Warning and Non-Publication Order
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.5(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code. These subsections and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.5(1) or (2), read as follows:
486.5 ORDER RESTRICTING PUBLICATION — VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
(1) Unless an order is made under section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a victim or a witness, or on application of a victim or a witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
(2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
(2.1) OFFENCES – The offences for the purposes of subsection (2) are:
(a) an offence under section 423.1, 467.11, 467.111, 467.12, or 467.13, or a serious offence committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization;
(b) a terrorism offence;
(c) an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or 22(1) of the Security of Information Act; or
(d) an offence under subsection 21(1) or section 23 of the Security of Information Act that is committed in relation to an offence referred to in paragraph (c).
(3) LIMITATION – An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice if it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community.
486.6 OFFENCE
(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Ontario Court of Justice
DATE: 2025-07-18
COURT FILE No.: Newmarket – Central East 4911-998-23-91107114
BETWEEN:
His Majesty the King
— AND —
Mahyar Radmehr
Before Justice M. Townsend
Heard on May 12, 2025, and May 13, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on July 18, 2025
R. Gill — counsel for the Crown
C. Gill — counsel for the defendant Mahyar Radmehr
Introduction
TOWNSEND J.:
[1] Mr. Radmehr stands charged on the following count:
That between the 1st day of June, in the year 2023, and the 30th day of June, in the year 2023, in the City of Richmond Hill in the Regional Municipality of York, he did without lawful authority, and knowing that another person was harassed, engage in threatening conduct directed at that person, and cause S.A. to reasonably fear for her personal safety, contrary to section 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
[2] The Crown elected to proceed summarily, and Mr. Radmehr plead not guilty. The trial commenced with reference to the Crown’s application for a publication ban pursuant to section 486.5 of the Criminal Code.
[3] That issue was eventually argued on Day 2 of this trial, with an agreement that any publication ban put in place would apply retroactively to the beginning of the trial. After argument, I ruled that an Order under section 486.5 was appropriate and imposed the publication ban. Oral reasons for that judgment can be found in the trial transcript.
[4] The central issue for me on this trial is whether the Crown has proven the offence as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Crown has not met its burden and has not proven the offence before the Court as against Mr. Radmehr beyond a reasonable doubt.
[5] In the alternative, the Crown asks that I exercise my common law jurisdiction and impose a common law peace bond upon Mr. Radmehr prohibiting him from contacting or communicating with the complainant. I will address this issue later in my reasons.
[6] For the sake of brevity, the complainant indicated that she prefers to be referred to as Ms. K.
Overview of the Evidence
[7] At the outset of the trial, an agreed statement of fact was filed as Exhibit No. 1. That agreed statement of fact provides as follows:
Malahat Kheradyar, the defendant’s mother, was captured on video surveillance on June 28th, 2023, at approximately 3:02 p.m. leaving pieces of paper consisting of the link to [name removed].com inside the Hudson’s Bay, located [address removed], Ontario.
Four complete transcripts are posted on [name removed].com consisting of the following:
a) complete trial proceedings from June 21, 2019, before the Honourable Justice Pirraglia. The Crown sought dismissal of the charges at trial and Radmehr, Mahyar was found not guilty.
b) family court proceeding disposition of Ms. K. from November 9th, 2018. Family court proceedings disposition of Ms. K. from May 23rd, 2019.
[8] Mr. Radmehr and Ms. K. met in 2006 and were married in Toronto in 2007. Together they have two daughters. They separated in 2018 and were the subject of an eventual Family court trial in 2022 and the divorce was finalized in and around 2023.
[9] Ms. K. provided a statement to the police on June 30th, 2023. In that statement, and in her testimony before the court, she stated that a couple days before her statement to the police, she was advised by some of her co-workers at the Hudson’s Bay that there was a woman leaving pieces of paper at The Bay with a website name on it.
[10] Through the agreed statement of fact, we know that that woman was Mr. Radmehr’s mother, and the website name was [name removed].com.
[11] This website, [name removed].com, was created by Mr. Radmehr. There is no dispute about that. Ms. K. was taken through the website, and many screenshots of the website were entered as exhibits on this trial.
[12] The website, consistent with the agreed statement of fact, contains several court transcripts relating to family court proceedings, and criminal court proceedings in which Mr. Radmehr was the accused.
[13] The website also contains information about the employment history of Ms. K., and information relating to her family members – in particular, her brother. It also contains information about Ms. K.’s previous husband, intimate and common-law partners. The information relating to these individuals (i.e. the previous partners of Ms. K.) is not particularly negative, but it is written in such a way that it paints Ms. K. in a particularly bad light with respect to how she treated these people while in a relationship with them.
[14] Throughout the website, Ms. K. and her brother are constantly referred to as “fraudsters” and “impersonators”. There are allegations contained on the website that Ms. K. engaged in an attempted forgery at one of her places of employment. There is also an allegation that Ms. K. attempted to fraudulently obtain a line of credit from the Royal Bank. Again, these are all just allegations made by Mr. Radmehr, as I do not believe that any formal charges were ever laid against Ms. K. There is a picture of Ms. K. and her brother on the home page of the website.
[15] The Crown asked Ms. K. the following question at the beginning of her examination-in-chief:
Q. Okay. And how did you feel the first time you saw the website on that day?
A. I feel constantly harassed. Very disappointed. Helpless. I lost my confidence since that website is on.
[16] Ms. K. testified that when she initially saw the website under her name some time before June of 2023, there was simply a placeholder page – presumably from the website provider GoDaddy.com – which said, “Something Cool is Coming Soon”. Ms. K. believed that Mr. Radmehr created the website before June 2023 but he was bound by some kind of court imposed restriction that prevented him from posting anything relating to Ms. K. on the internet, and that that restriction expired on June 28th, 2023 when they had their final family court appearance.
[17] Throughout the website, Mr. Radmehr calls Ms. K. a “dangerous person” and a “liar”. He makes the same comments with respect to her brother. The website constantly suggests that Ms. K. forged documents and made false allegations with respect to a number of things. All of which Ms. K. denies.
[18] In the introductory section of the website, Mr. Radmehr clearly identifies that he is the author of the website and sets out why he created the website. He cites two main reasons for creating the website. The first is:
“Reason No. 1 is to expose [Ms. K.] as a dangerous person and a liar who can and will accuse anyone for the purpose of displacing them by Police force to serve an unrelated purpose. I do not want anyone else to meet the same fate as I did and if they do, they have something to show for her evil pattern of behaviour. I was wrongfully accused and arrested thrice on charges of assault, threat and harassment. The 2nd time I was found not guilty in a trial but on the 1st and 3rd occasions, the cases against me were withdrawn without a trial so there is no transcript or closure. In all 3 cases I had no legal recourse. [Ms. K.] is a serial accuser who has had Police encounter with at least 5 male partners (me included) and a female since 1997 and yet every time she decides to accuse someone, she is celebrated as a new victim with no regard to her past records.” (spelling mistakes in original)
[19] The second reason for creating the website is that Mr. Radmehr takes issue with the way he perceives that men are treated in the family court system and in the criminal justice system. He believes that there is an inherent unfairness in the way that men are treated in family court, and when accused of criminal offences by former intimate partners. That is simply his opinion.
[20] At the bottom of the introductory page, he states: “If you have any information about [Ms. K.] that I do not know about with supporting document and you want to share it please call or e-mail me at [name removed].com or call [telephone number removed]”. That is his cell phone number and his email address.
[21] In response to this last paragraph, Ms. K. stated in her examination-in-chief:
Q. How do you feel seeing that Mr. Radmehr is asking for more information to come forward?
A. Constantly harassed.
Q. Okay.
A. All the time I have fear, what’s next.
Q. Okay.
A. I’m disappointed.
[22] Throughout her testimony, Ms. K. expressed a feeling of embarrassment that her co-workers and friends could access this website and know personal details about her. In particular, that she was accused of forgery, and that she was the subject of an arranged marriage early on in her life.
[23] Ms. K. frequently testified that this website gives her anxiety, she is embarrassed these private details of her life are out in the public domain, and it really bothers her that information about her past is available for co-workers to see. At one point in her examination-in-chief Ms. K. stated:
A. This is affecting my life, my kid’s life, my job, my – my everything. It’s all of these reports and everything it’s – it’s affecting my life.
Q. Okay
A. I – I – I lost my self confidence. I – that’s not me. I used to be like more in public or – I – I don’t like even – like I have a fear even search something in the internet, or you know just like the simple thing. Or in public like – like I feel all the time like embarrassed and constantly like harassed.
[24] Throughout the examination-in-chief, Ms. K. went through the history of her relationship with Mr. Radmehr and his family. It was not without turmoil. It seems that Mr. Radmehr and Ms. K. have had difficulty in their relationship from the beginning. Family members seem to have never really got along, Ms. K. and her mother-in-law seem to frequently be at odds, and from time to time the police were involved.
[25] Eventually Ms. K. was asked:
Q. Okay. And when you say you have fear, what – can you expand on that? What or who are you fearful of?
A. Mr. Radmehr. Because since 2018 in each court – after each court he hurt me and harmed me, in different ways. In the creative ways. And I have to just you know for them to prove – to ask the police how – it’s not easy. And now, he created this website. He’s bringing up about the ex-boyfriend, first husband about 20-25 years ago. He’s putting my transcript. Why he’s not putting his transcript. Why he’s not showing all the fraudulent documents he did to the – to the Revenue Canada, to the other companies, to the court, and the other stuff he’s blaming me. He’s blaming me on this website that he has a very heavy bail condition. I’m not the one put the bail condition on him. He’s blaming every single thing, and he's putting me down. It’s – I am extremely busy to raise two teenage girls in this society. The only request I have he move on. Leave me alone, because my focus is my kids. This website is not just hurting me and my future. It’s about my kids and also about my brother.
Q. Okay. So, I’m going to pause you there because you gave us a lot of information. First, I’ll ask, how do you feel testifying in this trial?
A. It’s not easy because all this stuff it’s in there - it’s in this website...
Q. Okay.
A. ... I testified already in my family court. I – I – I talked about in my questioning. I talked about in every court. Like in other trial. Like why he just keep going back and mentioning, because I can’t forward. I have to block this stuff. It’s – it’s bothering me. It’s making me nervous. It’s making me anxiety. It’s – and that fear it’s not easy.
Q. Okay. Do you have concerns for your safety seeing your workplace listed there?
A. Of course, I see because I mentioned about the guy who was a stalker. I just – you know I just don’t want to like find me. And also, it’s – it’s about more than me. It’s about my ex-husband. Like it’s just public – putting in public that where am I working. What am I doing. Like this and that. It's....
[26] Ms. K. appears to be a very private person. The fact that this website is out there, and personal details relating to herself and members of her family bothers her. She is frustrated and embarrassed by the fact that her co-workers and friends have seen this material and frequently ask her about it. This website makes her feel harassed and gives her constant anxiety and embarrassment.
[27] In cross-examination, Ms. K. agreed that all criminal allegations that she has levied against Mr. Radmehr have either had no charges laid, been dismissed by the Crown or Court, or he has been found not guilty.
[28] Ms. K. also agreed that in the statement that she gave to the police on June 30th, 2023, the concern that she expressed to the police with respect to the actions of Mr. Radmehr was “embarrassment” that her children and co-workers would find things out about her past and relationship with Mr. Radmehr.
[29] Ms. K. wants the website taken down, she wants the embarrassment to stop, and she wants both she and Mr. Radmehr to move on with their lives independent of any contact or communication with or about (my emphasis) one another.
Analysis
[30] Section 264(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada sets out the offence of criminal harassment. More specifically, s.264(2) specifies that the offending conduct can amount to criminal harassment in a number of ways:
(1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
(2) Prohibited conduct - The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of:
(a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to them;
(b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or anyone known to them;
(c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or
(d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their family.
[31] Mr. Radmehr has been charged under section 264(2)(d) – frequently referred to as criminal harassment – threatening conduct.
[32] The burden of proof in this, and in all criminal trials always rests with the Crown, it never shifts. That burden, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, must be met in relation to each essential element of the offence. That burden is a heavy one.
[33] As is often cited in many criminal trials, a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, far-fetched, or frivolous doubt, nor is it a doubt based on sympathy for either party or prejudice for or against any party. A reasonable doubt must be a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is a doubt that logically arises from the evidence, or the absence of evidence. See: R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77.
[34] To be clear, it is not sufficient that on the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that Mr. Radmehr is probably guilty. Probable guilt is not the criminal law standard of proof - it is closer to certainty. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense which must be logically based on the evidence or lack of evidence. See: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] S.C.J. No. 33. It is open to me as the trial judge to accept some, none or all of a witness’ testimony.
[35] Justice Martin in R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, [2024] S.C.J. No. 7, stated the following at paragraph 62:
Reasonable doubt applies to credibility assessments such that if the evidence the Crown adduced does not rise to the level required of a criminal conviction, an accused cannot be found guilty simply because they are disbelieved. … Some elements of the totality of the evidence may give rise to a reasonable doubt, even where much – or all – of the accused’s evidence is disbelieved. Any aspect of the accepted evidence, or the absence of evidence, may ground a reasonable doubt. Moreover, where the trier of fact does not know whether to believe the accused’s testimony, or does not know who to believe, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
[36] The Crown submits that the creation of the website by Mr. Radmehr, the inclusion on the website of personal details with respect to Ms. K.’s past, her employment history and dating history, along with allegations that both she and her brother are “fraudsters” and “impersonators” has created within her a sense of fear. The Crown argues that a reasonable person in Ms. K.’s circumstances would feel that the website has created a sense of fear within her.
[37] Counsel for Mr. Radmehr submits that there is nothing contained within the website which is designed to instill a sense of fear or intimidation in Ms. K. While the actions of Mr. Radmehr are not to be condoned, and while his actions may be embarrassing and frustrating for Ms. K., they do not rise to the level of engaging in threatening conduct.
[38] In R. v. Martinez-Calderon, 2025 O.J. No. 2865 (CJ), the elements of criminal harassment in the context of section 264(2)(d) were put succinctly at paragraph 23:
The elements of the offence of criminal harassment were discussed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Kosikar and R. v. Kordrostami. Applying those principles to this case, in this case, the Crown must prove that (1) the defendant engaged in threatening conduct toward the complainant, (2) this harassed her, (3) the defendant knew the complainant was harassed or was reckless or wilfully blind to it, (4) the defendant's conduct instilled fear in the complainant, and (5) this fear was reasonable.
[39] See also: R. v. Province, 2019 O.J. No. 4003 (CA) at paragraph 120.
[40] The mens rea requirement for the offence of criminal harassment – threatening conduct is the intent to commit the prohibited act. In this case, that prohibited act is the creation of and authorship of the website. The knowledge requirement can be satisfied either by an expression of direct intention to harass the complainant, or recklessness or willful blindness as to whether the complainant is harassed.
[41] R. v. Sim, 2017 O.J. No. 5792 (CA), outlined with reference to other authority how the actus reus is to be treated:
[13] Sim was convicted under paragraph (2)(d) -- "engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person". In lengthy reasons, the trial judge found that the Crown had established the mental element or mens rea of the offence:
The Crown has also established well beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's threatening conduct towards the complainant was done while he was at least reckless as to whether she was harassed. The mens rea of count one is made out as well.
[14] Sim does not challenge this finding. He does, however, challenge the trial judge's finding that the actus reus had been made out. The trial judge found:
I have found that the actus reus of threatening has been made out on the basis of all the evidence I accept. In particular the accused's recklessness at least about the link being made between the real-life [P.L.] and the on-line [P.L.]. As well as the recklessness about the complainant finding out about the home page and the whole website, as she eventually did.
[15] Sim submits that the trial judge erred in law in making this finding because establishing the actus reus of the offense requires proof that the accused subjectively intended to engage in threatening conduct. The trial judge acknowledged that if the actus reus imports a requirement to prove an accused's subjective intention, then Sim was entitled to be acquitted. But the trial judge held that there was no such requirement. I agree. For that reason, I do not accept Sim's submission.
[16] In R. v. Burns, 2008 ONCA 6, 77 W.C.B. (2d) 402 -- relying on the judgment of the Yukon Territory Court of Appeal in R. v. George, 2002 YKCA 2, 52 W.C.B. (2d) 530 -- this court endorsed an objective standard for determining the actus reus of harassment by engaging in threatening conduct. At para. 2, the court wrote:
To establish harassment under s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, the Crown had to establish that the appellant engaged in "threatening conduct". We accept the definition of threatening conduct given in R. v. George at para. 39 that, in order to meet the objectives of s. 264, the threatening conduct must amount to a "tool of intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in the recipient". The impugned conduct is to be viewed objectively, with due consideration for the circumstances in which they took place, and with regards to the effects those acts had on the recipient. [Citation omitted.]
[17] In support of his submission, Sim focuses on the word "designed" in the phrase "tool of intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in the recipient". I do not read this phrase or the word "designed" in the way Sim does for two main reasons.
[18] First, Sim's submission is inconsistent with s. 264(1) of the Code and thus is contrary to Parliament's express intent. Subsection 264(1) specifies that the mens rea component of criminal harassment can be met by an accused's knowledge or recklessness. To suggest that the actus reus of threatening conduct requires a specific intent to instil fear is contrary to the plain language of s. 264(1).
[19] Second, as this court said in Burns, under s. 264(2)(d) the conduct in question must be viewed objectively. In other words, would the accused's threatening conduct cause a reasonable person in the complainant's situation to fear for her safety? The word "designed" does not require the Crown to prove the accused's subjective intention. And, in assessing whether an accused's conduct is threatening under s. 264(2)(d), a judge is not required to get into the accused's mind.
[20] Instead, the word "designed" is meant to focus on the effect of the accused's conduct on a reasonable person in the shoes of the target of the conduct. In Burns, this court clarified that the objective assessment must consider the circumstances in which the conduct took place, and the effects that the conduct actually had on the complainant. Although an accused's threatening conduct may not affect every target of that conduct, in every conceivable situation, it could well instill fear in a reasonable person in the complainant's specific situation, particularly when the actual effects of the conduct on the complaint are considered. That is the case here. The trial judge did not err in finding that the Crown had established the actus reus of the offence.
[42] It is clear that Mr. Radmehr created this website. He is the sole author of it. The content of the website is directed at Ms. K. and her family. In fact, Mr. Radmehr clearly set out his intention on the introductory page of the website.
[43] While the Court in Sim stated at the conclusion of paragraph 19 that “in assessing whether an accused's conduct is threatening under s. 264(2)(d), a judge is not required to get into the accused's mind”, in the case before me we are in a unique situation in that the stated intention of the accused is clearly outlined on the website. Mr. Radmehr wanted to “expose” the perceived wrongdoings of Ms. K.
[44] While I do not condone, encourage, or agree with the actions of Mr. Radmehr, this is a situation, different than in Sim, where it is important to look at the word “designed”. On my assessment of the website, and the content included therein, this website was “designed” almost exclusively to embarrass and frustrate Ms. K. That assessment is consistent with the stated objective of the website, and with the resulting effect of the website on Ms. K. This website was not “designed” as a tool of intimidation. Embarrassment appears to be the effect that the conduct actually had on the complainant.
[45] At paragraph 123 of R. v. Province, 2019 O.J. No. 4003 (CA), Mr. Justice Watt stated:
A final point concerns the nature of the "threatening conduct" under s. 264(2)(d). That conduct must amount to a "tool of intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in the recipient". The conduct should be viewed objectively with due consideration for the circumstances in which it took place and its effect on the complainant: R. v. Burns, 2008 ONCA 6, at para. 2, citing R. v. George, 2002 YKCA 2, 162 C.C.C. (3d) 337, at para. 39; see also R. v. Sim, 2017 ONCA 856, 41 C.R. (7th) 416, at para. 16.
[46] Viewed objectively, I do not see this website as "tool of intimidation which is designed to instill a sense of fear in the recipient". One of the main reasons for this, and which may be distinguishing for other cases or situations, is that in all the content on the website Mr. Radmehr never once actively solicits action from anyone. He never tells people to go to Ms. K.’s place of employment, never asks people to contact her or her family, never even directs comments at Ms. K. He is stating what he believes, erroneously, to be fact.
[47] Throughout her testimony, Ms. K. repeatedly stated that as a result of the website she felt anxious, was embarrassed, got stressed out, and feels like she lost her self-confidence. At one point, she did mention that she felt fear, but when asked to specify she indicated that she felt fear of “what is to come next”.
[48] In R. v. Benyamin, 2024 O.J. No. 5224 (SCJ), Justice Schabas sitting as a summary conviction appeal judge stated the following:
[20] Assessing the reasonableness of a complainant's fear requires consideration of how a reasonable person would have felt in the circumstances of the complainant: R. v. Sim, 2017 ONCA 856, at para. 19. This includes having regard to the complainant's personal circumstances and experience with the offender.
[21] Reasonable fear in this context can include fear for one's physical safety, and fear of and freedom from, mental, emotional, or psychological trauma caused by psychological violence: R. v. Finnessey at para. 16. The Crown does not have to prove threats of violence. Protecting psychological safety is an objective of the legislation. As Durno J. stated in R v. Wisniewska, 2011 ONSC 6452 at para. 38:
Indeed, the uncertainty as to what the harasser could do, in itself can often establish the fear component and its reasonableness. In addition, the past conduct of the accused and the past relationship between the parties can inform the assessment of the reasonableness of the fear even when that background evidence is not within the timeframe of the information or indictment.
[49] I fully accept that Ms. K. “felt harassed” by the creation of the website. But that is not the test. She was embarrassed that her co-workers knew of her past, she was embarrassed that her friends read the content on the website, and she did not want her children to read what their father was writing about their mother. As a result of her co-workers being aware of the website, Ms. K. did not return to work.
[50] I also accept that the website caused Ms. K. some anxiety – that is a perfectly reasonable response. Being called a “fraudster” is very likely anxiety-inducing for many people. The difficulty here is that over and above embarrassment, frustration, and perhaps even extreme anger, I am not satisfied that a reasonable person in the circumstances of Ms. K. would have seen this as threatening conduct, or experienced fear at the existence of the website.
Conclusion on Trial Proper
[51] I find that the Crown has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to each of the essential elements of the offence in section 264(2)(d). Criminal harassment as outlined in section 264(2)(d) is a very specific charge. Had the Crown charged under a different offence, or a different section, the outcome may have been different.
[52] As a result, Mr. Radmehr I find you not guilty, and the remaining charge against you is dismissed.
Crown Request for a Peace Bond
[53] At a couple of points throughout the trial, the Crown expressed that in the event that Mr. Radmehr is acquitted, the Crown would ask the Court to impose a common law peace bond restricting contact between Mr. Radmehr and the complainant and perhaps even a term of the peace bond that the website is to be taken down.
[54] Justice Carnegie commented at paragraph 24 of R. v. Mackie, 2020 O.J. No. 3594 (CJ):
[24] Stringent application of the rules of a criminal trial do not apply in a non punitive proceeding, as here. Parliament intended peace bonds to be a preventative tool for courts to address public safety. Succinctly put, in R v Schafer the Yukon Territorial Court of Appeal recently and persuasively highlighted the applicable evidentiary standard:
The informant (whether a peace officer or a person concerned about personal safety) is not required to act on the basis of evidence admissible at trial. The issue for the judge is whether there are reasonable grounds for the subjective fear, not whether the facts underlying that fear can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In these circumstances, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended that the judge strictly apply the rules of evidence. This latter point is reinforced by noting that the test for granting a peace bond is no different if the application is made by a person concerned about personal safety. It would defeat the purpose of the provisions if such a person could not rely on hearsay evidence to justify a reasonable fear of harm, but could only secure the protection of a peace bond on strictly admissible evidence.
... The role of the judge is to assess whether the grounds tendered in support of the stated fear are objectively reasonable and sufficient to justify the imposition of a recognizance with terms and conditions. In my view, hearsay evidence that is credible and trustworthy is relevant to that question.
[55] Justice Rowe writing for the Court in R. v. Pennusi, 2019 SCC 39, [2019] S.C.J. No. 39 went through a bit of the history and evolution of the peace bond as we know it today:
[12] The peace bond is an instrument of preventive justice. The prevention of crime is a well-recognized purpose of the criminal law. As Locke J. explained in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 303: "The power to legislate in relation to criminal law is not restricted, in my opinion, to defining offences and providing penalties for their commission. The power of Parliament extends to legislation designed for the prevention of crime as well as to punishing crime" (p. 308; see also R. v. S. (S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, at p. 282).
[13] In Mackenzie v. Martin, [1954] S.C.R. 361, Kerwin J. (as he then was) wrote that a peace bond delivers preventive justice by "obliging those persons, whom there is probable grounds to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to give full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not happen; by finding pledges or securities for keeping the peace, or for their good behaviour" (p. 368, citing W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (16th ed. 1825), cited in R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871, at p. 911, per Sopinka J.).
[14] R. v. Budreo (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 347 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) ("Budreo S.C."), dealt with a constitutional challenge to the peace bond under s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code. Then J. referred to the preventative nature of the peace bond:
The court in considering what constitutes fundamental justice in a liberal society must refer to the history of a particular power and the policy rationale behind it. Preventive justice is the exercise of judicial power not in order to sanction past conduct but to prevent future misbehaviour and harm. The exercise of this power is justified by the risk of harm or dangerousness posed by certain individuals ... . [pp. 368-69]
This was echoed by Laskin J.A. in his decision affirming the reasons of Then J. (R. v. Budreo (2000), 46 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.) ("Budreo C.A."), leave to appeal dismissed, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 542, [2001] 1 S.C.R. vii):
The criminal justice system has two broad objectives: punish wrongdoers and prevent future harm. A law aimed at the prevention of crime is just as valid an exercise of the federal criminal law power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as a law aimed at punishing crime. [Footnote omitted; para. 27]
[15] The modern peace bond can be traced back as early as the 1300's, to the common law practice of "binding over". "Binding over" described a judicial authority to make preventive orders to maintain social order despite no specific crime having been charged, aimed at preventing a wide range of undesirable activity. The earliest reference to the practice was in the Justices of the Peace Act 1361 (Eng.), 34 Edw. 3, c.1, where the power was granted to justices to "take of people who came before them sufficient mainprise of their good behaviour towards the king and his people" (Law Commission No. 222, Binding Over: Report on Reference under Section 3 (1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (1994), cited in D. Orr"Section 810 Peace Bond Applications in Newfoundland" (2002), 46 Crim. L.Q. 391, at p. 391).
[16] In 1892, existing English law was codified in the Criminal Code, including the common law peace bond. Section 959(2) of the Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, provided:
2. Upon complaint by or on behalf of any person that on account of threats made by some other person or on any other account, he, the complainant, is afraid that such other person will do him, his wife or child some personal injury, or will burn or set fire to his property, the justice before whom such complaint is made, may, if he is satisfied that the complainant has reasonable grounds for his fears, require such other person to enter into his own recognizances, or to give security, to keep the peace, and to be of good behaviour, for a term not exceeding twelve months.
[17] The 1892 peace bond provision bears strong similarity to the modern day peace bond provisions, but like the common law peace bond, there was no requirement to hold a hearing. Where a justice was satisfied that the "complainant" had a reasonably founded fear, the justice could require the "other person" to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding 12 months.
[18] Regarding the procedural requirements of common law peace bonds, Chief Justice Lamer, writing in dissent in Parks, cited a decision of the English Court of Appeal which noted:
That is not to say that it would not be wise, and indeed courteous in these cases for justices to give such a warning; there certainly would be absolutely no harm in a case like the present if the justices, returning to court, had announced they were going to acquit, but had immediately said "We are however contemplating a binding-over; what have you got to say?" I think it would be at least courteous and perhaps wise that that should be done, but I am unable to elevate the principle to the height at which it can be said that a failure to give such a warning is a breach of the rules of natural justice. [Emphasis in original; pp. 893-94, quoting R. v. Woking Justices, Ex p. Gossage, [1973] 2 All ER 621, at p. 623 (Eng. C.A.)]
[19] In the 1954 amendments to the Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, the phrases "cause the parties to appear""evidenced adduced", and reference to the court "before which the parties appear" were introduced into s. 717 (a predecessor of s. 810). These amendments resulted in a more procedurally robust peace bond scheme; one where a hearing was required so that the defendant could have the opportunity to respond to the alleged fear and contest the peace bond. As will be discussed below, I respectfully cannot accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the enactment of provisions which include the phrase "cause the parties to appear" (e.g. ss. 810(2) and 810.2(2)) are "special provisions to compel appearance", or that their enactment created a unique "scheme for dealing with peace bond Informations" (para. 50) to compel the attendance of a defendant to a hearing. Rather, the introduction of the wording most likely reflected the requirement that, before ordering a defendant to enter a recognizance, a judge must hold a hearing to determine whether the informant's fear is reasonably founded.
[20] In addition to the general peace bond, based on fear of personal injury or damage to property (s. 810), Parliament has since the early 1990's added a number of specialized peace bonds respecting: fear of a criminal organization offence, including intimidation of a justice system participant or a journalist (s. 810.01); fear of a terrorism offence (s. 810.011 and s. 83.3); fear of an offence related to forced marriage or child marriage (s. 810.02); fear of a sexual offence committed against a minor (s. 810.1); and fear of serious personal injury (s. 810.2).
[56] Given that it was mentioned a number of times throughout the trial, Mr. Radmehr was always on notice that the Crown was going to ask for a common law peace bond at the conclusion of the trial should he be acquitted. Counsel for both Mr. Radmehr and the Crown conducted their examinations-in-chief and cross-examinations in such a fashion that it incorporated all aspects of what would have been a secondary hearing relating to the issuance of a peace bond into the trial proper.
[57] When assessing whether to exercise my common law jurisdiction pursuant to my preventative justice powers and have Mr. Radmehr enter into a peace bond, one of the first things I have to do is assess the reasonableness of the fear proposed by the complainant.
[58] The complainant just wants to move on with her life. Hopefully Mr. Radmehr does as well. Why he is so focused on her is beyond me. Their marriage did not sustain, there was disagreement and perceived criminality between them, but they are divorced, their relationship is over, family courts have given their final decision on what is to happen with their children. Mr. Radmehr needs to grow up, move on, and stop with the fixation on Ms. K. and her family.
[59] I am unable to get past the first task I must perform with respect to the imposition of this common law peace bond. As per my findings above, I do not find there to be any reasonable fear on the part of the complainant toward Mr. Radmehr solely as a result of the creation of this website.
[60] Given that the cause of the fear purported to be the website, and I have found that fear to be unreasonable, I have no jurisdiction to impose a term on Mr. Radmehr that he take down the website.
[61] Ms. K. has stated that she wishes not to have any contact with Mr. Radmehr. I truly hope that Mr. Radmehr respects those wishes and leaves Ms. K. and her family alone.
[62] Given that I am unable to find a reasonable fear upon which to base the exercising of my common law jurisdiction pursuant to my preventative justice powers, and I find no nexus between the existence of the website and the offence upon which Mr. Radmehr was arraigned, I decline to order that Mr. Radmehr enter a peace bond with respect to Ms. K. or any member of her immediate family.
Released: July 18, 2025
Signed: Justice M. Townsend