WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.— (3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
DATE: July 3, 2025
COURT FILE NO. C40403/20
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO
JODI KAIMAN, for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and -
O.G. and V.G.
THE RESPONDENT
O.G., ACTING IN PERSON
OLENA BRUSENTSOVA, for the RESPONDENT, V.G.
RESPONDENTS
CARINA CHAN, on behalf of the OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S LAWYER, for the child, E.G.
HEARD: JUNE 30, 2025
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
[1] The applicant, Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the society), has brought a motion, within its protection application, seeking to place the subject child, E.G. (the child), in the temporary care and custody of the respondent V.G. (the father), subject to terms of supervision, with access to the respondent O.G. (the mother) to be in its discretion with respect to location, frequency, duration and the level of supervision.
[2] The society’s motion is supported by the father and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer on behalf of the child (the OCL).
[3] The father also seeks an order that the mother remove all social media postings about this case and about its participants. He asks that she be prohibited from making any such further social media postings. This request is supported by the society and the OCL.
[4] The mother seeks a temporary order placing the child in the temporary joint care and custody of her and the father, and a restoration of the shared parenting plan they had until the child was brought to a place of safety by the society on April 1, 2025.[1]
[5] The mother told the court she would abide by an order requiring her to remove her social media posts about this case and its participants, and to not make any such further postings.
[6] The court read the affidavits filed by the society workers. One of the affidavits attached a report dated April 24, 2025 prepared pursuant to section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act by a clinician from the OCL (the clinician). The report was prepared for an ongoing parenting case between the mother and the father in the Superior Court of Justice.
[7] The mother was offered the opportunity of consulting with duty counsel prior to starting this hearing. She declined.
Part Two – History of events
[8] The mother and the father were married in December 2006 in Ukraine.
[9] The father sponsored the mother to come to Canada in 2008.
[10] The child is the only child the mother and the father had together. She will turn 10 years old in August.
[11] The mother and the father separated on March 4, 2018. The child primarily lived with the mother after the separation.
[12] The mother started a Divorce Application in the Superior Court of Justice in February 2019. The mother and father have made corollary relief claims in that case regarding parenting, support and property division. That case is scheduled for trial in September 2025.[2]
[13] On April 15, 2020, the society issued a protection application in this court regarding the child. It sought a six-month supervision order placing the child in the mother’s care. The protection concern was that the child had been subjected to repeated interviews, physical examinations, therapy sessions and assessments, mostly arising out of the mother’s belief that the father had sexually abused the child. None of the mother’s allegations had been verified by professionals. The parties consented to a temporary supervision order.
[14] On January 11, 2021, the protection application was withdrawn on consent. The mother and the father continued their case in the Superior Court of Justice.
[15] The mother and the father started a temporary equal-time parenting arrangement in July 2021.
[16] The society received several referrals regarding the mother and the father between 2021 and 2024.
[17] On August 7, 2023, the mother was charged with assaulting the father. She was restrained from contacting him unless it was about parenting issues. The mother’s Peace Bond expired on June 14, 2025.
[18] On April 15, 2024, Justice Carolyn Horkins requested the involvement of the OCL in the Superior Court of Justice case. The clinician was assigned to provide a report.
[19] A trial was scheduled in the Superior Court of Justice for April 2025. However, the trial was adjourned until September 2025 because the clinician had not completed her report.
[20] On January 22, 2025, the society received a referral from Toronto Police Services because the child had reported that the mother had punched her, grabbed her by the arms and thrown her down. The child told the society worker that the mother often hit her.
[21] On February 11, 2025, the society was called by the child’s school reporting that the child was saying she did not want to live anymore. The child expressed suicidal thoughts to the society worker at a subsequent meeting. At this meeting, the child confirmed that the mother often hits her. When asked how often, she said “last year it was over 100”. She told the worker she wanted to live with the father.
[22] The society opened a new investigation on March 28, 2025, after receiving a flurry of emails from the mother questioning the identities of the father and the child. She believed they might be different people.
[23] On March 31, 2025, the society was called by the child’s school principal, who expressed concerns about the mother’s mental health.
[24] On April 1, 2025, the society worker met with the mother at the child’s school. The mother showed her a video of the child and claimed the child was not walking right. She also stated her belief that the child had been molested by the father. The mother said she wasn’t sure the child she had dropped off at school that morning was her child. The worker reported the mother became upset when discussing this, stormed out of the room and drove off at a high speed in her car.
[25] The father deposed that after that meeting, the mother followed his car at a high speed. The child was in the car with him. They were scared. He drove to a police station.
[26] The mother was arrested and admitted to the hospital on a Form 1 pursuant to the Mental Health Act.
[27] The mother has a criminal release term that she is to have no contact with the father.
[28] The child told the society worker that the mother had tried to force her to see a doctor the previous day because the mother said she did not walk normally. She said the mother hit her when she resisted. The child told the worker that she does not feel safe with the mother.
[29] The child was brought to a place of safety, designated by the society as the father, on April 1, 2025.
[30] On April 4, 2025, a social worker from the hospital advised the society worker that the mother had been criminally charged for throwing bricks.[3] The mother was placed on a Form 3 pursuant to the Mental Health Act, which meant she would remain at the hospital for a further two weeks and be assessed.
[31] The society started this protection application. On April 7, 2025, Justice Sara Mintz made a temporary without prejudice order placing the child in the care and custody of the father. The mother’s access was ordered to be in the society’s discretion, a minimum of one hour each week, in accordance with the views and preferences of the child.
[32] On April 10, 2025, the mother called the police from the hospital to conduct a wellness check on the child. The police attended at the father’s home. The child was fine.
[33] On April 14, 2025, the mother sent the society worker an email questioning the identities of the father and the child.
[34] The mother was discharged from the hospital on April 15, 2025, after declining recommended treatment.[4]
[35] On April 18, 2025, the father brought the child to the society office for access with the mother. The child refused to see the mother. The mother then refused to leave the society office and insisted that the worker prove that the child who was at the office was her child. The mother became very upset. She banged on doors and security was called.
[36] The child has refused to have any access with the mother.
[37] The child has reported to the society that she is happy living with the father. The school principal has reported that the child is now doing much better at school.
[38] The father deposed that the mother approached the child on May 12, 2025, when he was picking her up from school. The child was distressed by this. This was a breach of the restraining order.
[39] The father deposed that on May 21, 2025, the child’s teacher advised him the school had sent a letter to the mother requesting her to stop posting on her Facebook page about the child, the father and the school. The mother was claiming that the father was a pedophile.
[40] The father deposed that on May 23, 2025, the mother attacked his mother who was exchanging the child at school. The police were called. The mother was not arrested.
Part Three – The OCL report
[41] The OCL discontinued its investigation ordered in the Superior Court of Justice case on April 1, 2025 because of these child protection proceedings. It prepared a discontinued report dated April 24, 2025 that it sent to the society.[5] It sets out the following:
a) Due to her concerns about the mother’s mental health and its impact on the child, the clinician reported the matter to the society.
b) The mother had no fixed address between June and September 2024, because she was evicted from her apartment. The mother had not paid the rent because she believed the father was spying on her and the child.
c) There were ongoing concerns that the mother did not believe the identities of the father and the child. The mother sent the clinician several photos and videos claiming that the father and the child had been changed in some way she could not explain.
d) The mother believes the father has brainwashed the child against her.
e) The mother is concerned that the father is sexually abusing the child.
f) The mother believes the father has intimidated the child into remaining silent.
g) The clinician observed a positive and warm interaction between the father and the child. No concerns were noted.
h) The clinician had to end her observation visit between the mother and the child early as the mother was becoming distressed in the child’s presence. She observed the mother acting erratically.
i) The child has been subject to countless interviews and examinations due to the mother’s persistent belief that the father is sexually abusing her.
j) The child told the clinician the mother often hits her and she does not feel safe with her.
k) The child told the clinician that the mother often drives around the building she lives in, constantly sends her messages and threatens to call the police if she does not respond.
l) The child told the clinician she wants to live with the father.
m) The clinician observed that the child rarely smiled and sat with slumped shoulders. She wrote that the child’s mental health should be the top priority for everyone involved.
Part Four – The mother’s narrative
[42] The mother’s narrative is that:
a) There are no valid protection concerns related to her.
b) She does not have mental health issues.
c) She has appropriately cared for the child and will continue to do so.
d) She is the parent who seeks out services for the child. The father and the society have failed to obtain supports for the child.
e) She is only raising concerns about the identities of the father and the child, not denying they are the same people. She is just asking that steps be taken to determine their identity.
f) She is concerned that the child who she says lashes out and has tantrums with her is not the same child who professed her love for her in February 2025. She does not understand how the child can change that much.
g) She only expressed a concern that the father has sexually abused the child and just wants it properly investigated. She is not saying this has actually happened.
h) She expressed concerns that the father is not appropriately caring for the child. She alleged that:
i) The father leaves the child unsupervised.
ii) The child is often hungry when with the father.
iii) The father lets the child spend too much time on her phone.
iv) The father blocks the child’s communication with her.
i) The society, the police, the clinician and medical professionals have misconstrued her concerns about the father and the child. They also have not properly investigated them.
j) She feels the society is now covering up for its past mistakes.
k) She feels it is in the child’s best interests to be returned to the joint care of her and the father and to restore their shared parenting arrangement.
l) She wants the trial to proceed in the Superior Court of Justice in September 2025. She wants to challenge the clinician’s findings made in the discontinued report.
Part Five – Legal considerations for placement on a temporary care and custody hearing
[43] The legal test for the court to apply on a temporary care and custody motion is set out in subsections 94 (2), (4), and (5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) that read as follows:
94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,
(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.
Criteria
(4) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).
Placement with relative, etc.
(5) Before making a temporary order for care and custody under clause (2) (d), the court shall consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to make an order under clause (2) (c) to place the child in the care and custody of a person who is a relative of the child or a member of the child’s extended family or community.
[44] Subsection 94 (11) of the Act states that before making an order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained. The child gave clear and consistent views and wishes in this case. The court seriously considered them.
[45] The child was in the joint care of the parents before society intervention under Part V of the Act. This means the court cannot make an order under clause 94 (2) (c) of the Act (placing the child solely with the father), unless the society meets the legal test set out in subsection 94 (4) of the Act.
[46] The onus is on the society to establish, on credible and trustworthy evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if the child is returned to the care of the mother, it is more probable than not that she will suffer harm. Further, the onus is on the society to establish that the child cannot be adequately protected by terms or conditions of a temporary supervision order. See: Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. T., [2000] O.J. No. 2273 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). Simply stated, this is a two-part test that the society has to meet with respect to the mother.
[47] A court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection of the children (subsection 1 (2) of the Act). See: Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.D. and F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448.
[48] The degree of intrusiveness of the society's intervention and the interim protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. See: CCAS of Toronto v. J.O., 2012 ONCJ 269.
[49] The Divisional Court has held that a Society seeking an order for temporary society care at this early stage of a case has only to demonstrate that it has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a protection risk for the child that justifies society intervention. See: L.D. v. Durham Children’s Aid Society and R.L. and M.L., [2005] O.J. No. 5050 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The burden on the society at this stage does not go as high as showing that on the balance of probabilities there is an actual risk to the child in the parent’s care. See: CCAS of Toronto v. M.L.R., 2011 ONCJ 652; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.G., 2021 ONSC 2260.
[50] Subsection 94 (10) of the Act permits the court to admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstance. In determining what evidence is credible and trustworthy, the evidence in its entirety must be viewed together. Evidence that may not be credible and trustworthy when viewed in isolation might reach that threshold when examined in the context of other evidence. See: Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227 at para 18; CAS of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. S.S.H., 2019 ONSC 5365.
[51] This does not mean that all evidence is admissible. For instance, in this case, the society sought to introduce a clinical diagnosis of the mother, told to its worker by a social worker from the hospital. This evidence did not come close to being credible or trustworthy. It was multiple hearsay. The social worker was not qualified to give this opinion. And the source of the opinion was not set out. The court ruled this evidence was inadmissible.
[52] The court finds that the child’s statements, as related to the society workers and the clinician are credible and trustworthy. They were recorded by professionals with a duty to record them accurately soon after the statements were made. The statements were very consistent. The child’s concerns about the mother’s mental health were corroborated by many professionals. They were also corroborated, in part, by the mother’s evidence and her social media postings. The child’s views and preferences were affirmed by her counsel at this hearing.
[53] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 866, this court wrote that it does not automatically follow that a child will be in need of protection just because a parent has mental health challenges. Many parents with mental health issues parent their children well – others can’t. There is a wide range of mental illnesses that affect parents differently and, by extension, affect their children differently. The court wrote at paragraph 114:
[114] The court needs to assess several factors to determine if a parent’s mental illness places a child at risk of harm and if so, whether a child can still be placed in the parent’s care. These factors include:
a) The type of mental illness the parent has.
b) The severity of the mental illness.
c) The frequency of the parent’s mental illness symptoms – whether they are situational or chronic.
d) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s functioning.
e) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s parenting.
f) Other risk factors impacting on the mental illness, including substance abuse, difficulties with interpersonal relationships, domestic violence and other stressors such as unstable housing and financial problems.
g) The impact of the mental illness on the children.
h) The insight of the parent into their mental illness.
i) The ability of the parent to meaningfully engage with supports to address the mental health issues.
j) Whether the parent is compliant with treatment recommendations.
k) The strength of the parent’s support system, the insight of those support persons into the parent’s mental health issues and the ability of those persons to prioritize a child’s needs to those of the parent’s and to protect the child.
l) Whether the children have any needs that make them more vulnerable to compromised parenting.
Part Six – Placement analysis
[54] The society met its onus on both parts of the two-part test for not returning the child to the care of the mother. There are reasonable grounds to believe that if the child was returned to her care that it is more probable than not that the child will suffer harm. Supervision terms would be inadequate to protect the child from these risks. The court makes these findings for the following reasons:
a) The mother’s mental health has seriously deteriorated. She was involuntarily hospitalized under the Mental Health Act for two weeks in April 2025. She left the hospital against medical advice. She has declined recommended treatment.
b) The mother continues to challenge the identities of the father and the child. She appears to have a tenuous grip on reality.
c) The mother continues to believe the father has sexually abused the child. There is no basis for this belief.
d) The court was provided with rambling social media postings made by the mother about the child, the father, the society, the clinician and the court system. Many of the messages were incomprehensible and indicative of a person with mental health challenges.
e) The mother’s mental health challenges are not benign. They have resulted in the following behaviour:
i. The child has alleged that the mother frequently hit her. The mother did not deny this.
ii. The society required security to have the mother leave its office in April 2025.
iii. The mother followed the father and the child in her car on April 1, 2025, allegedly at a high speed, frightening the child. The mother was arrested for this.[6]
iv. The mother allegedly assaulted the father’s mother at the school. The mother did not respond to this allegation.
v. The mother may have been charged in April 2025 for throwing bricks.
vi. The mother has taken the child to multiple intrusive medical examinations due to her belief that the father sexually assaulted her.
f) The mother’s mental health challenges have had a profound impact on the child as follows:
i. The child was expressing suicidal ideation in the fall of 2024.
ii. The child is telling multiple professionals that she is afraid of the mother and does not feel safe with her.
iii. The child is upset about the repeated medical investigations the mother has taken her to.
iv. The child is upset that the mother keeps coming to her school or watching her just outside her school.
v. The child is upset about how the mother questions her identity and the father’s identity.
vi. The child is tired of the police constantly being called.
vii. The child is upset about what the mother tells her about the father.
viii. The child has been observed as somber and unhappy, with the weight of the world on her shoulders.
ix. The child is resisting having any contact with the mother.
g) The mother demonstrates no insight into her mental health issues. She feels she has none. She has disregarded treatment recommendations. It is unlikely, without treatment or insight, that her mental health will improve in the near future.
h) The mother demonstrates no insight into how her conduct has adversely affected the child. Instead, she externalizes blame for the child’s issues to everyone else. Her social media postings blame the father, the society, the clinician and the court system for not protecting the child and victimizing her.
i) The mother does not appear to have a support system to mitigate the child protection concerns.
j) The child’s emotional and social development would be at severe risk of harm if she was placed back in the mother’s care.
k) Supervision terms are inadequate to protect the child in the mother’s care. The mother’s mental health challenges are far too severe at this time. She is unable to provide the child with a safe, secure and stable home.
[55] The evidence indicates that the child has been doing much better in the father’s sole care. The mother’s allegations about neglectful parenting have not been verified by the society. The child’s academic performance has improved. She has been much happier. Her life is calmer. The court finds it is in her best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to terms of society supervision.
Part Seven – Access
[56] Subsection 94 (8) of the Act provides that where an order is made under clause (c) or (d) of subsection 94 (2), the court may order access on any terms that it considers appropriate. In determining what order is appropriate, the court should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (subsections 1 (1) and (2) of the Act). In assessing best interests, the court should consider the relevant factors set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act. See: JFCS v. H.B.S. [2012], O.J. No. 5055 (OCJ).
[57] The party seeking to impose restrictions on a parent’s contact or access to a child must demonstrate that it is necessary and the limit is proportionate to the risk. Any such terms should be child and harm specific and be supported on the evidence. See: Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A.C., 2020 ONCJ 505.
[58] The mother would like as much access with the child as possible.
[59] The society seeks an order that the mother’s access with the child be in its discretion, to include location, duration, frequency and the level of supervision. This position was supported by the father and the OCL.
[60] The child expressed through counsel that she does not want any visits with the mother at this time.
[61] The court finds it is in the child’s best interests to make the order sought by the society with the following two changes:
a) The society shall not take steps to persuade the child to see the mother. It shall only respond to requests by her to see the mother. The child was left in a damaging placement with the mother for a long time. She suffered significant emotional damage. She felt unsafe. She was unsafe. The child needs the opportunity and the time to feel safe again and to have some stability. Access with the mother at this time, against the child’s wishes, will undermine that stability.
b) Any access the child requests must be fully supervised by the society.
[62] The court expressed at the hearing that counseling for the child should be expedited. It wants to emphasize that the society should not be pursuing any form of reunification counseling or family counseling between the mother and the child at this time. The counseling should be to address the trauma the child has suffered in the mother’s care.
Part Eight – Social media postings
8.1 Positions and evidence
[63] The father seeks an order that the mother remove all social media postings about this court case and its participants. He also asked for an order prohibiting such postings. This request was supported by the society and the OCL.
[64] To her credit, the mother told the court that she would comply with such an order. She indicated that she was frustrated that the system was not taking her concerns about the child and the father seriously.
[65] The father, the society and the OCL advised the court that the father only attached a small portion of the messages posted by the mother on her Facebook page.
[66] There is no need to go into significant detail about these postings.[7] They can be briefly summarized as follows:
a) The mother identifies the child as being part of this child protection case and posts many pictures of her.
b) The mother identifies the father as being part of this child protection case and posts many pictures of him.
c) The mother posts excerpts of court documents in this child protection case.
d) The mother posts photos of and comments about the judges who have heard appearances in this child protection case. By doing this, she has published that the child is the subject of a child protection case.
e) The mother posts multiple comments about the society workers, the clinician and the Superior Court of Justice judges involved with her cases.
f) The mother posted a video of her March 24, 2025 court appearance before Justice Nakonechny in the Superior Court of Justice.
g) The mother posted private information about the father, including his driver’s licence and phone number.
h) The mother calls the father a “pedo” and judges “pedo supporters”.
8.2 Legal considerations
[67] Courts are starting to react more forcefully to inappropriate social media postings in family and child protection cases.
[68] In cases under the Children’s Law Reform Act (the CLRA), the court has the authority pursuant to clause 28 (1) (c) to prevent a party from making negative social media postings and to require them to remove the existing ones. Many courts are now making such orders in the best interests of children. See: Shotton v. Switzer, 2014 ONSC 843; Singh v. Batoolall; Chartrand v. De Laat, [2008] O.J. No. 4529 (SCJ); Daher v. Khanafer, [2016] ONSC 5969; E.H. v. O.K., [2018] ONCJ 412; Hicks v. Geist, 2022 ONSC 5677; S.B. v. J.I.U., 2021 ONCJ 614; B.M. v. J.G., 2025 ONCJ 72.
[69] Subsection 87 (8) of the Act provides that no person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family. Pursuant to subsection 142 (3) of the Act, it is an offence to contravene subsection 87 (8). The offence is punishable on conviction by way of a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than three years, or both.
[70] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.B., [2012] O.J. No. 3241 (Ontario Court of Justice), Justice Ellen Murray made an order directing the father in that case to remove social media postings that had the effect of directly or indirectly identifying the three children before the court and suspended his access until that was done. Justice Murray found that since the child protection case was the only family law case before the court, any reference to family court proceedings in his social media postings would indicate a connection to the protection case.
[71] The father appealed that decision. The decision was upheld. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.B.-R., 2013 ONSC 1965. The appeal court noted that although the father did not name the children’s last names in his social media postings, he included their first names and referred to the society, his caseworker, family court and court proceedings. He included photos of family court. The motions judge had ample information to enable her to conclude that there was public information that identified the three children as subjects of a child protection proceeding, as well as the father.
[72] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.T.L., 2019 ONCJ 530, both parents were making inappropriate social media postings and videos. Justice Alex Finlayson ordered the parents to remove any text, photographs and videos posted on social media that directly or indirectly discussed or referenced the other, the child and any of the court cases in which either parent had been involved. This included not posting anything about the father’s criminal charges and family law proceedings in Quebec. He prohibited the parents from making any such postings in the future. He ordered that the child’s social media and YouTube accounts be closed.
[73] In Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. E.L., 2022 ONSC 4508, Justice Pamela Krause had ordered the mother to remove postings on her TikTok account about the child protection workers. The mother refused to do so and the court found her in contempt. This was the second time the mother had been found in contempt for making inappropriate social media postings. The court gave the mother the opportunity to purge her contempt. She did not do so and kept making social media postings about the child protection workers.
[74] Justice Krause wrote the following at paragraphs 38 and 39 of her decision:
38 There must be a general deterrence to making public information in child protection proceedings and breaching orders made within those proceedings relating to publication.
39 Social media has created a situation where information can be shared instantaneously around the world. The court must ensure persons know and understand there is no entitlement to post on social media any information about child protection proceedings in Ontario which will identify the child(ren), family or caregivers.
[75] Justice Krause sentenced the mother to three days in jail.
[76] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.E., 2023 ONCJ 156, this court ordered the mother in that case to remove social media postings identifying the society worker. The postings included personal information about the worker. The court found that the Ontario Court of Justice also had the jurisdiction to order the removal of such postings pursuant to its authority to control its own process.[8]
8.3 Do the social media posts violate subsection 87 (8) of the Act?
[77] The mother’s social media postings violate subsection 87 (8) of the Act. She repeatedly identifies the child, and the child’s parents in this child protection case. She has posted excerpts of the documents filed in this child protection case. She has identified potential witnesses and judges involved in this child protection case. This indirectly identifies the child and the child’s parents as being part of this child protection case in violation of subsection 87 (8) of the Act.
8.4 Discussion
[78] In family law cases, courts have relied on clause 28 (1) (c) of the CLRA to protect children, parties, witnesses and other participants in family law cases from cyberbullying, abuse and intimidation by parties to the case.
[79] There is no reason that children, parties, witnesses and other participants in child protection cases, including children’s aid society employees, counsel, employees or agents of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and court officials should receive any less protection from the court. The ability of child protection courts to control inappropriate social media posting is essential to its ability to maintain the integrity of the child protection proceedings. Anything less could result in an unjust process and undermine the administration of justice.
[80] The court finds that the mother’s Facebook postings were made to denigrate, intimidate and cyberbully the father, the clinician, the society and court officials. The court would have ordered, as part of its responsibility to control its court process, the removal of the mother’s Facebook postings about these people (and prohibited the mother making similar postings about them in the future) even if they did not technically fall within the prohibition set out in subsection 87 (8) of the Act.
8.5 Consequences of breaching this order
[81] The court understands that the mother is frustrated and angry at the professionals involved in her case. She feels her concerns have not been heard. However, she cannot make social media postings about the child protection case or the participants in it.
[82] It is important that the mother understand the consequences if she does not comply with the court order to remove these postings or if she makes similar postings in the future.
[83] These possible consequences are as follows:
a) A fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to three years for identifying a child or a child’s parent in a child protection case pursuant to subsection 142 (3) of the Act.
b) Contempt remedies set out in rule 31 of the Family Law Rules. The mother is reminded that in Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. E.L., supra, the court jailed the mother for 3 days for her refusal to remove offensive social media postings.
c) The court may make an adverse finding against the mother on the basis that making these social media postings shows poor judgment and an inability to put the needs of the child over her own anger. It will also likely inform the court, if she does not comply with its orders, that she is not capable of following court orders – an important consideration if the court is to consider returning the child to her under a supervision order.
d) In addition, subrule 1 (8) of the Family Law Rules provides the court with the following enforcement options if an order is breached:
(i) an order for costs;
(ii) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;
(iii) an order dismissing a claim;
(iv) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;
(v) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;
(vi) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(vii) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and
(viii) on motion, a contempt order.
[84] The cyberbullying and the intimidation of children, parties, witnesses and other participants involved in child protection proceedings should not and will not be tolerated.
Part Nine – Next steps
[85] One of the functions of a case management judge is to provide clear expectations to a party of what needs to be done to have their child returned to them.
[86] The court is aware that this decision will be upsetting to the mother and that she will disagree with it. The court has no doubt that she sincerely holds the belief that she is being mistreated and that the child is at risk of harm with the father.
[87] However, the court is not helping the mother if it does not give her the hard truth.
[88] The hard truth is that she needs to do a lot of work before she can even have access with the child. She should do the following:
a) Consent to the release of her medical records – in particular her records from her stay at St. Joseph’s hospital in April 2025.
b) Attend for a comprehensive mental health assessment. The assessor should be able to meet with the society worker to obtain the necessary context for the assessment.
c) Follow the treatment recommendations of the assessor.
d) Demonstrate sustained improvement in her mental health.
e) Demonstrate insight into her mental health challenges and the impact that those challenges have had on the child.
f) Comply with the court’s order regarding social media postings.
g) Stay away from the child and the child’s school. She needs to respect boundaries for the child.
[89] The court hopes that the mother will take these steps, even if she does not believe that they are necessary. It is her best chance of reuniting with the child.
[90] The society should be doing the following during this adjournment period:
a) Arranging counseling for the child. It should not be reunification or family counseling at this time. The society should also consider looking into a program for the child to assist her in coping with the mother’s mental health challenges, such as the FAME program. The court expects a report on the status of obtaining counseling for the child at the next court date.
b) Preparing motions for third party disclosure. It should be obtaining police and medical records regarding the mother.
c) Prepare a motion for the appointment of amicus. Child protection proceedings are complex. The mother demonstrated limited ability to focus her submissions on this motion. The court is concerned that her case will not be adequately presented without amicus to assist the court.
Part Ten – Conclusion
[91] A temporary order shall go on the following terms:
a) The child is placed in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to the terms of supervision ordered by Justice Mintz on April 7, 2025.
b) The child’s access with the mother, if any, shall be in the discretion of the society, including duration, frequency, and location.
c) The society shall take no steps to persuade the child to have access with the mother. It shall only arrange access if the child asks for it.
d) Any access between the mother and the child is to be fully supervised by the society.
e) The mother is prohibited from publishing or making public information that has the effect of directly, or indirectly, identifying the child, or any of the participants in this case. This includes, but is not limited to, the posting of comments, texts, documents, audio and video recordings or photographs on social media about the child, the father, a member of the father’s family, any lawyer in this case, the society, or any worker for the society, the clinician and any judge or court official involved with this case.
f) The mother shall immediately remove the social media postings referred to in paragraph (e) above.
g) The society is to conduct an internet search to determine if any information has been posted by the mother in violation of this order. If so, then the court expects the society to bring it to the attention of the court.
h) To ensure compliance with this order, if any content remains, the society shall put any internet service providers, websites, website hosts or social media companies on notice that the court has ordered this material to be removed and they shall ask those organizations to remove the content and close the websites or accounts. If those organizations do not respond within 30 days, then the society is to bring a motion before the court, on notice to the organization, for an order to compel the appropriate organization to remove the content and close the website or account.
Released: July 3, 2025
Justice Stanley B. Sherr
[1] The society designated the father as a place of safety and placed the child with him.
[2] The father’s counsel advised the court that no temporary parenting orders have been made in that case.
[3] The court received little information about this. The society will need to follow up about whether a criminal charge was laid against the mother.
[4] The mother confirmed this in her affidavit.
[5] The clinician swore to the truth of the contents of the report on April 24, 2025.
[6] The mother admitted following the father and the child in her car. She denied that she drove at a high speed.
[7] Multiple postings are attached to the father’s affidavit sworn on June 21, 2025.
[8] See paragraphs 26 to 39 of that decision for a discussion of the court’s authority to control its own process and to order the removal of inappropriate social media postings about participants in a case.