Warning
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Case Information
COURT FILE No.: 4810 998 23 48106717-00
DATE: 2025-05-26
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JANANAN SRI
Before Justice Peter Scrutton
Reasons for Judgment
Released on May 26, 2025
M. Walia .................................................................................................................... for the Crown
G.J. Partington ........................................................................................................ for the Accused
Scrutton J.:
Introduction
[1] Jananan Sri is charged with sexually assaulting I.C. on the morning of May 24, 2023. Both parties accept that the complainant and defendant were not known to each other prior to the allegations. DNA evidence incontrovertibly establishes that they engaged in sexual intercourse. I.C. alleges that none of the sexual activity they engaged in was consensual and that she communicated this to the defendant. He testified that she was the one who initiated their sexual activity and consensually participated in all of it. In determining whether the Crown has proved this offence beyond a reasonable doubt, I must assess their respective accounts, which will require a detailed review of the evidence.
I.C.’s Account
[2] I.C. is a middle-aged woman who had been addicted to crack cocaine and other drugs for over a decade. As of May 2023, she had been sober for approximately 6 months and was living in a recovery home. Sometime during the night of May 23rd or the early morning hours of May 24th, she relapsed and left her residence to buy drugs. She remembered smoking methamphetamine and, later, spending the rest of her money on a considerable amount of crack cocaine. She did not recall how much she bought but knew that she had smoked a lot and, not having recently used any drugs, got very high. She was not sure how long she was out and about after she left her home – she did not have a good sense of time. She thought she had drunk some beer. She did not think that she had eaten.
[3] I.C. felt euphoric and stimulated by the crack cocaine. It sped things up and made her manic and “all over the place.” It also made her very trusting. She had a history of mental illness but testified that the only kind of delusion she experienced that day was a common one when she was high – she believed in people, trusted them, and thought everyone was good and full of love.
[4] I.C. has only muddled memories of first meeting the defendant. He had a small bike and a red bandana. She recalled meeting him in an alley off Sherbourne Street. She may have smoked crack with him – that is what a lot of people in that area did and she had been smoking with different people. She recalled that he made a remark about how she could be his step-mother which she found creepy and caused her to walk away but had no other memories of their first interaction.
[5] When she met the defendant again some time later near a church, she had run out of money and drugs. I.C. did not recall how this conversation began but remembered the accused holding open his hand to show her he had some crack cocaine. He suggested going to his friend’s apartment to smoke it. I.C. wanted to smoke more drugs and was happy to go with him. Because of the comment he had made earlier, she told him that she was not going to have sex with him. She did not remember exactly what she was thinking when she decided to leave with him – she was high, wanted more crack, and was fine just going along with him. I.C. was challenged on the unlikelihood that a stranger would simply share drugs upon first meeting her with no strings attached but explained that in her experience, this was not uncommon.
[6] I.C. had no concerns about accompanying the defendant until they arrived at his friend’s apartment. He was unsuccessful getting buzzed in and they had to wait for someone else to enter to get through the security doors. I.C. became scared as soon as they got to the unit. The apartment was filthy, with dirty clothes everywhere – she described it as “squalor.” It was a bachelor apartment and the main room was very dark. A black man and a woman were having sex on a bed in the living room. Another woman was there; she thought the women were being trafficked. The defendant took her into the bathroom, which was filthy and had a clogged toilet. She said she had to leave, that she did not want to be there. Someone said she could not leave – she thought it was the black man. The bathroom had no door and was completely open to the living area next to it where the people were.
[7] The defendant pulled down his pants and told her to suck him. He had scabs on his penis and she was disgusted. She said she did not want to do this. She began to fellate him and gagged; she felt like she was going to throw up. He held her head over his penis. She fellated him for around 15 minutes. She kept saying “stop”, that she did not want to do this. After, without asking, he bent her over the bathtub and penetrated her vagina from behind before ejaculating inside her. She thought the sexual activity lasted for around 20 minutes. She did not consent to any of it and expressed that throughout. She just wanted to get out of the apartment. She said she wanted to go but someone in the apartment said she could not leave, that the door was locked from the inside. She had remembered hearing the door lock when they came in. Someone said something to the effect of “this one is too pretty, people are going to be looking for her, you should let her go.”
[8] Three other people were in the room at this point – the black man, the woman he had been having sex with, and the defendant. As between the defendant and the black man, she did not know who said what. When they left the apartment, I.C. told the defendant they were horrible people and he laughed at her. They took the elevator down together. At some point, she asked him if he wanted to go to jail and he laughed again. She left the building and went directly to 51 Division to report the sexual assault, then went to the hospital where she participated in a sexual assault evidence kit. She was still high when she spoke to the police. She felt horrified by what had happened.
[9] At the time of her testimony, I.C. was sober and had been properly medicated for her bipolar disorder for some time. She was in recovery and said that she had given her life over to God. She was upset about the defendant’s lack of kindness and empathy but had forgiven him and did not care about the outcome of the prosecution.
Challenges to I.C.’s Evidence
[10] I.C. denied that she had prostituted herself with the defendant for drugs. She denied that she had agreed to fellate him in exchange for crack and disagreed that she initiated the sex because she was so happy with the crack. She also denied that she had fabricated these allegations because she was angry after their sex when she learned he had run out of drugs and felt like she had been misled. She said that even when in the throes of addiction, she would never hurt anyone but would steal from donation boxes, even eat out of garbage bins. She denied the suggestion that she only met the accused once that day but acknowledged having memory gaps about when she thought she first met him and other aspects of the day. She agreed that she was coming down from her high and was craving more crack when she met the defendant the second time but did not agree that she was so desperate that she would do anything for more. When asked how he could have known she smoked crack, she explained that it would have been obvious as she had been smoking there for some time and that it was what people did at that corner.
[11] I.C. disputed that she smoked crack in the bathroom or the apartment. Ultimately, she allowed that it was possible she had smoked in the apartment. She was cross-examined on having told the police that she had smoked crack in the apartment but as I read the passage of the interview that was put to her,[1] it is clear she was referring to her earlier drug use, which she clarified in re-examination. She thought the apartment’s address was 200 Sherbourne but agreed that she had been wrong when she told the police it was by a Dollarama store, which was a few blocks south. She agreed that she had told the police she did not know why she accompanied the defendant to the apartment despite knowing that she had gone there for drugs. She confirmed it was not the defendant who locked the door to the apartment, and that she was not threatened during her time there. She testified that she thought she had drunk some beer that day but told the police she had drunk a cooler, explaining that the cooler was made by Coors (a beer company).
Mr. Sri’s Account
[12] Mr. Sri is in his early thirties. He became addicted to crack cocaine sometime during COVID when he had CERB money to spend. He was homeless and would mostly sleep on friends’ couches. In May 2023, he was moving between various buildings in the Dundas and Sherbourne area of Toronto. He had been up all night on May 23rd. Around 5:30 a.m., he sold some jewellery in exchange for crack. He was walking around the neighbourhood when he saw I.C., whom he did not know, sitting in a parking lot by Filmore’s strip club, looking sad. This was the first and only time they met that day. He asked what was bothering her and she said she had been smoking crack and had run out of money. He told her he had crack and asked what she would give him for it. She told him she would give him a blowjob and then sex if the crack was good. He did not want to do any of this in public and she agreed to go to his friend’s.
[13] They made small talk as they walked and then waited to enter the building before taking the elevator to his friend’s apartment on the fourth floor. He knocked and they went in. The apartment was dark and the door locked automatically upon closing – only his friend was able to unlock it.
[14] They both went to the washroom, which had no door. They smoked and she said something like “this is really good crack, I am happy and horny, people always rip me off” before fellating him. After, she offered him sex and he agreed. He said I.C. pulled her shorts down and bent over. They had sex for 5 minutes or so and he ejaculated inside her. When she learned he was out of drugs, she got really angry and said she wanted to leave. He told her the front door was locked and went to his friend’s room. He described his friend as “preoccupied” with a woman so they waited for him to let them out, then went to the elevator.
[15] Mr. Sri denied that he had any scabs on his penis, positing that if he did, it would have been too painful for him to engage in the sexual conduct they had both described. He denied that I.C. had ever protested or tried to leave.
Cross Examination of Mr. Sri
[16] Mr. Sri elaborated that he knew I.C. was sad when he saw her in the parking lot because she was crying and covering her face. He offered to share his crack because of that, thinking maybe she would feel better after a toke. Later in his testimony, he said that he would not normally give drugs to a stranger but that he wanted to help her, out of the goodness of his heart, and she was the one who raised the crack for sex trade.
[17] Mr. Sri did not recall the name of the friend whose apartment they went to. He described him as an older black man. Mr. Sri initially described the apartment as a one room “bachelor” but later said it had an enclosed bedroom. It was dark in the apartment, such that he could not see how many people were inside, potentially as many as four people. His friend was “pre-occupied” when he opened the door. Mr. Sri acknowledged that it was possible people were having sex in the living area of the unit when they entered but then indicated he did not remember this, though he said people may have been having sex in the bedroom. He did not think anyone was in the living area when they were in the bathroom.
[18] Mr. Sri acknowledged that the apartment was dirty, with clothes all over it but disputed that it was filthy or a “trap house.” He did not know whether the washroom toilet was clogged because its seat was down.
[19] At some point during the 15 minutes of oral sex, they took a break and smoked some more crack. When asked if there was any discussion of protection, he said that he had told I.C. that he did not have any condoms and she replied, “I don’t care I’m horny, I’m clean, let’s have sex.” They did not discuss ejaculation – Mr. Sri did not assume it was fine for him to ejaculate inside her but said she knew “there was a chance, a slight chance, that I could.” The intercourse lasted for 5 minutes or more and at one point, I.C. looked back at him and smiled. He did not say anything before he ejaculated – that was something that just happened.
[20] Mr. Sri knew I.C. was angry when she left the apartment. Although he initially said he had not been laughing when she left the building, he agreed that she looked angry on the video and also that he was laughing. He said his laugh must have been in response to something funny that she said.
Surveillance Video from the Apartment Building
[21] Mr. Sri and I.C. went to 251 Sherbourne Street just after 6:00 a.m. Many different areas of that building have video surveillance cameras. The parties agree that the time stamps noted on this footage are accurate. At 6:05 a.m., I.C. and Mr. Sri enter the building. He is riding a small bike and is wearing a red bandana and necklaces. She is wearing shorts, a purple sweatshirt, and flip flops. They can be seen speaking together; I.C. mostly has her hands in her pockets. In my view, their interaction, the distance between them, and their body language looks platonic. I.C. appears to be very tired, almost to the point of looking groggy. It takes almost 5 minutes for them to gain entry through the security door. Neither witness has any specific recollection of their conversation during this period. They behaved similarly as they rode up the elevator.
[22] I.C. and Mr. Sri are next visible on the footage leaving the fourth floor at 6:54 a.m. I.C. stands farther apart from Mr. Sri relative to when they had arrived; their body language is similar, except that I.C.’s arms are akimbo. At one point in the elevator, I.C. makes an animated hand gesture in the defendant’s direction. I.C. did not recall what she had said at that moment but remembered being angry and thought that she had said something like “what you did is not ok.” Mr. Sri can be seen smiling and then laughing in response to whatever was uttered.
[23] At 6:56 a.m., as she leaves the building, I.C.’s demeanour is noticeably different – she speaks to the defendant with her arms out wide and twice gives what looks like an exaggerated or exasperated shrug-like gesture with both hands. She testified that she was yelling at him at that moment and thinks she said something like “do you want to go to jail?” Mr. Sri appears to be smiling but his face is only briefly visible in the frame.
Forensic Evidence
[24] I.C. attended Mount Sinai Hospital for a Sexual Assault Evidence Kit on May 24, 2023. A CFS biologist compared external genitalia and vaginal swabs collected from her to a DNA sample of Mr. Sri’s that the police obtained. He cannot be excluded as the source of a male DNA profile located on both swabs and it is estimated that it is more than one trillion times more likely that the male DNA originates from him than from an unknown person unrelated to him.
The Parties’ Positions
[25] Defence counsel submits that I.C. is an unreliable witness. While adamant throughout that she did not consent to any sexual activity, her evidence is fraught with gaps and contradictions. With respect to her description of their first encounter, it is likely that she is confusing the defendant with someone else she met that day, given how intoxicated she was. There were many aspects of her narrative that she was unsure about and she acknowledged problems with her memory which were likely caused by the drugs. Further, she lied to the police when she said she did not know why she went with Mr. Sri to the apartment. Ultimately, she craved the drug so much that she sold her body for it and then fabricated the allegation out of anger when she learned he had no more drugs.
[26] The Crown argues that I.C. was a credible witness who answered questions fairly, did not exaggerate, and was consistent on all material issues. She struggled to remember antecedent events but had a clear memory of what transpired at the apartment. Her fragmented memories should not affect the assessment of the credibility of her core memory of the sexual assault. His evidence was not credible and should be rejected.
Relevant Legal Principles
[27] Jananan Sri is presumed innocent of these charges. The burden of proof is on the Crown, who must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Sri is guilty of sexual assault. There is no onus on him to prove anything. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an exacting one. It is more than probable or likely guilt and falls much closer to absolute certainty than it does to proof on a balance of probabilities. Ultimately, I may only find the accused guilty if I am sure that he committed the offence alleged.
[28] Mr. Sri testified and is entitled to the full weight of the Supreme Court of Canada's direction to trial judges in R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. If I believe his evidence that he did not sexually assault I.C., then I must find him not guilty. If I do not believe his testimony but am nonetheless left in reasonable doubt by it, he must similarly be found not guilty. Even if I am not left in doubt by his evidence, I must ask myself whether, on the basis of the evidence which I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of Mr. Sri’s guilt.
[29] The purpose of the W.(D.) framework is to emphasize the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence by ensuring that criminal cases are not reduced to credibility contests. The issue is not whose evidence I prefer but whether the Crown has proven the case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, I can accept some, none or all of a witness’ evidence. No magic formula that applies in assessing credibility. A witness’ evidence is to be considered using a common-sense approach that is not tainted by myth, stereotype or assumption. Many factors may be relevant to determining credibility. Some key ones include whether the witness’ evidence is internally consistent, whether it coheres with evidence from other witnesses or exhibits, whether the witness has motive to fabricate, whether inconsistencies in the evidence are about important or minor matters, what explanations are given for any inconsistencies, and whether the inconsistencies suggest that the witness is lying.
[30] I must be mindful of the distinction between credibility and reliability. Credibility relates to the honesty or sincerity of the testimony. Reliability relates to its accuracy, which engages a consideration of the witness’ ability to accurately observe, recall and recount an event: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, at para. 41. Here, I.C.’s lack of memory and intoxication raise questions about her reliability as a witness that I must consider.
Credibility Assessments and Factual Findings
[31] I understand that there is no rigid order in which the evidence must be analyzed and that compliance with reasonable doubt principles is a matter of substance: R. v. C.L.Y., 2008 SCC 2, [2008] S.C.J. No. 2, para. 7. In this case, it is convenient to begin the analysis with the evidence of Mr. Sri.
(i) Mr. Sri
[32] When Mr. Sri first described meeting I.C. in the parking lot, he said that she looked sad and he signalled his willingness to give her drugs if she gave him something in return. In cross-examination, he said that he had initially offered her his crack for money but said that he had forgotten that when testifying in chief. I do not accept this evidence. Mr. Sri testified that I.C. told him she was out of drugs and money when he asked her why she was sad – it would not make sense to suggest a cash sale in these circumstances. This is also incongruous with him having sold some of his belongings to buy a relatively small amount of crack hours earlier for his own personal use.
[33] Mr. Sri elaborated that he knew I.C. was sad because she was crying and covering her face. He also said that he offered her crack to make her feel better, because he wanted to help her, “out of the goodness of his heart”, and that she was the one who brought up an exchange. I find these to be significant inconsistencies. There are obvious differences between “looking sad” and being “distraught”, and between a gift and a barter (or altruism and self-interest). I do not accept Mr. Sri’s account of this meeting or that he came upon I.C. for the first and only time when they had this exchange. He testified that he had been up all night. He did not have any memory of where he spent that time. I infer that he was out and about in the neighbourhood during part of the time that I.C. was out. It would be at least random and at worst predatory to approach a distraught stranger and immediately engage in a crack-for-fellatio negotiation. I accept I.C.’s evidence that Mr. Sri did interact with her in some fashion before this.
[34] I do not believe Mr. Sri when he says that he does not recall the name of his friend at 251 Sherbourne. On his own version of events, this was a friend with whom he was sufficiently close to arrive at his apartment, unannounced, at 6:00 a.m., accompanied by a stranger with whom he intended to smoke crack and engage in sexual activity. Nor do I accept his description that the apartment had an enclosed bedroom – as set out above, he initially described it as having only one room.
[35] Further, I do not accept Mr. Sri’s explanation that he did not have scabs on his penis on the basis that those scabs would have made the sexual activities he engaged in very painful. He said that he would not have had sex if he was in that condition. Mr. Sri did not testify that he knew what it felt like to have sex with scabs on his penis and no other evidence was tendered from which this could be inferred. Scabs are different from open sores. Nothing about his behaviour that morning demonstrates any concern about engaging in safe sex.
[36] I reject Mr. Sri’s explanation for smiling and laughing at I.C. as they left the apartment building. Initially, he disagreed with the suggestion that he had done so until he was shown video of them leaving together. He then explained that he was responding to something funny I.C. had said. Even on his own version of events, there was nothing funny about this situation – I.C. was angry with him and they were leaving together because she was angry. He said they were talking about her anger in the elevator. Defence counsel concedes that her demeanour is noticeably different leaving the building than it was on arrival, a characterization that I agree with.
[37] Apart from these deficiencies in his evidence, in my view, the most salient parts of his testimony with respect to the factual issues I must resolve come from the aspects of I.C.’s account that Mr. Sri confirmed. He agreed that I.C. was not exhibiting any signs of delusion or mental illness, that they interacted and communicated in a normal fashion that morning, which is itself evident from the video. He disagreed that his friend’s apartment was filthy, but agreed it was disorganized with clothes all over the floor. He also described the apartment as dark, which is notable because it was light outside. He confirmed that the apartment door locked automatically and that his friend was the only person who could open it. This is a strange detail that raises obvious safety concerns. He confirmed that there was no door on the bathroom. He confirmed that his friend was “pre-occupied with a woman” when he attended, which I interpret as a euphemism for having sex. He initially admitted that people may have been having sex in the living area when they first entered the apartment but then said he could not see anyone in the living area. Finally, Mr. Sri agreed that when I.C. was angry and wanted to leave, he had to ask his friend to let them both out because of the way the door was locked.
[38] For these reasons and others that I will expand on below, I reject Mr. Sri’s version of events that he and I.C. engaged in consensual oral and vaginal sex in exchange for crack cocaine as failing to raise a reasonable doubt.
(ii) I.C.
[39] I will begin my assessment of I.C.’s evidence by noting that in my view, she sincerely tried to be fair in her testimony. She had clearly reviewed her statements before testifying but rather than adhering to them like a script she proactively referred to the events she had previously recounted but which she could not remember. While she had a tendency to interrupt defence counsel during his questions, in my view she did not do so in an obstreperous or argumentative way; it seemed to me that she genuinely wanted to answer his questions, albeit often without waiting for the entire question. She acknowledged that there were real gaps in her memory and did not speculate or try to fill them in. She acknowledged her use of drugs that night and the extent of her intoxication. I accept her evidence that, while intoxicated, she was of sound mind and not experiencing any delusions or other symptoms of her bipolar disorder. I also accept that she is sincere when she says that she is not interested in the outcome of this case because she has forgiven the defendant. I reject the defence theory that she was motivated to fabricate this allegation because she felt angry and misled by Mr. Sri.
[40] While counsel demonstrated some inconsistencies between I.C.’s evidence and her prior statements, in the main I do not find them to be material. Most of them clearly relate to peripheral issues. For example, she described the location of the apartment building as by the Dollarama near Queen and Sherbourne when it was actually north of Dundas Street. She thought they had gone to 200 Sherbourne when the building was actually 251 Sherbourne. The surveillance footage incontrovertibly establishes that they went to a secure apartment building. I accept I.C.’s evidence that she has a bad sense of direction and do not find that these mistakes undermine her general reliability. Whether I.C. was wrong about having drunk beer or coolers that evening is clearly peripheral and not the sort of detail I would expect anyone to remember two years later absent the distinction between drinks having some particular significance.
[41] I.C. described scabs on the defendant’s penis in her testimony. Counsel suggested that she told the police she did not see any scabs. Review of the transcript of her interview, however, establishes that she told the police the defendant had scabs and when asked to describe them said: “I didn’t really see them…I just kind of felt them, they were all over his penis, like scabs and …”. She went on to describe the scabs as feeling “rough” and “gross.” I do not find this to be an inconsistency, let alone an inconsistency that would cause me to question the credibility or reliability of this aspect of her testimony: see R. v. A.M., [2014] O.J. No. 521 at paras. 13-14 and R. v. Duncan, 2020 ONSC 7428 at para. 17.
[42] Counsel initially disputed that I.C. told the police anything about consuming drugs that night but then retracted that submission when presented with parts of her statement where she told the police she was on drugs and intoxicated. The only potentially material inconsistency that I find counsel successfully demonstrated is that I.C. testified that she went to the apartment to smoke crack with the defendant but told the police she did not know why she went to the apartment with him. Initially, I.C. explained in her testimony that she had meant she did not know why she would put herself in that position, why she had been so foolish. After extensive questioning, she ultimately agreed she had gone there for crack but did not tell the police that. This is an inconsistency, but I do not find that it suggests that she was lying in her testimony or trying to mislead the police when she gave her statement. She told the police she was intoxicated from drugs and that she went with a stranger to an apartment. Part of the prior statement counsel put to her was in response to being asked why she followed the man to the bathroom. I.C. did not explain why she neglected to tell the police she went to the apartment to smoke crack. It is not hard to think of reasons she may have had for withholding that detail but I will not rely on any of these to explain or justify this inconsistency, given that I.C. offered no explanation for it. Ultimately, while I recognize this inconsistency is potentially capable of negatively impacting the credibility of her account, I am satisfied that it does not.
[43] I.C.’s inability to remember where she was, who she was with, and what she was doing prior to meeting the defendant the second time is certainly a factor that I must consider when determining the reliability of her account of what she does remember that morning. I accept her evidence that she was very high on drugs during this period, which explains the gaps in her memory and her poor sense of time. She was fair and candid in her testimony on this issue and did not attempt to fill in her memory gaps with speculation, a frailty that could potentially have undermined the credibility or reliability of her entire account. On both witnesses’ versions of events, this interaction in the apartment happened some time after I.C. had finished her own drugs. I.C. admitted to “craving” crack when she went to the apartment with the defendant and said that she was “coming down” after not having smoked crack for some indeterminate period of time. Nothing in either of their accounts suggests that she was demonstrating any significant impairment as they went to the apartment – she was acting rationally and communicating normally. From my review of the surveillance footage, she does not appear to be intoxicated – or at least very intoxicated – she simply looks very tired. I accept that she has a reliable memory of what happened in the apartment that is not undermined by her inability to remember many of the antecedent events.
[44] I.C. was unwavering in her evidence that she did not accompany the defendant to the apartment for sex, did not consent to any sexual activity in the apartment, and actively communicated her lack of consent. I accept that she had no concerns about accompanying the defendant until they entered the actual apartment. I.C. said that she was immediately scared once they arrived and it is easy to understand why. The apartment was dark and she could see two people she had never met having sex; the former description was confirmed by the defendant and he did not contradict the latter.
[45] I.C. evocatively described the filth of the apartment and the feeling of disgust it engendered in her. I accept her evidence on this point as sincere and accurate. This description, too, was partly confirmed by the defendant. In noting these pieces of confirmatory evidence, I do not mean to suggest that any aspect of I.C.’s evidence required corroboration before it could be relied upon. But it is notable, in my assessment of her credibility, and Mr. Sri’s, in the context of all the evidence at trial, that many of the material parts of her account are confirmed by his evidence. I accept that I.C. heard the door lock when they entered, that she relayed the gist of the conversation about the locked door that she overheard, and that she was genuinely terrified because she believed she would be trapped there. A self-locking door that could only be opened from the inside by the resident of the apartment is a strange, concerning, singular detail, one that the defendant confirmed. On both versions of events, they engaged in sexual activity in a small bathroom with no door for a considerable period of time, a place that was visible to anyone in the main room of the apartment.
[46] After considering all of the evidence, and for the reasons explained above, I reject Mr. Sri’s evidence that he and I.C. engaged in consensual oral and vaginal sex in that bathroom. Not only do I disbelieve his evidence, it does not leave me with a reasonable doubt. I accept I.C.’s testimony that she only accompanied Mr. Sri to the apartment to smoke crack cocaine, not because she had agreed to prostitute herself for crack cocaine. I find that the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not consent to any sexual activity in that apartment, that she did nothing to communicate consent, and that the defendant knew she did not consent to any of the sexual activity they engaged in. Accordingly, I find Mr. Sri guilty of sexual assault.
Dated: May 26, 2025
Justice Peter Scrutton
[1] Exhibit B, p. 6.