ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: V.S.B. v. B.L.O., 2022 ONCJ 569

DATE: December 5, 2022

COURT FILE No.: 20-15664-A1

BETWEEN:

V.S.B.

Applicant

— AND —

B.L.O.

Respondent

HEARD IN CHAMBERS

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

Dana Lue................................................................................................ counsel for the applicant

B.L.O………………….. …………………………..………………….. acting in person

JUSTICE W. KAPURURA:

Part One – Introduction

[1] On November 7^th, 2022, the court released its reasons for decision regarding a trial about the parenting and support arrangements for the parties’ 2-year-old son (the child). See V.S.B. v. B.L.O., 2022 ONCJ 506. The trial lasted five days.

[2] The parties were given the opportunity to make costs submissions.

[3] The applicant (the mother) seeks her costs of $46,945.47. She seeks to have the costs enforced as child support, with the father paying the costs amount at a rate of $100.00 per month, commencing December 1^st, 2022. Her request for costs pertains to trial preparation from May 16, 2022, until the final day of trial, October 17, 2022. She also seeks costs for events after the release of the court’s final decision, including the preparation of her costs submissions.

[4] The respondent (the father) seeks his costs of $42,724.23. He further seeks reimbursement of $477.00, the amount he paid for a paternity test in 2021.

Part Two – Legal considerations and analysis

2.1 General principles

[5] The determination of costs is a two-stage process. First, the court must decide whether either party is liable to pay costs. Second, if liability for costs is established, the court must then determine the appropriate amount of the costs award.[^1]

[6] Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, as amended, provides that costs orders are in the discretion of the court.

[7] Two important principles in exercising discretion are reasonableness and proportionality. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.

[8] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 set out that modern costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes:

(1) to partially indemnify successful litigants;

(2) to encourage settlement;

(3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants and;

(4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2 (2) of the Family Law Rules (all references to the rules in this decision are to the Family Law Rules).

[9] While these four objectives provide a general framework for the analysis of costs, the court must also ensure that the law of costs does not become an impediment to the pursuit of justice. Accordingly, in seeking to advance these objectives, the court should also consider the importance of not unduly deterring potential litigants from pursuing legitimate claims for fear of overly burdensome costs consequences. See: Weber v. Weber, 2020 ONSC 6855 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 11.

[10] An award of costs is subject to the factors listed in subrule 24 (12), subrule 24 (4) pertaining to unreasonable conduct of a successful party, subrule 24 (8) pertaining to bad faith, subrule 18 (14) pertaining to offers to settle, and the reasonableness of the costs sought by the successful party. See: Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, at paragraph 94.

2.2 Success

[11] Subrule 24(1) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. Consideration of success is the starting point in determining costs. See: Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 22584 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 330 (SCJ-Family Court).

[12] To determine whether a party has been successful, the court should examine who was the successful party, based on the positions taken in the litigation. See: Lazare v. Heitner, 2018 ONSC 4861. The court may also take into account how the order compares to any settlement offers that were made. See: Lawson v. Lawson, 2008 23496 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 1978 (SCJ); Todor v. Todor, 2021 ONSC 3463.

[13] Subrule 24 (6) sets out that if success in a step in a case is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate.

[14] “Divided success” does not necessarily mean “equal success”. And “some success” may not be enough to impact on costs. It requires a comparative analysis. Most family cases have multiple issues. They are not equally important, time-consuming or expensive to determine. See: Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 66.

[15] Where there are multiple issues before the court, the court should have regard to the dominant issue in determining success. See: Firth v. Allerton, [2013] O.J. No. 3992 (Ont. S.C.J.); Mondino v. Mondino, 2014 ONSC 1102 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[16] The determination of whether success was truly “divided” requires a contextual analysis that takes into consideration the importance of the issues that were litigated and the time and expense that were devoted to the issues that required adjudication. Most family cases have multiple issues. They are not equally important, time-consuming or expensive to determine. See: Kachra v. Skeaff, supra, at para 19; Scipione v. Del Sordo, 2015 CarswellOnt 14971 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 68.

2.3 Offers to settle

[17] Subrule 18 (14) sets out the consequences of a party’s failure to accept an offer to settle that is as good as or better than the trial result of the person making the offer. It reads as follows:

COSTS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO ACCEPT OFFER

18(14) A party who makes an offer is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date, if the following conditions are met:

1. If the offer relates to a motion, it is made at least one day before the motion date.

2. If the offer relates to a trial or the hearing of a step other than a motion, it is made at least seven days before the trial or hearing date.

3. The offer does not expire and is not withdrawn before the hearing starts.

4. The offer is not accepted.

5. The party who made the offer obtains an order that is as favourable as or more favourable than the offer.

[18] The onus of proving that the offer is as or more favourable than the trial result is on the person making the offer. See: Neilipovitz v. Neilipovitz, [2014] O.J. No. 3842 (SCJ).

[19] The court is not required to examine each term of the offer as compared to the terms of the order and weigh with microscopic precision the equivalence of the terms. What is required is a general assessment of the overall comparability of the offer as contrasted with the order. See: Wilson v Kovalev, 2016 ONSC 163.

[20] Close is not good enough to attract the costs consequences of 18 (14). The offer must be as good as or more favourable than the trial result. See: Gurley v. Gurley, 2013 ONCJ 482.

[21] Courts have discussed the value of severable offers. See: Lawson v. Lawson, 2004 6219 (ON SC), 2004 O.J. No. 3206 (SCJ); Paranavitana v. Nanayakkara, 2010 ONSC 2257, [2010] O.J. No. 1566 (SCJ). In Lawson, Quinn J., wrote at paragraph 26:

26 I would discourage the making of all-or-nothing offers. The severable variety allows for the prospect that some of the outstanding issues might be settled, thereby reducing the length and expense of the motion or trial, as the case may be. All-or-nothing offers sometimes have a heavy-handed air about them and certainly they possess a much lower chance of being accepted than severable offers.

Part Three – Analysis

3.1 The parties’ offers to settle

[22] The mother made a severable offer to settle dated April 7, 2022. However, one part of her offer was not severable, as discussed in detail below.

[23] The father made a non-severable offer to settle dated October 3, 2022.

[24] Each party’s offer to settle was not withdrawn.

[25] The mother’s offer to settle was structured in five parts as follows:

Part A: Communication (severable)

Part B: Decision-making and access to information (severable)

Part C: Travel (severable)

Part D: Parenting time (severable)

Part E: Child support and section 7 expenses (only to be accepted in combination with Part B and Part D)

[26] Even though each part of the mother’s offer was to be accepted as a whole, the mother kept the door open for further negotiations by adding the following clause to her offer:

If there are specific paragraphs that the respondent (father) is agreeable to in the Offer, he may present those to the (applicant) mother, and she will advise if she is agreeable to severing them from the rest of the "Part".

[27] The father’s non-severable offer to settle has sub-headings covering his proposed clauses on each issue. His offer to settle was the same as the requests he made at trial on all issues and all clauses.

[28] The mother’s offer was delivered to the father on April 7, 2022. The parties’ trial was held in October 2022, for five days.

[29] In her offer, the mother asked for sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence. The father’s offer was for joint decision decision-making responsibility, with a detailed consultation clause. He further offered that in the event of disagreement, the mother would have final decision-making authority. He also sought a parenting arrangement that would gradually increase to an equal time-sharing arrangement for the child.

[30] The final order made by the court was as favourable as the mother’s offer since the mother was granted sole decision-making responsibility for the child and primary residence. Given that the offer was severable, the father should have accepted this offer. The mother’s offer regarding decision-making responsibility and primary residence meets the requirements under subrule 18(14). She is presumptively entitled to full recovery of her costs on those two issues and that presumption has not been rebutted. She will get full recovery of her costs for the two issues.

[31] The mother’s offer for the father’s parenting time was for one overnight per week, which would change to two overnights every second weekend. She also offered an additional two hours of parenting time on alternate Wednesdays. The father offered his parenting time to start with two overnights per week, and gradually increase to fourteen days per month. Following the trial, the father was awarded alternate weekends, from Friday after daycare until Sunday evening. He was also awarded alternate Thursday overnights. Neither party’s offer was as or more favourable than the trial result. Therefore, the requirements under subrule 18(14) are not met by either party.

[32] The mother offered to impute the father’s annual income at $30,000.00 for purposes of child support calculation (under part ‘E’). The monthly table amount for one child is $256.00. The father offered to pay child support based on his current income. However, no income was provided in his offer to settle. At trial, the father’s annual income was imputed at $39,149.00 for purposes of support calculation. The monthly table amount for one child is $349.00. He is now required to pay more than what he was offered.

[33] The mother also offered (under part ‘E’) to contribute 70% of section 7 expenses (daycare), with the father contributing 30% of the total cost. The father offered that each parent contributes their proportionate share towards section 7 expenses based on their income. However, the father did not state his income in the offer. The final order made by the court requires the father to contribute 31.1% of the daycare expenses, with the mother contributing 68.9%. Her offer was more favourable to the father than the final order made by the court.

[34] The mother’s offer for child support and section 7 expenses (part E) was not severable as it required the father to also accept parts B (decision-making) and D (parenting time) if he were to accept her offer for child support and section 7 expenses. Given that her offer for parenting time was not as favourable to the father as the final order from the court, her offers on child support and section 7 expenses do not meet the technical requirements under subrule 18(14). She is not presumptively entitled to full recovery of her costs on the issues of child support and section 7 expenses based on her offer to settle.

[35] However, the mother’s offer to settle had a clause inviting the father to communicate any clauses he wished to be severed from a part and the mother would consider whether to sever the part. There is no evidence that the father communicated his willingness to sever the clauses on child support and section 7 expenses. It was unreasonable for the father not to do so as the child support offer would have resulted in him paying child support based on an income that is close to the Ontario general minimum wage amount. His contribution towards the daycare expenses would have been 1.1% lower had he accepted her offer for section 7 expenses.

3.2 Determination of success

[36] Given that the mother is entitled to her costs on a full recovery basis regarding decision-making and primary residence, the following analysis addresses success on the remainder of the issues based on the positions taken by the parties at trial. The issues are parenting time, child support, section 7 expenses, the child’s legal name, and travel.

[37] At trial, the father sought a parenting arrangement that would gradually increase to an equal time-sharing arrangement for the child.

[38] The mother sought to have the father’s parenting time on alternate weekends (from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday at 4:00 p.m.). This parenting time would increase in January 2024, by starting on Friday after school until Sunday at 4:00 p.m. The mother also requested additional parenting time for the father during the summer, commencing in the year 2024, with the father getting an additional four days of parenting time for each month in July and August.

[39] Pursuant to Justice Finlayson’s temporary order dated November 4, 2020, the father was having one overnight of parenting time every week. The mother’s request at trial, if granted, would have resulted in a reduction of the father’s parenting time from four overnights to two overnights per month.

[40] The father’s request for parenting time was for two days per week and gradually increase to fourteen days per month. The father also requested two non-consecutive weeks of parenting time for each parent during the summer break.

[41] Neither party succeeded in their position on the issue of parenting time. Neither party is entitled to costs on the issue of the father’s parenting time based on success.

[42] The mother asked the court at trial to impute the father’s annual income at $55,000.00 for purposes of support calculation, with a payable monthly child support amount of $507.00. The father sought to have child support paid based on his ‘current income’. He declared his current annual income to be $23,000.00.

[43] The court made findings that the father had failed to provide court-ordered financial disclosure.

[44] The court made findings that the father is intentionally under-employed and that there is no reasonable excuse for his under-employment. His annual income was imputed at $39,149.00 for purposes of support calculation, with a monthly table amount of $349.00 for one child. He was also ordered to contribute $212.00 per month towards the child’s daycare expenses.

[45] Even though the court did not impute the father’s income to the level requested by the mother, she was the successful party on the issue of child support and section 7 expenses.

[46] The court dismissed the father’s request to change the child’s name. The mother’s requests for police enforcement of the parenting orders and her request to require the father to seek leave before bringing a motion to change parenting orders were both dismissed by the court.

[47] The father sought an order allowing both parents to travel with the child outside Canada, on notice, without the requirement for either parent’s consent. The mother sought an order allowing her to travel with the child internationally without the father’s consent (on 14 days’ notice to the father), and for the father to be able to travel internationally during his parenting time, with the mother’s consent. She was the successful party on the travel issue as her request mirrored the final order. However, her request was even more favourable than the final order as the court did not require the mother to provide notice to the father.

3.3 The cost of a paternity test

[48] During the proceeding, the father requested a paternity test on the child. On March 23^rd, 2022, the father paid $477.00 for a paternity test. The results confirmed him as the child’s biological father. He is now asking the court to have the mother reimburse him for the cost of the paternity test.

[49] There is no legal or logical basis to make the order requested by the father. He is the one who questioned paternity and the mother agreed to have the paternity test conducted. The result confirmed him as the child’s biological father. He is fully responsible for this cost.

Part Four – Factors in determining the amount of costs

[50] Subrule 24 (12) reads as follows:

24 (12) In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,

a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:

(i) each party’s behaviour,

(ii) the time spent by each party,

(iii) any written offers to settle including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18,

iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,

v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates,

vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and

(b) any other relevant matter.

[51] This case was important for the parties. It was made more complex and difficult due to the father’s conduct, particularly regarding his failure to provide court-ordered financial disclosure.

[52] Both parties acted unreasonably by filing extensive document briefs for trial which contained materials that were not relevant to the trial issues.

[53] The mother acted reasonably by making a severable offer to settle on decision-making responsibility, primary residence, parenting time, and travel. The father should have accepted the clauses on decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and travel.

[54] The mother did not act reasonably by:

i. Seeking to reduce the father’s regular parenting time from four overnights a month to two overnights a month, as per the mother’s position at trial.

ii. Refusing to provide the father with copies of the child’s identification documents, advising him to obtain the documents from relevant government offices.

[55] The father did not act reasonably by:

i. Failing to file an affidavit for his evidence-in-chief, in breach of Justice Jones’ trial management order dated March 30^th, 2022.

ii. Failing to file affidavits for three of his witnesses (the paternal grandfather, the maternal grandfather, and Ms. Harssar), in breach of Justice Jones’ trial management order dated March 30^th, 2022.

iii. Refusing to accept the mother’s offer for decision-making responsibility and primary residence.

iv. Refusing to call the child by his legal name. It required two court orders for him to start using the child’s legal name.

v. Failing to comply with disclosure orders and requests for financial disclosure. The court had to resort to imputing income on him due to the lack of financial disclosure. He is self-employed and the disclosure ordered was vital to a proper assessment of his income for purposes of support calculation. If a party chooses to play the “catch me if you can” game, they should expect that there will be harsh costs consequences if they are caught. See Mpamugo v. Nyeche-Woluchor.[^2]

vi. Failing to file a sworn financial statement, as was ordered by Justice Jones on March 30^th, 2022.

vii. Trying to resile from his sworn financial statement dated July 29, 2019. The financial statement had been prepared by his lawyer.

viii. Failing to pay child support following the birth of the child. He only started paying child support seven months after the mother had filed her court application seeking support.

ix. Failing to provide proof of his debts.

x. Refusing to contribute towards the child’s daycare expenses.

xi. Priding himself in having a free lawyer funded by Legal Aid Ontario. The father spoke of ‘round two’ of legal proceedings, and mocked the mother for having to pay her legal fees privately.

[56] The father’s behaviour as described above is concerning.

[57] Subrule 24(12) speaks of the reasonableness and proportionality of a party’s behaviour as it relates to the importance and complexity of the case.

[58] The father’s conduct should not be condoned. As Justice Desormeau stated in Carmichael v. Carmichael, 2019 ONSC 7224:

12 The justice system is a precious public resource. Access to the justice system by individuals must be balanced with the need to ensure that the resource is available for all those who need it. This is one of the purposes of Rule 2: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 2017 ONCJ 431, at para. 52.

13 Parties to litigation must understand that court proceedings are expensive, time-consuming and stressful for all concerned. They are not designed to give individual litigants a forum for carrying on in whatever manner they may choose, oblivious to the impact of that conduct on the other side and, perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this case, oblivious to the mounting costs of the litigation: Lawrence v. Lawrence, supra, at para. 54.

[59] When the mother attempted to negotiate parenting issues with the father just before and following the child’s birth, the father took the approach described by Justice McGee in Lazare v Heitner, 2018 ONSC 4861 (Ont. S.C.J.) as “accept my terms or I will fight you on everything” [para 16].

[60] Costs can be used to sanction behaviour that increases the duration and expense of litigation, or is otherwise unreasonable or vexatious. In short, it has become a routine matter for courts to employ the power to order costs as a tool in the furtherance of the efficient and orderly administration of justice. See: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, 2003 S.C.C. 71, paragraph 25.

[61] As stated above, the mother will obtain full recovery of her costs regarding decision-making responsibility and primary residence. She will obtain partial recovery of her costs regarding the issues of child support and section 7 expenses. No costs will be awarded to either party regarding the issue of parenting time and the secondary issues such as travel, name change and child’s documents. The parenting and support issues were the dominant issues at trial.

[62] The mother is entitled to her costs, with the quantum being determined by the court. She is seeking costs in the amount of $46,945.47.

[63] Even though the two lawyers who assisted the mother were from the same firm, they provided services at different times. The mother was initially represented by Ms. Shoot, who was called to the bar in 2017. Her hourly rate is $300.00. The hourly rate is reasonable.

[64] When Ms. Shoot went on maternity leave, Ms. Lue took over the matter. She was called to the bar in 2013. Her regular rate is $350.00 per hour. However, she maintained Ms. Shoot’s rate of $300.00 on the mother’s file. The rate applied by Ms. Lue is reasonable.

[65] The disbursements claimed by the mother for photocopying ($843.34) and process server ($61.72) are reasonable.

[66] The mother claims a disbursement of $1,249.60 for transcripts. However, no invoices were provided in support of the disbursement. For that reason, the court will only allow two-thirds of the requested disbursement (which amounts to $833.06).

[67] The court finds that the time claimed by the mother is proportionate to the issues. She is claiming a total of 130.2 hours for services rendered by the two lawyers. She is not seeking costs for events preceding her offer to settle. Further, she is only claiming 1.1 hours for services rendered on day four of the trial which lasted from around 10:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m.

[68] The court considered the father’s financial circumstances in making this order. [See: MacDonald v. Magel (2003), 2003 18880 (ON CA), 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (Ont. C.A.)]. He is of modest means. The court will address any hardship to the father, by permitting him to pay an affordable amount of costs over a reasonable amount of time.

[69] Even though the father is not currently paying child support for his daughter from a different relationship, he continues to have a responsibility towards her as she is in his care on a shared parenting arrangement with her mother. This is an additional financial responsibility for the father.

[70] However, the father should have expected to pay costs approaching the range that will be ordered by the court.

[71] The court also considered the following:

(a) Parties cannot expect to be immune from an order of costs based on their limited financial resources. If this were the case, parties would be free to conduct litigation as they wished without fear of reprisal in the form of adverse costs orders and this would be contrary to the philosophy and requirements of the Rules. See: Culp v. Culp, 2019 ONSC 7051 (Ont. S.C.J.); Mark v. Bhangari, 2010 ONSC 4638 (Ont. S.C.J.).

(b) Ability to pay alone cannot, nor should it, over-ride the other factors in Rule 24(12). See: Peers v. Poupore, 2008 ONCJ 615 (Ont. C.J.); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 2017 ONCJ 431, 2017 CarswellOnt 9843 (Ont. C.J.).

(c) Those who can least afford litigation should be the most motivated to seriously pursue settlement and avoid unnecessary proceedings. See: Mohr v. Sweeney, 2016 ONSC 3238 (Ont. S.C.J.); T.L. v. D.S., 2020 ONCJ 9 (Ont. C.J.); Balsmeier v. Balsmeier, 2016 ONSC 3485 (Ont. S.C.J.).

(d) Family law litigants are responsible for and accountable for the positions they take in the litigation. See: Heuss v. Surkos, 2004 ONCJ 141 (Ont. C.J.).

(e) Impecuniosity does not grant a litigant the right to unrestricted access to the courts. Such access has to be exercised responsibly and reasonably. See: G.W.S. v. C.S., 2018 ONCJ 378.

[72] The father’s costs claim of $42,724.23 is strong evidence of what he reasonably expected to pay in the event of lack of success in the litigation.

[73] The court considered the fact that the father was self-represented.

[74] Self-representation cannot be used to shield or insulate a litigant from a costs award, otherwise it would create a two-tier system. Any such consideration is outweighed by the need to ensure that the objective of sanctioning/discouraging inappropriate behaviour is met. At a time when our family court system is seeing ever-increasing numbers of self-represented parties, it is important to reaffirm that costs sanctions apply equally whether parties have counsel or not. No one should get a “free pass.” See: M.A.L. v. R.H.M., 2018 ONSC 2542 (par. 100); Barran v. Schanck, 2019 ONCJ 218.

[75] As discussed in paragraph 44 of the court’s decision, the father sent the following message to the mother just before the child’s birth:

… if our son comes out of you without an agreement in place, there are already processes in place for a father (that is not living with the mother) to follow. …You will have to get a lawyer to follow the process properly between us. Your lawyer will be a $5000 retainer which will be used up in the first month, then $5000 more.. [emphasis added]

[76] In determining the appropriate quantum, the court should consider the amount that the unsuccessful party could reasonably have expected to pay in the event of lack of success in the litigation. See: Arthur v. Arthur, 2019 ONSC 938.

[77] The court considered the several factors outlined above in determining the quantum of costs.

[78] The court finds that it is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances for the father to pay the mother costs in the amount of $26,964.00 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

[79] The court imputed the father’s annual income at $39,149.00. Any hardship to him can be ameliorated by permitting him to pay costs over a reasonable period. He will be allowed to pay the costs at the rate of $200.00 per month until the full amount is paid.

Part Five – The mother’s request for FRO enforcement of costs order

[80] The mother seeks an order that her costs be payable as support and enforced as an incident of support by the Director pursuant to clause 1(1)(g) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act. She seeks that the father pays a monthly installment of $100.00 until the full amount is paid.

[81] The court has discretion to allocate what portion of the costs are attributable to support, particularly when there are multiple issues being litigated. See: Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665.

[82] A flexible approach has been endorsed when the court is determining what proportion of costs should be allocated to the support issues. See: Shelley v. Shelley, 2019 ONSC 2830.

[83] The court considered the following factors:

a. The amount of time that was spent on the support issues at trial.

b. The relationship between the parties, and,

c. The history of support.

[84] The court will allocate 35% of this costs order as an incident of support.

Part Six – Order

[85] Balancing all the above considerations, an order shall go on the following terms:

a. The father shall pay the mother costs fixed at $26,964.00, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

b. The father shall pay the costs at the rate of $200.00 each month, starting on January 1^st, 2023. However, if he is more than 30 days late in making any costs payment, the full amount of costs then owing shall immediately become due and payable.

c. 35% of this costs award is a support order within the meaning of section 1(1)(g) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, and as such, it is enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office.

d. The father shall be required to provide proof of compliance with this costs order before bringing a motion to change parenting and/or support issues.

e. The father’s request for costs is dismissed.

f. Support deduction order to issue.

Released: December 5, 2022.

Signed: Justice Wiriranai Kapurura

[^1]: Justice S. Sullivan in Deguire v. Alleranos, 2022 (unreported), OCJ, File #66/19, para. 18

[^2]: 2022 ONCJ 559 (Justice S.B. Sherr).