ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Toronto and Region Conservation Authority v. Pickering Developments (Squires) Inc., 2024 ONCJ 317

DATE: 2024 06 24

COURT FILE No.: Regional Municipality of Durham

2860 999 22 1694

2860 999 22 1695

2860 999 22 1696

2860 999 23 0146

2860 999 23 0147

BETWEEN:

TORONTO AND REGION CONSERVATION AUTHORITY

— AND —

PICKERING DEVELOPMENTS (SQUIRES) INC., PICKERING DEVELOPMENTS (BAYLY) INC., PICKERING DEVELOPMENTS (401) INC., PETER APOSTOLOPOULOS, and STAVROS APOSTOLOPOULOS

Before Justice of the Peace Kevin J. A. Hunter

Considered via written materials submitted on May 10, 2024

Reasons for Judgment released on June 24, 2024

Kenneth JULL and Rob WINTERSTEIN…………………. counsel for the prosecution

Ira KAGAN and Rahul SHASTRI….……………. counsel for the corporate defendants

Jennifer FAIRFAX and Evan BARZ…………… counsel for the individual defendants

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE KEVIN J. A. HUNTER:

[1] The individual and corporate defendants are each charged with undertaking development in an area falling within the jurisdiction of the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) without a permit. Specifically, between October 11, 2022, and October 22, 2022, the defendants are alleged to have changed or interfered with a wetland located on the property at 1802 Bayly St., Pickering (the property) without TRCA approval. Charges were laid under ss. 2 (1)(d) and 5 of O. Reg. 166/06 under the Conservation Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.27 on November 4, 2022.

[2] Pursuant to pre-trial discussions, the parties appeared briefly before me on April 3, 2024. The purpose of this appearance was for the defendants to enter not guilty pleas, thus seizing me as the trier of fact. The parties jointly requested an adjournment to the first scheduled trial date, June 10, 2024. In the interim, the parties would provide the court with written materials seeking rulings on two pre-trial motions: the TRCA’s “collateral attack” motion and the defendant’s unreasonable delay application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). The parties urged the court to consider the motions in concert. Given their connectivity, I accepted this invitation.

[3] I received motion materials from the parties on May 10, 2024. After reviewing them, I sent a courtesy e-mail to the parties on June 2, 2024, advising them that I was dismissing the TRCA’s “collateral attack” motion and staying the charges pursuant to the defendants’ s. 11(b) Charter motion on June 10, 2024, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

TRCA’s “Collateral Attack” Motion

[4] This motion is curiously styled. A collateral attack, also called an indirect attack, is a challenge to the validity of a prior judicial or administrative order during a subsequent proceeding, rather than by appeal or review. In this case, there is no prior order to attack, collaterally or otherwise.

[5] However, the TRCA asks the court to treat their Approximate Regulation Limit (ARL) maps like a prior judicial or administrative order. These ARL maps are created and kept by the TRCA to geographically illustrate the boundaries of their jurisdiction. The TRCA submits that the defence should not be able to challenge their jurisdiction over the property because it is established by these maps, which form part of O. Reg. 166/06. While ARL maps are likely admissible at trial for evidentiary purposes, I find that there is no legal basis to elevate them to have the same effect as an administrative or judicial order that cannot be challenged at trial.

[6] Further, the TRCA asks the court to dispense with the need to call evidence on two issues. First, the TRCA submits that the defendants cannot contest their jurisdiction over the property because they have not contested it in other forums. Second, the TRCA further requests the court to dispense with the need to hear expert evidence on the issue of whether the property contains a “wetland,” a defined term in the legislation. The TRCA’s position is that the defendants should not be able to contest the existence of a “wetland” on the property because consultants acting on their behalf used the word “wetland” 384 times in materials used as part of the defendant’s since withdrawn permit application.

[7] Put differently, the TRCA invites the court to force the defendants to concede two essential elements of the offence – that the property falls within TRCA’s jurisdiction, and that it contains a “wetland.” This request ignores two central tenets of criminal and regulatory litigation - the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The defendants enjoy the Charter right to be presumed innocent unless and until the prosecution proves each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. The court has no jurisdiction to force the defendants to concede anything, irrespective of communications outside of this proceeding. For these reasons, the TRCA’s “collateral attack” motion is denied.

Defendant’s s. 11(b) Charter Motion

[8] The defendants seek a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter, claiming their collective right to have a trial within a reasonable time has been infringed.

[9] The TRCA’s position is that because the defendants require the prosecution to spend the time needed to prove all elements of the offence, it is unfair for the defendants to also assert their right to a trial within a reasonable time. The TRCA submits:

The Defendants’ position is that the prosecution must prove the elements of a wetland as set out in section 28(25) of the Conservation Authorities Act referred to in the prior section herein. Yet at the same time the Defendants complain in a separate 11(b) Charter Application that the time that will be taken to prove the existence of a wetland violates their right to be tried within a reasonable time. This is an inconsistent and manifestly unfair position.[^1]

[10] I disagree. There is nothing inconsistent or unfair with the defendants simultaneously exercising rights afforded to them under both ss. 11(b) and (d) of the Charter. The defendants have an absolute right to hold the prosecution to their burden of proof, while, at the same time, demanding a trial within a reasonable time.

Facts

[11] The following chart outlines the relevant stages of the proceedings:[^2]

Date	Description
November 4, 2022	Information sworn
December 7, 2022	First appearance for corporate defendants pursuant to summons. Individual defendants not summonsed
January 13, 2023	New information sworn (identical to first). Initial disclosure provided by TRCA
January 20, 2023	Individual defendants summonsed
February 1, 2023	All defendants present. Adjourned to March 1 to allow parties to discuss duplicate charges and outstanding disclosure issues. Parties to have pre-trial discussions and consider setting a judicial pre-trial (JPT) Defendants not available March 1, request March 15 for a virtual appearance. Court advises March 15 is for in-person matters. Next virtual appearance is April 5. Parties accept April 5.
April 5, 2023	Adjourned to May 3 to allow TRCA to provide additional disclosure, which was requested March 23 – original information withdrawn.
April 27, 2023	TRCA provides additional disclosure.
May 3, 2023	Adjourned to June 7 to allow for additional disclosure (which was requested May 2). Court suggests setting JPT.
June 7, 2023	Adjourned to July 19 to allow defendants to review disclosure provided a week earlier. Court suggests setting a JPT. Parties agree it may be premature to do so.
July 19, 2023	JPT set for Oct 5.
October 5, 2023	JPT – matter adjourned to October 26 for continuing JPT. Counsel for TRCA to follow up with client and to provide further information to the defendants. TRCA advises they will email trial scheduling to obtain 10 days for trial. TRCA recognizes difficulty in getting court dates in Durham Region.
October 18, 2023	TRCA emails trial scheduling to inquire about setting 10 days for trial.
October 26, 2023	Continuing JPT – Court advises that the trial coordinator has provided 10 dates for trial – parties agree that trial is now expected to last 20 days. Court advises permission will be sought from the office of the regional senior Justice for special dates since judicial resources are strained in summer months. Matter adjourned to December 6, to set trial dates.
November 3, 2023	Trial coordinator offers parties trial dates
November 7, 2023	Parties agree on trial dates. June 10, 19, 20 (TRCA declined June 24) August 14, 22 Sept 13, 18, 20, 23, 25 Oct 1, 4, 11, 16, 18, 23, 24 Nov 8, 13, 15
December 6, 2023	Trial dates set on record

The Law

[12] The defendants have the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter. In R. v. Jordan,[^3] the Supreme Court of Canada advanced a new Charter framework to assist trial courts in characterizing pretrial delay. The Court focused on the concept of net delay and whether it breached a presumptive ceiling. For matters in the Ontario Court of Justice, including matters proceeding under Part 3 of the Provincial Offences Act (POA), the presumptive ceiling is 18 months.[^4]

[13] The steps to be taken in analyzing stay applications under the Jordan framework are as follows:

1. Calculate the total delay - the period from the charge to the end of trial.
2. Subtract defence delay from total delay, which results in the net delay.
3. Compare the net delay to the presumptive ceiling.
4. If the net delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut the presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown cannot rebut the presumption, a stay will follow. In general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.
5. Subtract delay caused by discrete events from the net delay (leaving the remaining delay) for the purpose of determining whether the presumptive ceiling has been reached.
6. If the remaining delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable.
7. If the remaining delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable.

Analysis

[14] In calculating the total delay, the Jordan clock starts ticking when the proceeding commences. For Part 3 POA matters, the proceedings commence when an information is sworn.

[15] An information charging all five defendants was sworn on November 4, 2022. The TRCA summonsed the corporate defendants to appear in court on December 7, 2022. The individual defendants were not summonsed. On January 13, 2023, a new, identical information was sworn. The individual defendants were then summonsed to appear in court on February 1, 2023. The original information was eventually withdrawn. The TRCA submits that the date of the replacement information should be used as the date the individual defendant’s Jordan clock starts.

[16] In my view, absent exceptional circumstances, allowing the prosecution to reset the Jordan clock by simply swearing to a new, identical replacement information is an abuse of process which erodes the defendant’s right to have a trial within a reasonable time. The legal jeopardy of all five defendants started on the date charges were initially laid. In my view, November 4, 2022, is the date against which the Jordan ceiling is measured.

[17] The total delay in this case, from the date the information was sworn (November 4, 2022) to the final scheduled day of the trial (November 15, 2024), is just under 24½ months.

Delay Characterized

[18] Two distinct periods of delay plagued this prosecution. First, the delay in setting trial dates. Second, the delay caused by a lack of available dates due to insufficient judicial resources. It is important to understand the mechanics of each of these periods to properly analyze the reasonableness of the overall delay.

[19] The parties secured trial dates on November 3, 2023, approximately one year after the information was laid.[^5] This, despite the court recommending that the matter be advanced by scheduling a JPT on three prior appearances.[^6]

[20] At the February 1, 2023, appearance, the parties advised the court that initial disclosure had just been provided. After some discussion of an appropriate return date, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: I think that'll give counsel plenty of time to review the matters and have a Crown pre-trial. We can come back ready to set a date either for trial, resolution, or judicial pre-trial after you've had that Crown pretrial. So, is that a date that’s available for the prosecution, April the 5th, 2:00 p.m. in 103 court?

MR. JULL: That – just bear with me. April the yeah. Yes, that’s a date – what time, I'm sorry, Your Worship, is that....

THE COURT: Could be – it'll be April 5th, 2:00p.m., 103 virtually, and we'll mark the matter to set a date please.[^7]

[21] The court expected the parties to engage in typical pre-trial discussions to move the matter forward toward a more meaningful proceeding, the date for which would be set at the next appearance.

[22] Instead, at the April 5, 2023, appearance, the parties agreed to adjourn the matter to May 3, 2023, for further disclosure. No request was made for a judicial pre-trial, despite the court’s prior recommendation.[^8]

[23] On May 3, 2023, the TRCA advised the court that additional disclosure issues were still being resolved and requested a return date in June of 2023. The court urged the parties to continue pre-trial discussions and, before the matter was adjourned to June 7, 2023, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT : ...Well, that would give you about four or five weeks and then you can - I'll hear from, from you Mr. Winterstein, or a colleague of mine, and counsel for the defendants on where we're at with finalizing disclosure. Also, turn your mind, it, it may be premature on June 7th, but at some point, whether this matter would benefit from a judicial pre-trial. You can let the court know at that time as well if....

MR. WINTERSTEIN: Yes. Thank you, Your Worship. I think that's...

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WINTERSTEIN: ...prudent.

[24] On June 7, 2023, the court again urged the parties to set a judicial pre-trial.[^9]

MR. WINTERSTEIN: Your Worship, we've gone through a few rounds of - there was initial disclosure, then some requests for additional disclosure which have been responded to. The last of which was last week, if, if I'm correct. My friends need a little bit of time to go through that, which I'm okay with. I don't anticipate that there will be any further requests. What I'd like to do is have the five matters at lines three, four, ten, eleven and twelve adjourned to be spoken to, to July 19th.

THE COURT: At 2 p.m.?

MR. WINTERSTEIN: 2 p.m. is fine, Your Worship.

THE COURT: Okay. So, 2022. Did – having consideration for that, did you want to schedule a JPT now, Mr. Winterstein, as we did previously, on a previous tier?

MR. WINTERSTEIN: I'd be fine with that. If – I actually have some August dates, we could have for the JPT.

THE COURT: Madam Clerk?

CLERK REGISTRAR: One moment, please.

THE COURT: We can vacate the 19th, you can have your CPT in advance, have a JPT to get - to keep this thing on the rails and then go from there.

CLERK REGISTRAR: Your Worship, we have a date as early as June 15th, we have July 20.

THE COURT: Yes.

CLERK REGISTRAR: Or August 17th.

THE COURT: July 20 or August 17th. How would that be for you gentlemen? Mr. Barz?

MR. BARZ: I would not want to do the July date. We, we are working with experts. One, one of the components of the charges is quite technical. And so, we need to have, provide the additional disclosure we've received to these folks so they can conduct their assessment. So, I wouldn't want to do the July date. August might be doable, but it might also be a little bit tight. I know that my client's summonses were issued in January of this year.

THE COURT: Okay. We're in good shape then. We'll keep the July 19th date if you're okay with that, Mr. Winterstein?

MR. WINTERSTEIN: I am, Your Worship.

[25] In fairness, I have attributed the delay caused by this adjournment to the defence, as discussed below. However, the TRCA was once again agreeable to adjourning the matter without setting a judicial pre-trial to move the prosecution forward. A judicial pre-trial was eventually scheduled at the next appearance, July 19, 2023.[^10]

[26] At the October 5, 2023, judicial pre-trial, the TRCA undertook to e-mail trial scheduling to obtain trial dates. The TRCA advised the court of their recent difficulty in obtaining trial dates in Durham Region on an unrelated matter.[^11] Yet, the TRCA did not e-mail trial scheduling until October 18, 2023.

[27] On their own, each of these short periods where the matter did not progress are not problematic. But taken as a whole, they represent a complacency that the ruling in Jordan sought to eliminate. Delays in providing fulsome disclosure only exacerbated the issue. After all, initial disclosure was not provided until nearly 2½ months after the charges were laid. Disclosure was not finalized until June of 2023, nearly seven months into the prosecution.[^12] None of the above is consistent with the prosecution’s obligation to diligently pursue trial dates.[^13]

[28] Once trial dates were eventually set, a lack of judicial resources contributed to further unreasonable delay. On November 3, 2023, trial scheduling offered trial dates to the parties. The first of those dates was June 10, 2024, some seven months down the road. More problematically, by the time the trial was scheduled to start, over nineteen months would have passed since the proceedings commenced - already in breach of the Jordan ceiling.

[29] Frustratingly, the remaining nineteen days of trial were scheduled to be heard intermittently over the following six months. Scheduling trials in such piecemeal, sporadic fashion is rather unsatisfactory. Significant gaps in time between hearing dates make it difficult to present, respond to, and digest evidence.

[30] Recognizing that a lack of judicial resources resulted in problematic scheduling, the pre-trial Justice offered to request additional resources be set aside to accommodate this trial.[^14] None were provided, presumably because judicial resources were already stretched thin.

[31] Since my appointment in April 2018, this jurisdiction has lost the services of ten full-time presiding Justices of the Peace, through either retirement or administrative reassignment. The addition of three new Justices during that same time frame has done very little to offset those losses.

[32] At full capacity, Durham Region operates four POA courts. The current lack of judicial resources has resulted in the operation of, at best, only two POA courts on any given day. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for those two courts to be combined into one when judicial resources have been further strained by daily operational needs. The result is the necessary, but disappointing, adjournment of countless trials. These adjournments cause a snowballing backlog which thwarts the timely scheduling of trials, including more sophisticated prosecutions like this one.

[33] Indeed, this issue has been recognized by other prosecution services in Durham. While presiding on May 16, 2024, a municipal prosecutor appeared before me to address a "withdrawal docket." The prosecutor made a statement prior to withdrawing 132 charges due to lack of judicial resources. This statement was repeated before me on June 7, 2024, before 298 charges were withdrawn. The statement reads as follows:

On behalf of the Regional Municipality of Durham, Prosecution Services has brought forward these Part I certificates, which were issued in various enforcement agencies in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Prosecution Services has determined that the Region of Durham, Provincial Offences Court, cannot accommodate these matters within the timeframe set out in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision of R. v. Jordan. Despite a concentrated effort to prioritize the most serious cases involving high public interest, the Region of Durham is facing an unprecedented backlog and cannot be solved without provincial intervention.

Durham Region is a four-court model location. Since the trial courts reopened in 2021, after the COVID-19 court closures, it has been reduced to a two-court model. This is less than half of the customary judicial resources in a jurisdiction that is growing in population, and enforcement activity, within the last three years. In fact, our charge volume has doubled since 2019.

In recent years, with only half of our allocated judicial resources, there has been a growing backlog…s. 49(5) orders being issued,[^15] as well as courts being combined due to lack of judicial resources. In 2022, there were 28 s. 49(5) orders issued, 27 s. 49(5) orders in 2023. In 2024, there have been 15 s. 49(5) orders issued, plus an additional 16 days with orders were not issued, however courts were combined due to one courtroom not having a Justice available. Consequently, on s. 49(5) order days, all matters are adjourned by the Clerk of the Court, to another day, which consumes further judicial resources, adding to the backlog, as new matters cannot be scheduled. On days where our courts are combined, contested matters are not reached, and consequently adjourned. The Regional Municipality of Durham is forced, with a significant lack of judicial resources, due to the Province of Ontario not allocating sufficient Justices of the Peace to adjudicate in this region, … to withdraw all the matters on the 9:01 docket.[^16]

[34] While I do not have confirmation of the cited statistics, they are not inconsistent with my experience. Delays have now become normalized, rather than being the exception. The objectionable way this trial was scheduled is further evidence that the Durham Region bench is simply not staffed to adequately serve the public in a timely manner.

Defence Delay

[35] The parties were offered a judicial pre-trial date of September 21, 2023. Defence counsel was not available, but accepted October 5, 2023. The defence concedes that this two-week delay lies at their feet.

[36] At the February 1, 2023, appearance, the TRCA suggested an adjournment to an in-person appearance on March 1, 2023, to allow the parties to have discussions about issues surrounding outstanding disclosure and the duplicate informations. The defence requested a virtual appearance date and suggested March 15, 2023. Since March 15, 2023, was scheduled for in-person matters, the parties accepted the next virtual appearance date of April 5, 2023.[^17] Despite the TRCA agreeing to this date, I find that the month of delay between appearances is attributable to the request made by the defence to attend virtually.

[37] At the June 7, 2023, appearance, the court suggested setting a judicial pre-trial in July or August. The TRCA was agreeable and offered availability in August. However, the defence declined the court’s invitation:

MR. BARZ: I would not want to do the July date. We, we are working with experts. One, one of the components of the charges is quite technical. And so, we need to have, provide the additional disclosure we've received to these folks so they can conduct their assessment. So, I wouldn't want to do the July date. August might be doable, but it might also be a little bit tight.[^18]

[38] The matter was adjourned to July 19, 2023, to allow defence experts to review additional disclosure, rather than setting a judicial pre-trial. I find that the almost 4½ week delay from June 7, 2023, to July 19, 2023, is also attributable to the defence.

[39] This brings the total defence delay to approximately 3 months. When subtracted from the total delay of 24½ months, the net delay is 21½ months. Therefore, since the net delay exceeds the 18-month Jordan ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable.

[40] To rebut this presumption, the TRCA must establish the existence of exceptional circumstances which might render the delay reasonable. The TRCA argues that delays caused by the complexity of the case, and to a lesser extent, the COVID-19 pandemic, are sufficient to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

Pandemic Delay

[41] In its materials, the TRCA submits, in one unsupported sentence, that “the COVID-19 pandemic is a discreet event that may be taken into account as a factor” in justifying a portion of delay.[^19]

[42] In Quezada[^20], a November 2022 s. 11(b) decision, I concluded that delays attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic could still be considered a discrete event. At the same time, however, I also opined that pandemic delay could not be relied upon ad infinitum.

And yet, the pandemic cannot be relied upon indefinitely as an exceptional circumstance to justify delays which exceed the presumptive ceiling. As various courts reimagine their operations, periods of delay properly attributable to the pandemic will depend on the measures employed by each jurisdiction.[^21]

[43] At the time of this decision, it will have been approximately 3½ years since Durham Region recommenced the process of scheduling trials in January of 2021.[^22] Provincial prosecution services have had sufficient time to address pandemic related backlogs during that span. Indeed, I have witnessed various prosecution services making sustained efforts to do just that. In my view, without further evidence, prosecution services responsible for litigating provincial offences in Durham Region can no longer rely on the pandemic, in blanket fashion, to mitigate delay above the Jordan ceiling.

[44] Since the net delay cannot be reduced by pandemic related interruptions, the remaining delay is still 21½ months.

Case Complexity

[45] I am required to consider whether the complexity of this matter would justify a breach of the 18-month Jordan ceiling. Particularly complex cases are those which require an inordinate amount of time to prepare for and/or conduct a trial.[^23] The hallmarks of a particularly complex case include:

a) the number of charges and defendants, b) the time span of the offence(s), c) the volume and nature of the disclosure, d) the number of witnesses, e) the need for expert evidence, f) the need to resolve numerous significant issues in dispute, g) the assessment of various issues of credibility, h) the consideration of novel or complex legal issues, i) the filing of multiple pre-trial motions, j) and issues of significant statutory interpretation.[^24]

[46] The defendants submit that this case contains none of these factors. I do not agree.

[47] The TRCA sought to economize trial time by eliminating the need to call expert evidence from several witnesses. However, complexity is a qualitative assessment, not a quantitative one.[^25] Albeit from several witnesses, the anticipated expert evidence is aimed at proving a single issue – that the property contained a “wetland.” This, by itself, is not enough to elevate a case to a level which meets the high threshold for being considered particularly complex.

[48] Disclosure exceeded what is normally generated in POA prosecutions, totaling approximately 1800 pages. However, roughly half of the disclosure was comprised of photos and reports prepared before the allegations arose.[^26] This volume of disclosure is a fraction of that which was considered in R. v. Robert.[^27] In that case, Thomas, R.S.J. found that even with disclosure totaling over 17,000 pages, a terabyte of data, the threshold of complexity required to mitigate delay above the Jordan ceiling had not been met. Given that the disclosure in this case is approximately 10% of what was weighed in Robert, I am not convinced that it is so voluminous that it justifies delay beyond 18 months.

[49] While the expert evidence and volume of disclosure in this case undoubtedly elevate its level of complexity, the case is otherwise relatively simple. The remaining issues, while important, are few and rather mundane. They are neither novel, nor do they engage significant issues of statutory interpretation. The charges span a relatively short period of time in October 2022. The five defendants each face only one identical charge. While there are two pre-trial motions, the only one requiring true consideration is the s. 11(b) Charter motion.

[50] While this case contains some elements of complexity which rise above more typical POA prosecutions, it does not reach the level of a particularly complex one envisioned by Jordan. The volume of disclosure and the need for expert evidence is insufficient to justify 3½ months of delay over the 18-month ceiling. This is particularly so when considering the complacency involved in setting trial dates and the delay occasioned by a lack of judicial resources.

Conclusion

[51] After calculating the remaining delay, it exceeds the 18-month Jordan ceiling and is unreasonable. As a result, I find that the defendants’ s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time has been infringed. The defendants unreasonable delay application is granted, and the charges are stayed pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

Released: June 24, 2024

Signed: Justice of the Peace Kevin J.A. Hunter

[^1]: Exhibit 1, TRCA’s factum at para. 127 [^2]: Exhibit 2, taken from transcripts of proceedings on the appliable dates. [^3]: R. v. Jordan 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 [^4]: R. v. Nyugen 2020 ONCA 609 [^5]: Exhibit 2, e-mail from Trial Scheduling [^6]: February 1, May 3, June 7, 2023. [^7]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings on February 1, 2023 [^8]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings on April 5, 2023 [^9]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings June 7, 2023. [^10]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings July 19, 2023 [^11]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings October 5, 2023. [^12]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings June 7, 2023. [^13]: R v. S.S., 2019 ONCJ 144 at para. 71 [^14]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings October 26, 2023. [^15]: s. 49(5) of the POA allows the clerk of the court to adjourn matters, at the direction of Regional Senior Justice, when no Justice is available to preside. [^16]: Statement of Durham Prosecutor, R. Johnson, addressing the 9:01am docket on May 16, 2024. [^17]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings February 1, 2023. [^18]: Exhibit 2, transcript of proceedings June 7, 2023. [^19]: Exhibit 1, Legal Argument and Cases, para. 5 [^20]: Durham (Regional Municipality) v. Quezada (November 16), 2022 ONCJ 526 [^21]: Ibid, at para. 14 [^22]: Ibid, at para. 12 [^23]: Jordan at para. 77. [^24]: Ibid. [^25]: R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at paras. 64-65; [^26]: Exhibit 2, defendant’s factum at para. 99 [^27]: R. v. Robert 2018 ONSC 545, [2018] OJ No 732 (QL)