ONCJ 2020

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, forcible confinement, and uttering a forged document.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the first three charges and guilty to uttering a forged document.

Following a three-day trial in December 2019, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the assault and forcible confinement charges.

The court found the aggravating circumstances related to the uttering of a forged document were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment followed by 3 years probation on the sexual assault charge, with a suspended sentence on the uttering forged document charge.

The accused was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and leaving the scene of an accident knowing he had caused bodily harm.

He ran a red light at high speed on University Avenue in Toronto, striking a cyclist who was lawfully crossing on a green light.

The accused did not stop and was apprehended two blocks north.

The victim suffered serious injuries including spinal fracture and brain injury, resulting in permanent disability.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months incarceration (9 months for dangerous driving, 5 months consecutive for failing to remain), a three-year driving prohibition, and two years probation with counselling and community service requirements.

The accused was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours after ceasing to operate a conveyance, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand and alleged breaches of his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to demand a roadside sample based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's dazed appearance, slow and deliberate movements, and apparent hand-eye coordination difficulties following a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court also found no breach of the accused's s. 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated understanding of his rights and provided cogent responses to questioning.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference with a person under 14 years of age contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The offender had sexual intercourse with his daughter and sexually touched her on multiple occasions over several years prior to October 2017.

The victim became pregnant and underwent an abortion.

DNA testing confirmed the offender was the father.

The Crown sought 8-10 years imprisonment; defence counsel sought 5 years.

The court imposed a 9-year penitentiary sentence, reduced to 8 years and 320 days after crediting 45 days of pre-trial custody.

The offender was prohibited from seeking employment or volunteering with persons under 16, ordered to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for 20 years, and ordered to provide a DNA sample.

The Crown applied for the appointment of counsel for a youth who was the subject of a third party records application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the youth in third party records proceedings.

The court reviewed relevant case law and concluded that it possessed inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and to appoint counsel for the youth, emphasizing the importance of youth having access to legal representation in proceedings affecting their interests.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an incident on February 4, 2018, where the complainant alleged that after initially consenting to sexual intercourse, she asked the defendant to stop, but he continued to engage in sexual activity for a few more thrusts.

The defendant denied continuing after the complainant asked him to stop.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant continued to engage in sexual intercourse after the complainant said she wanted to stop.

The court found significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with her police statement, limited memory of key events, and the selective provision of text messages to police.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and concluded that the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault, alleging that while engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on February 4, 2018, the complainant told him to stop, but he continued to penetrate her briefly before stopping.

The defendant acknowledged the complainant told him to stop but testified he immediately complied.

The court held a hearing under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity and private records relating to the complainant.

The central issue at trial would be whether the defendant stopped when the complainant communicated her withdrawal of consent.

The court admitted certain text messages and Snapchat messages between the parties and the complainant and her friend that directly related to the sexual activity in issue, as they were relevant to the complainant's credibility regarding her account of the events.

However, the court excluded evidence of other sexual activity between the parties occurring on other dates, as such evidence had minimal probative value and would substantially prejudice the complainant's privacy and dignity rights.

The court also excluded a sentence from the complainant's post-incident message to the defendant that the Crown sought to introduce.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault on February 4, 2018.

This decision addresses applications under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine whether certain evidence is capable of being admissible.

The defendant sought to introduce: (a) Snapchat messages between the complainant and a friend dated February 4-8, 2018; (b) text messages between the defendant and complainant dated February 3-4, 2018 of a sexual nature; (c) text messages of other sexual activity from various dates between January and August 2018; and (d) evidence of other sexual activity as outlined in the notice of application.

The Crown also sought to introduce a sentence from a message sent by the complainant to a friend.

The court determined that all evidence should proceed to a s. 278.94 hearing to determine final admissibility, with the exception of certain portions that the defendant agreed to redact.

Trial management order addressing pre-trial motions in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defendant sought to admit Snapchat messages, text messages, and evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of other sexual activity.

The court established a comprehensive procedural framework and timetable for determining admissibility issues in stages, including determinations of standing, document characterization, and application of statutory tests for admission of sensitive evidence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to exclude breath samples and test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter, including claims of racial profiling.

The court found no Charter breaches.

The officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on improper parking at an LCBO, admission of prior alcohol consumption, and detection of alcohol odour.

The screening demand was lawful and made within the immediacy requirement.

No racial profiling occurred.

The defendant was properly arrested and advised of her rights.

A conviction was registered.

The applicant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief on September 1, 2018.

His trial was scheduled for September 25-26, 2019, but was adjourned when he was charged with new offences on the first day of trial.

Those charges were withdrawn approximately six weeks later.

The rescheduled trial was set for December 23-24, 2020, resulting in total delay of 27 months and 23 days.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay in violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to justify the excess delay by taking reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The Crown alleged that Michelle Hyde, a bookkeeper operating as Simply Bookkeeping, defrauded her client Castor Canadensis of approximately $300,000 between August 7, 2013 and June 20, 2016.

The Crown's case rested on evidence of fraudulent cheques written to cash or to Simply, many of which were either mis-posted to other suppliers in the general ledger or not posted at all, with funds deposited into Hyde's Simply bank account.

The defendant claimed the payments were legitimate compensation for work performed at an agreed hourly rate of $80/hour, and that cheques to cash were part of a scheme with the firm's principal to conceal the extent of bookkeeping expenditures from investors.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence entirely and found her guilty based on the totality of evidence, including testimony from the firm's principal, its accountant, and documentary evidence showing a pattern of deliberate misposting and non-posting of cheques.

The respondent father brought a Form 14B motion seeking production orders from non-parties, including police, paramedics, Brantford Family and Children's Services, and various hospitals, for records relating to the applicant mother's substance abuse, physical health, mental health, and fitness to parent.

The applicant cross-moved to amend the application and to schedule a settlement conference.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for production, finding that the requests were overly broad, speculative, and not sufficiently connected to the issues in the case.

The court granted the applicant's request to amend her pleadings and scheduled a settlement conference in place of the scheduled focused hearing.

Crown appeal from acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(a) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was also charged with failing to surrender an insurance card contrary to section 3(1) of the same Act.

The respondent paid the set fine for the section 3(1) offence before trial on the section 2(1)(a) charge.

The trial judge acquitted on the section 2(1)(a) charge, finding the Crown had not proven the absence of insurance beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent also sought a stay of the section 2(1)(a) charge based on the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions.

The appeal court found that section 3(1) is a lesser included offence within section 2(1)(a), but that the respondent's prior conviction on the lesser offence does not bar prosecution for the more serious offence.

The court also found that the Crown need not prove the absence of insurance; rather, once the Crown establishes the respondent was operating the vehicle and could not produce proof of valid insurance upon demand, the offence is complete.

The respondent failed to adduce any evidence of valid insurance or due diligence.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence on the offender following his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offender had sexually assaulted and forcibly confined a 23-year-old victim in April 2017.

He had a significant criminal history including prior sexual offences against children and adults.

Two psychiatrists provided evidence regarding risk assessment, treatability, and management prospects.

The court found that neither a conventional determinate sentence nor a determinate sentence with long-term supervision would adequately protect the public, given the offender's chronic dangerousness, lack of insight, minimization of responsibility, sexual deviance, and poor treatment outcomes despite multiple prior interventions.

The Crown applied to designate the accused as a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The accused argued that his future treatment prospects were compelling and that a Long-Term Offender Supervision Order would be appropriate.

The court found that the accused's pattern of sexual violence over a 17-year period, his persistent denial of responsibility, his anti-social personality traits, and his failure to benefit from previous treatment demonstrated that his threat to public safety was intractable.

The court designated the accused as a dangerous offender under multiple provisions of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against a 14-year-old victim on January 27, 2014.

The offender, then 36 years old, gave the victim hallucinogenic drugs (ketamine and ecstasy) at his residence and engaged in multiple acts of sexual contact, including digital penetration, attempted intercourse, and fellatio.

He also photographed the victim during the sexual assault.

The sentencing hearing addressed the Crown's request for a 4.5-year penitentiary sentence and the defence's request for a blended sentence of one year imprisonment followed by one year conditional.

The court imposed a total sentence of 4.5 years (54 months) imprisonment, with 2 years on the first count and 2.5 years consecutive on the second count, along with a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act order and a DNA order.

This is a costs endorsement following the court's September 4, 2020 decision granting the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's Answer/Claim.

The applicant sought costs of $2,581.20.

The respondent did not make written costs submissions.

The court fixed costs at $2,400, payable immediately, finding that the applicant's offer to settle was as favourable as the motion result and that the respondent had acted unreasonably by breaching multiple court orders and failing to remedy those breaches despite a lengthy adjournment.

A father brought a motion seeking decision-making authority over his almost 10-year-old son's vaccinations, requesting the child not return to private school and day care, and seeking an equal time-sharing arrangement.

The mother opposed all three requests.

The court granted the father decision-making authority over the child's publicly funded vaccinations, finding it in the child's best interests based on the child's good health, expert medical evidence, and the mother's failure to provide any credible medical evidence supporting her position.

The court dismissed the father's requests regarding day care and deferred the parenting schedule issue to trial.

The court applied a best interests test rather than requiring the father to demonstrate material change in circumstances or exigent circumstances.

The father brought a motion for expanded access to his young child, including overnight visits, while the mother brought a cross-motion to restrict the father's access to supervised visits only.

The mother alleged that the child had suffered unexplained injuries, including bruises and sunburns, while in the father's care and that he was unable to meet the child's health and dietary needs.

The father denied the allegations and relied on positive observation notes from supervised access centres and a Child and Family Services investigation that found no substantiated concerns.

The court granted the father's motion for overnight access, finding that the mother's evidence did not support her claims and that her concerns were disproportionate to the neutral third-party evidence.

The court dismissed the mother's motion to restrict access.