DATE: November 8, 2024 COURT FILE NO. FO-07-43127
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY OFFICE FOR THE BENEFIT OF DIANA SAHID
APPLICANT
DIANE GILLIES, for the APPLICANT
- and -
BHOJNARINE RAMGOPAUL
RESPONDENT
ACTING IN PERSON
AND
COURT FILE NO. FO-16-90605
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY OFFICE FOR THE BENEFIT OF KRISTINA BHANSINGH
APPLICANT
DIANE GILLIES for the APPLICANT
- and -
BHOJNARINE RAMGOPAUL
RESPONDENT
ACTING IN PERSON
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
Both Cases Heard: November 5, 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
[1] On November 5, 2024, the court heard default hearings in these cases (the Sahid case and the Bhansingh case).
[2] The parties agreed that the cases should be heard together as the respondent’s (the payor’s) ability to pay child support arrears was the central issue in both cases.
[3] The payor was permitted to file personal and corporate income tax returns, notices of assessment and his personal bank account statements that he brought to the hearing. They were marked as exhibits.
[4] The payor testified and called his father to testify on his behalf.
[5] The applicant (the Director) seeks default orders that the payor be immediately imprisoned for 120 days in each case, or until such earlier time as he pays all of the outstanding arrears. It also seeks an order that the payor be jailed for 3 days for each payment in default for ongoing support accruals in each case, or until such earlier time as the payments are made.
[6] In the alternative, the Director seeks an order that the payor be imprisoned immediately in each case for a significant term, or until such earlier time as he pays $6,008 in the Sahid case and $2,373 in the Bhansingh case. It also seeks orders that the balance of arrears owing in each case be paid in four lump sum instalments over one year, with 30-day committal terms for each payment in default, or until such earlier time as the payments are made. It also seeks an order that the payor be jailed for 3 days for each payment in default for ongoing support accruals in each case, or until such earlier time as the payments are made.
[7] The payor proposed to pay a total of $577 each month towards support arrears in both cases, in addition to his ongoing support obligations. He submitted that he did not have the ability to pay the lump sum amounts sought by the Director. He asked that no committal terms be attached to his payments.
Part Two – The Sahid case
[8] The payor is the father of a 17-year-old child in the Sahid case.
[9] On November 22, 2019, after a contested trial, Justice Robert Spence imputed annual income of $75,000 to the payor and ordered him to pay child support of $700 each month, starting on October 1, 2017. He also ordered the payor to pay $86 each month towards special and extraordinary expenses for the child, pursuant to section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines (the Spence order).
[10] On September 29, 2022, the payor moved to change the Spence order. He did not attend at court and his motion to change was dismissed as abandoned on December 16, 2022.
[11] On October 3, 2022, in this default proceeding, the court made a temporary default order that the payor be committed to jail for 3 days in default of making ongoing support payments of $786 each month.
[12] The payor retained counsel. The default matter was adjourned several times at the payor’s request to pursue a motion to change the Spence order. Financial disclosure orders were made.
[13] The payor issued a motion to change the Spence order on January 22, 2024. The payor did not attend at the hearing of the motion to change and it was dismissed on August 9, 2024.
[14] The Director filed its updated Statement of Arrears at the hearing. Its contents were not disputed by the payor. The payor is $40,141.42 in arrears pursuant to the Spence order, as of November 5, 2024.
[15] It was also not disputed that the payor is $6,008 in arrears pursuant to the temporary default order made on October 3, 2022.
Part Three – The Bhansingh case
[16] The payor is the father of a 10-year-old child in the Bhansingh case.
[17] On November 1, 2017, on consent, Justice Paisley of the Superior Court of Justice ordered the payor to pay child support of $270 each month, together with $154 each month for special and extraordinary expenses up until August 1, 2018, and $77 each month after August 1, 2018. This was based on an annual income attributed to the payor of $32,100 (the Paisley order).
[18] The payor has not moved to change the Paisley order.
[19] On October 3, 2022, the payor consented to a temporary default order in this proceeding to pay $372 each month.
[20] On September 12, 2023, the temporary default order was changed to provide that the payor be committed to jail for one day for each payment in default.
[21] The default proceeding was adjourned several times for the payor to pursue his motion to change in the Sahid case. Financial disclosure orders were made.
[22] The Director filed its updated Statement of Arrears at the hearing. Its contents were not disputed by the payor. The payor is $11,075 in arrears, pursuant to the Paisley order, as of November 4, 2024.
[23] The payor did not dispute that he is $2,373 in arrears pursuant to the temporary default order made on October 3, 2022.
Part Four – The payor’s evidence
[24] The payor is 43 years old. He said he has lived with his parents for the past 11 years and does not pay rent.
[25] The payor completed a course as an Automotive Service Technician in 1990 at Centennial College.
[26] The payor said he used to work as an Automotive Technician at car dealerships. He claimed he annually earned between $50,000 and $60,000.
[27] In about 2013, the payor said he joined his family automotive business. He said it is owned by his parents.
[28] The payor said he runs the automotive business. He does all the service work. He said his father comes to the shop 3 to 4 days each week to oversee the operation.
[29] The payor acknowledged that his business operates in cash. He said he does not receive a formal salary and that he is paid by his father in cash. He said he receives 40% of the profits of the business and his parents receive 60%.
[30] The payor filed his personal tax returns and notices of assessment showing the following annual income:
2020 - $12,000 2021 - $17,500 2022 - $8,378 2023 - $12,000
[31] The payor claimed he has no other sources of income.
[32] The corporate tax returns filed by the payor each year for the business showed annual losses.
[33] The payor said the business did very poorly during the pandemic but is now doing better. He estimated his current annual income is $35,000 to $40,000.
[34] The payor acknowledged his tax returns do not reflect his actual income.
[35] The payor said he tries to contribute to household expenses when he can. He stated he pays for his own clothing, entertainment expenses and food expenses outside the home.
[36] The payor acknowledged that his finances and those of his parents are intertwined. He also acknowledged that both he and his father pay personal expenses through the business bank account.
[37] The payor’s father testified. He said that except for very brief periods where the payor lived with the mothers of his children, he has always lived in his home. The payor’s father said he pays for all the household expenses. He said the payor does not contribute to those expenses.
[38] The payor’s father stated that he and his wife own their home and that there is a line of credit registered against it. He said that the automotive business and the property it operates from are owned by his wife. He said there is a mortgage on the property.
[39] The payor’s father testified that he and his wife are retired and live off Canada Pension Plan benefits.
[40] The payor’s father testified that the business is looking promising as the economy is improving. He said he visits the automotive shop four days a week.
[41] The payor’s father contradicted the payor’s evidence about the financial arrangements for the business. He said he pays the payor a salary of about $2,500 each month, and pays the payor weekly, in cash. He denied having any profit-sharing arrangement with the payor.
Part Five – Legal considerations
[42] The current statutory scheme governing default hearings is found in section 41 of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996 (the Act) and rule 30 of the Family Law Rules. The Director may initiate the default proceeding. The Director prepares a statement of arrears. The payor files a financial statement and, if so inclined, a default dispute. The court may hear oral testimony, direct the production of other relevant documentation and add parties to the default proceedings. See: Fischer v. Ontario (Family Responsibility Office), 2008 ONCA 825, paragraph 17.
[43] At the hearing, the amount of arrears owed and the payor's ability to pay are the central issues. Subsection 41 (9) of the Act puts the onus on the payor, as follows:
Presumptions at hearing
(9) At the default hearing, unless the contrary is shown, the payor shall be presumed to have the ability to pay the arrears and to make subsequent payments under the order, and the statement of arrears prepared and served by the Director shall be presumed to be correct as to arrears accruing while the order is filed in the Director’s office.
[44] Subsection 41 (10) of the Act sets out the powers of the court on a default hearing as follows:
Powers of court
(10) The court may, unless it is satisfied that the payor is unable for valid reasons to pay the arrears or to make subsequent payments under the order, order that the payor,
(a) pay all or part of the arrears by such periodic or lump sum payments as the court considers just, but an order for partial payment does not rescind any unpaid arrears;
(b) discharge the arrears in full by a specified date;
(c) comply with the order to the extent of the payor’s ability to pay;
(d) make a motion to change the support order;
(e) provide security in such form as the court directs for the arrears and subsequent payment;
(f) report periodically to the court, the Director or a person specified in the order;
(g) provide to the court, the Director or a person specified in the order particulars of any future change of address or employment as soon as they occur;
(h) be imprisoned continuously or intermittently until the period specified in the order, which shall not be more than 180 days, has expired, or until the arrears are paid, whichever is sooner; and
(i) on default in any payment ordered under this subsection, be imprisoned continuously or intermittently until the period specified in the order, which shall not be more than 180 days, has expired, or until the payment is made, whichever is sooner.
[45] Subsection 41 (11) of the Act states:
No effect on accruing of arrears or other means of enforcement
(11) An order under subsection (10) does not affect the accruing of arrears, nor does it limit or otherwise affect any other means of enforcing the support order.
[46] Subsection 41 (17) of the Act reads:
Imprisonment does not discharge arrears
(17) Imprisonment of a payor under clause (10) (h) or (i) does not discharge arrears under an order.
[47] At a default hearing, the payor must show an inability to pay due to valid reasons. A valid reason is an event over which the payor has no control which renders the payor totally without assets or income with which to meet his or her obligations, such as disabling illness or involuntary unemployment. See: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Carney, 2004 ONCJ 11. The payor must also show that he or she has accepted their responsibilities and placed the child’s interests over their own and has provided frank disclosure to the court. See: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Labrash, 2002 CarswellOnt 90 (OCJ).
[48] In Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. De Francesco, 2012 ONSC 6338, Justice Carolyn Jones further explores the meaning of “valid reason” under subsection 41 (10) as follows at paragraph 21 of her decision:
“21 Valid reasons, within the meaning of s. 41(10) of the Act, imply reasons for which the payor cannot be faulted or for which the payor does not bear responsibility in the culpable sense. The court would expect some evidence of circumstances where, despite reasonable, diligent and legitimate efforts by the support payor to comply with the support order, the support payor has been unable to do so for reasons that are not connected with an unwillingness to pay, a lack of effort, a failure to prioritize the support obligation or a deliberate neglect, failure or avoidance on the part of the payor. Evidence relating to the past and present circumstances of the payor, including his financial circumstances since the time of the first default under the order, the manner in which he has applied his available income and assets, and his efforts to secure employment or income during the time that the arrears have arisen will have some bearing upon the determination of the legitimacy of the reasons the payor puts forward for his default under the support order. Circumstances that are beyond the control of the payor, resulting in the payor's inability to pay, would be valid reasons. An illness on the part of the payor, including a mental disorder, rendering the payor completely unable to work on either a full or part-time basis, as in the case before the court, would amount to a valid reason for the payor's failure to pay.”
[49] The court is not required to incorporate the payment terms of the existing support order in its default order. DeFrancesco, supra, par. 22.
[50] In determining ability to pay, the payor must give priority to child support before consumer debts. See: Baumann v. Clatworthy, 35 R.F.L. (3d) 200 (Ont. General Division).
[51] Where an order has been made imputing income, a support payor is not going to be able to vary that order unless he can demonstrate that there has been a material change since it was made. It is not open to a litigant to fail to produce financial information, run the risk that a trial judge will impute income, and then come back to a new court and suggest that the imputed income was wrong. See: Ruffolo v. David, 2016 ONSC 754, 2016 CarswellOnt 2151 (Ont. Div. Ct.). While this was written on a motion to change, this comment is also germane to default hearings. See: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Ramsay, 2024 ONCJ 64.
[52] Clause 41 (10) (i) of the Act contemplates an order of imprisonment for failure to pay an amount owing at the time the order is made or a failure to make future payments required under the order: See: Saunders v. Saunders, [1987] O.J. No. 1578, 10 R.F.L. (3d) 284 (Dist. Ct.), at para. 11; Fischer, supra.
[53] Enforcement legislation should be viewed as remedial rather than punitive. See: Saunders, supra.
[54] Imprisonment is a last resort. Something more than non-payment is required. The payor’s conduct must demonstrate a willful and deliberate disregard for the obligation to comply with court orders. It is meant as a mechanism to enforce support and not as a means of punishing the payor. See: Fischer, supra.
[55] In Fischer, supra, the court writes at paragraph 25:
Further, the case law and the Act recognize that imprisonment for non-payment is meant as a means of enforcing the support order and not as a means of punishing the payor. The payor must be released upon payment of the amount owed: see s. 41(10) (i). A committal order, imposed as a term of either a temporary or final order in a default hearing, is intended to induce compliance with the payment terms of the order. The prospect of imprisonment hopefully focuses the payor's mind on the importance of making the required payments. The enforcement rationale for imprisonment upon non-payment makes sense only if the payor has the ability to make the payments required by the order: see Saunders, at paras. 11-13 …
[56] The maximum jail time should be reserved for the most severe cases. See: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Kirkpatrick, 60 R.F.L. (6th) 435 (SCJ); Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Ramsay, 2024 ONCJ 64.
[57] In FRO v. Hennessy, 2022 ONSC 2594, the court set out the following non-exhaustive set of factors (the Hennessy factors) to consider before ordering imprisonment:
- Pattern of accumulated arrears: it is the pattern of the payor’s non-payment that should be more compelling than the total amount of support arrears owing. At first look, larger sums of support arrears might appear to reflect more blameworthy conduct. However, one must bear in mind that support arrears are relative to the monthly support award: sustained periods of non-payment, whether $100 per month, or $10,000.00 per month can be equally devastating to the recipient. As such, the period of non-compliance is likely more probative to the nature of the payor’s non-compliance than the total quantum owing.
- Voluntary v. involuntary payments: In reviewing the Director’s Statement of Arrears filed, the court may consider whether the payor’s historic contributions towards the support obligation were made by way of direct payment from the support payor, or by involuntary diversions. Such information might be relevant to whether the payor was making efforts to comply with the terms of the operative support order or playing a game of ‘catch me if you can’.
- Income source disclosure: Similarly, the court might consider the payor’s history of income disclosure. In some cases, the payor will diligently and voluntarily disclose income sources to the Director or the Recipient, facilitating the prompt garnishment of income streams. In other cases, the payor will not disclose changes in employment, leaving the recipient and FRO caseworker to attempt to chase and locate income sources.
- Previous findings: It is not inappropriate to review the historic court record, and in particular, any previous court endorsements which speak to the payor’s willingness or unwillingness to accept their obligation to support recipients. For example, if income was imputed to a payor due to a finding of intentional unemployment or underemployment, or because the payor failed to produce the financial disclosure as required, the court may be more likely to find that any non-payment of support was wilful and deliberate in nature rather than as a result of unfortunate circumstance. Likewise, where a default hearing continues after an operative support order has been changed (i.e. under s. 41(22) of the FRSAEA), the court may consider whether any of the periods of non-payment of support were mitigated, excused or forgiven for legitimate reason in the subsequent order.
- Timeliness of actions of payor: It is not uncommon that a payor does not take steps to commence a Motion to Change proceeding until they have been brought before the court on default notice. However, once the payor indicates that they intend to seek changes to the operative support order, the court may consider whether the payor took bona fide steps to comply with court procedure and seek change on the merits, or whether the payor was simply engaging in further tactics to delay payment to the recipient.
- Other evidence of prioritization of self over support: In some cases, there may be lifestyle or other financial information before the court which causes the court concern that the payor has prioritized other expenditures over compliance with the support order. It is not inappropriate to consider information relating to the payor’s assets or expenditures, if available, in assessing whether their non-payment is wilful and deliberate.
[58] In Director, Family Responsibility Office v. Masoud, 2021 ONCJ 265, this court wrote that the court must also consider the interests of the child and the support recipient who are not before the court, and the consequences to them of the payor’s failure to meet his support obligations. The court wrote at paragraphs 71 and 72:
[71] In Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at paragraph 121, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of support payors meeting their support obligations and commented that the neglect or underpayment of support is strongly connected to child poverty and female poverty.
[72] It is imperative that courts not contribute to that hardship and to the feminization of poverty by failing to enforce valid and subsisting court orders when a payor does not establish a valid inability to pay and fails to provide adequate financial disclosure – as is the case here.
Part Six – Analysis
[59] The payor only partially rebutted the presumption that he has the ability to immediately pay the entire amount of arrears and the ongoing support payments in both cases.
[60] The payor did not rebut the presumption that he could afford to make significant payments towards payment of the arrears and the ongoing support payments in both cases.
[61] The payor has not acted in good faith regarding his child support obligations. He has placed his own interests ahead of his children’s interests. He owns two cars. He spends $60 each month for alcohol and tobacco. He has a joint RSP of $1,800 with his mother. These funds could have been applied to his child support obligations.
[62] The payor has a very poor history of paying child support. He has actively avoided his child support obligations. He has deliberately hid income from the support recipients. For the most part, he has only voluntarily paid child support when under the pressure of a default proceeding.
[63] The payor brought two motions to change the Spence order. Both were dismissed when he did not attend at court. He has not complied with temporary default orders in these cases. He has stalled the enforcement of these cases.
[64] The payor has prioritized payment of debts to his support obligations to his children.
[65] The payor was not a credible witness. The court does not accept his evidence about his income or about his ability to earn income.
[66] The payor operates a cash business. He provided no credible records about his income or expenses. His income tax returns and bank statements do not reflect his actual income. The income he reports each year to the Canada Revenue Agency is manufactured.
[67] The self-employed have an inherent obligation to put forward not only adequate, but comprehensive, records of income and expenses, from which the recipient can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established. See: Meade v. Meade, 31 R.F.L. 5th 88 (SCJ). This includes the obligation to present information in a user-friendly fashion. See: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Salman, 2022 ONCJ 329. This was not done.
[68] The court will usually draw an adverse inference against a party for his or her failure to comply with their disclosure obligations as provided for in section 21 of the guidelines. See: Smith v. Pellegrini, [2008] O.J. No. 3616, (Ont. S.C.); Maimone v. Maimone, [2009] O.J. No. 2140, (Ont. S.C.); Isaya v. Ozo, 2022 ONCJ 321. The party must make full and complete financial disclosure to ensure that the information required to make a decision on the issue is before the court. See: Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719.
[69] The court draws an adverse inference against the payor for his failure to provide any meaningful financial disclosure. Much of the disclosure provided by the payor was only provided at this hearing, despite multiple financial disclosure orders.
[70] The payor’s finances are intertwined with his parents’ finances. They are one financial unit. The payor admitted he keeps no records of monies flowing between himself and his parents. His parents have enabled him to shirk his child support obligations.
[71] The payor’s evidence about the financial arrangements for the business were starkly contradicted by his father who denied the existence of any profit-sharing arrangement and said he pays a weekly cash salary to him.
[72] The payor misrepresented his income to the court on his motion to change dated January 22, 2024. In his financial statement filed in support of his motion to change, he deposed his annual income was $8,378. He knew this was false. At this hearing, he stated he earned $20,000 to $25,000 in 2023. He likely earned much more than that.
[73] The payor said he was earning $50,000 to $60,000 annually when he worked as an automotive technician for dealerships many years ago. He would likely be earning far more today if he looked for similar work. He acknowledged that the median pay rate for automotive technicians is about $32 per hour, or over $66,000 annually for full-time work. He is an experienced automotive technician who could make even more than the median amount. It defies logic for him to work for 11 years earning far less than minimum wage income. He is either earning much more income than he claims, or he is choosing to earn far less income to avoid his child support obligations – or likely both.
[74] Justice Spence imputed annual income of $75,000 to the payor on November 22, 2019 after a contested trial. The payor had claimed to be earning far less income during that proceeding. Justice Spence endorsed that the payor failed to make financial disclosure. He did not accept the payor’s evidence about his income then and this court does not accept his evidence now. There is no evidence to support a finding that the payor has been unable to earn the income imputed to him in the Spence order.
[75] The payor has modest living expenses. He pays no housing expenses. This has increased his ability to pay the support ordered in the Spence and Paisley orders.
Part Seven – The default orders
[76] This leaves the court to determine what default orders are appropriate in these circumstances.
[77] The court’s sympathies lie with the support recipients and the children who have not received a fair amount of child support from the payor. It is one of the court’s primary objectives in a default hearing to maximize the enforcement of an order.
[78] The court also has to consider that imprisonment is the last resort for enforcement. In making a default order with a term of imprisonment attached, the court should be confident that the payor has the ability to make the payments ordered. The consequences to the payor if the court orders him to pay amounts he cannot afford are profound.
[79] Reconciliation of the objective to maximize the enforcement of an order while not unjustly imprisoning a payor for non-payment of a default order is a delicate balancing act for the court. This court prefers to err on the side of caution in balancing these considerations. See: Ontario (Family Responsibility Office) v. Levy, 2016 ONCJ 474.
[80] The court accepts the Director’s position that a committal term should be attached to any payment order. The payor has a poor payment history. He has demonstrated little regard for court orders. He has defaulted on the temporary default orders. The orders this court makes must have teeth to them if they are to be effective and to achieve long-awaited justice for the support recipients and the children.
[81] While the court does not find that the payor has the ability to immediately pay the full amount of the arrears in both cases, as requested by the Director, the evidence informs it that the payor earns or has the ability to earn far more income than he states and that he has the ability to obtain funds to permit him to make meaningful lump sum payments towards the support arrears over the next 18 months, including an immediate payment of $15,000.
[82] The court will allocate the arrears payments in proportion to the arrears owing to the support recipients, being approximately 80% to the Sahid case and 20% to the Bhansingh case.
[83] In the Sahid case, the payor will be required to immediately pay $12,000 towards the arrears. He shall be imprisoned for 80 days or until such earlier time as the payment is made. A warrant of committal shall be issued forthwith but shall be held in abeyance until the return date of December 3, 2024 to see if the payment is made.
[84] The payor shall be required to make the following additional payments towards the arrears in the Sahid case:
a) $5,000 by March 1, 2025 b) $5,000 by June 1, 2025 c) $5,000 by September 1, 2025 d) $5,000 by December 1, 2025 e) $5,000 by March 1, 2026 f) The balance by June 1, 2026.
[85] The payor shall be committed to jail for 30 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes these payments in full.
[86] The payor shall also pay the ongoing child support payments in the Sahid case of $786 each month starting on December 1, 2024. He shall be committed to jail for 3 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes these payments in full.
[87] In the Bhansingh case, the payor will be required to immediately pay $3,000 towards the arrears. He shall be imprisoned for 20 days or until such earlier time as the payment is made. A warrant of committal shall be issued forthwith but shall be held in abeyance until the return date of December 3, 2024 to see if the payment is made.
[88] The payor shall be required to make the following additional payments towards the arrears in the Bhansingh case:
a) $1,200 by March 1, 2025 b) $1,200 by June 1, 2025 c) $1,200 by September 1, 2025 d) $1,200 by December 1, 2026 e) $1,200 by March 1, 2026 f) The balance owing by June 1, 2026
[89] The payor shall be committed to jail for 10 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes the payments in full.
[90] The payor shall also pay the ongoing child support payments of $347 each month in the Bhansingh case, starting on December 1, 2024. He shall be committed to jail for 3 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes these payments in full.
Part Eight – Conclusion
[91] In the Sahid case, there shall be a final default order on the following terms:
a) Child support arrears are fixed in the sum of $40,141.42 as of November 5, 2024.
b) The payor shall be committed to jail immediately for 80 days, or until such earlier time as he pays $12,000 towards the arrears.
c) The payor shall pay the balance of the arrears as follows:
i. $5,000 by March 1, 2025 ii. $5,000 by June 1, 2025 iii. $5,000 by September 1, 2025 iv. $5,000 by December 1, 2025 v. $5,000 by March 1, 2026 vi. The balance by June 1, 2026.
d) The payor shall be committed to jail for 30 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes the payments in full.
e) The payor shall also pay the ongoing child support payments of $768 each month starting on December 1, 2024. He shall be committed to jail for 3 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes these payments in full.
f) The maximum length of time, cumulatively, that the payor can be imprisoned under this default order is 180 days.
[92] In the Bhansingh case, there shall be a final default order on the following terms:
a) Child support arrears are fixed in the sum of $11,075, as of November 4, 2024.
b) The payor shall be committed to jail immediately for 20 days, or until such earlier time as he pays $3,000 towards the arrears.
c) The payor shall pay the balance of the arrears as follows:
i. $1,200 by March 1, 2025 ii. $1,200 by June 1, 2025 iii. $1,200 by September 1, 2025 iv. $1,200 by December 1, 2026 v. $1,200 by March 1, 2026 vi. The balance owing by June 1, 2026
d) The payor shall be committed to jail for 10 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes the payments in full.
e) The payor shall also pay the ongoing child support payments of $347 each month starting on December 1, 2024. He shall be committed to jail for 3 days for each of these payments in default, or until such earlier time as he makes these payments in full.
f) The maximum length of time, cumulatively, that the payor can be imprisoned under this default order is 180 days.
[93] Nothing in these orders precludes the Director from collecting arrears from any other source, including income tax or HST/GST refunds, inheritances, and lottery or prize winnings.
[94] The periods of incarceration set out in the Sahid and Bhansingh cases shall run consecutively.
[95] The Director may serve the payor with any motion for committal in either case by both ordinary mail and email addressed to him at his last known addresses in its records, if he is served within six months. After six months, any motion must be served by special service.
[96] These matters shall return to court on December 3, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. The warrants of committal shall be held in abeyance and not enforced until that date. This gives the payor the opportunity to make the required payments and not be sent to jail.
Released: November 8, 2024
Justice S.B. Sherr