WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

( c ) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged .— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.— (3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Court File and Parties

DATE: July 18, 2023 COURT FILE No.: FO05/22-001 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N :

CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES OF GRAND ERIE Applicant

— and —

J.L.S. and E.A.B. Respondent

Before: Justice K.A. Baker

Motion heard on: July 13, 2023 Endorsement released: July 18, 2023

Counsel: S. Luu, Counsel for Applicant F. Roy, Counsel for Respondent, J.L.S. E.B., not appearing

Judgment on Motion for Summary Judgment

BAKER, J. :

[1] This is my judgment on the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the Applicant agency with respect to the subject child, Z.S., born [...], 2022, and now aged one and one-half years.

[2] Z.S. is the subject of a Status Review application seeking extended care and limited access to the Respondent mother. The Respondent mother, J.L.S., initially filed an Answer in which she sought an Order returning the child to her custody, or, in the alternative, placing the child with her, subject to the supervision of the agency. In the further alternative, she sought an Order that Z.S. remain in the care of the Applicant agency for six months.

[3] More recently, and on the eve of this hearing, J.L.S. filed an amended Answer which sought, first, an Order for custody of the child, or, in the alternative, an Order placing the child jointly in the care of herself and A.G. and in the further alternative, an Order placing the child in the sole care of A.G.

[4] The Respondent father was noted in default on March 29, 2023. He has no contact with the child.

[5] In this motion, the Applicant argues that there is no genuine issue requiring trial insofar as an Order for extended care is a foregone conclusion. The Respondent mother says there are genuine issues for trial, and the Applicant’s motion should be dismissed.

[6] The Applicant has filed three affidavits in support of its motion for summary judgment, dated May 11, 2023, June 2, 2023, and June 26, 2023, all of which are deposed by the family service worker, Karen Button.

[7] The factual background, as alleged by the Applicant, is set out in some degree in Ms. Button’s initial affidavit. The mother has a long-standing history of illicit drug abuse. The Applicant says that at the time the child was born, he was in active withdrawal, because of in utero exposure to unspecified drugs. Ms. Button deposes that the mother had not sought prenatal care and did not seem to have any plans for the child. The mother was said to be transient at the time.

[8] Ms. Button further asserts that the mother acknowledged having “used substances” on the day the child was born. Further discussion ensued including repeated suggestions that the mother contact her family doctor and arrange drug testing.

[9] In a later conversation on February 14, 2022, the mother acknowledged that her historical drug of choice was crystal methamphetamine.

[10] It is not clear from the Applicant’s evidence for this motion what steps were taken immediately after the child’s birth to deal with the rather obvious protection concerns. It may be inferred that a Protection Application was commenced at some point, and an Order finding Z.S. in need of protection pursuant to subsections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) was made on consent on June 8, 2022. Although the evidence does not address any Order of disposition in relation to the original Protection Application, it is apparent from the court’s endorsement record that an Order was made placing Z.S. in the care of the Child and Family Services of Grand Erie (hereinafter CFSGE) for a period of five months on the same date.

[11] It should also be noted that in her affidavit responding to the motion, mother refers to a visit she had with the child on January 12, 2022. The logical inference from all of this evidence is that the child was removed from the mother’s care at, or shortly after birth.

[12] Obviously this chronology of child protection involvement is critical background information. It should not be left to the court to piece it together from the totality of the evidence, including court records.

[13] The Applicant says that the mother was transient following the child’s birth. Unfortunately, however, there is only vague reference in the evidence to this issue. J.L.S. admitted to “couch surfing” as of February 14, 2022. She said she was “temporarily staying with a friend, J. R.” as of March 18, 2022. Later, on January 6, 2023, J.L.S. told Ms. Button she had to leave the home she was staying in as the landlord had given notice. By February 2, 2023, she was staying, again temporarily, with a friend’s mother, outside of Simcoe, Ontario.

[14] It is not clear from the evidence where and with whom J.L.S. was residing over any particular period of time. This evidence was certainly available, as Ms. Button was having regular contact with J.L.S. throughout her involvement. In fact, there are repeated references to Ms. Button attending “the home” in relation to where J.L.S. was residing. Regrettably, there is a lack of specific detail on what is presented by the agency as an important protection concern. It would have been helpful to have a clear articulation of the mother’s residential history set out, to support this asserted protection concern.

[16] What is apparent from the evidence, however, is that there were concerns with respect to some of the residences in which J.L.S. was staying. The first of these was the presence of what might be described as “random” individuals appearing around the residence in which J.L.S. was staying. These individuals are described as being apparently under the influence of some sort of substance.

[17] A second concern was the physical state of the home in March of 2023. It was described as extremely cluttered and unsuited to a toddler.

[18] At some point, drug testing was arranged for J.L.S. On September 14, 2022, Ms. Button met with the mother to discuss a recent positive test for amphetamine and cannabinoids. J.L.S. provided an implausible explanation for a positive result however this did not involve any acknowledgement of having intentionally consumed drugs.

[19] Following this discussion, the agency ceased receiving drug screens from J.L.S., despite repeated reminders from the worker.

[20] Although J.L.S. did complete a parenting program, she was said to be somewhat disengaged. J.L.S. did not follow up with a recommendation to attend counseling through St. Leonard’s Society to address substance abuse. J.L.S.’s lack of address of substance abuse issues is identified by the Applicant as a central reason why the protection concerns have not been satisfactorily addressed and why extended care is the only disposition that can meet the child’s needs.

[21] The Respondent mother has sworn an affidavit dated May 17, 2023, to respond to this motion. Her proposed support person/joint custodian, A.G. has also filed an affidavit sworn May 18, 2023.

[22] J.L.S. response to the drug use concern might fairly be described as elusive. She says at paragraph 10 of her affidavit that there have “never been any issues with drug use during any of my pregnancies”. She does not however specifically dispute the important allegation that the child was exposed to drugs in utero. Nor does she dispute the allegation that she admitted her drug of choice was crystal methamphetamine and that she acknowledged having used drugs on the day of the child’s birth.

[23] A significant portion of mother’s affidavit is devoted to addressing the concerns of the home that she was apparently residing in in March of 2023, and which Ms. Button had described as being unsuitable for a toddler. Much of that content offers excuses and explanations for the condition of the home. This is of limited utility in addressing the issues in this litigation, let alone the concerns that would arise from the home being offered as a residence for the child, despite its condition. In fact, it is notable that despite having advanced this proposal, the mother acknowledged that “we were fully aware that the current state of the home was not suitable for a young toddler”. Rather, the mother asserts that at some unspecified point in the future, the plan was to render the home suitable for a small child.

[24] It is not clear from mother’s evidence, or indeed the Applicant’s evidence, where mother now resides. The mother’s use of the present tense in describing the home that Ms. Button saw in March of this year invites the inference that she continues to reside there. J.L.S. says she resides with her “spouse” identified only as ‘Jesse’, and his mother, identified by the agency as, ‘B.R’. There is also reference to a twelve-year-old granddaughter of B.R., who has apparently been identified as being somewhat challenged.

[25] The mother says that she is welcome to reside with A.G. in A.G.’s one bedroom apartment in Brantford.

[26] A.G. says that she has had a significant role in J.L.S.’s life. She says she provides her with encouragement and constructive input. She goes on to say that “I am prepared to offer a safe and loving place for her (J.L.S.) and Z.S. so that they may reside together”. She also says she is willing to have Z.S. in her care.

[27] In her affidavits of June 2nd and June 26th, 2023, Ms. Button responds to the late-breaking plan to have A.G. play a significant role, one way or another, in Z.S.’s care. In attending at A.G.’s home, Ms. Button observed a syringe on the roof. Ms. Button asked A.G. about child protection involvement, and specifically whether she herself had had child protection involvement. A.G. responded that she “did not think so”. A.G. acknowledged both historical mental health and addiction issues. This included both psychosis and having a lot of seizures. She has also been diagnosed as bi-polar. She is not on medication and addresses these concerns through keeping busy and exercising. Her source of income is ODSP as a result of her limitations.

[28] Later investigation revealed that A.G. has an extensive child welfare history including repeated file openings. Three children were apprehended from A.G.’s care due to A.G.’s mental health issues and addiction.

[29] A.G. was asked to provide a police check and has not done so. The initial inspection of the home revealed conditions not suitable for a small child. A.G. assured Ms. Button she was in the process of actively rectifying the situation. A.G. then cancelled the two follow up home inspections scheduled to verify that claim.

[30] Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules provides for the summary judgment process. Subrule 16(6) provides that where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

[31] The onus is on the moving party throughout to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that there is no genuine issue requiring trial.

[32] The Ontario Court of Appeal has provided some guidance on the summary judgment process in child protection cases in Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W. (2019) ONCA 2029. First, it quoted with approval from lower court decisions that stated that “no genuine issue for trial” equates to a situation where it is “plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed” or where there is “no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that sought by the applicant”, or where the outcome of trial is a “foregone conclusion”.

[33] Benotto, J.A. then went on to discuss the requirement that the process of adjudication must be fair and just and said “As applied to child protection proceedings, a fair and just determination on the merits must recognize that such proceedings engage Charter rights for a vulnerable segment of our society. Consequently, courts have stressed the need to take a cautious approach to granting summary judgment in child protection proceedings.”

[34] The court then went on to discuss the standard of evidence required for a fair and just adjudication in summary judgment. Justice Stanley Sherr of the Ontario Court of Justice has been an outspoken proponent of what might be termed the “trial worthy evidence rule”. That is, a requirement that evidence at summary judgment be of sufficient quality such that it would be admissible at trial. This standard was adopted by the Court of Appeal, who quoted with approval from Justice Sherr’s decision in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. B.B. 2012 ONCJ 646 saying in part,

“The consequences of the orders sought at summary judgment motions on families in child protection cases are profound. These important decisions should not be based on flawed evidence. The summary judgment is designed to winnow out cases that have no chance of success. It is not an invitation to water down the rules of evidence in order to make a determination.”

[35] At paragraph 80 the OCA then set out the proper approach to summary judgment in child protection proceedings. On the subject of evidence, it said “The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial.”

[36] Subrule 16(4.1) does require the responding party to provide an affidavit or other evidence to set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. This however does not shift the ultimate burden of proof.

[37] As noted in J.C.J.-R.V. Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County, if the evidence does not raise a triable issue as to where the best interests of the child lie, those best interests themselves call for a resolution without the delay associated with a trial and the resulting prolongation of the state of the uncertainty about the child’s future.

[38] A best interests test should have a wide focus encompassing the entirety of the situation and include concerns arising from emotional harm, psychological bonding, and the child’s desires. The emotional well-being of the child is of the utmost importance.

[39] In Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk v. T.M.A. [2007] O.J. 760, the court found that it would be contrary to a child’s best interest to remove her from a stable environment and place her in an uncertain one in which the person required to provide stability for that child has demonstrated a total lack of ability to plan for and create a stable environment for herself and the child.

[40] As noted in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent’s desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from the parents’ evidence that she faces some better prospects than what existed at the time of the Society’s removal of the child from her care and has developed some new ability as a parent.

[41] This is a Status Review application. The Order of disposition must be guided exclusively by what is in the child’s best interests. The factors a court must consider in determining best interests are set out at section 74(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and are as follows:

Best interests of child

(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

Analysis

[42] My analysis in this matter is as follows:

[43] At eighteen months of age, Z.S. is far too young to be able to express views and preferences.

[44] Z.S.’s young age renders him extremely vulnerable. Because of his age, he requires careful, attentive care. He is a toddler. As such, he requires close supervision and the maintenance of a safe environment. Both of the homes the mother has presented as possible environments have been unsuitable. The reasons for the condition of those homes matters far less than the fact of their unsuitability.

[45] It would appear from the totality of the evidence that Z.S. has been in foster care most, if not all, of his life. As a result, and because of the competing plans, his situation has been one of uncertainty. He needs permanence and stability. These are critical months in his life. Additional delay in the resolution of this matter would almost certainly adversely affect him.

[46] The concerns that gave rise to the previous protection findings were significant. The use of illicit drugs by a child’s caregiver raises many significant issues that go beyond the obvious one: impairment of the ability to ensure the child’s safety. Further concerns relate to the lifestyle that accompanies illegal drug use, which includes personal instability and exposure to other unsavoury and indeed criminal individuals. Weapons and violence are, sadly, frequent correlates to the drug trade.

[47] Crystal methamphetamine, the mother’s drug of choice, is a particularly dangerous drug. The jurisprudence is replete with descriptions of crystal methamphetamine as a highly addictive, dangerous drug. As noted in several cases, these poisons wreak havoc on the lives of addicts, their families, and the community at large. The immeasurable harm caused to the fabric of our society by these drugs has been recognized by our courts on numerous occasions: See R. v. Cunningham (1996), 104 C.C.C. 542 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Hamilton (2004), 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C. A.); R. v. Woolcock, [2002] O.J. No. 4927 (C.A.).

[48] The degree of risk that justified the finding that the child was in need of protection was extreme. J.L.S. used substances on the very day this child was born. She acknowledged to Ms. Button it would be, “hard to stop”, going on to say “Z.S. is worth it”. That sentiment however did not preclude J.L.S. from exposing the child in utero to this incredibly dangerous drug. That fact has not been denied.

[49] The Applicant has invited the court to infer that, given the positive drug test in September of 2022, the mother continues to use methamphetamine. The evidence with respect to the results of the drug test is, however, not trial worthy. It consists only of a lab system data report from Ontario Laboratories Information System. The face of the document notes that the results should be used for medical purposes only. I place no weight whatsoever on it.

[50] As a result, the Applicant cannot prove on a balance of probabilities that the mother continues to use illicit substances. Mr. Roy argues, and I accept, that the onus to meet the test remains always on the moving party. It does not shift to the Respondent.

[51] However, I am also mindful of the court’s guidance in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H.. There must be an arguable notion discernible from the parents’ evidence that she faces some better prospects than what existed at the time of the Society’s removal of the child from her care and has developed some new ability as a parent.

[52] In consenting to the protection findings on June 8, 2022, the mother specifically acknowledged that the child was in need of protection because of her inability to adequately care for, protect, provide for or supervise the child, or because of her neglect. In consenting to an Order of disposition for five months interim care, the mother acknowledged that she was unable to care for the child at that time.

[53] The task for the court then is to determine what is different now. The first question to be answered is why is the mother now able to care for the child? What is the genuine issue requiring trial to determine that fact?

[54] The Society’s says: 1) On the concern about illicit drug use: There is nothing different because mother has not addressed the concerns. She has not undertaken the kind of comprehensive treatment that would be necessary to resolve an addiction to a very serious drug. She has not even asserted abstinence from that drug. She has not complied with requests to produce drug results that might address that concern. 2) On the concern about lack of and/or unsuitable housing: there is no change. The mother has been unable to offer any housing situation that would be suitable for this young child.

[55] To this might be added: Mother did not have an articulable plan to care for this child at the time of the initial finding and has not articulated a reasonable plan now.

[56] The issue of illicit drug abuse is a significant concern that justified the original Orders. There is an obligation upon the Respondent mother to “put her best foot forward” in demonstrating that this concern has been resolved or at the very least, mitigated. She has offered no evidence whatsoever on this point.

[57] There can be no genuine issue requiring trial on this point. There is nothing in dispute.

[58] There is no genuine issue requiring trial on the allegation that mother has failed to undertake meaningful treatment to address the substance abuse issues. The mother herself acknowledges a relatively brief involvement with St. Leonard’s in early 2023. She acknowledges having decided she no longer required their services, with the result that that agency closed its file. She acknowledges that she hasn’t received any further treatment.

[59] There is no genuine issue requiring trial with respect to the inadequate housing that mother has so far offered as her residence. She acknowledges that the homes other than that of A.G. have been unsuitable for Z.S. The only, very limited dispute is that mother describes her potential home with A.G. as being “suitable” for herself and Z.S. to live in. Ms. Button has been far more specific in her description of that home, which would support a very different conclusion. Following the identification of safety risks in the home, A.G. declined to make the home available for further inspection.

[60] A bald assertion that the home is “suitable” does not render that matter a genuine issue for trial.

[61] It is of course also notable that the plan for J.L.S. to move into A.G.’s residence is prospective. It is untried. Its viability is untested.

[62] At its heart, this is a situation where the mother did not have a viable plan to care for the child at the time of his birth or thereafter. She was using crystal methamphetamine; she did not have stable housing. She acknowledged an inability to provide care. What is different now? The mother must put her best foot forward to show she now has a workable plan.

[63] Unfortunately, J.L.S. has not done so. Her evidence leaves the court in uncertainty about even the most basic aspects of any plan. She does not clearly and cogently set out something as basic as where and with whom she is currently living. She provides no particulars about these individuals, who are identified only as ‘Jesse’ and ‘my spouse’s mother’ or B.R.

[64] She provides no evidence as to her plans for childcare, including alternate care should the child be returned to her. She says nothing about source of income. She offers no plan to mitigate the pre-existing protection concerns other than the involvement of A.G. She is non-specific about what help A.G. might provide if the child was returned to her care, other than support and encouragement. A.G. has had her own problems with child welfare and addiction.

[65] There is simply no evidence upon which the court could conclude that the mother faces better prospects to be able to care for this child now. There is no genuine issue requiring trial with respect to mother’s central plan to have the child returned to her care.

[66] For much the same reasons, there is no air of reality to the mother’s plan to jointly care for the child with A.G. or for A.G. to assume care of Z.S. The plan for joint custody seems to rest on mother, child and A.G. all residing in the one-bedroom apartment. To reiterate: that plan is completely untested.

[67] There is also no indication that A.G. has even met Z.S. or that she has any insight into his specific needs. Neither does A.G. indicate any insight into J.L.S.’s difficulties such that she might help mitigate them.

[68] Also concerning is that A.G. has dissembled facts in her representations to the agency on important issues. It is inexplicable that she would respond that she did not think she had child welfare involvement with her own children, given her actual history. A.G. has been uncooperative with the agency’s worker in trying to re-assess the condition of her home. There are two possible inferences available from that behaviour. First, the home continues to be unsuitable as a residence for this child. Second, A.G. has decided she has no wish to subject herself to further scrutiny by the agency.

[69] Either inference raises the inexorable conclusion that a plan involving A.G. is not viable.

[70] A.G. has not provided a criminal record check, nor offered any reason for not doing so.

[71] Either plan, as it involves A.G., smacks of a ‘stop gap’ measure designed to delay a permanent resolution of this little boy’s situation. This is particularly so given the language adopted by the mother in describing her living situation. This can be seen in a rather rambling paragraph (paragraph 37) that addresses everything from access to services to mother’s plan. In it, J.L.S. deposes at one point “Although there were some challenges at the beginning of this year, things are gradually falling back into place, and we have no plans to move anytime soon. My spouse and his mother have agreed for all of us to stay in her home until we find a place of our own, allowing us to focus on stabilizing our lives and ensuring we can have a place for my son to reside with us.” In the very next paragraph, J.L.S. describes A.G.’s residence in glowing terms and says that A.G. is “…willing and able to provide us a safe and loving place for me to reside until I can have Z.S. in my care . (my italics)”

[72] The nature of this statement suggests a temporary arrangement.

[73] For her part, A.G. neither places a time limitation on how long J.L.S. and the child could reside with her, nor does she indicate a commitment to a relatively long-standing arrangement. Indeed, a long-standing arrangement would seem doubtful, given the physical arrangements that would be required within a one-bedroom apartment to be shared by two unrelated adults and a toddler.

[74] It is also noteworthy, that this is the third such plan presented by the mother. J.L.S. has presented two other individuals as potential supports/joint custodians. In both cases, few details of a plan were provided and ultimately each fell through. The plan involving A.G. is last minute and largely speculative.

[75] It cannot be in this little boy’s best interests to consign him to a jerry-rigged, highly uncertain plan. The determination of that matter does not require trial.

[76] For all of these reasons, I find that there is no realistic possibility of an outcome of anything other than extended care for this child.

[77] There is then the issue of access. The mother is currently enjoying supervised access twice per week for one-and-one-half hours each time. She is consistent in attending. The Applicant does not address the quality of the access in detail other than to say there have been concerns at times, including J.L.S. being on her phone during visits. J.L.S. describes her visits are uniformly positive, although she acknowledges sometimes being on her phone too often or too long. She says she has tried to address this since the issue was brought to her attention.

[78] The Applicant says that access should be in its discretion following the making of any order for extended care, with a minimum of six visits per year, with the child being the access holder and the mother being the access recipient. The Respondent mother did not directly address the issue of access in her materials or submissions. Presumably, she would wish for more frequent access following the making of an Order for extended care.

[79] The court can take judicial notice that the purpose of access changes once an order for extended care is made. Prior to that Order, the purpose of access is to maintain the parental bond, allow the parent to demonstrate their caring abilities and to facilitate a reintegration into parental care. Subsequent to the Order, access is to maintain some connection with the child’s biological family. But this goal must be subservient to the need for the child to bond with his adoptive family. It is therefore logical for access to be decreased.

[80] The Applicant agency’s plan recognizes that reality. There is no competing plan put forward by the mother. Although the mother claims access in the alternative in her Amended Answer, she has not particularized that claim.

[81] The specifics of access will obviously need to be in the agency’s discretion following an Order for extended care. This is because this child will have to transition to a more permanent plan, the specifics of which are currently unknown. In all of the circumstances, and in the absence of a competing plan, an Order for substantially reduced access is a foregone conclusion.

Final Order

[82] Final Order to go-

1. The child Z.S., born [...], 2022, shall be placed in the extended society care, in the care of Child and Family Services of Grand Erie.
2. The Respondent mother shall have access to the child, Z.S., at the discretion of the Child and Family Services of Grand Erie as to duration, location, time and dates, with access occurring at a minimum of six (6) times per year with the child being the access holder and the Respondent mother being the access recipient.
3. There shall be no access between the Respondent father, E.A.B. and the child, Z.S.
4. The Applicant shall be given leave to amend the child’s name(s) or parents’ names and dates of birth in the final order to conform to the Statement of Live Birth once filed with the Court.
5. The Ready List date of August 15, 2023, shall be vacated, and the matter shall be removed from the trial sittings of September 18, 2023. The previously scheduled return date of August 1, 2023 shall also be vacated.

Dated at Brantford, Ontario this 18th day of July, 2023

The Honourable Justice K.A. Baker