Ontario Court of Justice (Central West Region)
Ontario (Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development) v. The Econo-Rack Group Inc.
Ruling on Motion for Particulars
Before Justice of the Peace Trevor J. Howard
Application heard April 9, 2025, in Brantford, Ontario
Ruling released April 17, 2025, in Brantford, Ontario
Counsel:
Ms. J. Chan and Mr. T. Fram for the Respondent
Mr. K. Jull and Ms. D. Bikic for the Applicant
Introduction
[1] The Applicant, The Econo-Rack Group (2015) Incorporated, doing business as Konstant Manufacturing (hereinafter “Konstant”), is charged with two offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, as amended (OHSA).
[2] The alleged offences stem from an incident on May 1, 2023, which resulted in severe injury to a Konstant employee. Following the incident, an inspector from the Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development (hereinafter “the Ministry”) attended Konstant’s facility at 132 Adams Blvd. to conduct an inspection. The inspector issued three compliance orders and eventually the two charges before the Court.
[3] On March 10, 2025, Konstant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The trial commenced and I immediately heard a s. 8 Charter[^1] motion. I dismissed this motion on April 8, 2023. The Applicant requested to make their opening statement after the Respondent. The Respondent consented to this, as the Applicant undertook to call evidence in this trial. However, after the Respondent’s opening statement, a disagreement arose between the parties about whether particulars had been formally provided to the Applicant regarding count #1.
[4] The Applicant was of the view, based on correspondence with the Respondent, that count #1 included particulars. The Respondent did not view the correspondence this way and states that no particulars are included on count #1. It should be noted that the information before the Court shows particulars on count #3, but not on count #1.
[5] The Applicant requested that I adjourn the trial for one day to allow for a formal motion for particulars. I granted this request and heard the motion on April 9, 2025.
[6] I heard the motion via a voir dire. Both parties agreed that the evidence heard in the voir dire would not carry forward to the trial. Both parties also agreed that the Applicant bears the onus on a balance of probabilities to demonstrate that particulars are necessary to ensure a fair trial.
[7] The Applicant asks for an order pursuant to s. 35 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended (POA), “that the Respondent, Ontario (Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development) (“MOL”), provide the particulars with respect to how and why the incident on May 1, 2023, on the paint line involving Mr. Rob Mokryzcki occurred, which it relies on for its position that the Applicant violated section 45(b) of R.R.O. 1990, O. Reg. 851 in the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1”.
[8] The Respondent argues that further particulars are not necessary and asks that I dismiss the application.
[9] For the reasons contained herein, I find that particulars on count #1 and further particulars on count #3 are not necessary to ensure a fair trial. Thus, the motion is dismissed.
Background
[10] The undisputed factual background regarding the incident at Konstant and the resulting Ministry inspection was established for the purposes of the s. 8 motion.[^2] I will not reiterate it here. It is important however, to replicate the precise wording on the information from counts #1 and #3, as well as outline the disputed correspondence:
Count #1:
The Econo-Rack Group (2015) Inc. D.B.A. Konstant Manufacturing, 1303 North Service Road East, Unit 3, Oakville, Ontario, L6H 1A7 on or about the 1st day of May, 2023 at the City of Brantford, in the Central South Region, in the Province of Ontario did commit the offence of failing as an employer to ensure that the measures and procedures prescribed by section 45(b) of Ontario Regulation 851, R.R.O. 1990, as amended, were carried out at a workplace located at 132 Adams Blvd., Brantford, Ontario, contrary to section 25(1)(c) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, as amended.
Count #3:
and that the Econo-Rack Group (2015) Inc. d.b.a. Konstant Manufacturing, 1303 North Service Road East, Unit 3, Oakville, Ontario, L6H 1A7 on or about the 1st day of May, 2023 at the City of Brantford, in the Central South Region, in the Province of Ontario did commit the offence of failing as an employer [sic] provide information, instruction and supervision to a worker to protect the health and safety of the worker at a workplace located at 132 Adams Blvd. Brantford, Ontario, contrary to section 25(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, as amended.
Particulars: the defendant failed to provide information, instruction and supervision to a worker with respect to the safe operation of the Kito electric hoist.
[11] On January 31, 2025, Mr. Jull, for the Applicant, emailed a letter to Ms. Chan, for the Respondent. This is not in dispute, nor is the content of the letter. The letter stated in part:
At the last continuing judicial pre-trial you advised that you are “not saying that the hoist was defective but that the accident related to the frame that it was lifting.” The quotes reflect our notes of the pre-trial. If this is inaccurate, please advise.
In any event, we note that the Crown disclosure contains no section that attempts to address the cause of the accident on May 1, 2023.
Would you kindly advise, as soon as possible, the particulars in response to the following questions:
(1) Does the MOL have a theory of what caused the accident on May 1, 2023?
(2) If the answer to the first question is yes, please articulate the theory and any documents, pictures, or statements in support of it.
(3) Is the MOL position that the hoist in issue was not defective but that the accident related to the frame that it was lifting?
[12] Ms. Chan responded to the letter in an email dated February 2, 2025. Again, the content of the response is not disputed. It read:
Good morning, Ken.
As we have discussed, the Crown’s position is that the May 1, 2023, incident was caused by the defendant’s failure to move the frame in question in a manner that did not endanger a worker. In particular, the following facts contributed to the incident: (1) use of the particular type of below-the-hook attachment with the electric hoist; (2) the conveyor was not reversed back to a location within the hoist’s range; (3) the frame was pushed and pulled while it was being supported by the below-the-hook attachment; and (4) workers were not provided with adequate information and instruction to safely hoist the frame with the particular type of below-the-hook attachment. The evidence to prove the Crown’s case is in the disclosure.
[13] Clearly however, this exchange was not interpreted in the same way by the parties, which raises the issue to be dealt with here.
Positions of the Parties
The Applicant
[14] The Applicant’s position is that particulars are necessary to ensure a fair trial for Konstant, because without them the Applicant cannot know the case they have to meet. The Applicant also claims that the disclosure provided by the Respondent did not contain information that could inform the Applicant of the way in which it is alleged to have violated s. 45(b) of Ontario Regulation 851, R.R.O. 1990 (O. Reg. 851) under the OHSA.
[15] It is for this reason, the Applicant states, that they wrote to the Respondent asking for details about how and why the incident on May 1, 2023, took place. The Applicant states they relied on the Respondent’s reply and details contained therein to prepare a due diligence defence. Now that the Respondent has stated they were not intending to provide particulars, the Applicant claims they are unfairly prejudiced.
[16] Finally, the Applicant highlights that the Respondent is not planning to call any expert evidence at trial that might have informed the Applicant of the specific problems with the lifting device or frame involved in the incident. In the Applicant’s view, this enhances the need for particulars.
[17] In support of their argument the Applicant provided an affidavit from Ms. Lindsay Poole, an articling student with Gardiner Roberts LLP, counsel for the Applicant. Ms. Poole outlines details of the disclosure she reviewed from the Respondent including eye-witness statements. Ms. Poole states that none of the eye-witness statements, nor any of the other disclosure, provides details about how or why the incident took place. Ms. Poole also states that Ms. Chan sent Mr. Jull an email stating that the incident was caused by Konstant’s failure to move the frame in a manner that did not endanger a worker and provided particulars with respect to what contributed to the accident.
[18] The Applicant points me to the case of Precision Diversified, which states that particulars take on a heightened significance in strict liability proceedings and are consistent with the golden rule; that an accused must be reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against him to prepare a full defence and have a fair trial.[^3] Therefore, the “Crown cannot merely lead evidence of an incident or suggest that generally not all reasonable steps were taken and sit back and see what happens. This does not provide sufficient direction to the accused to know the case it has to meet.”[^4]
[19] In oral submissions, the Applicant added that s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851 sets out a “conjunctive test”, requiring that the Respondent prove not only that material was transported in a manner that allowed it to tip or fall, but that the manner of transport also endangered a worker. According to the Applicant, this conjunctive test in-turn informs a fulsome due diligence defence. The Applicant states that the law requires that they prove that Konstant was specifically diligent in preventing materials from tipping or falling in a manner that endangered a worker; it would not be enough to show that Konstant was diligent in preventing materials from tipping or falling generally.
[20] The Applicant points to the case of Brampton Brick to support this position. At paragraph 28 of that case the Court states:
The offence of which Brampton Brick was convicted has been characterized in R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 (S.C.C.) as one of strict liability. Strict liability offences involve consideration of what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances: R. v. Chapin (1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 333 at 374 (S.C.C.). In a charge under s. 25(2)(h), the onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the precautions particularized in the information are ones that a reasonable employer in the circumstances of the company charged ought to have implemented for the protection of the worker: R. v. Inco Ltd., [2001] O.J. No. 4938 at para. 32 (Sup.Ct). In response to a prima facie case that the employer did not take the particular precaution a reasonable person would take in the circumstances, the employer is entitled to raise a defence of due diligence, that is, to show that it was in no way negligent: Chapin, supra, at 343-4. The employer must show it acted reasonably with regard to the prohibited act alleged in the particulars not some broader notion of acting reasonably: R. v. Kurtzman, (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.). [emphasis added]
[21] Based on this, the Applicant argues that particulars of how and why transportation of the material failed – resulting in that material falling and endangering a worker – are necessary to allow for full answer and defence. In other words, the current wording of count #1 is not specific enough to allow for a properly informed due diligence defence.
[22] Finally, the Applicant raises the issue of “foreseeability” (and “threshold foreseeability”) and whether the Respondent has the onus to prove the incident at Konstant was foreseeable. The Respondent argues they do not. Ultimately, the Applicant concedes that foreseeability is not relevant to the issues on this motion. Therefore, I will not address it.
The Respondent
[23] The Respondent’s position is that the charges on the information are sufficiently particularized and meet the requirements of s. 25(6) of the POA, and therefore the Applicant has not met their onus on this motion.
[24] The Respondent argues that count #1 clearly refers to section 45(b) of O. Reg. 851, which provides specific details about how and why a contravention takes place, and that count #3, as currently drafted, does the same.
[25] The Respondent argues that the wording of the charges, the disclosure, the Crown’s opening statement, and the Crown’s theory of the case together provide sufficient detail to the Applicant to allow them to fully defend the case. The Respondent references Khan to support this position. The Respondent also references Hall v. Jakobek to support their position that reference to the regulations in the charge wording provides further, specific information to the Applicant about the alleged breach and the case they need to meet.
[26] The Respondent highlights that s. 25(7) and (8) of the POA outline reasons that a count on an information is not insufficient. Specifically, s. 25(7)(f) of the POA states that a count is not insufficient by reason only that it does not specify the means by which the alleged offence was committed, which in the Respondent’s view, is precisely what the Applicant seeks.
[27] With respect to the Crown’s theory of the case, the Respondent argues that it does not need to be proven and there is no requirement for the Crown to provide the defence with information setting out its theory of the case. The Respondent references Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc.[^8] for support.
[28] In oral submissions, the Respondent added that the Applicant did not properly ask for particulars in his email to the Crown, rather he asked for “particulars” of the Crown’s theory of what caused the accident. The Respondent states that such details were provided in response, not particulars to either count.
[29] The Respondent highlights that count #3 is particularized on the information because the charge relates to a “general duty” provision of the OHSA, which necessarily requires particulars. That is not the case for count #1 according to the Respondent, because count #1 deals with a “strict duty” provision, which includes reference to the associated regulations. Had count #1 also related to a general duty provision, it would have been particularized as well according to the Respondent.
[30] The Respondent highlights that the Inspector’s Investigative Report (see exhibit 2) provides a summary of his findings, including his conclusion about what caused the accident starting at page 13. That portion of the report reads:
The lifting device attachment piece is placed under the lip of the upright member but not secured in any manner. The paint line conveyor was stopped when the workers recognized that the conveyor had traveled too far for the hoist to still be able to reach the required conveyor hooks. Mokrzycki attempted to rock the frame and pull it towards the required hook while it was still attached to the hoist. This was being done at the same time as Jimaleh lowering the frame towards the ground. While the frame was being pulled, it slid off of the lifting device hook attachment and fell on the ground. The heavier end of the frame with the base plate struck Mokrzycki on his right foot, severing two of his toes. Mokrzycki had been wearing steel toe protective footwear at the time of this incident.
[31] In the Respondent’s view, this is the “how and why” of the incident that the Applicant seeks and provides sufficient detail to the Applicant.
[32] With respect to whether s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851 is conjunctive, the Respondent states that the use of the word “and” in the text does not mean the Crown must prove all elements of the section. The Respondent’s view is that the Crown need only prove subsection 45(b)(i) – that material was transported by the employer in a manner that allowed it to tip, collapse or fall – to make its case.
Legal Principles and Relevant Statutory Provisions
The Right to a Fair Trial
[33] The right to a fair trial is a principle of fundamental justice that engages the broad interests of society, complainants, and accused individuals.[^9]
[34] The right to make full answer and defence is situated within the right to a fair trial and requires that the defendant be able to call evidence necessary to establish a defence, to challenge evidence called by the prosecution, to cross-examine witnesses in a reasonably unconstrained fashion, and to obtain full disclosure.[^10] These rights however, are not unrestricted; the admission of evidence can be limited, cross-examination can be curtailed, and disclosure is usually bounded to what is reasonable and in the Crown’s possession.
[35] Importantly, in the context of a request for particulars, trial fairness requires some consideration of the Crown’s burden of proof and prosecutorial scope; ordering particulars that are unnecessary may unreasonably restrict the Crown’s prosecution of the case,[^11] which is not in the public interest.
The Occupational Health and Safety Act
[36] Section 25 of the OHSA deals with “duties of employers”. Konstant is charged with violating s. 25(1)(c) of the Act, which states:
An employer shall ensure that, the measures and procedures prescribed are carried out in the workplace. [emphasis added]
[37] The specific measures and procedures Konstant is alleged to have failed to carry out are contained in s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851 dealing with “industrial establishments”. Section 45 reads:
Material, articles or things,
(a) required to be lifted, carried or moved, shall be lifted, carried or moved in such a way and with such precautions and safeguards, including protective clothing, guards or other precautions as will ensure that the lifting, carrying or moving of the material, articles or things does not endanger the safety of any worker;
(b) shall be transported, placed or stored so that the material, articles or things,
(i) will not tip, collapse or fall, and
(ii) can be removed or withdrawn without endangering the safety of any worker; and
(c) to be removed from a storage area, pile or rack, shall be removed in a manner that will not endanger the safety of any worker. [emphasis added]
[38] Section 45(b) contains two subsections. The first deals with material being transported, placed, or stored so that they will not tip, collapse or fall. The second deals with the material being removed or withdrawn without endangering any worker. Notably, the information charging Konstant does not specify which of these two measures or procedures prescribed Konstant failed to ensure.
The Provincial Offences Act
[39] Section 25 of the POA deals with “counts” and reads as follows:
Counts
25 (1) Each offence charged in an information shall be set out in a separate count. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (1).
Allegation of offence
(2) Each count in an information shall in general apply to a single transaction and shall contain and is sufficient if it contains in substance a statement that the defendant committed an offence therein specified. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (2).
Reference to statutory provision
(3) Where in a count an offence is identified but the count fails to set out one or more of the essential elements of the offence, a reference to the provision creating or defining the offence shall be deemed to incorporate all the essential elements of the offence. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (3).
Idem
(4) The statement referred to in subsection (2) may be,
(a) in popular language without technical averments or allegations of matters that are not essential to be proved;
(b) in the words of the enactment that describes the offence; or
(c) in words that are sufficient to give to the defendant notice of the offence with which the defendant is charged. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (4).
More than one count
(5) Any number of counts for any number of offences may be joined in the same information. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (5).
Particulars of count
(6) A count shall contain sufficient detail of the circumstances of the alleged offence to give to the defendant reasonable information with respect to the act or omission to be proved against the defendant and to identify the transaction referred to. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (6).
Sufficiency
(7) No count in an information is insufficient by reason of the absence of details where, in the opinion of the court, the count otherwise fulfils the requirements of this section and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, no count in an information is insufficient by reason only that,
(a) it does not name the person affected by the offence or intended or attempted to be affected;
(b) it does not name the person who owns or has a special property or interest in property mentioned in the count;
(c) it charges an intent in relation to another person without naming or describing the other person;
(d) it does not set out any writing that is the subject of the charge;
(e) it does not set out the words used where words that are alleged to have been used are the subject of the charge;
(f) it does not specify the means by which the alleged offence was committed;
(g) it does not name or describe with precision any person, place, thing or time; or
(h) it does not, where the consent of a person, official or authority is required before proceedings may be instituted for an offence, state that the consent has been obtained. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (7); 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s. 1 (33).
Idem
(8) A count is not objectionable for the reason only that,
(a) it charges in the alternative several different matters, acts or omissions that are stated in the alternative in an enactment that describes as an offence the matters, acts or omissions charged in the count; or
(b) it is double or multifarious. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 25 (8); 1993, c. 27, Sched.
Need to negative exception, etc.
(9) No exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification prescribed by law is required to be set out or negatived, as the case may be, in an information. [emphasis added]
[40] Section 35 of the POA states:
The court may, before or during trial, if it is satisfied that it is necessary for a fair trial, order that a particular, further describing any matter relevant to the proceeding, be furnished to the defendant. [emphasis added]
Issues and Analysis
[41] In my view, the only issue I must resolve is whether count #1 on the information charging Konstant is “factually sufficient”. If count #1 is factually sufficient as presently worded, then particulars are not necessary. If count #1 is not factually sufficient then particulars are merited. Count #3 is factually sufficient, as it is narrowly particularized.
[42] The Supreme Court in R. v. G.R.[^12] stated the following about factual sufficiency at paragraph 15:
It is important not to confuse the requirement to specify the charge with the need to provide sufficient supporting detail of the underlying transaction or circumstances. In Brodie v. The King, [1936] S.C.R. 188, cited by my colleague, the charge of seditious conspiracy was clearly made in the indictment, but the transaction that gave rise to the charge was not sufficiently identified. The Court accepted as correct "the apt words of counsel for the appellants: 'it does not describe the offence in such a way as to lift it from the general to the particular'" (p. 198). Since Brodie, the courts, encouraged by amendments to the Criminal Code, have taken a broader view of sufficiency and of the exercise of the courts' powers of amendment, but such a relaxation has nothing to do with the fundamental requirement that the accused be able clearly to ascertain from the offence charged (as described in the enactment creating it or as charged in the count or as expressly stated to be an included offence in the Criminal Code itself), the charges for which he or she risks conviction. In the more recent case of R. v. Douglas, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 301, for example, there was no question but that the charge was specified in the indictment. The question was whether the underlying transaction was identified in sufficient detail to permit a full answer and defence. In my view, it is important to keep separate and distinct the different issues of the offence(s) charged and the sufficiency of notice of the underlying circumstances or transaction to which the charge(s) relate. [bold added]
[43] Two questions are therefore relevant here: i) does count #1 sufficiently identify the “transaction(s) alleged to constitute the offence”? And ii) does count #1 sufficiently identify the “circumstances of the alleged offence” and give the accused “reasonable information” about it?[^13]
[44] The answer to the first question is clearly “yes” in the circumstances. The Applicant is aware of the transaction alleged to constitute the offence. Count #1 identifies the date, location, and that the charge relates to a failure to ensure safe transportation, placing, or storing of materials. The transaction in question is the transport of the frame that fell and injured Konstant’s employee on May 1, 2023.
[45] The answer to the second question requires a more nuanced analysis. Which circumstances need to be sufficiently identified and what is reasonable information about the alleged offence in this case?
[46] The Applicant seeks particulars of the how and why of the incident. In other words, the Applicant seeks particulars of causation; specifically, particulars about whether the hoist or lifting device was faulty, whether the frame was faulty, or whether the workers’ actions were the cause. In my view, there are two primary reasons why these details are not circumstances that need to be identified, nor reasonable pieces of information about the alleged offence.
[47] First, the central focus in this case is not on what caused the accident narrowly speaking, but on the actions of Konstant regarding their obligations to uphold measures and procedures prescribed under O. Reg. 851. In this way, the matter is similar to an allegation of careless driving contrary to s. 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, as amended. Careless driving is also a strict liability offence, which requires that drivers operate vehicles with due care and attention and with reasonable consideration for other persons using the highway. In cases where there is a collision, including bodily harm or death, the focus remains on the alleged driving behavior of the defendant, not on the consequences of a collision, nor on who caused the collision.[^14] It follows therefore, that circumstances and information that centers on what caused a collision in a careless driving case – or an accident in an OHSA case – are not necessary to allow for full answer and defence generally speaking. This is not to say that a “cause” is never relevant.
[48] Second, the particulars of the how and why of the incident seek to draw a connection between Konstant’s actions and the falling of the frame. Essentially, this equates to the means by which Konstant is alleged to have committed the offence. The POA explicitly states this information is not required for a count to be sufficient [see s. 25(7)(f)]. It follows therefore, that such circumstances and information are not necessary to allow for full answer and defence to the charge.
[49] Other factors that vitiate the need for particulars in this case are those highlighted by the Respondent: i) full disclosure, including the Investigative Report outlined above, ii) the Crown’s theory of the case, including the details provided by Ms. Chan in her email, iii) the Crown’s opening statement, and iv) reference to s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851. All of this information can inform a due diligence defence but does not need to be proven by the Crown.[^15]
[50] In my view, it is not necessary for me to make a finding on whether s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851 creates a “conjunctive test” or not at this stage. I may need to make such a finding at the end of trial, but it has no bearing on my decision on this motion for the following reason.
[51] Whether s. 45(b) of O. Reg. 851 creates a single prescriptive measure or two distinct prescriptive measures is not determinative of the Applicant’s ability to make full answer and defence in these circumstances. The information provided to the Applicant in this case, includes information about a worker being endangered; the Respondent has made clear that they will establish a worker was endangered in this case. Thus, the Applicant is aware of this element and can take it into consideration when presenting a due diligence defence. Further, it is hard to imagine that any safety procedure(s) put in place by Konstant to ensure safe materials handling would not target worker safety; that is the purpose of the OHSA and its regulations.
Conclusion
[52] The Applicant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that particulars are necessary in this case to ensure a fair trial. The totality of information provided to the Applicant in this case is sufficient to achieve this. The information provided to the Applicant by the Respondent via email are not particulars.
[53] The application is dismissed.
Justice of the Peace Trevor J. Howard
Footnotes
[^1]: The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”]
[^2]: Ontario (Ministry of Labor, Training and Skills Development) v. The Econo-Rack Group Inc., 2025 ONCJ 190
[^3]: R. v. Precision Diversified Oilfield Services Corp., 2018 ABCA 273, paras. 56-57
[^4]: Precision Diversified, supra, para. 58
[^8]: Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 24, 2011 CarswellOnt 13 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 41-44
[^9]: R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, p. 603; R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, para. 13
[^10]: Seaboyer, supra, p. 608
[^11]: R. v. R.D. Longard Services Ltd., 2014 NSPC 100, para. 23
[^12]: R. v. G.R., 2005 SCC 45, [2005] S.C.J. No. 45
[^13]: Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2023), p. 650
[^14]: R. v. Kinch, [2004] O.J. No. 486, paras. 51-56
[^15]: R. v. McCune, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2925, paras. 35-38