Non-Publication Order Warning

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court File and Parties

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 2024 12 04 COURT FILE No.: Halton Info # 998 22 12102601

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

M.D.

Before Justice Jennifer Campitelli

Heard on May 13th, May 28th, May 29th, May 30th, July 10th, July 12th, July 17th July 18th, September 9th, September 11th, September 13th, October 8th, and October 9th, 2024

Reasons for Judgment released on December 4, 2024

Counsel: Emily Roda........................................................................................... counsel for the Crown Arash Ghiassi................................................. …………...... counsel for the accused M.D.

Reasons for Judgment

CAMPITELLI J.:

[1] M.D. faces a number of counts on the information, which is before the court:

(1) on or about the 28th day of July in the year 2018 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit a sexual assault on A.E. contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code; and

(2) that M.D. on or about the 28th day of July in the year 2018 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit an assault on A.E. contrary to Section 266 of the Criminal Code; and

(3) that M.D. on or about the 13th day of January in the year 2018 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did commit an assault on A.E. contrary to Section 266 of the Criminal Code; and

(4) that M.D. on or about the 1st day of July in the year 2017 at the Town of OAKVILLE in the said Region, did in committing an assault upon A.E. cause bodily harm to her contrary to Section 267 (b) of the Criminal Code; and

(5) that M.D. on or about the 8th day of February in the year 2017 at the City of BRAMPTON in the said Region and/or anywhere in the Province of Ontario, did commit a sexual assault on A.E., contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

Factual Background

[2] M.D. and the complainant A.E. were previously married and share one child together. A.E. alleges that during their marriage, M.D. engaged in both physically and sexually assaultive conduct towards her. Specifically, A.E. alleges four separate incidents between February 8, 2017, and July 28, 2018.

[3] M.D. expressly denies these allegations, arguing A.E. was motivated to fabricate the incidents alleged to better position herself relative to an ongoing family court matter. The defence takes the position that A.E. is not a credible witness, and her evidence is wholly unreliable.

The Evidence of A.E. Generally

[4] A.E. provided her evidence with the assistance of an Arabic speaking interpreter. A.E.’s evidence continued over a number of days, and I had a good opportunity to assess the nature and quality of her evidence. Prior to reviewing A.E.’s evidence in any substantive way, I want to make it very clear that I have no concern regarding A.E.’s ability to understand and respond to the questions being asked meaningfully. On multiple occasions, A.E. provided her evidence in English and had to be reminded to speak in Arabic. At points in her evidence, A.E. asked for clarification, or for questions to be repeated when she felt it necessary. Moreover, when questions were not being answered, prior to pressing A.E. for an answer, I first ensured she understood the question being posed. As such, I find the difficulties associated with A.E.’s evidence was a direct result of a lack of integrity and a clear intention to mislead the court. This was not about language comprehension.

[5] A.E. was not an impressive witness. I find she provided evidence that was intentionally evasive, implausible, and dishonest. When pressed regarding the more contentious aspects of her evidence, I find A.E. set out to intentionally mislead the court. A.E.’s evidence was internally inconsistent and not corroborated by external evidence. I did not find A.E. to be a credible witness, nor did I find her evidence to be reliable.

February 8, 2017

[6] A.E. testified that on February 8, 2017, M.D. initiated vaginal intercourse with her in their bedroom, which she consented to. She recalled that M.D. asked her to move into the living room area of their shared residence, where they continued consensual vaginal intercourse. However, it was A.E.’s evidence that M.D. then turned her onto her “belly” and penetrated her anus with his penis without her consent. A.E. remembered that she told M.D. the pain was unbearable and tried to “push him away from me”. A.E. testified that M.D. continued to penetrate her anus “for a few minutes, maybe five to ten minutes”. During that time A.E. recalled crying. It was also A.E.’s evidence that their child, D, began to cry during this incident. When asked to estimate how long D was crying, A.E. estimated D was crying for ten to fifteen minutes. Therefore, it was A.E.’s recollection that D was crying when the non-consensual anal intercourse began and continued throughout. Notwithstanding, it was A.E.’s evidence that M.D. was not responsive and continued until he “finished” or “ejaculated”, and then he let her go.

[7] A.E. testified that “one day or two” after this incident she spoke with M.D. and told him “I know now – now what rape is”. A.E. remembered that M.D. responded by saying, “I am not going to repeat this act with you a second time”. When asked why she didn’t report the incident to the police at that time, it was A.E.’s evidence that, “I did not even know that this is – this thing – is wrong. I felt that I was upset, I was not comfortable with it, but I didn’t think or know that it is something wrong”. Given the very serious nature of the sexually assaultive behaviour A.E. alleges M.D. perpetrated against her, I find it unbelievable that she did not know M.D.’s conduct towards her was “wrong”. Moreover, I find this aspect of her evidence is inconsistent with the comment she testified stating to M.D. immediately following the alleged incident related to her comprehension of the term “rape”.

[8] A.E. testified that following the incident she alleges occurs in July of 2017, she attended McGill University Health Centre, and disclosed this sexual assault to the attending physician who treated her. The report produced as a result of A.E.’s attendance at McGill University Health Centre was marked as Exhibit #9 on these proceedings. Of note the attending physician makes no note in her report of A.E. disclosing any alleged sexually assaultive conduct on the part of M.D. at that time. A.E. was pressed on the absence of this detail while under cross-examination. It was her evidence that the attending physician did not include any information related to her disclosure of the prior sexual assault because she told her “I don’t want this topic or a mention of this to be included or mentioned in anything”. This, notwithstanding A.E. testified that the attending physician was the one who explained “what had happened to you is an assault” and was “trying to convince me that you need to go explain this to the police”. I find this aspect of A.E.’s evidence implausible. Particularly, when I consider it contextually and against the backdrop of the entirety of the report prepared by the attending physician wherein, she describes in great detail the physically assaultive behaviour alleged by M.D.

[9] It was M.D.’s evidence that he has no memory of the incident described by A.E. ever taking place, and he specifically denies these allegations.

July 1, 2017

[10] A.E. testified that on July 1, 2017, she asked M.D. if he wanted “to go somewhere to refresh”. She recalled that he refused and “told” her to go prepare breakfast. It was A.E.’s evidence that she complied and went downstairs to prepare breakfast, while M.D. remained with D. A.E. then recalled M.D. calling her in a loud voice and asking her to come to where he was and clean up a mess created by D. A.E. testified that the conflict escalated between them and he told her “this is your job” in reference to cleaning up the garbage. She recalled that M.D. had D in his arms at the relevant time, and D started crying. A.E. remembered asking M.D. for D, so she could breastfeed him; however, the conflict continued to escalate. At this point in the interaction, A.E. testified that “I found myself hit with something hard” and “fell down on the ground”. It was A.E.’s evidence that she “lost consciousness maybe for a minute or so”. Of note, A.E.’s evidence to this end is inconsistent with the report prepared by the attending physician at McGill University Health Centre on July 3, 2017[^1]. Specifically, the attending physician notes that A.E. “denies any loss of consciousness”.

[11] A.E. recalled that D was “screaming and crying” so she attempted to get up quickly to reach him. However, it was A.E.’s evidence that M.D., while holding or pulling her from her hair, threw her to the ground. A.E. remembered that she attempted to get up a “few times”, but M.D. would push her back down on the ground. A.E. recalled that M.D. repeated this behaviour to a point where she thought she was “going to die”. A.E. testified that she was able to locate her phone and called the police. It was her evidence that she told the police “my husband it beating me”, while waiting for the police to arrive, A.E. recalled M.D. pointed out that she was not wearing her hijab, and asked her to go back inside their home. A.E. recalled that she agreed, and took D inside with her at that point. A.E. testified that as a result of her altercation with M.D. on July 1, 2017, she sustained an injury to one of her teeth and bruises on both legs and her face. It was A.E.’s evidence that she sent photographs of the bruising she sustained to investigators by “e-mail”. Those images do not make up a part of the record before me.

[12] M.D. agreed that there was a conflict between the pair on July 1, 2017, which initiated over a garbage can being knocked over by D. M.D. acknowledged that when asked by A.E. if he viewed her as a maid, he responded out of anger and “in a spiteful way” and told her “yes, this is how I view it”. However, it was M.D.’s evidence that as the conflict escalated, A.E. was trying to grab D in a way that he believed was “really harmful”. It was his evidence that he “shielded” D with his arms against A.E. M.D. testified that while holding D's back with his left hand, he twisted to his left very “rapidly”, incidentally making contact with the left side of A.E. with his forearm or elbow. M.D.’s evidence to this end was very detailed and he recalled his contact with A.E. occurred because her arms “were still there”. M.D. was very clear in his evidence that he did not intentionally come into contact with A.E. on July 1, 2017 in any way. Rather, any contact that occurred between them in the midst of the admitted conflict was incidental.

[13] A.E. testified that she told the officers who arrived that day that M.D. “hit me”. However, it was A.E.’s evidence that when she learned that M.D. could be arrested, she asked the officers “don’t do that. I don’t want to hurt him…I don’t want to make any problem”. A.E. recalled that consequently, the officers present told her they were not “going to mention or to write anything in the report”. A.E.’s representation to this end is consistent with the report prepared by attending physician at McGill University Health Centre, as it is noted, “she initially decided not to press charges when the police initially appeared at her home”. Additionally, A.E. also made a similar representation in a family court affidavit indicating, “the applicant father was charged a few years ago, but the respondent mother withdrew the charges as the applicant promised he would change”. A.E. was pressed on the content of this family court affidavit while under cross examination, and she clarified her assertion in the family court affidavit referred to the incident between the pair on July 1, 2017, when she “told the police that I do not want him to be arrested”. When A.E. was further pressed about this affidavit, it was her evidence that the affidavit was not actually sworn or affirmed; rather, the lawyer representing A.E.’s interests in the collateral family court proceeding had her sign the document using “Docusign”. To be very clear, I completely reject this suggestion. I must consider it against the backdrop of the complete evidentiary record, which has been placed before me. I find there is absolutely no basis for me to believe that a member of the bar has conducted themselves unprofessionally.

[14] A.E.’s evidence related to Halton Regional Police Officers voluntarily omitting a reported domestic assault from their notes is directly contradicted by the relevant notes prepared by the responding officers on July 1, 2017. A.E.’s contention to this end was also directly contradicted by the viva voce evidence of Officer Hurley and Mr. Eric Simpson, who has since resigned from the Halton Regional Police Service.

[15] Officer Hurley testified that he did not have an independent recollection of everything that occurred on July 1, 2017; however, he was able to use his notes to refresh his memory. He recalled attending a domestic related call with Eric Simpson and at least two additional officers. Officer Hurley had noted that there was a dispute between A.E. and M.D. over cleaning chores, wherein M.D. was holding D and A.E. continued to try and retrieve D from him. It was Officer Hurley’s evidence that Eric Simpson informed him that “no criminal allegations were made by the female at that time”. When Officer Hurley was asked if, at any point, he offered to falsify his notes to A.E., his reaction was very telling. Officer Hurley responded, “Sorry? Say that one more time? I just want to be clear what...” When the question was repeated, Officer Hurley responded, “Okay, No.” It was clear to me that the suggestion being put to Officer Hurley was so foreign to him, he couldn’t even understand the question the first time it was asked. I found Officer Hurley’s evidence to be candid, clear, and believable. He was a credible witness, and I found his evidence to be reliable.

[16] Mr. Simpson had no independent recollection of his involvement in the investigation on July 1, 2017, so his notes were made an exhibit accordingly to the principles associated with past recollection recorded.[^2] Mr. Simpson noted that there was a verbal argument over cleaning and M.D. was holding D. A.E. attempted to retrieve the baby and M.D. turned away from her. While doing so, his arm made contact with A.E. Mr. Simpson further noted that A.E. advised investigators that she called the police because she was scared and wanted D back. Mr. Simpson’s notes indicate “no criminal offence as both parties are saying incidental contact while reaching for baby”. When asked if he offered to write erroneous information in his notes to A.E. that day, Mr. Simpson responded, “No”. Further, Mr. Simpson testified that in his six-year career as a police officer, he never offered to falsify his notes to any witness. I found Mr. Simpson provided evidence that was straightforward and honest. He was a credible witness, and I find his evidence to be reliable.

[17] I want to address very clearly the very serious allegations made by A.E. against Officer Hurley and Mr. Simpson, which were furthered by the crown on this record. I agree with the crown, no witness comes before the court with any presumption of credibility. The entirety of the evidence placed before me must be impartially and dispassionately assessed, regardless of whether the witness is a professional witness or a civilian witness. To that end, where an appropriate evidentiary record exists, I want there to be no doubt that I am capable of finding police officers engaged in falsifying their notes, collusion, and perjury en masse. However, this isn’t such a record. I do not believe that Officer Hurley and Mr. Simpson agreed to falsify their notes to assist A.E., who was a stranger to them at the time, in the context of an investigation Officer Hurley can barely remember and Mr. Simpson has completely forgotten. I find their respective notes, and their evidence surrounding the events to be plausible, and consistent with the detailed evidence provided by M.D. I believe them. I find A.E. provided evidence that she knew was false to maintain a narrative, which would be consistent with what she told the attending physician at McGill University Health Centre, and what she represented in family court documents. She was dishonest and intentionally tried to mislead the court.

January 13, 2018

[18] A.E. testified that on January 13, 2018, a conflict arose between herself and M.D., which lead to him attempting to leave their shared residence. A.E. recalled that she attempted to intervene and stop M.D. from leaving when he was close to the door, at which point M.D. took his left hand and pushed her back up against the stairs. It was A.E.’s evidence that the force of that contact was so strong, that her “back hit severely on the stairs”. A.E. later clarified that she didn’t fall on stairs, but she hit the railing. There was some inconsistency in A.E.’s description of where she alleged the assault took place. Initially, she described a piece of wall to the right of the stairs, and indicated at one point in their interaction, her back was up against that piece of wall. However, when an image of the exact location was presented to A.E. in the context of cross-examination[^3], it became clear this aspect of her evidence was implausible.

[19] M.D. has no recollection of any altercation occurring between the parties in the doorway of their shared residence as described by A.E.

July 28, 2018

[20] Both parties acknowledged that in July of 2018, their relationship was not in a good place. It was A.E.’s evidence that she only agreed to sleep in the same bed as M.D. at that point in time after telling him “I don’t want you to get close to me”. However, A.E. testified that on July 28, 2018 M.D. began to hug her “from the back”. She recalled he was tying to get close to her, notwithstanding A.E. was telling M.D. to leave her alone because she was trying to sleep. It was A.E.’s evidence that M.D was putting his penis on her back and “trying to continue to reach the location of the vagina”. She remembered her “muscles were in tension”, and she told M.D. “I don’t want that”. After one minute, M.D. responded.

[21] A.E. testified that at this point in the interaction, D had come into their room. A.E. recalled that she took D to his room to change his clothes and his diaper. It was A.E.’s evidence that M.D. was in D’s bedroom at that point in time, and his conduct was aggressive in nature. A.E. remembered that she told M.D. that she wanted to take something from D’s bedroom; however, he told her to “get out of his place”. A.E. testified that M.D. pulled her head and her left ear. She recalled him dragging her back to their shared bedroom and started screaming in her face “when your husband tell you something, you do it”. Ultimately, A.E. decided to call the police.

[22] M.D. remembered there was some conflict between himself and A.E. on July 28, 2018, which initiated in their shared bedroom. M.D. testified that while A.E. was breastfeeding D, he left their bedroom and went to lay down on D’s bed. It was his evidence that he was attempting to de-escalate the conflict; however, A.E. eventually followed him into D’s bedroom. M.D. recalled A.E. was “storming the door and shouting at me”. M.D. remembered asking A.E. to leave D’s room, and her responding “this is my house…don’t tell me what to do”. M.D. testified that he asked A.E. to leave D’s room in an ”assertive way”. However, specifically denies physically touching her, or dragging her back to their shared bedroom. M.D. also denied attempting to have sexual intercourse with A.E. that day. It was his evidence that he remained clothed, as did A.E., while the pair were lying together in bed. He denied rubbing his penis on A.E.’s back or touching her vagina with his penis in any way. M.D. recalled at that point in their relationship, he was “not it the mental or emotional state to desire sex” with A.E.

[23] Officer Pratt attended in response to the call A.E. made to the Halton Regional Police on that occasion. Officer Pratt testified that initially, the call for service alleged that M.D. had pulled A.E.’s hair. However, when Officer Pratt personally spoke with A.E. on July 28, 2018, it was her evidence that A.E.’s story “changed a few times” throughout their interaction. A.E. first indicated that M.D. had “pulled her ear”, and then A.E. told Officer Pratt that “nothing physical had happened”. Officer Pratt recalled that the very first thing A.E. told her when she arrived on scene, was that she wanted a report prepared by the police stating that “she’s a good person” just in case M.D. tried to take D away. At the conclusion of her investigation, Officer Pratt determined that she did not have reasonable grounds to believe any intimate partner violence had occurred between the parties, so M.D. was not charged criminally at that point in time.

[24] Ultimately, all of the allegations M.D. answers to at trial were reported to the police by A.E. on September 21, 2022, the very same day her family law counsel received an ultimatum letter, which demanded M.D. be permitted to have overnight visitation with D. When A.E. was pressed in cross-examination on the timing of when she reported the incidents alleged, relative to the collateral developments in the family law proceedings, I find she became extremely evasive. She testified that she was unaware of the letter, and only became aware of the correspondence after she contacted the authorities. I found her evidence to this end to be implausible, and I do not accept it.

Grounding Legal Principles

[25] M.D. is presumed innocent unless and until the crown has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system, originally embedded in our common law tradition and now guaranteed as a fundamental legal right under our constitution: R. v. Nyznik 2017 ONSC 4392, [2017] O.J. No. 4138 at para. 4. The presumption of innocence and the standard or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, are important safeguards to ensure that no innocent person is convicted of an offence. Without these protections, there would be a serious risk of wrongful convictions, an outcome, which cannot be accepted in a free and democratic society: R. v. Nyznik at para. 5.

[26] The concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lifchus. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence. Even if I believe M.D. is probably or likely guilty, that is not sufficient. In those circumstances, I must give the benefit of the doubt to M.D. and find him not guilty, as the crown would have failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It would not be safe to convict: R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 at para. 39; R. v. Nyznik at para. 6.

[27] On the other hand, I have reminded myself that it is virtually impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty and the crown is not required to do so. Such a standard of proof is impossibly high. Essentially, before I can find M.D guilty, I must be sure that he has committed the offences charged: R. v. Lifchus at para. 39; R. v. Nyznik at para. 7.

[28] In applying these principles in a case, which involves allegations of sexual assault, I find Justice Molloy’s comments at paragraph 16 of R. v. Nyznik provide helpful guidance:

“It is sometimes said that the application of these principles is unfair to complainants in sexual assault cases, that judges are improperly dubious of the testimony of complainants, and that the system is tilted in favour of the accused. In my opinion, those critics fail to understand the purpose of a sexual assault trial, which is to determine whether or not a criminal offence has been committed. It is essential that the rights of the complainant be respected in that process and that decisions not be based on outmoded or stereotypical ideals about how victims of assault will or will not behave. However, the focus of a criminal trial is not the vindication of the complainant. The focus must always be on whether or not the alleged offence has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In many cases, the only evidence implicating a person accused of sexual assault will be the testimony of the complainant. There will usually be no other eye-witnesses. There will often be no physical or other corroborative evidence. For that reason, a judge is frequently required to scrutinize the testimony of a complainant to determine whether, based on that evidence alone, the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That is a heavy burden, and one that is hard to discharge on the word of one person. However, the presumption of innocence, placing the burden of proof on the Crown, and the reasonable doubt standard are necessary protections to avoid wrongful convictions. While this may mean that sometimes a guilty person will be acquitted, that is the unavoidable consequence of ensuring that innocent people are never convicted.”

[29] Moreover, “believe the victim” has no place in a criminal trial. To approach a trial with the assumption that the complainant is telling the truth is the equivalent of imposing a presumption of guilt on the individual accused of the sexually assaultive conduct. This places a burden on him to prove his innocence, which is antithetical to the fundamental principles of justice enshrined in our constitution and the values underlying a free and democratic society: R. v. Nyznik, at para. 17.

[30] Given that M.D, the defendant, has provided evidence, the framework set out in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 26 applies. Specifically, the test outlined at paragraph 28:

(1) If I believe the evidence of M.D., obviously, I must find him not guilty;

(2) Second, even if I do not believe the testimony of M.D., but I am left in reasonable doubt by it, I must find him not guilty;

(3) Finally, even if I am not left in doubt by the evidence of M.D., I must ask myself whether on the basis of the evidence which I do accept, if I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of M.D.

[31] In turning my mind to the analysis I must engage in, I have also reviewed the article written by Paciocco J.A. entitled, “Doubt about Doubt: Coping with W.(D.) And Credibility Assessment” found at 2017 22 Canadian Criminal Law Review 31. In that article, Justice Paciocco helpfully breaks down the W.(D.) principles into five analytical points:

(1) Criminal trial cannot properly be resolved by deciding which conflicting version of events is preferred;

(2) A criminal fact-finder that believes evidence that is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused cannot convict the accused;

(3) Even if a criminal fact-finder does not entirely believe evidence inconsistent with guilt, if the fact-finder is left unsure whether that evidence is true there is a reasonable doubt and an acquittal must follow;

(4) Even where the fact-finder entirely disbelieves evidence inconsistent with guilt, the mere rejection of that evidence does not prove guilt; and

(5) Even where the fact-finder entirely disbelieves evidence inconsistent with guilt, the accused should not be convicted unless the evidence that is given credit proves the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Analysis

[32] I have carefully considered the evidence of M.D. against the backdrop of the entire evidentiary record, which was placed before me. I believe him. M.D. provided evidence that was thoughtful, clear, and honest. He admitted to making unfortunate utterances towards A.E. which he personally characterized as “spiteful”. I found his willingness to make admissions of this nature served to enhance his credibility and the reliability of his evidence overall.

[33] M.D.’s evidence was detailed, it flowed logically, and his evidence was corroborated by the evidence provided by investigators on this record. I accept it. I do not believe M.D. engaged in any physically or sexually assaultive conduct towards A.E. With a view to the interaction, which occurred between the parties on July 1, 2017, I find any physical contact to be incidental rather than assaultive.

Conclusion

[34] In the result, I find M.D. not guilty with respect to all counts charged on the information, which is before the court.

Released: December 4, 2024 Justice Jennifer Campitelli

[^1]: Exhibit #9 [^2]: Exhibit 16A [^3]: Exhibit 13