A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. —(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
( a ) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,
(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or
(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or
( b ) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs ( a )(i) to (iii).
(2) Mandatory order on application. — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)( a ) or ( b ), the presiding judge or justice shall
( a ) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
( b ) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 Offence. —(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
DATE: 2024 12 13 COURT FILE No.: Toronto 23-48120519
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
MICHAEL LATIMER
Ruling on Application To Admit Other Sexual Activity Evidence Stage 2 Criminal Code Sections 276, 278.93 – 278.94
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on December 6, 2024 Written Reasons for Judgment released on December 13, 2024 Approved for Publication on January 8, 2025: Criminal Code section 278.95(1)(c)
Counsel: C. Blondell............................................................................................ counsel for the Crown S. Hutchison........................................................................................ counsel for M. Latimer G. McLaughlin….…………………………………………………………....counsel for J.R.
Jones J.:
Introduction
[1] Ms. J.R. alleges that Michael Latimer sexually assaulted her on a date in September or October 1988. One night, while staying as a guest at his parents’ home, he entered her bedroom and attempted to force himself upon her. This is a historical allegation. The information in this case was sworn on October 20, 2023.
[2] Mr. Latimer disputes the charge. He denies any physical contact between him and J.R. on the evening in question but accepts that he entered her bedroom to discuss the possibility of an intimate encounter. When she rejected him, he left peacefully.
[3] According to Mr. Latimer, his conduct that evening can only be properly understood by placing it in the context of his relationship with J.R. Briefly stated, Mr. Latimer asserts he and J.R. had a previous consensual sexual encounter in the summer of 1988. His decision to approach J.R. on the offence date was driven by what happened between them earlier that year. Had it not been for this prior sexual experience, he would not have propositioned her a second time.
[4] Accordingly, Mr. Hutchison applied to introduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant under Criminal Code section 276 (2). Ms. Blondell, on behalf of the Crown, and Ms. McLaughlin, counsel for J.R., oppose the introduction of this evidence.
[5] For the following reasons, the application is granted.
Factual Background
The Alleged Offence
[6] J.R. knew Mr. Latimer’s family well due to her employment. She worked as a nurse at a camp owned by Mr. Latimer’s parents. In October 1988, she stayed at his parents’ home as a guest. She intended to reside there for a few months.
[7] During either September or October 1988, Mr. Latimer entered her room one night without warning. He made advances on her that she considered sexual. She yelled at him to leave. She struck him. It took five or six minutes before he left. She was not physically injured. [1]
[8] She chose not to report the assault in 1988. In 2023, she learned from the media that John Latimer, Michael’s father and the director of the camp, had been sued civilly for alleged historical sexual assaults. These reports appeared in the media around August 1, 2023. After learning of these lawsuits, she approached the lawyer representing the complainants. [2]
[9] She then contacted another lawyer and chose to make a police report about the 1988 assault. She contacted the Toronto Police Service on October 10, 2023.
[10] She described her relationship with Michael Latimer before the assault as a “good friendship.” They were “friendly” at the camp where they both worked. Their relationship was platonic, and she denied that anything romantic or sexual occurred between them. [3]
The Other Sexual Activity Evidence
[11] Mr. Latimer provided an affidavit in support of the application. He agrees that he worked alongside J.R. during the summers of 1987-1989. They were friends. In 1988, he was 22 years old. J.R. was older than him. He believes she was in her mid-30s. It is not in dispute for this application that J.R. was 35 years old at the time.
[12] They had a consensual sexual encounter one night during the summer of 1988. It occurred in her bedroom in the infirmary building at the camp. Afterwards, they remained friends.
[13] In the early fall of 1988, he was staying at his parents’ house. J.R. was also residing there temporarily.
[14] On the night of the alleged offences, he agreed that he approached J.R. in her room to ask if she wanted to engage in sexual activity. He approached her bed but did not attempt to enter it. She was asleep, and he woke her up. She said she was not interested in another sexual encounter, and he left the room.
[15] There was no physical contact between them that night.
[16] During cross-examination on the voir dire, Mr. Latimer testified that when he entered J.R.’s bedroom, he recalled asking J.R. if she “wanted to go again” or “have round two” or words to that effect. He approached her and asked this question based on his prior experience with her. He believed they both enjoyed it.
Position of the Parties and the Complainant
[17] Mr. Hutchison submits that the other sexual activity evidence is relevant to two issues at the upcoming trial. First, the evidence is critical to contextualize Mr. Latimer’s account of what did and did not happen if he chooses to testify in his defence. The trier of fact should understand why Mr. Latimer, then 22, would approach an older woman at his parents’ home for a sexual encounter. If Mr. Latimer could not reference their prior sexual activity, it could leave the impression that his decision to approach her on the night in question was made without any reasonable explanation. This, in turn, invites adverse inferences about his respect for personal boundaries.
[18] Second, the evidence is relevant to assessing the credibility of the complainant. It provides a contradictory narrative of the relationship between the parties in 1988. In her police statements, J.R. denied any romantic or intimate relationship with Mr. Latimer before the offence date. If I were to accept that Mr. Latimer’s account of their relationship was accurate instead and that J.R. was intentionally providing a misleading representation of that relationship, that could be used lawfully to detract from J.R.’s credibility.
[19] Ms. Blondell, in her written submissions, argued that the application relies on prohibited, myth-based reasoning. Even if the complainant had consensual sexual contact with the applicant in the past, that does not justify its admission in this trial. The other sexual activity evidence is irrelevant to determining why he entered her bedroom on the night of the offence. The crux of the defence position, that because the accused was much younger than the complainant, and therefore a prejudicial inference would be left with the court about his behaviour in the absence of this evidence, is without merit. The age difference is of little to no significance.
[20] Mr. Latimer’s version of events can be put to the complainant in cross-examination without needing to reference the prior sexual activity. He may also testify in his defence and deny the allegations. She asks me to dismiss the application.
[21] Ms. McLaughlin, on behalf of J.R., seeks to have the application dismissed as well. She reminds me that the overarching objective of section 276 of the Criminal Code is to ensure trial fairness by confronting, preventing, and eliminating myths, stereotypes and prejudices about complainants in sexual assault cases. All discriminatory generalizations should be barred.
[22] The evidence sought to be introduced by Mr. Latimer can only be used to imply one or both twin myths. It will do nothing more than attempt to paint J.R. as an older woman who tried to seduce a younger man. It is irrelevant, and his proposed defence does not require it.
[23] Ms. McLaughlin submits that the recent case of R. v. Sandhu, 2024 ABCA 47, is informative. In that case, the accused was charged with sexual assault. At his trial, he sought to admit evidence that, earlier in the evening, before the alleged assault, he danced with the complainant. She purportedly pulled him towards her and started kissing him: see para. 26. His defence at trial was consent. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to deny the section 276 application. Its introduction could only invite myth-based reasoning. The evidence could not be admitted based on characterizing it as “narrative” or “context.” The evidence would serve no lawful purpose.
[24] Mr. Latimer’s application should be dismissed for the same reasons. “Context” is not enough. If Mr. Latimer believed that he could have a second sexual encounter with J.R. based on the first experience, his flawed internal reasoning should not be imported into my decision. Furthermore, as a form of proposed “relationship evidence”, the probative value of a single prior incident is quite weak compared to cases involving evidence of a long-standing romantic connection between an accused person and a complainant.
Law and Analysis
[25] Criminal Code section 276 prohibits the introduction of other sexual activity evidence for either of the twin myths. Evidence that the complainant has engaged in previous sexual activity with the accused (or any other person) is not admissible to show that the complainant is (1) more likely to have consented to the subject matter of the charge or (2) less worthy of belief.
[26] Prior sexual activity may be admissible if it meets four criteria:
(1) First, that it is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting either of these two prohibited inferences;
(2) Second, that it is relevant to an issue at trial;
(3) Third, that it is of specific instances of sexual activity; and
(4) Fourth, it has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
[27] In determining whether the proposed evidence is admissible under section 276(2), section 276(3) lists the criteria to be considered:
a. the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;
b. society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences;
c. whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist in arriving at a just determination in the case;
d. the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;
e. the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
f. the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy;
g. the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and
h. any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice considers relevant.
[28] The Supreme Court explained the importance of the trial judge’s gate-keeping function in R. v. T.W.W, 2024 SCC 19, at paras. 27-28:
In order to be potentially admissible, the relevance and probative value of the evidence in each case must go beyond a general ability to undermine the complainant’s credibility … it must respond to a specific issue at trial that could not be addressed or resolved in the absence of that evidence.
Trial judges must guard against improperly widening the scope of when other sexual activity evidence should be admitted given that, as Karakatsanis J. noted in Goldfinch, “credibility is an issue that pervades most trials” (para. 56)… Too broad an approach to credibility … would cast open the doors of admissibility, overturning Parliament’s specific intention and this Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that evidence of other sexual activity will be admitted only in cases where it is sufficiently specific and essential to the interests of justice. Given the specific thresholds set by Parliament and their underlying objectives, something more is required to show that admission is justified…
[29] In R. v. R.V., 2019 SCC 41, the Supreme Court described the limits section 276 places on the accused’s right to cross-examine the complainant. These limits are essential to protecting the complainant’s dignity, privacy and equality interests: see para. 40. They are also vital to ensuring that cross-examination is not used to embark upon irrelevant, misleading or humiliating questioning that does not advance the truth-seeking function of the trial but instead descends into forbidden myths and stereotypes: see, for example, R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38, at para. 33; R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, at para. 1.
[30] The degree of specificity required by this section is intended to ensure that the trial judge can meaningfully engage with the section 276 analysis: R.V. at para. 48. What is required will depend on “the circumstances of the case, the nature of the sexual activity that the accused seeks to adduce and the use to be made of that evidence”: R.V. at para. 49.
[31] Importantly, other sexual activity evidence will not pass the threshold test for admissibility where it has minor or trifling probative value. The evidence must have “significant probative value,” and that probative value must not be “substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice” from its admission. In R. v L.S., 2017 ONCA 685, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that evidence which has “significant probative value” is evidence that has more than “trifling relevance” and is capable in the context of all of the evidence of leaving the jury with a reasonable doubt: see para. 90; see also R. v. Darrach, 2000 SCC 46, at paras. 39-41.
[32] In T.W.W., the Supreme Court expressed the test for the admission of other sexual activity evidence in arguably more restrictive language. The evidence will be admissible when it goes to “the fundamental coherence of the defence narrative” and when, in the absence of the evidence, the defence position would be “untenable” or “utterly improbable”: see para. 28. Furthermore, evidence of other sexual activity must be “sufficiently specific” and “essential to the interests of justice.”
[33] Therefore, a blanket assertion that the evidence is essential to the defence narrative should not be blindly accepted. The judge hearing the application must critically analyze whether the theory of the defence can be advanced without reference to the proposed other sexual activity evidence. In such a case, the “relative value of sexual history evidence will be significantly reduced”: see Goldfinch at para. 69, while the potentially serious harm from the evidence’s inclusion is ever-present. The prejudice considered as part of the balancing exercise in a section 276 application is not limited to the harm to the individual complainant but engages broader societal concerns. These include protecting the equality rights of women and promoting the reporting of sexual-based offending: see R. v. Osolin, at para. 34. There will be real and meaningful harm to any witness forced to needlessly endure the intimate details of their life being exposed in a public courtroom, and others may be deterred from coming forward.
[34] Thus, evidence of other sexual activity evidence will only be exceptionally admitted. Mr. Hutchison directed my attention to R. v. Temertzoglou. In that case, the male accused was significantly older than the female complainant. The defence applied to introduce evidence of their prior sexual encounters to protect against the trier of fact being left with the misleading impression that the accused’s conduct was otherwise unexplained. In the context of a sexual encounter between two people with a noticeable age difference between them, the risk of an adverse inference being drawn was heightened. Justice Fuerst granted the application on this basis and found that the proposed evidence was not being introduced to support twin-myth-based reasoning. Her Honour explained her reasoning in para. 29:
…The inferences to be drawn from the evidence are not the general inferences that solely by reason of the other sexual activity, Ms. M-E.C. is more likely to have consented on November 24, or should not be believed. Specifically, the evidence of other sexual activity has relevance in that it shows the development of a relationship between the parties which is more than platonic, notwithstanding an age difference that might otherwise engender a presumption against the defence…
[35] This decision was cited approvingly by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in T.W.W. Justice O’Bonsawin characterized Temertzoglou as an example of “where evidence goes to the fundamental coherence of the defence narrative” and “was held to be necessary to the ability of the accused to make full answer and defence”: see paras. 34-5. Justice Karakatsanis cited Temertzoglou in Goldfinch to illustrate the same principle: see para. 66.
[36] In R. v. Harris, the appellant was convicted of sexual assault. The complainant alleged that he forced sexual intercourse on her while they were staying at a motel. The complainant testified that her relationship with the accused was “platonic,” and she was “shocked” when he asked her if they were going to have sex: see paras. 16 and 41. The accused applied to introduce evidence of a prior sexual experience between them that occurred approximately one week before the offence date in order to buttress his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible and overturned the conviction.
[37] Moldaver J.A. (as he then was) held that because the nature of the parties’ relationship was at issue, the appellant “was entitled to lead evidence designed to rebut the complainant’s testimony”: see para. 42. The importance of this evidence was explained at para. 49:
By failing to permit the appellant to lead evidence of the Tuesday night incident, the jury was deprived of the tools needed to fully and fairly assess the conduct of the parties and the believability of their respective positions. Left unchallenged, the complainant's testimony concerning her relationship with the appellant was potentially devastating to his position. If accepted, it would be a short step for the jury to conclude that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity at the motel. To interpret s. 276 of the Code in a manner that would foreclose the appellant from attempting to rebut this crucial evidence would be to deprive him of his right to make full answer and defence.
[38] Mr. Hutchison provided me with several other reported decisions where courts have granted section 276 applications where the complainant denied the existence of a prior sexual relationship and the accused was permitted to lead evidence to the contrary: see R. v. S.R., 2014 ONSC 1795; R. v. Harnett 2022 ABQB 150; and R. v. Cole 2020 ONSC 6239.
[39] In addition to these decisions, I find R. v. Derksen, 2023 MBCA 85 of great assistance. In Derksen, the appellant was charged with sexual assault and sought to introduce prior sexual activity evidence. That evidence included that he had engaged in a “romantic” relationship with the victim for approximately a year and a half before the offence date. The appellant did not deny the sexual encounter underlying the charges occurred but took the position that it was consensual: para. 38. He argued that without the prior sexual history evidence, he would be unable to advance his primary defence of consent or an alternative defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent: para. 46.
[40] The trial judge denied the application, which was upheld on appeal. However, the Court of Appeal explained that the evidence might have been relevant to the victim’s credibility due to the disputed nature of the prior relationship between the parties. The appellant failed in his application at trial because he did not establish a proper foundation to challenge the victim’s credibility with this proposed evidence. His application did not establish the “relevance of the sexual nature of the relationship to an issue at trial with the required precision to be admissible”: see para. 42.
[41] The admissibility of “relationship evidence” in sexual assault trials continues to be fraught with complexity. Its introduction raises specific challenges for criminal courts. Excluding this evidence may undermine an accused person’s right to a full answer and defence by leaving the trier of fact without a complete understanding of the relationship between the parties. That, in turn, could result in a misinterpretation of pivotal aspects of why the accused behaved as he did towards the complainant at or near the time of the alleged offence. How people relate to and act towards one another is often shaped by their shared experiences and the nature of their pre-existing relationships. That is the argument Mr. Hutchison has made in support of this application. Excluding this evidence would leave me, as the trial judge, with a distorted lens through which to view his client’s conduct toward J.R.
[42] While this argument has merit, the same evidence could also be used unlawfully to support prohibited reasoning. Relationship evidence, however characterized, can never be allowed to invite the trier of fact to engage in myth-based reasoning. In this case, the improper reasoning would be that Mr. Latimer was permitted to assume the complainant’s advance consent. There is “no room for implied consent in Canada,” and an accused person must ensure that active, informed consent is provided for each sexual act regardless of anything that has occurred between the parties previously: see R. v. G.F., 2020 SCC 20 at para. 1.
[43] Nor do I mean to overstate the significance of the proposed evidence Mr. Latimer seeks to introduce. This is not akin to cases where the foundation of the application centres around a long-standing prior intimate relationship between the accused and the complainant. Here, only a single prior sexual encounter is presented. However, it occurred only a few months before the offence date, and that temporal proximity matters. “Relationship evidence” will inevitably capture a wide range of human interactions and is best considered as a descriptive term. Section 276 of the Criminal Code contains the legal requirements for the admissibility of other sexual activity evidence, which must be strictly applied.
[44] The divide between the majority and dissenting judgments in Goldfinch is emblematic of the complexity associated with these applications. In that case, the majority held that evidence that the accused and complainant were “friends with benefits” was inadmissible because it would invite the prohibited inference that the complainant’s consent on prior occasions made it more likely she consented on the offence date: see para. 47. In dissent, Justice Brown noted that there may be permissible purposes for relationship evidence that are different from twin-myth-based reasoning, and to deny its admission in all cases may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial. At paras. 193-4 he wrote:
To deny the appellant the ability to point to his relationship would, in these circumstances, disable the jury from meaningfully performing its central function of finding facts and seeking out the truth…
To prohibit the appellant from explaining these statements, or this knowledge, by testifying that he was in a relationship with the complainant, is to force him to tell an incomplete story — a story which includes an account of the act but no explanation for how he and the complainant “got there”, and why he said what he said, and why he did what he did. More particularly, without this evidence, his actions (including his words and gestures) will have appeared to have arisen out of nowhere, creating a completely misleading impression on the jury. His right to make full answer and defence would be reduced to painting a picture of himself as (at best) crude and reckless, or (at worst) predatory.
[45] The scope of the majority decision in Goldfinch denying the admissibility of the “friends with benefits” evidence should, therefore, not be read too broadly. It was not a blanket prohibition on relationship evidence in every case. While the majority cautioned that relationship evidence must be “scrutinized and handled with care,” the trial judge’s error in admitting the evidence hinged on the fact that the accused could not point to a relevant use for it: see paras. 46-7. Where an applicant can identify a lawful use of the evidence, it may pass the test for admissibility.
[46] This distinguishes Mr. Latimer’s application from the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Sandhu, which was relied upon by Ms. McLaughlin. Counsel for the accused argued in Sandhu that the “sole purpose” of admitting the evidence was to demonstrate how the complainant’s “attitude and disposition toward him” informed the issue of consent at the time of the alleged offence: see para. 28. The Court of Appeal characterized the argument in these terms at para. 29:
The underlying logic of the argument for admissibility could only be that her alleged conduct was, for the appellant, a form of circumstantial evidence from earlier conduct of her inclination to later consent to an entirely different form of “activity that forms the subject matter of the charge” under s 273.2 of the Code.
[47] The application failed because the complainant’s alleged demonstration of interest in the accused earlier the same evening but before the offence “could in no sense be probative of her consent at the later time of the “activity” of sexual intercourse without the connecting bridgework of forbidden reasoning.”
Conclusion
[48] I find that the proposed other sexual activity evidence is admissible. This is a case akin to Justice Fuerst’s decision in Temertzoglou. I am satisfied that the evidence consists of a specific instance of prior sexual activity. If excluded, Mr. Latimer’s right to make a full answer and defence would be significantly prejudiced. It is fundamental to the coherence of the defence narrative.
[49] I appreciate that any questioning of J.R. about what happened between her and Mr. Latimer in the summer of 1988 will have a negative effect on her dignity and right to privacy. However, Mr. Hutchison has also been clear that he does not wish to ask about any unnecessary details of this encounter. He only seeks to cross-examine her to determine if she agrees that she engaged in sexual activity with Mr. Latimer. If Mr. Latimer testifies in his defence, his evidence in this area will be confined to what is contained in his affidavit.
[50] Unlike in Derksen or Sandhu Mr. Latimer is not advancing a defence of consent. He disputes anything physical occurred on the alleged offence date and wishes to challenge J.R.’s characterization of their relationship as entirely platonic before the offence date. I agree with Mr. Hutchison’s characterization of the probative value of this evidence in para. 57 of his written materials:
Here, the s. 276 evidence is extremely significant to the Applicant’s ability to provide a full answer and defence because, otherwise, the Applicant would be prohibited from putting forward how and why he came to be in the complainant’s bedroom. In turn, he would be unable to challenge the… characterization of him as a person who would enter into a houseguest’s room in the middle of the night – completely out of the blue – to solicit sex with absolutely no reason to believe that she would even consider such a proposition.
[51] I, therefore, find that the evidence of their prior sexual relationship has significant probative value, which is not substantially outweighed by the potential prejudice to J.R. or the proper administration of justice. The evidence is not being proposed for any twin-myth-based reasoning. Regarding the balancing required by Criminal Code section 276(2)(d), it is vital to remember that the language of that section mirrors the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Seaboyer. In Seaboyer, the majority held that the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter require the accused to be permitted to lead relevant evidence unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. As noted by Prof. L. DuFraimont of Osgoode Hall Law School, “Seaboyer held that the Charter requires the balancing of prejudicial effect against probative value to be weighted in favour of admitting relevant defence evidence”: see “R. v. Goldfinch and the Problem of Relationship Evidence,” (2019) 55 CR (7th) 282. [4]
[52] The majority in Seaboyer further noted that there would be cases where other sexual activity evidence “may well be of great importance to getting at the truth and determining whether the accused is guilty or innocent under the law -- the ultimate aim of the trial process”: see para. 59. While those cases may be rare, each application must be decided on its merits. Trial courts must never lose sight of the fundamental, animating values in our constitution that guard against the injustice of a potential wrongful conviction.
[53] As part of this ruling, I order that the proposed questioning be conducted carefully and with due regard to J.R.’s dignity. The questions will be limited to the nature of J.R.’s relationship with Mr. Latimer in the summer of 1988 and whether a sexual encounter occurred between them one night before the alleged offence date. While the location, date, and time of that encounter are relevant, specific details about the nature of the sexual activity are not permitted.
[54] I thank counsel for their excellent written materials and highly professional approach to this hearing.
Released: December 13, 2024 Signed: Justice Brock Jones
[1] Statement of J.R., October 10, 2023 (45 pages) at pp. 19, and 23, 25 and 26. [2] Statement of J.R., October 10, 2023 (45 pages) at pp. 42-43 [3] Statement of J.R., October 10, 2023, (21 pages) at pp. 12 and 12-13. [4] My emphasis added.