ONCJ 2020

The accused operated an escort service employing adult women and were charged with receiving material benefits from sexual services, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code sections 286.2, 286.3, and 286.4 under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that all three provisions violated the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

The court determined that the provisions were arbitrary, overbroad, and grossly disproportionate in their effects on the liberty and security of the person, particularly as they prevented sex workers from accessing safety-enhancing measures and third-party support services.

The defendant, a caseworker at a children's centre, was charged with sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against a fourteen or fifteen-year-old female client.

The allegations arose from incidents occurring one to two years prior to reporting.

The trial focused on credibility and reliability of witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible despite numerous discrepancies in peripheral details.

The court acquitted the defendant of invitation to sexual touching regarding the arcade hug incident, finding insufficient evidence of sexual intent.

However, the court convicted the defendant of sexual assault for the car wash incident, where the defendant commented on the complainant's body and placed his hands around her waist for an extended period.

The court acquitted the defendant of sexual interference.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol concentration following a traffic stop in the early morning hours.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol to any degree, based on the totality of evidence including observations of physical signs of impairment, inconsistent statements regarding the route driven and alcohol consumption, and the defendant's own acknowledgment that he knew he had consumed too much alcohol to drive safely.

The Crown also established compliance with the statutory prerequisites under section 320.31 of the Criminal Code for relying on the Certificate of Qualified Technician to prove blood alcohol concentration.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant in an automobile on November 1, 2018, while driving the complainant home from a medical appointment in Toronto.

The complainant testified that the accused repeatedly touched his genitals and inner thigh over his clothing while driving, despite the complainant pretending to sleep.

The accused denied any sexual touching, claiming he only shook the complainant's shoulder to wake him and kept both hands on the wheel due to heavy traffic.

The trial judge found the complainant credible but harbored reasonable doubt about his reliability given his drowsy state and the practical impossibility of the accused simultaneously driving safely in rush hour traffic while engaging in the alleged conduct.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused raised four Charter challenges: (1) the objective reasonableness of the approved screening device failure; (2) the arbitrariness of detention in cells pending release; (3) a violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure due to videotaping while using the washroom; and (4) a violation of the right to counsel due to being directed to duty counsel.

The court rejected all four challenges and found the accused guilty.

The court found the ASD failure was objectively reasonable, the detention was not arbitrary as it was incident to a valid arrest and necessary for supervision and paperwork completion, the videotaping with privacy blanket protections did not violate privacy rights, and there was no improper funnelling to duty counsel.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking but not guilty to firearms-related offences.

Police seized a loaded prohibited handgun and ammunition from under the driver's seat of a vehicle the accused was operating.

The Crown sought to establish the accused's knowing possession of the firearm through circumstantial evidence.

The court found the police investigation incomplete, as the two other vehicle occupants who were released before the gun's discovery were never investigated or called as witnesses.

The court held that reasonable alternative inferences existed regarding who placed the gun under the seat, and the Crown failed to negate these reasonable possibilities beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of the firearms offences but convicted of the drug trafficking charge.

The defendant was charged with one count of dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant drove aggressively, making multiple unsafe lane changes, brake-checking other vehicles, and ultimately striking an e-bike rider.

The defendant contended that his driving was not a marked departure from that of a reasonably prudent driver and that the accidents were attributable to other motorists.

After hearing evidence from multiple witnesses, the court found the defendant guilty, concluding that his intentional aggressive driving—including rapid acceleration, aggressive braking, unsafe lane changes, and gesturing at other drivers—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care required and posed significant risk to other highway users.

The court issued a judicial summary of redacted information relating to a search warrant application.

The decision addresses the balance between the defendant's right to full disclosure and the right to make full answer and defence against the Crown's obligation to prove allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and the protection of a confidential informant's identity.

The court determined which redactions to Appendix D of the Information to Obtain were necessary to protect the confidential informant while providing sufficient information to allow the defendant to challenge the issuance of the search warrant.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and assault upon his aunt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to simple assault on count two.

The court conducted a trial on the sexual assault charge.

The Crown called two witnesses and the defendant testified.

The court found the defendant guilty of sexual assault and not guilty of the assault charge, as the assault was committed in circumstances of a sexual nature and formed part of a continuing transaction that began in the boiler room with the defendant's exposure of his genitals and sexually suggestive language.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

A Gardiner hearing determined that the accused believed he possessed only cocaine, not fentanyl.

The court found the accused was not wilfully blind to the nature of the substance.

The accused, a young first-time adult offender with strong family support and early guilty plea, was sentenced to two years imprisonment: fifteen months for cocaine trafficking and nine months consecutive for fentanyl trafficking, with ancillary orders including DNA databank sample, weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The accused brought an application for leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant.

The accused challenged the issuance of the warrant under section 8 of the Charter, asserting insufficient credible and reliable evidence.

The court applied the test from R. v. Garofoli and R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, denying leave to cross-examine on all proposed areas.

The court found no evidentiary foundation showing the affiant knew or ought to have known that information in the ITO was false or misleading, and that proposed cross-examination would not assist in determining whether the warrant could have issued.

A youth was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The Crown and defence agreed that sexual intercourse occurred between the accused and the complainant, both aged 17 at the time.

The sole issue was whether the sexual activity was consensual.

The complainant testified that she did not consent and that the accused forced her into sexual activity despite her verbal and physical resistance.

The accused testified that the sexual activity was consensual and that he obtained the complainant's permission.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a serious motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of his passenger.

The accident occurred on February 21, 2017, when the accused was driving northbound on Keele Street in Vaughan at an excessive speed in heavy rush hour traffic.

He attempted to pass a slowing vehicle, lost control of his vehicle, which rolled and was struck by an oncoming vehicle.

The passenger, Alwyn Lloyd, a 27-year-old father and husband, died as a result of his injuries.

The court imposed a $1,000 fine, 18 months probation with a requirement to perform 50 hours of community service and attend counselling, and an 18-month driving suspension.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop on September 20, 2018.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving, as the only observations were signs of alcohol consumption rather than impairment.

The court also found that the defendant's detention was unlawful as she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours as required by the Criminal Code.

The Intoxilyzer test results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop for dangerous driving.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple Charter violations including arbitrary detention, failure to provide timely rights to counsel, and failure to comply with the "forthwith" requirement for the approved screening device demand.

The court found minor breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence, finding that the breaches were inadvertent, the impact on Charter-protected interests was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The respondent brought a motion for release of the applicant's medical records.

The applicant was successful in opposing the motion.

The applicant sought costs on a substantial recovery basis in the amount of $9,253.27, arguing the respondent acted in bad faith.

The court awarded costs on a partial recovery basis of $2,500.00, finding that while the applicant was the successful party, the respondent's conduct did not constitute bad faith.

The court also found the applicant's claimed hours and administrative costs to be excessive and disproportionate to the limited issue before the court.

Costs were ordered to be paid in two instalments.

An Indigenous offender was sentenced for three counts of aggravated assault, breach of recognizance, and assault.

The offender stabbed three men without provocation while significantly intoxicated and in breach of a bail condition prohibiting weapon possession, and subsequently assaulted a nurse during detention processing.

The court applied Gladue principles, considering the offender's intergenerational trauma stemming from residential schools, post-traumatic stress disorder, and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (388 days on a 1.5-1 basis) plus three years of probation, rejecting the Crown's request for 4-6 years imprisonment and the defence request for 6 months time served.

Two young persons were convicted after trial of robbery with violence committed against a peer on the first week of school.

The offence involved a premeditated attack on an isolated location where the victim was lured, assaulted, robbed of personal items and marijuana, and left with bleeding feet after being forced to descend metal stairs barefoot.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of three months (two months secure custody followed by one month community supervision) followed by two years probation, finding that the seriousness of the offence, the degree of participation, the intentional and foreseeable harm, and the need for denunciation and accountability warranted custody despite the YCJA preference for non-custodial dispositions.

The applicant mother sought an order for security for costs in the amount of $30,000 against the respondent father in a motion to change custody and access arrangements.

The respondent father, self-represented, opposed the motion.

The court found that the respondent father's motion to change was contrary to all previous court orders and the recommendations of the Ontario Children's Lawyer's report.

The respondent father's conduct throughout the proceedings was troublesome, including refusal to amend pleadings despite court direction, aggressive communications with opposing counsel, refusal to approve disclosure orders, and substantial arrears in child support payments.

The court determined that the respondent father lacked the financial means to pay costs and that the case constituted a waste of time and a nuisance.

The court ordered security for costs in the reduced amount of $15,000, finding that $30,000 was excessive given the anticipated trial length of 2-3 days.

The accused were charged with various offences after police and a child protection worker conducted a warrantless search of their basement dwelling and garage.

The worker entered the home to conduct a child protection inspection, and the police assisted to ensure safety.

The court found that the worker lacked statutory or common law authority to conduct a warrantless home inspection, and the police entry was therefore also unlawful.

The search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The subsequent search warrant, based on observations from the unlawful entry, was also invalid.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the egregious nature of the worker's conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests.

Both accused were acquitted.