Warning Notice
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.— (3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
Case Information
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2025-04-28
COURT FILE No.: Woodstock C127/24
BETWEEN:
Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County
Applicant
— AND —
T.S.
B.B.
Respondents
Before Justice S. E. J. Paull
TCCH held on April 15, 2025
Reasons for Judgement Released on April 28, 2025
Counsel:
Danielle Lapare — counsel for the applicant
James H. Raynor — counsel for the respondent, B.B.
Mira Pilch — counsel for the respondent, T.S.
Susan Gordon — OCL counsel for the child, M.S.
Reasons for Judgement
PAULL J.:
[1] The Society has brought a motion seeking an order that M.S. born […], 2013 be placed in the temporary care and custody of her father, B.B., with access to her mother, T.S. in the discretion of the Society. The Society brought a further motion seeking to specify T.S.’s access in terms of supervision and times. The applicant apprehended the child from her mother’s care on November 21, 2024.
[2] B.B. and OCL counsel support the Society’s position. T.S. opposes the Society’s motion and brought her own motion seeking an order returning the child to her care pursuant to the supervision of the Society, or alternatively increased access.
[3] The legal test for me to apply on this motion is set out in subsections 94 (2), (4) and (5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) that read as follows:
94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,
(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;
(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the Society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;
(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the Society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or
(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the Society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.
Criteria
(4) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).
Placement with relative, etc.
(5) Before making a temporary order for care and custody under clause (2) (d), the court shall consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to make an order under clause (2) (c) to place the child in the care and custody of a person who is a relative of the child or a member of the child’s extended family or community.
[4] The court has also taken into consideration the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity pursuant to subsection 94 (11) of the Act.
[5] At a temporary care and custody hearing, the onus is on the Society to establish, on credible and trustworthy evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if a child is returned to the respondent(s), it is more probable than not that he or she will suffer harm. Further, the onus is on the Society to establish that the child cannot be adequately protected by terms and conditions of an interim supervision order. Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. T., [2000] O.J. No. 2273 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). Simply stated, this is a two-part test that the Society has to meet.
[6] A court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection of the child (subsection 1 (2) of the Act): Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.D. and F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448.
[7] The degree of intrusiveness of the Society's intervention and the interim protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. CCAS of Toronto v. J.O., 2012 ONCJ 269.
[8] Subsection 94 (10) of the Act permits the court to admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstance. In determining what evidence is credible and trustworthy, the evidence in its entirety must be viewed together. Evidence that may not be credible and trustworthy when viewed in isolation might reach that threshold when examined in the context of other evidence. Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227 at para 18; CAS of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. S.S.H., 2019 ONSC 5365.
[9] The Act gives priority to the person who had charge of the children prior to Society intervention under Part III of the Act. There can be more than one person in charge of the children. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.(S.) and R. (M.), 2008 ONCJ 348.
[10] The Divisional Court has held that a Society seeking an order for temporary Society care at this early stage of a case has only to demonstrate that it has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a protection risk for the child that justifies Society intervention. L.D. v. Durham Children’s Aid Society and R.L. and M.L., [2005] O.J. No. 5050 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The burden on the Society at this stage does not go as high as showing that on the balance of probabilities there is an actual risk to the child in the parent’s care. CCAS of Toronto v. M.L.R., 2011 ONCJ 652; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.G., 2021 ONSC 2260.
[11] Subsection 94 (6) applies to an order being made in accordance with clause 94 (2) (b) for a temporary supervision order. Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. P. (C.R.), 2011 ONSC 2056.
[12] The onus of proof or criteria are the same when the Society is requesting a non-removal order pursuant to clause 94 (2) (b) of the Act or a removal order pursuant to clauses 94 (2) (c) and (d) of the Act - the issue to be determined in making the non-removal order under clause 94 (2) (b) is whether or not the Society has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a probable risk that the child will suffer harm if reasonable terms and conditions of a supervision order are not imposed. Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. Z. (T.A.), 2012 ONCJ 231 at para 20.
[13] Subsection 94 (8) of the Act provides that where an order is made under clause (c) or (d) of subsection 94 (2), the court may order access on any terms that it considers appropriate. In determining what order is appropriate, the court should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (subsections 1 (1) and (2) of the Act). In assessing best interests, the court should consider the relevant factors set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act. [JFCS v. H.B.S., 2012 O.J. No. 5055 (OCJ)].
[14] The party seeking to impose restrictions on a parent’s contact or access to a child must demonstrate that it is necessary and the limit is proportionate to the risk. Any such terms should be child and harm specific and be supported on the evidence. Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A.C., 2020 ONCJ 505.
[15] In C.A.S. v. C.F., 2020 ONSC 3755, Justice Heather McGee discussed supervised access in the child protection context at paragraphs 32 to 34 as follows:
[32] Access is the right of a child. As stated by Justice Blishen in V.S.J. v. L.J.G., “there is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children. The right of a child to visit with a non-custodial parent, to know and maintain or form an attachment to a non-custodial parent is a fundamental right and should only be forfeited in the most extreme and unusual circumstances.”
[33] A child’s right to access with a parent invites a further layer of complexity in a child protection proceeding. Court must engage in a careful balancing of the benefit of a parent’s care, the specific risk of harm to the child while in that parent’s care, and the measures in place for risk reduction.
[34] Supervised access is a critical tool in that engagement. Supervision provides a safer bridging period during which parental deficits can be assessed and whenever possible: repaired. Supervised access is clearly indicated when parenting judgement is impaired, there is a history of violence and other harmful behaviour directed toward the primary caregiver and/or evidence of abuse or neglect of the child.
[16] Supervised access is not intended to be a long-term arrangement for a child. It is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger of physical or emotional harm. Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374, [2004] O.J. No. 5472 (OCJ).
[17] In addition to the submissions of the parties I considered the affidavits filed by the applicant, the responding parties’ affidavits, and the affidavit of T.S.’s brother. I have also reviewed and considered records from the school, the OPP, and the Niagara Regional Police filed with Notice by OCL counsel.
Background and Evidence
[18] The respondents are the separated parents of one child, M.S. born […], 2013. Pursuant to final orders under the CLR A, T.S. has final decision-making authority and B.B. has regular parenting time. The parties have had significant involvement over several years with four different child protection agencies.
[19] T.S. has another child, M. from a prior relationship and who is not the subject of this proceeding. In 2011 the Society verified a risk of harm based on the unhygienic state of the home and adult conflict between T.S. and her sister.
[20] Between 2014 and 2024 there were 15 further investigations and further calls to intake. The issues related to conflict between T.S. and B.B. and disputes over M.S. which necessitated frequent police involvement. In 2017 T.S. was charged and later pled guilty to criminal harassment related to B.B. The Society verified parental conflict and the unhygienic state of T.S.’s home due to the presence of cat urine.
[21] In 2019 the school made a referral regarding concerns that T.S. was intoxicated and confrontational and had threatened school staff, which again prompted police involvement.
[22] In 2024 Hamilton CAS became involved. Mother had vacated her home and left it covered in animal feces and empty alcohol bottles according to the landlord. T.S. denied any issues and refused to cooperate with the investigation.
[23] The current involvement began on October 21, 2024 when a local Crisis Line received a text from M.S. alleging abuse in her mother’s home and that she did not feel safe. T.S. once again refused to cooperate with the investigation and blamed B.B. for sending the text. She refused the Society contact with the child until November 20, 2024 when she permitted an interview with M.S. if she was present. During this interview with her mother present M.S. denied calling the Crisis Line or having safety concerns in her mother’s home.
[24] On the evening of November 20, 2024 the Society received a further referral from the OPP with concerns related to T.S. and that following an argument M.S. went to a neighbour’s home for assistance and police were called. T.S. refused to speak to the police and a plan was developed by the police and CAS that M.S. would stay with the neighbour for the night. Later in the evening T.S. repeatedly called the police station demanding M.S.’s return. When the worker attended the following morning to speak to T.S. she was not present.
[25] On November 21, 2024 the family service worker had a private interview with M.S. during which she disclosed that her mother consumed alcohol daily and would often yell at her and call her derogatory names. M.S. also disclosed that her mother told her not to speak to the CAS. M.S. stated that she did in fact contact the Crisis Line but was afraid to admit it in front of her mother, so she lied in their first interview.
[26] T.S. denied being intoxicated or calling M.S. derogatory names, refused to permit the worker to see the home, and refused to cooperate in any safety planning for M.S. T.S.’s brother also refused to cooperate in safety planning.
[27] As a result the Society contacted B.B. who agreed to pick up M.S., and M.S. indicated to the worker that she was agreeable to staying with her father. CAS Niagara completed a safety check and approved his home. M.S. has remained there since.
[28] The school records filed indicate that for the 2023-24 school year when M.S. was in grade 5 she was absent a total of 109 days and late 24 times. When she was in grade 4 she was absent 36 days and late 7 times, and for grade 3 she was absent 60 days and late 19 times. Throughout this period she was residing in the primary care of her mother.
[29] The records filed from OPP disclose multiple police involvements with T.S. including altercations with neighbours and in the community, and confirmed that she was charged with harassment towards B.B. in 2017. There were multiple reports by T.S. that B.B. had harmed M.S. which were not verified by the Society or police and no charges against B.B. were ever laid. The occurrence reports include officers’ repeated observations of T.S. appearing intoxicated, and that she was often uncooperative and belligerent during police interactions.
[30] The records from Niagara Regional Police note that in 2015 there was repeated contact with the parents over a custody dispute during which T.S. was not cooperative. In 2019 T.S. called police alleging B.B. had sexually assaulted M.S. which was not verified. The police forwarded the referral to CAS and noted that the police were of the view that T.S. had a history of fabricating evidence and contacting several different police agencies with the same allegations.
[31] In 2021 B.B. was charged with possessing a BB gun and pointing it out his window at construction workers who he felt were making too much noise. In 2024 there was a further investigation of T.S. harassing B.B. after the apprehension by the Society in November 2024 which resulted in the police cautioning T.S.
[32] In response, T.S. disputes all the allegations of the Society. She denies being abusive towards M.S. or ever being intoxicated in the caregiving role, and further disputes that she has been uncooperative.
[33] She disputes that there was any need for M.S. to be removed from her care on November 21, 2024 and states the disagreement with M.S. was over her inappropriate social media use. This made M.S. upset when her phone was taken away and she went to the neighbours and fabricated the allegations.
[34] T.S. disputes that there is any basis to support a finding of risk of harm and seeks to have M.S. returned to her care immediately and views the Society’s position as an overreach based on one negative report by a neighbour. Alternatively, she seeks increased access and points out that, despite being M.S.’s primary caregiver prior to the Society intervention, she has had minimal contact since November 21, 2024.
[35] T.S.’s brother P.S. filed an affidavit supporting his sister and her version of events. He supports her view of B.B. as the instigator of the conflict, and that the actions of both the police and the CAS were unjustified.
[36] B.B. filed an affidavit and supports the Society’s position. He disputes that he has been the instigator of any conflict with T.S. He acknowledges pleading guilty in 2021 and states that he complied with probation following the incident with the BB gun and the construction workers.
[37] B.B. denied that he contacted the Crisis Line and pretended to be M.S. Despite the court ordered access he deposed that he had not seen the child since May 6, 2024 as T.S. had moved to Hamilton and not provided the address. Since the apprehension he has enrolled the child in school and counselling services.
[38] Since intervention M.S. has continued to disclose concerns related to her mother’s alcohol use and verbal abuse.
[39] OCL counsel submitted that M.S. has reported the following views and preferences:
a. She wishes to remain residing with her father at this time and to see her mother.
b. She would like to see her mother three times per month during the day from 10 AM to 6 PM.
c. Initially she reported that she wants access with her mother supervised but more recently has expressed the tentative desire to try access unsupervised to see if it works.
d. She expressed the following conditions for increased access or any return to her mother’s home:
(i) her mother to stop drinking;
(ii) a clean home environment;
(iii) her mother to stop yelling.
[40] Since intervention T.S. has not permitted the Society to meet in person with her older child, and has refused to cooperate with home visits.
[41] Her access was originally supervised on alternate Saturdays for three hours and the Society acknowledges that these visits went well. The Society later approved Tonya Scammell as a community supervisor for T.S.’s visits. The worker acknowledged an oversight which caused a disruption and conflict over T.S.’s access. Despite the worker acknowledging the oversight and rectifying the problem, T.S. became abusive and vulgar towards the worker, other Society staff, and OCL counsel.
[42] Overall, the Society raises concerns for the safety and well-being of M.S. in T.S.’s care due to her alcohol use while in a caregiving role and her verbally abusive behaviour towards M.S. to an extent that M.S. no longer felt safe in her mother’s care. The Society has secondary concerns related to the condition of T.S.’s home environment and the impact of these concerns on M.S.’s emotional well-being and education.
Analysis
[43] I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if M.S. is returned to T.S.’s care, it is more probable than not that she will suffer harm.
[44] For the same reasons which will be outlined below I am further satisfied that the child cannot be adequately protected by terms of supervision returning her to T.S.’s care.
[45] The evidence is compelling that T.S. has a serious and long-standing issue with alcohol which she is unable to recognize. The evidence, including the third-party records from two police agencies and the records and information from the school, show a history of concerns with aggressive and confrontational behaviour, particularly when T.S. is observed to be intoxicated. This has been repeatedly observed by the police, school officials, and M.S. herself.
[46] I accept M.S.’s views and preferences as related to OCL counsel and the worker during private interviews. I find that those that she expressed to the worker when her mother insisted on being present were not genuine.
[47] It is telling that a child (who was 10 at the time) felt compelled to contact a Crisis Line for support and it is entirely understandable she would be worried about speaking to the worker about this with her mother present. Overall, on a balance of probabilities, and despite not having a complete outline of the context of the interviews and the questions asked, I find that the child has independent reasons, which are well-founded, to feel unsafe in her mother’s care at times. She indicates to OCL counsel that she desires to continue to reside in the primary care of her father. Her conditions for increasing access or returning to her mother’s home are entirely reasonable and show a level of insight on her part when considered in the context of the evidence in its entirety. Given her age and level of insight, her views and preferences are entitled to significant weight.
[48] The evidence is also compelling that M.S.’s school has been neglected to an extent that establishes a risk of harm. Even if there were concerns at the school as alleged by T.S., for M.S. to miss 109 days and be late for 24 days in grade 5 is excessive, and school attendance appears to be a long-standing issue when the records for prior years are considered.
[49] T.S.’s response to the serious concerns is essentially to either deny them or to place the blame squarely on other parties. Her view that this is an overreach by police and the Society based on one negative report from a neighbour is not reflective of the evidence. Given the extent of the evidence from the third parties involved with T.S., and now from M.S. herself, her denial that there are any concerns is simply not credible.
[50] The evidence clearly supports the Society’s position that T.S.’s alcohol use and the resultant aggressive and abusive behaviour puts M.S. at risk of harm. Similar concerns have been observed by multiple third parties over an extended period of time, which lend credence to M.S.’s disclosures.
[51] Unfortunately, these risks are only amplified by T.S.’s continued refusal to acknowledge a problem with alcohol and her refusal to cooperate with both the investigation and the supports necessary to mitigate the issues.
[52] T.S. appears to lack any insight into how her actions, decisions, alcohol use and the resultant emotional dysregulation negatively impacts M.S. and puts her at risk of harm.
[53] T.S. has been minimally cooperative with the Society in conducting its investigation, has discouraged M.S. from speaking to the Society, and has refused to allow the Society to view the home where she and the child were staying. Her brother also refuses to speak to the worker or to allow access to his home. In addition to the established protection concerns, these factors suggest an inability or unwillingness to follow a supervision order which would make it insufficient in ensuring M.S.’s safety and well-being. To her credit, T.S. appears to have recently completed two online parenting courses.
[54] Overall, I conclude that the available evidence, when taken together, establishes a multitude of areas which combined establish that M.S. is at risk of harm sufficient to justify Society intervention. Further, I find that the Society has established that the child cannot be protected by terms and conditions of a supervision order returning her to the care of T.S.
[55] These have been long-standing concerns and support M.S. remaining with her father as the least intrusive order sufficient to address the level of risk. B.B. has been cooperative with Oxford CAS and with FASC Niagara, who approved the safety of B.B.’s home for M.S. He has also facilitated counselling support for M.S. Further, M.S. reported a desire to remain with her father at this time, and has stated that she feels safe in his care.
[56] These protection concerns and T.S.’s response to them have also made an expansion of her access problematic. Given the level of risk, the lack of insight, and any demonstrable progress in addressing the issues, the evidence supports that supervised access continue. Supervision of access will provide a safer bridging period during which parental deficits can be assessed and, if possible, repaired. I am satisfied that access be supervised in the community by Ms. Scammell, and that the Society maintain the discretion to expand access and remove the requirement for supervision when appropriate.
[57] However, any expansion of access will require T.S. to meaningfully engage with appropriate supports and to fully cooperate with the worker including with meetings in her home. If T.S. remains resistant and uncooperative her access is unlikely to expand in the manner that she seeks. Overall, the schedule proposed in the applicant’s motion is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances, with the additional term that the Society maintain discretion to expand the access and review the need for supervision.
[58] A temporary order shall issue pursuant to the motion at tab 2, paragraphs 1 (a-k), and the motion at tab 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, with the additional term that the Society shall maintain the discretion to expand the access and review the need for supervision. The remaining relief in the motions and the motion at Tab 8 are dismissed.
[59] I thank counsel for their thoughtful submissions in this matter.
Released: April 28, 2025
Signed: “Justice S. E. J. Paull”