits of this length, it will need to be supervised by one of the private professional supervised parenting programs.
j) The father may have virtual parenting time with the children for up to 20 minutes every other day. The maternal grandmother shall supervise these visits and set the times for the visits. She has the discretion to end the video calls if she believes the father is acting inappropriately.
k) The father shall pay child support to the mother in the amount of $543 each month, starting on June 1, 2025. This is based on an annual income attributed to him of $35,770. This is the guidelines table amount for two children. This amount is subject to adjustment, both as to the amount and the start date, at trial.
l) The father shall immediately notify the mother’s counsel of the name and address of any employer he works for.
m) A support deduction order shall issue.
n) If either party seeks costs, they shall serve and file their written costs submissions by June 26, 2025. The other party will then have until July 10, 2025 to serve and file their written response (not to make their own costs submissions). The submissions shall be no more than 3 pages, not including any bill of costs or offer to settle. The submissions may be delivered to the trial coordinator’s office on the second floor of the courthouse or emailed to the trial coordinator.
o) All other claims made by the parties on these motions, not addressed above, are dismissed.
p) The case will return to court on August 8, 2025, at 2 p.m., for an in-person settlement conference. The parties are to serve and file settlement conference briefs, updated sworn financial statements, with all attachments required by the Family Law Rules, and offers to settle.
q) The case is to be placed on the next trial sittings, being the week of October 20 to 27, 2025.
[142] The court thanks counsel for their professional presentation of these motions.
[1] The parties submitted draft orders for the motions that included several other incidents of parenting. The court is just summarizing the main claims in this introduction.
[2] The court in Plumley sets out three key considerations in deciding temporary relocation cases being:
a) A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim motion and permit the move when there is a genuine issue for trial.
b) There can be compelling circumstances which might dictate that a justice ought to allow the move. For example, the move may result in a financial benefit to the family unit, which will be lost if the matter awaits a trial of the best interests of the children or the best interests of the children might dictate that they commence school at a new location.
c) Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong possibility that the custodial parent’s position will prevail at trial.
[3] There are also material facts in dispute regarding the mother’s claim to relocate with the children to the Philippines that the court is not able to decide based on the process used on these temporary motions. These material facts in dispute will be reviewed in the relocation section below.
[4] The mother also proposed daily virtual visits and the father traveling to the Philippines to see the children. Her proposals were more geared to a final order.

