ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: April 10, 2025
City of Toronto
Court File Numbers:
4860 999 24 24100008-00 1 FA
4860 999 24 24100008-00 2 FA
4860 999 23 23101035-00 1 FA
4860 999 23 23101035-00 2 FA
4860 999 23 23100878-00 1 FA
4860 999 23 23100878-00 2 FA
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
LUCIANO BATTISTON
Before Justice of the Peace R. Shawyer
Heard on April 4, 2025.
Reasons for Judgment released on April 10, 2025
McPherson, J ........................................................................... counsel for the Prosecution
Tomovski, R................................................................................. counsel for the Defendant
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SHAWYER:
Introduction
[1] On April 4, 2025, the Court heard the defendant, Luciano Battiston’s (hereinafter the “defendant”), Charter Application (hereinafter “application”). The relief that the defendant sought in his application was a stay of proceedings. The defendant argued that because it took more than 18-month for his matter to be resolved, his 11b rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (hereinafter the “Charter”) were violated.
[2] The charges before the Court stem from an accident that took place on October 30, 2023. On this date the defendant was making a left turn onto Dufferin Street from Ridelle Avenue in the City of Toronto (hereinafter the “City”). While making this left turn the defendant struck two pedestrians (hereafter the “accident”). As a result of the accident both pedestrians were injured and one of the pedestrian’s eventually succumbed to their injuries while in hospital.
Information before the Court
[3] After the accident on October 30, 2023, the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”) officers called to the scene and charged with investigating the accident did not charge the defendant. As a result, the defendant was allowed to leave the scene of the accident.
[4] On November 2, 2023, an information (hereinafter the “original information”) relating to the accident was sworn by a member of the TPS. After the information was sworn the defendant was contacted by a member of the TPS. He was asked to attend a TPS Station in relation to the accident. When the defendant attended at the TPS Station as requested he was charged with two counts of careless driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 (hereinafter “HTA”). At the same time the defendant was also issued a summons to appear in Court for the first time on January 4, 2024.
[5] On December 19, 2023, a replacement information was sworn. This information replaced the original information (hereinafter the “second information”).
[6] On January 5, 2024, a third information (hereinafter the “third information”) was sworn. The difference between the original information(s) and the third was that the original information(s) charged the defendant with careless driving causing bodily harm (x2). Whereas the third information charged the defendant with one count each of careless driving causing death and careless driving causing bodily harm pursuant to s. 130(3) of the HTA. The third information was laid to reflect the fact that after the first two information’s were laid one of the pedestrians that the defendant is alleged to have hit with his vehicle on October 30, 2023, succumbed to their injuries.
[7] On September 20, 2024, both the original two information’s and the third information were before the Court. After confirming which information’s were before the Court the prosecution advised that it would only be proceeding on the third information and requested that the first two information’s be marked withdrawn on consent.
The Law and Analysis
[8] Section 11(b) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. In R v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (hereinafter “Jordan”) at paragraph 19 the Supreme Court of Canada (hereinafter “Supreme Court”) reiterated the importance of a defendant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time:
[The] right to be tried within a reasonable time is central to the administration of Canada's system of... justice. It finds expression in the familiar maxim: "Justice delayed is justice denied". An unreasonable delay denies justice to the accused...and the public as a whole.
[9] Four years later the Supreme Court again opined on a defendant’s 11b rights. In R v. K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7 (hereinafter “K.G.K.”) Moldaver J writing on behalf of the majority said at paragraph 25:
Section 11(b) of the Charter provides that “[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right ... to be tried within a reasonable time”. This provision reflects and reinforces the notion that “[t]imely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society” (Jordan, at para. 1). Section 11(b) protects both an accused’s interests and society’s interests. The individual dimension of s. 11(b) protects an accused person’s interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial. The societal dimension of s. 11(b) recognizes, among other things, that timely trials are beneficial to victims and witnesses, as well as accused persons, and they serve to instill public confidence in the administration of justice (see R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, at para. 38).
[10] In a provincial court of justice, the Supreme Court has decided that 18 months is a reasonable time. In Jordan the Supreme Court said:
1 Timely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society. In the criminal law context, it takes on special significance. Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms attests to this, in that it guarantees the right of accused persons “to be tried within a reasonable time”.
2 Moreover, the Canadian public expects their criminal justice system to bring accused persons to trial expeditiously. As the months following a criminal charge become years, everyone suffers. Accused persons remain in a state of uncertainty, often in pre-trial detention. Victims and their families who, in many cases, have suffered tragic losses cannot move forward with their lives. And the public, whose interest is served by promptly bringing those charged with criminal offences to trial, is justifiably frustrated by watching years pass before a trial occurs.
3 An efficient criminal justice system is therefore of utmost importance. The ability to provide fair trials within a reasonable time is an indicator of the health and proper functioning of the system itself. The stakes are indisputably high.
4 Our system, however, has come to tolerate excessive delays. The circumstances in this appeal are illustrative. Notwithstanding a delay of over four years in bringing a drug case of modest complexity to trial, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal were of the view that the appellant was tried within a reasonable time. Their analyses are reflective of doctrinal and practical difficulties plaguing the current analytical framework governing s. 11(b). These difficulties have fostered a culture of complacency within the system towards delay.
5 A change of direction is therefore required. Below, we set out a new framework for applying s. 11(b). At the centre of this new framework is a presumptive ceiling on the time it should take to bring an accused person to trial: 18 months for cases going to trial in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court. Of course, given the contextual nature of reasonableness, the framework accounts for case-specific factors both above and below the presumptive ceiling. This framework is intended to focus the s. 11(b) analysis on the issues that matter and encourage all participants in the criminal justice system to cooperate in achieving reasonably prompt justice, with a view to fulfilling s. 11(b)’s important objectives.
19 As we have said, the right to be tried within a reasonable time is central to the administration of Canada’s system of criminal justice. It finds expression in the familiar maxim: “Justice delayed is justice denied.” An unreasonable delay denies justice to the accused, victims and their families, and the public as a whole.
20 Trials within a reasonable time are an essential part of our criminal justice system’s commitment to treating presumptively innocent accused persons in a manner that protects their interests in liberty, security of the person, and a fair trial. Liberty is engaged because a timely trial means an accused person will spend as little time as possible held in pre-trial custody or living in the community under release conditions. Security of the person is impacted because a long-delayed trial means prolonging the stress, anxiety, and stigma an accused may suffer. Fair trial interests are affected because the longer a trial is delayed, the more likely it is that some accused will be prejudiced in mounting a defence, owing to faded memories, unavailability of witnesses, or lost or degraded evidence.
24 Timely trials allow victims and witnesses to make the best possible contribution to the trial, and minimize the “worry and frustration [they experience] until they have given their testimony” (Askov, at p. 1220). Repeated delays interrupt their personal, employment or business activities, creating inconvenience that may present a disincentive to their participation.
25 Last but certainly not least, timely trials are important to maintaining overall public confidence in the administration of justice. As McLachlin J. (as she then was) put it in Morin, “delays are of consequence not only to the accused, but may affect the public interest in the prompt and fair administration of justice” (p. 810). Crime is of serious concern to all members of the community. Unreasonable delay leaves the innocent in limbo and the guilty unpunished, thereby offending the community’s sense of justice (see Askov, at p. 1220). Failure “to deal fairly, quickly and efficiently with criminal trials inevitably leads to the community’s frustration with the judicial system and eventually to a feeling of contempt for court procedures” (p. 1221).
26 Extended delays undermine public confidence in the system. And public confidence is essential to the survival of the system itself, as “a fair and balanced criminal justice system simply cannot exist without the support of the community” (Askov, at p. 1221).
27 Canadians therefore rightly expect a system that can deliver quality justice in a reasonably efficient and timely manner. Fairness and timeliness are sometimes thought to be in mutual tension, but this is not so. As D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C., wrote in a report commissioned by the B.C. Justice Reform Initiative:
... the widely perceived conflict between justice and efficiency goals is not based in reason or sound analysis. The real experience of the system is that both must be pursued in order for each to be realised: they are, in practice, interdependent.
(A Criminal Justice System for the 21st Century (2012), at p. 75)
28 In short, timely trials further the interests of justice. They ensure that the system functions in a fair and efficient manner; tolerating trials after long delays does not. Swift, predictable justice, “the most powerful deterrent of crime” is seriously undermined and in some cases rendered illusory by delayed trials (McLachlin C.J., “The Challenges We Face”, remarks to the Empire Club of Canada, published in (2007), 40 U.B.C. L. Rev. 819, at p. 825).
49 The most important feature of the new framework is that it sets a ceiling beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable. For cases going to trial in the provincial court, the presumptive ceiling is 18 months from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial. For cases going to trial in the superior court, the presumptive ceiling is 30 months from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial. 2 We note the 30-month ceiling would also apply to cases going to trial in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry. 3 As we will discuss, defence-waived or - caused delay does not count in calculating whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached — that is, such delay is to be discounted.
50 A presumptive ceiling is required in order to give meaningful direction to the state on its constitutional obligations and to those who play an important role in ensuring that the trial concludes within a reasonable time: court administration, the police, Crown prosecutors, accused persons and their counsel, and judges. It is also intended to provide some assurance to accused persons, to victims and their families, to witnesses, and to the public that s. 11(b) is not a hollow promise.
57 There is little reason to be satisfied with a presumptive ceiling on trial delay set at 18 months for cases going to trial in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases going to trial in the superior court. This is a long time to wait for justice. But the ceiling reflects the realities we currently face. We may have to revisit these numbers and the considerations that inform them in the future.
105 The new framework for s. 11(b) can be summarized as follows:
• There is a ceiling beyond which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.
• Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional circumstance arises from the case’s complexity, the delay is reasonable.
[11] The Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan has been considered on many occasions. One such occasion was in R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704 (hereinafter “Coulter”). In Coulter the Ontario Court of Appeal (hereinafter “ONCA”) at paras. 34-41 provided a useful guide to lower courts for applying the Jordan framework. Under the heading “[a] new framework summarized” the ONCA laid out the following steps that a Court must follow when applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan:
- Step 1: Calculate the total delay, which is the period from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial.
- Step 2: Subtract defence delay from the total delay, which results in the “Net delay.”
- Step 3: Compare the Net Delay to the presumptive ceiling.
- Step 4: If the Net Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut the presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot rebut the presumption, a stay will follow. In general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.
- Step 5: Subtract delay caused by discrete events from the Net Delay (leaving the “Remaining Delay”) for the purpose of determining whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached.
- Step 6: If the Remaining Delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable.
- Step 7: If the Remaining Delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable.
- Step 8: The new framework, including the presumptive ceiling, applies to cases already in the system when Jordan was released (the “Transitional Cases”).
[12] After the Jordan decision cases were litigated over how to apply the Jordan framework. This led to the Supreme Court’s decision in K.G.K. In K.G.K. at paragraph 31 Moldaver J, under the heading “[t]he Temporal Scope of the Jordan Ceilings”, clarified how Jordan should be operationalized by lower courts:
[p]roperly construed, the Jordan ceilings apply from the date of the charge until the actual or anticipated end of the evidence and argument. That is when the parties’ involvement in the merits of the trial is complete, and the case is turned over to the trier of fact….this date permits the straightforward application of the Jordan framework in a manner consistent with its design and goals.
[13] The Supreme Court’s decision in K.G.K. means that the clock starts running as of the date a charge is laid and it stops when the charges are resolved. In accordance with K.G.K. anything that transpires from the time a charge is laid until the time the charge is resolved may slow down but never stop the 18-month clock.
[14] The Jordan framework is like a timer that has been started in an action movie. Once the clock has started it cannot be stopped unless either the correct wires have been cut (i.e. a plea is entered, a Court orders a withdrawal, or a Court orders a stay of proceedings) or the device explodes (a trial has started, all of the evidence has been led, closing submissions have concluded and the case is turned over to the trier of fact for a decision).
[15] If a defendant chooses to try and resolve their charges before the Court by engaging in an early resolution process but ultimately decides to proceed to trial, time continues to tick away: See Halton (Regional Municipality) v. Grewal, 2024 ONCJ 470. If a defendant decides that they want to plead guilty, enters a plea but then their plea is struck, time continues to tick away. This is because as Moldaver J wrote in K.G.K. “the Jordan ceilings apply from the date of the charge until the actual or anticipated end of the evidence and argument”.
[16] The Jordan framework applies to POA proceedings as well as criminal proceedings. In R. v. Nguyen, 2020 ONCA 609 (hereinafter “Nguyen”), the ONCA made it clear that the presumptive ceiling of 18 months applies to provincial offences as well. Specifically, the ONCA said the 18-month ceiling applies to both charges contained in Part I and Part III of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 (hereinafter the “POA”): See Nguyen at para(s). 21, 22, and 26 and R. v. Battigaglia, [2023] O.J. No. 5267 at para. 19 (hereinafter “Battigaglia”).
[17] Finally, as argued by defence counsel, the seriousness of the charges before the Court do not factor into whether a defendant’s 11b rights have been infringed. The Supreme Court in R v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 at paras. 33–38 wrote:
34 First, a person’s right to a trial within a reasonable time cannot be diminished based solely on the nature of the charges he or she faces. As this Court wrote in R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.), at para. 40, “Charter protections must be construed so as to apply to everyone, even those alleged to have committed the most serious criminal offences.” Many appellate courts across the country, including this one, have stayed serious charges, even when the total delay (minus defence delay) was less than that in this appeal.
35 In this regard, we note that s. 11(b) guarantees the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”. It does not admit of gradients of reasonableness where the charges are serious. For example, it does not guarantee the right to be tried within “somewhat longer” than a reasonable time, or within a time that is “excessive but not so long as to be clearly unreasonable” when the charges are serious (Cromwell J., at paras. 43 and 80). Delay is either unreasonable, or it is not. As a result, our point of departure with our colleague is on what we consider reasonable. In short, we have different perspectives on a subjective standard.
36 Second, while our colleague uses the seriousness of the offence to dilute the constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time, we consider that the Charter right is respected, and the public interest is best served, by trying serious charges on their merits in a timely fashion. These are precisely the cases that should be heard promptly, on the strongest possible evidence.
37 Third, the seriousness of the offence does not sit comfortably with the notion of reasonable time. Some grave charges require very little time to be tried, while some less serious charges require more time.
38 We agree with our colleague that the charges against Mr. Williamson are grave. Like the Court of Appeal, we reach our conclusion “with great reluctance” (para. 68). The victim underwent the ordeal of a criminal trial, and Mr. Williamson was eventually convicted by a jury of his peers. But as we discussed in Jordan, timely justice is one of the hallmarks of a free and democratic society. This case is an example of how delay works to the detriment of everyone. Conversely, timely justice accrues to the benefit of all.
[18] The charges before the Court stem from an accident on October 30, 2023. Three days later, November 2, 2023, an officer employed by the TPS swore and filed an information with the Ontario Court of Justice in Toronto (hereinafter “OCJ”). That information charged the defendant with two counts of careless driving causing bodily harm. The defence argues that the anticipated end of the defendant’s trial is 550 days (or 18.5 months) after the original Information was sworn. Therefore, defence counsel argues that the defendant’s 11b rights have been violated.[^1]
[19] Since the defendant was charged, no delay can be attributed to the defence when applying the Jordan framework: See Toronto (City of) v. Battiston, 2025 ONCJ 162 (“Battiston”) at para 42. Therefore, as the defendant’s matter is scheduled to take 550 days (approximately 18.5 months) to be completed, the time it will have taken is presumptively unreasonable as the completion of evidence and submissions falls outside of the ceiling set in Jordan: See Coulter at para 36. As the Copeland J.A. wrote on behalf of the majority in R v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151 at para 20, once an application Justice has found the delay excessive (1 day or more over 18 months on a net basis) they are obligated to find a breach of a defendant’s 11b rights and stay the charges against them.
(a) Discrete event
[20] On the first day of trial, March 21, 2025, Court was not able to start right at 9 a.m. because the prosecution had computer issues. Rather Court was only able to start at 11:05 a.m. The delay in starting Court together with the length of time it took to hear from the prosecution’s only witness, from a practical standpoint, the defence was not able to begin calling witnesses during the first day of trial. This necessitated scheduling a third day of trial. The date for the third day of trial, when evidence and closing submissions would conclude, was set for a day more than 18-months since the information before the Court was laid.
[21] The main thrust of the hearing was whether the delay occasioned by connectivity issues that the prosecution had on the first day of trial was a discrete event and therefore an exceptional circumstance. In his submissions counsel for the defendant argued that “[t]he internet connectivity occurrence was not reasonably unforeseen”, which means that it was not a discrete event and an exceptional circumstance. Whereas the prosecution argued that (1) the internet connectivity issue was reasonably foreseeable because of the lack of internet connectivity in POA Courtrooms in Toronto, (2) they took meaningful efforts to avoid internet connectivity issues, (3) the internet connectivity issue that occurred on the first of day of trial was a discrete event and (4) was an exceptional circumstance.
[22] It can be argued that the delay in starting court on the first day can be classified as a discrete event. However, computer issues are a recurring event in the POA Courts in Toronto that routinely delay matters before the Court as conceded by the prosecution in her submissions. In fact, on February 6, 2025, when this matter was before the Court there were significant computers issues that required the matter to be traversed to another Courtroom before the matter could be addressed.
[23] With that being said, turning to the Crown’s position, the prosecutor argued that she knew coming out Covid that doing in person trials was going to be a problem. She argued that unlike in R. v. J.M., 2017 ONCJ 4 where the Crown did not take steps to mitigate delay, the emails she sent dated May 27, 2024, and October 11, 2024, to the director of Crown operations about the lack of internet connectivity in POA Courtrooms in Toronto[^2] demonstrate that she was proactive in trying to prevent the issue she encountered on the first day of trial. She argued this because her emails led to the installation of Mi-Fi Eggs[^3] in or around January 30, 2025. In short, the prosecution argued that it was:
“the position of the Crown that having taken steps to mitigate the shortfalls that are as a direct result of Court’s Administration City of Toronto choosing not to have…internet access in the post-pandemic world where everything literally revolves around the use of technology”
the internet connectivity issue that arose on the first day of trial was a discrete event and therefore an exceptional circumstance. The fact that a prosecutor must make these types of arguments when a Court is tasked with deciding whether a defendant’s 11b rights were infringed means as the defence argued that:
[t]here’s something wrong when a criminal justice system, and here the Provincial Offences Act, the administration of that system, has the accused, in an adversarial position, relying on the Crown for access to internet by a personal Wi-Fi that the Crown has set up for just itself, and the court system itself has not made available to people it prosecutes or hears being prosecuted. There’s something fundamentally wrong with that.
With that said, with the greatest amount of respect, the internet connectivity issue that arose on the first day of trial was not a discrete event. Therefore, it cannot be treated as an exceptional circumstance.
[24] As Paciocco J, as he was then, said in R. v. M. (J.), 2017 ONCJ 4 at paragraph 161:
161 I know that the loss of this time was not the fault of the prosecuting Crown. Delay caused by a lack of technical support is nonetheless state caused delay. It is not unlike delay caused by the unavailability of interpreters, 10 or of courts or judges. The time lost may have been outside the control of the prosecutor, but, on the evidence before me, it was not outside the control of the state.
In this case the loss of time on the first day of trial was not the fault of the prosecutor. Nevertheless, despite that it was out of the control of the prosecutor in this matter, the delay caused by a lack of technology in the Court and a need for a work around that required technical support, which led to a delay in starting the defendant’s trial on day one, is state caused delay. It is because the Crown is an indivisible actor as acknowledged by the prosecution in answer to a question from the Court during submissions. Therefore, the loss of time, when calculating whether the 18-month ceiling has been breached, must be attributed to delay on part of the Crown.
[25] The technology issues in Toronto POA Courts cannot be considered a discrete event in this case like the technology issues were in R. v. Simeu, 2024 ONSC 1031: See para 54. They cannot because the City has made a deliberate decision not to install internet in any of the 29 POA Courts across Toronto as noted in the materials filed by prosecutor. Whereas in Simeu it was not a lack of technology in the Courtroom but rather with the technology “being down”, which is a circumstance outside the Crown’s control.
[26] In 2016 the City tore down the existing SLMN and began construction a new SLMN building, which houses one of its three POA Court locations. During construction the City had to contend with the COVID-19 pandemic, which necessitated the pivot from a paper based in person court system to a fully electronic system and then a hybrid system. Despite this the City choose not to pivot and alter the construction plans for the new SLMN building. Further, despite the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the POA Court system in Toronto the City did not install internet in the Courtrooms located at its other 2 POA Court locations after the COVID-19 pandemic abated.
[27] As the prosecutor in her submissions said, the “current policy or position of the City of Toronto with respect to internet in the courtrooms…is appalling.” This Court agrees. As argued by the defence in their submissions, the State cannot be forgiven for what it doesn’t provide when it prosecutes accuseds.” Again, this Court agrees.
[28] This Court does not excoriate the City of Toronto for its lack of investment in internet in its courtrooms lightly. Rather it does so to drive home the point that in this electronic age the State has an obligation to equip its courtroom with the required technology. If the State does not live up to that obligation, then it runs the risk of having prosecutions stayed if the lack of resourcing causes delay in prosecuting individuals in their Court system under 18 or 30 months as the case maybe.
[29] For the foregoing reasons the Prosecution has not established the presence of exceptional circumstances that would rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay: See Coulter at para 37. Therefore, the Court now turns to analyzing whether the matter before the Court was so complex that the presumption of unreasonableness can be dislodged.
(b) Was the defendant’s case complex?
[30] The Prosecution, if it can demonstrate that the case was complex, can also rebut the presumption of unreasonableness: See Coulter at para 37. However, this case was not complex as was conceded by the Prosecution on February 27, 2025: See Battiston at para 45. Therefore, again, the Prosecution has not established the presence of exceptional circumstances that would rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.
Conclusion
[31] After accounting for exceptional circumstances, the net delay does not fall below 18-months. As a result, the onus does not shift back to the defence (Coulter at para 40). Therefore, the length of time the defendant’s matter takes must be considered presumptively unreasonable and a violation of their 11b rights.
[32] The defendant sought a stay of proceedings. If the Court finds that the defendant’s 11b rights were violated a stay is the only remedy that a Court can order: See Battiston at para(s) 74 and 75, R. v. Charley, 2019 ONCA 726, 147 O.R. (3d) 497, and R. v. Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243, 150 O.R. (3d) 224.
[33] For the foregoing reasons this Court finds that the defendant’s 11b rights have been infringed upon. Therefore, a stay of proceedings in this matter is ordered pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.
Released: April 10, 2025
Signed: Justice of the Peace R. Shawyer
[^1]: This Court’s decision in Toronto (City of) v. Battiston, 2025 ONCJ 162 for a detailed chronological history of the defendant’s charges before the Court.
[^2]: Prior to the closing of Old City Hall (“OCH”) in Toronto OCH was the only POA Court in Toronto with internet connectivity because it used to operate as both a criminal and POA Court. When OCH closed on February 27, 2025, no POA Courthouse in Toronto had internet connectivity. This became the situation in Toronto POA Courts despite the opening of a new POA Courthouse located at 92 Front Street East at the new St. Lawrence Farmers Market also known as St. Lawrence Market North (“SLMN”).
[^3]: MiFi devices are compact, battery-powered routers that function like mobile hotspots, enabling internet access through a cellular network. They use a SIM card to connect to a mobile network (like 4G or 5G), and then create a Wi-Fi signal that other devices (phones, tablets, laptops) can connect to. Further, MiFi devices are generally used in situations where a person needs internet access away from home or a Wi-Fi network, such as travel, remote work, or areas with limited internet infrastructure.