WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.— (7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
( c ) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged .— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.— (3) Offences re publication. — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
Ontario Court of Justice
Date: 2022 03 01 Court File No.: Brantford FO-21-00000173-00
Between:
THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF BRANT O/A BRANT FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES Applicant,
— AND —
J. R. and S. J. Respondents
Before: Justice K. A. Baker
Heard on: February 24, 2022 Reasons for Judgment released on: March 1, 2022
Counsel: Vanessa Kaljaste, counsel for the applicant society Faizal Roy, counsel for the respondent(s) S.J., on his own behalf
Endorsement
BAKER, J.:
[1] On February 24, 2022, I heard a temporary care hearing with respect to this matter. A temporary and a temporary, without prejudice order was released through endorsement on February 25, 2022, with written reasons to follow. These are my reasons.
[2] The subject child is G.R., born January XX, 20XX and now aged 13 months. His parents are J.R. and S.J.
[3] Prior to the intervention of the Society, the mother was in an intimate relationship with one K.H. She resided in Brantford with Mr. H. and a roommate, N. (surname not in evidence).
[4] The Society became involved with the family on December 8, 2020, as a result of a referral from Detective Callum of the Brantford police. Detective Callum advised that Mr. H. had been charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a child. He had been released on Bail on terms, including that he not be in the presence of any child under the age of sixteen years unless supervised by another adult.
[5] G.R. was born prematurely on January XX, 20XX, and he remained in hospital for some weeks after his birth.
[6] Shortly after the baby’s birth, the Society worker, Brittany Boilard contacted the mother. The mother advised that she did not believe that the allegations against Mr. H. were true. Ms. Boilard made plans to meet with the mother and to establish a safety plan for when the baby was discharged from hospital.
[7] By January 25, 2021, the hospital was reporting concerns with respect to mother’s ability to care for the child. In particular, the mother appeared overwhelmed and frustrated when visiting. The mother’s friend, Ms. W., who attended with her, would generally take over the baby’s care at these times.
[8] It was later learned that Ms. W. has five children of her own, none of whom are in her care.
[9] Ms. Boilard convened a home visit to develop a safety plan on February 1, 2021. The mother proposed that Mr. H. continue to live in the home once the baby was discharged. Her idea was that Mr. H. would be supervised by either herself or her roommate. Ms. R. reiterated her belief that the allegations against Mr. H. were not true.
[10] After discussing matters with her manager, Ms. Boilard determined that the safety plan would not be acceptable to the Society, and she advised the mother accordingly on February 5, 2021. Ms. Boilard told the mother that it was necessary for Mr. H. to leave the home and that he must not have any contact with the baby. The mother was described as “adamant” that Mr. H. could stay in the home because she was capable of supervising him, “at all times”. Ms. R. was clear that she intended to continue her relationship with Mr. H.
[11] The hospital continued to report concerns with respect to mother’s visits with the baby, including the fact that Ms. W. was “taking over” the baby’s care.
[12] By this point, a referral had been made to Healthy Babies/Healthy Children. The mother attended on two days before ceasing involvement.
[13] On February 10, 2021, another home visit occurred to confirm the safety plan for the baby’s imminent release. Ms. Boilard reiterated that Mr. H. could not reside in the home and must not have any contact with the baby unless it was authorized by the Society. The mother questioned Ms. Boilard as to whether she could go outside to have smoke breaks with Mr. H., leaving the child with an approved adult. Ms. Boilard indicated that the Society would require child welfare and police checks for any adult used as an alternate caregiver. During this meeting, the mother’s roommate, N., agreed to cooperate with the necessary checks so as to be approved as an alternate caregiver.
[14] Throughout this meeting, the mother repeatedly objected to any restrictions on her contact with Mr. H.
[15] By this point in early February 2021, the mother had been referred to the Pregnancy and Resource Centre for service. The mother attended 8 appointments with 4 ‘no shows’ advising that she was, “busy”.
[16] Another home visit occurred on February 12, 2021. Ms. R. requested that her roommate N. be present during the meeting, “because you know how I am with my disability”. (Ms. R. suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome and is on ODSP as a result.) Ms. Boilard went over the safety plan which was later confirmed in a letter that mother signed the same day.
[17] The hospital had been encouraging the mother to spend more time with the baby and to attend on her own. By February 12, 2021, the hospital was reporting that mother was attending more often, but that she spent all her time on the phone with Ms. W. The reporting nurse noted that the mother struggled with basic care tasks.
[18] On March 1, 2021, the baby was discharged from hospital. The baby was discharged with a plan that he stay with mother from Monday to Friday and with father on weekends. Ms. Boilard’s evidence is that father also had the child some weekdays after work. Mother was supported in the care of the child by her roommate N. and his mother, Ms. E.
[19] G.R. has some special medical needs, including a heart murmur for which he requires regular medical attention. The mother failed to take G.R. for an appointment for that purpose, claiming a lack of transportation.
[20] On March 13, 2021, during another meeting, Ms. R. advised that she was meeting Mr. H. once or twice a week outside of the home. She said the child was sleeping at these times and she takes a baby monitor with her. When the worker expressed concern about this arrangement, the mother clarified that her roommate N. was, “in the apartment” with G.R. during these times. Despite having time to meet with Mr. H., the mother said she was “too busy” with the baby to resume involvement with Healthy Babies/Healthy Children.
[21] By March 17, 2021, mother was reporting that she had not seen Mr. H., “recently” and was focusing on G.R. She said she had contacted Healthy Babies/Healthy Children and they were no longer offering the program. Various options were offered by the worker.
[22] By March 24, 2021, the mother had still not rescheduled an appointment to address G.R.’s heart murmur.
[23] As concerns had been raised with respect to whether the mother was properly feeding G.R., the worker provided the mother with feeding logs during a meeting on April 13, 2021. The mother never completed those documents. She says in her evidence that she charted feedings on her phone, but she does not provide any corroborating evidence such as print outs of these charts. Mother had still not rescheduled an appointment to check G.R.’s heart murmur. G.R. had also missed an appointment for the flexion deformity in his wrist. Ms. Boilard reminded the mother of the need to follow the safety plan.
[24] Ms. R. then cancelled three appointments in May 2021 and another in early June. Although the mother said she had rescheduled G.R.’s medical appointment, mother then cancelled it. Mother did contact the Pregnancy Resource Centre, however she did not maintain regular contact and did not follow through with the recommended mentorship to new mom program.
[25] By June 30, 2021, Ms. E. was reporting concerns including that Ms. R. was leaving the baby to go and see Mr. H. without telling anyone else and ensuring that another adult would care for G.R.. Ms. E. went on to observe that Ms. R. appeared to be, “getting tired of G.R.” and was leaving him for days with different friends so she could spend time with Mr. H.
[26] During a home visit on July 7, 2021, the mother acknowledged having left G.R. with individuals (Aunt R. and an unnamed neighbour), not approved in advance by the Society, as required by the safety plan. During this meeting the worker observed that the playpen where the child sleeps was crowded with fluffy blankets and stuffed toys. She advised the mother about the risk of suffocation and the mother agreed to remove these items.
[27] By mid July 2021, G.R. had been referred to Lansdowne Children’s Centre for occupational therapy. The mother was not engaging, and services were thus frustrated.
[28] During an August 12, 2021 home visit, the mother disclosed that she had not rescheduled the appointment for G.R.’s heart murmur. She was not able to describe what the pediatrician had advised during a recent appointment, saying she was not good at remembering things. The playpen continued to have various extraneous items in it, despite Ms. R.’s prior agreement to keep it clear.
[29] When the safety plan was reviewed, the mother told the worker that Mr. H. was coming to her home on weekends, when the child was with his father.
[30] On August 23, 2021, the maternal great grandmother reported concerns as the mother was, “always outside hours at a time” and with Mr. H., “usually everyday”. At some points when mother was out, N., who supposedly was watching the baby, would be outside with the dog. (The mother resides on the fifth floor of an apartment building.)
[31] Mr. J. was reporting that Mr. H. was “always” there during exchanges of the child. At one point the mother and Mr. H. turned up at Mr. J.’s home uninvited during a time when G.R. was present. Both these assertions were corroborated by Mr. J.’s partner, A.
[32] On August 25, 2021, the mother cancelled another of G.R.’s appointments, this one with Lansdowne Children’s Centre.
[33] At a home visit two days later, the mother was unable to recall what recommendations Lansdowne had previously provided to improve G.R.’s motor skills. The extraneous items remained in the playpen. The mother acknowledged that Mr. H. was dropping in at different times when G.R. was in her care. Although the mother initially said that G.R. was always asleep during these visits, she later conceded that he was sometimes awake. She also acknowledged that Mr. H. was present during exchanges, saying that he makes the decision to attend, despite his knowledge of the safety plan.
[34] On August 31, 2021, Ms. Boilard attended the home, unannounced, with a warrant to remove G.R. to a place of safety. G.R. was found sleeping in a playpen that was, “filled with stuff” including a queen size pillow, a memory foam topper, stuffed animals and other toys. The mother was not present and the roommate, N. did not know she had left. It took mother five minutes to return.
[35] When the worker expressed her concern about the mother prioritizing her relationship with Mr. H. over the baby, the mother changed her story and said that she “never” sees Mr. H.
[36] G.R. was then placed with his father as a “place of safety”, where he has remained to date. At the first return of the Protection Application on September 3, 2021, a temporary, without prejudice order was made placing G.R. with Mr. J. under the Society’s supervision.
[37] Shortly after G.R.’s removal from mother’s care, it was learned that the mother had failed to bring G.R. for his six-month vaccines and then missed four subsequent appointments.
[38] Over the fall of 2021, the mother engaged with various services including counseling and parenting programming. On October 20, 2021, she reported to Ms. Boilard that she had ended her relationship with Mr. H., saying it ended in mid-September 2021.
[39] In her affidavit sworn November 29, 2021, the mother reiterates that she does not believe the allegations against Mr. H. She says that she has the support of her parents, her sister and Aunt R.W. in her plan to assume primary care of G.R. Various emails and letters are attached. These items do not meet the standard of credible and trustworthy evidence and I will not consider them. This leaves the court without any independent evidence from these support individuals.
[40] In her affidavit, the mother asserts her willingness to ensure that G.R. is not left alone and to, “attend to his every need”. She then embarks on a series of denials of the various identified concerns. She offers various excuses for failing to take the child to appointments and not engaging with Healthy Babies/Healthy Children. She blames clinics and service providers for not returning her calls. She says the person who identified themselves as the maternal great grandmother is actually her birth mother, and insinuates it was a malicious report. She says that she has, “taken good care of my son”. She insists that on the day the child was removed, her roommate was aware of “where G.R. was” at the time, which was in his playpen, watching tv. (The child was eight months old at the time.)
[41] With respect to Mr. H., the mother says that she, “had no intention of Mr. H. being around my child”. She goes on to say that “I have no issues with ending the relationship with Mr. H. if it means that my child G.R. can be returned to my care”. Later she says, “my relationship with Mr. H. has ended”.
[42] In relation to maintaining Facebook contact with Mr. H., she says that she thought the restriction only required physical distance.
[43] At paragraphs 80-83 of her affidavit, the mother asserts the following:
I have ended the relationship with Mr. H. I have a text message as proof that the relationship has ended. I can look for this text message and attach it through email as proof.
The last time I saw Mr. H. was September 21, 2021.
I am still in contact with Mr. H. we talk on and off, mostly discussing how G.R. is doing, alongside Ms. R. (sic).
I am intentional about no longer being in a romantic relationship with Mr. H. -my intention is to get my son back. G.R. can be returned to my care and custody.
[44] During a meeting between Ms. Boilard and the mother on December 10, 2021, Ms. Boilard reiterated the protection concerns relating to Mr. H. The mother asserted in response that she had ended the relationship with Mr. H. She told the mother that the Society had verified the allegations against the other child. Ms. Boilard reminded the mother of her sworn evidence that she continues to have contact with Mr. H. The mother responded that she remains, “friends” with Mr. H. and said that he, “does not really come her anymore”. Ms. R. reiterated her belief that the allegations against Mr. H. were untrue.
[45] On the same day the paternal grandfather reported that Mr. H.’s car was parked in the mother’s apartment parking lot and it had a child car seat and playpen in it. When questioned, the mother said that she and Mr. H. had broken up a month ago (which would be November 2021) and that Mr. H. had given her the car prior to their breakup. The ownership had not been changed however.
[46] By January 4, 2022, the mother was asserting that she had stopped contacting Mr. H. as she now sees his behaviours as unhealthy. She went on to say that Mr. H. was jealous and made insulting remarks such as calling the mother “stupid” and “retarded”. She said Mr. H. has threatened her to get what he wants, including threatening to call police to say she had stolen his car. As a result, the mother said she returned the car to Mr. H.
[47] On January 19, 2022, the mother met with the worker and revealed that she is pregnant, indicating that the father could be either Mr. H. or another male named ‘A’. When asked about the identity of ‘A.’ the mother denied that he is a current partner, but did describe him as a, “significant support”.
[48] On January 20, 2022, the mother sent a text to Ms. Boilard asking, “with K. being charged with what he is, is it really a good idea to let him around my child?” The mother was not able to articulate clearly what the concerns were with respect to Mr. H. and simply repeated that she had not understood what sexual interference was at the time.
[49] The current temporary, without prejudice order provides that access particulars are at the discretion of the Society. There is a specific term that requires that the mother not allow Ms. W. to care for the child nor allow any contact between the child and Mr. H. and to advise the Society immediately of any attempt by Mr. H. to secure contact with the child.
[50] The test at a temporary care hearing is well established. The Society bears the onus to show, on credible and trustworthy evidence, that a) the child is at risk of harm if returned to the person who had ‘charge’ prior to the intervention, and b) that a supervision order would not be sufficient to mitigate the risk.
[51] The first issue is who had charge of this child. The Society initially took the position that mother had ‘charge’. After some discussion with the court, the Society conceded that the situation could be construed as one where the parents both had ‘charge’. The father, who was self represented, did not take a position on the point. The mother asserted that she had ‘charge’.
[52] The term "charge" is not defined in the CYFSA. It has been interpreted in several cases. In Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. Teena G. et al. (2002), Kukurin J. considered the definition of "charge." He made the following comment at para. 15: "... 'Charge' has connotation of authority and responsibility. 'Charge' of a child suggests some established relationship, not something transient or temporary. ..."
[53] In Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. S.A., 2008 ONCJ 348, [2008] O.J. No. 3110 (Ont. C.J.), Spence, J. considered the same issue. In that case, Spence, J. splits the idea of "charge" and "custody." He adopts a definition of "charge" that is grounded in actively caring for the child and potentially distinct from the legal notion of "custody." Spence, J. ultimately determines "charge" to mean an active, caring relationship.
[54] The court then went on to comment:
“It is possible that more than one person had the charge of the child immediately before intervention and they subsequently compete for the return of the child to them at a temporary care hearing. In that case the court must consider the risk of harm of returning the child to either person.”
[55] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. W.I., 2014 ONCJ 62, Sherr, J. found that both parents had ‘charge’ of the child, despite the fact that the mother had previously secured an order for custody of the subject child.
[56] There is also jurisprudence that suggests that a ‘temporary, without prejudice’ order may have a limited “shelf life” in relation to the ‘charge’ issue. For example, in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. K.N., 2008 ONCJ 340, [2008] O.J. No. 3074 (Ont. C.J.), Justice Brian Weagant wrote at paragraph:
I do not agree with the proposition that an order made "without prejudice" can bind the court prospectively and indefinitely on the issue of who has "charge" of the child. In my respectful view, notwithstanding a prior "with prejudice" order, once an intervening "without prejudice" order is made placing the child elsewhere, the presumption described above has a dwindling shelf life.
[57] In this case, there is no pre-existing C.L.R.A. order addressing decision making authority or parenting time. Section 20(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that a child’s parents are equally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child. Subsection 20(2) then goes on to provide that, “A person entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the person of the child and must exercise those rights and responsibilities in the best interests of the child.”
[58] The child was in the shared care of the parents, albeit spending a majority of time in the mother’s home. Both parents were involved in taking the child to various professional appointments. Mr. J. was clearly an involved father.
[59] Moreover, the child has been placed with Mr. J. since he was removed from the mother on August 31, 2021, some six months ago.
[60] Under either line of reasoning, the logical conclusion is that these parents shared charge of the child.
[61] Turning now to the two part test for the temporary care hearing: It is conceded that the first branch of the test is met. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that the child would be at risk of harm if returned to the care of the mother. The mother has had a continued relationship with an individual who is facing criminal charges of sexual interference and sexual assault. She remained without any insight whatsoever as to the risks that individual might present in relation to the child, despite repeated explanation by the worker. She has only recently demonstrated what may be a nascent understanding of risk, although she remains unable to clearly articulate it.
[62] The mother was unable to meet this child’s basic needs including for appropriate follow up medical care and physiotherapy. She was unable to describe the recommendations made by service providers. She made inadequate arrangements of the child’s care as she absented herself from the home to maintain a relationship with Mr. H. This would be troubling with respect to any young infant, but more especially so given this child’s medical issues.
[63] Mother also failed to ensure safe sleeping arrangements for the child, despite repeated prompting to do so and despite her own asserted willingness to do so.
[64] The degree of risk posed to this very vulnerable young child as a result of mother’s inadequate parenting was very high.
[65] The question then becomes: is a supervision order sufficient to mitigate this high level of risk? I have concluded that it is not.
[66] This is for a number of reasons, including the fact that mother cannot be trusted to provide reliable information about herself and her care arrangements. A supervision order can only adequately protect a child if the information provided by the parent is trustworthy. If a parent is willing to mislead the Society (and the court) about what is actually going on with respect to significant matters-then the supervision order is all but useless.
[67] Here, the mother has made a succession of statements about various things, including the status of her “relationship” with Mr. H.; many of which statements have been demonstrated to be prevarications. The most glaring example of this is contained in the mother’s affidavit sworn November 29, 2021, at paragraph 81, when the mother states that the last time she saw Mr. H. was September 21, 2021. This, in itself, is an oddly specific date, particularly when no reference is provided to indicate why it could be identified.
[68] Mother is now pregnant with a child who could have been conceived with Mr. H. She is due in July of this year. This court can take judicial notice of the human gestational cycle of nine months. Nine months from September 21, 2021 would be June-not July.
[69] When this was pointed out to counsel during the hearing, counsel attempted to provide evidence that his client wished to “correct” the date of last contact with Mr. H. to sometime in October.
[70] This would seem to represent a material misrepresentation or inaccuracy in the mother’s sworn evidence, which obviously raises concerns with her credibility more generally.
[71] The mother’s representations to the Society about several important issues have also been unreliable. The mother repeatedly asserted that she was abiding by the safety plan. Yet she continued to permit Mr. H. to be present during exchanges of the child. Although she said that she was also ensuring the child was properly supervised at any time she was absent from the home, the events of August 31, 2021, make it obvious that she was not.
[72] Mother’s assertion as recently as December 2021 that she has “ended the relationship” with Mr. H. is difficult to reconcile with her simultaneous statement that, “he doesn’t really (my emphasis) come here anymore”. It is also difficult to reconcile with the fact that mother had possession of Mr. H.’s vehicle. Mother’s “explanation” of that transfer defies credulity, particularly insofar as mother was saying that despite possession of the vehicle, she did not actually use it due to an inability to afford gasoline for it. It is also difficult to understand why a playpen and a car seat would be in the vehicle if it was not being used.
[73] It is difficult to know if mother is intentionally attempting to mislead and misrepresent, or if she is, by virtue of her disability, unable to reliably report. In either circumstance however, the court cannot rely on her statements on important matters. For this reason, where there is a divergence between the evidence of the mother and the evidence of Ms. Boilard, I prefer that of Ms. Boilard, including the credible and reliable hearsay statements of Ms. E. and D. J.
[74] These issues of credibility, together with her failure to abide by her commitment to the safety plan raise serious concerns about the voracity of mother’s assertion that she will abide by any terms of a supervision order.
[75] Moreover, mother would seem to be a vulnerable individual by virtue of her disability, which seems to have a cognitive component, given her issues with memory and verbal expression. By mother’s own account, Mr. H. is a manipulative and emotionally abusive individual, ready to use the threat of criminal prosecution to secure his ends. Mother’s commitment to maintaining some sort of relationship with this individual has remained steadfast over a lengthy period.
[76] Mother is now involved in some fashion with another male individual whom she describes as a “significant support”. Exactly what this means is unclear. This fact however, given mother’s poor judgement with respect to male companions, raises further concern; concern that does not seem to have been adequately pursued. For her part, mother has not provided any information whatsoever about this individual.
[77] There is simply no evidence that mother has developed a clear insight into the risk posed by Mr. H. or that she has developed a reliable commitment to terminate her relationship. Nor is there evidence to demonstrate that mother would be able to resist any importuning from Mr. H.
[78] Mother’s persistent noncompliance with other aspects of the ‘safety plan’ also do not bode well for compliance with a supervision order. Mother was repeatedly instructed to remove the extraneous items from the child’s playpen, where he slept. She did not follow through, despite her agreement to do so.
[79] For all of these reasons, a supervision order with a placement with mother is incapable of sufficiently mitigating the risk.
[80] The father however is meeting the child’s needs and no one has sought the removal of the child from the father in the event that placement with mother is not granted.
[81] Turning now to access: the Society seeks an order that mother’s access be at its discretion as to all particulars, including the need for supervision. During the hearing of the matter, it was revealed that the Society is now exercising its discretion under the ‘temporary, without prejudice’ order to permit the mother parenting time each weekend from Friday to Sunday on an unsupervised basis. It is very difficult to reconcile this exercise of discretion with the approach the Society has taken to this temporary care hearing: including its assertion that a supervision order cannot protect the child for the very reasons set out herein.
[82] If the Society, and ultimately the court, has concluded that a supervision order cannot mitigate the risk to the child, it is difficult indeed to see how the proposed access terms can protect the child. If the mother cannot be trusted, by virtue, inter alia, of her repeated, significant breaches of the ‘safety plan’ to follow a supervision order, it is difficult to see how she can be trusted to follow an access order.
[83] I have carefully considered the best interests of this child as they relate to access to the mother. Subsections 74(3)(x) and (xi) are particularly relevant-which, if modified for the temporary care hearing situation would be: the risk the child may suffer harm by being in the parent’s care and the degree of risk.
[84] The Society has defended its decision to permit the unsupervised contact by saying that the mother is beginning to develop insight into the protection concerns and that no concerns have developed during the unsupervised access that has been established.
[85] With respect to the first contention: The evidence that mother is developing insight consists of mother’s disclosure that Mr. H. has treated her badly and has been willing to manipulate her and a renewed assertion of a commitment to focus on the child. The problem is that the mother has asserted a commitment to focus on the child before, but still continued a relationship with Mr. H. Further, disclosing abuse may be a first step, but it is not equivalent to insight into these particular protection concerns. The fact is the mother remains unable to articulate what the key risk is in relation to Mr. H.
[86] Second, there is no reliable evidence as to the quality of access and most importantly, whether mother is actually abiding by the terms of the temporary, without prejudice order. Although mother would have the court believe she is complying, her assertions are not reliable. There is also no evidence that the Society has actually checked in with the mother by going into the home or having someone else do so, to ensure that the terms are being met and this child is being adequately cared for.
[87] The Society has determined to exercise its discretion to provide significant unsupervised access. The court finds that this access is not congruent with the child’s best interests. In the circumstances then, I find it is appropriate at this time to eliminate the Society’s discretion with respect to whether access should be supervised.
[88] It may be that there is available evidence to distinguish mother’s ability to comply with court ordered requirements as between a short time and a long time. This might auger in favour of the current access arrangements. But that evidence is not currently before the court.
[89] For this reason, the order with respect to access shall be on a temporary, without prejudice basis, and subject to review.
Released: March 1, 2022 Signed: Justice K. A. Baker