Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2019-05-03

Court File No.: Regional Municipality of Durham 14-3200

Between:

WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE BOARD

— AND —

MASSIMO FATA

Before: Justice of the Peace M. Coopersmith

Heard on: October 17, 24 and 26, 2016, October 29, 30 and 31, 2018 and February 20, 2019

Ruling on Section 11(b) Charter Application released on: May 3, 2019

Counsel

J. Clarke — counsel for the prosecution

S. Yeghoyan — counsel for the defendant Massimo Fata

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COOPERSMITH:

Charges

[1] Massimo Fata is charged, in the City of Oshawa and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario, with two offences under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c.16, as amended ["WSIA"]:

1. Between May 22, 2012 and October 12, 2012, Massimo Fata wilfully failed to inform the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of a material change in circumstances in connection with his entitlement to benefits within 10 days after the change occurred, contrary to section 149(2) of the WSIA; and

2. On or about July 12, 2012, Massimo Fata knowingly made a false or misleading statement or representation to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in connection with his claim for benefits, contrary to section 149(1) of the WSIA.

Trial Overview

[2] The trial took place over several days: October 17, 24 and 26, 2016, October 29, 30 and 31, 2018 and February 20, 2019. I heard evidence from Laura Whiteing, Dave McFaul, Peter Koll and Shawn Phillips on behalf of the prosecution. The defendant, Massimo Fata, testified on his own behalf.

Charter Application

[3] The charge was laid against Mr. Fata on November 10, 2014. On February 20, 2019, defence counsel brought an Application pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ["Charter"] seeking a stay of the proceedings for unreasonable delay, violating the Applicant's rights under section 11(b) of the Charter. I am granting that stay for the reasons that follow.

I. SECTION 11(B) CHARTER APPLICATION – UNREASONABLE DELAY APPLICATION

The Right to Trial Within a Reasonable Time

[4] Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:

Any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

[5] In determining whether the defendant's right to a trial within a reasonable time has been infringed, I have carefully reviewed all of the application materials, the transcripts in these proceedings and the relevant jurisprudence.

(a) R. v. Jordan

[6] The right to be tried within a reasonable time is a central concept of our criminal and regulatory offences justice system. It stands to engage not only the liberty and security of the person, but also the right to a fair trial. Without such rights, the public's confidence in the administration of justice is questionable.

[7] On July 16, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the previous Morin framework used in assessing trial delay was too unpredictable, confusing and complex. It did not encourage participants in the justice system to take preventive measures to address ineffective practices and resourcing problems. In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 ["Jordan"], the Supreme Court of Canada established a new framework, to encourage all participants in the justice system to co-operate in achieving reasonably prompt justice.

[8] The new framework for s. 11(b) is summarized at para. 105 of Jordan:

• There is a ceiling beyond which delay becomes presumptively unreasonable. The presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases in the superior court (or cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary inquiry). Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.

• Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown's control in that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional circumstance arises from the case's complexity, the delay is reasonable.

• Below the presumptive ceiling, in clear cases, the defence may show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

• For cases currently in the system, the framework must be applied flexibly and contextually, with due sensitivity to the parties' reliance on the previous state of the law.

(b) Chronology of Mr. Fata's Proceedings

[9] Mr. Fata's matters have been before this Court on eighteen prior occasions. The chronology of the court appearances leading up to this s.11(b) Application can be summarized as follows:

November 10, 2014 – The information was sworn, charging Massimo Fata with two offences under WSIA.

December 3, 2014 – First Appearance:

• Crown, Mr. Clarke, attended. Defendant, Mr. Fata, did not attend.
• Judicial Pre-trial ["JPT"] set for January 29, 2015 and Crown to send letter to defendant with JPT date.

January 29, 2015 – Judicial Pre-trial:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Fata attended.
• Partial disclosure was provided.
• Adjourned to February 26, 2015, when defendant's legal counsel, Mr. Yeghoyan, could attend for a JPT.

February 26, 2015 – Judicial Pre-trial:

• Mr. Clarke and Defence Counsel, Mr. Yeghoyan, attended.
• Further disclosure (several hundred pages) was provided and Mr. Yeghoyan requested time to review it.
• Adjourned to April 9, 2015 for JPT.

April 9, 2015 – Judicial Pre-trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Adjourned to May 15, 2015 to set trial dates or resolve with guilty pleas.

May 15, 2015 – Set Date:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata, and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• No resolution reached. Trial dates set, with or without council, as Mr. Yeghoyan was retained for JPT purposes only.
• Adjourned to 3 full-day trial dates of February 22, 2016, February 29, 2016 and March 7, 2016.

February 5, 2016 – Defence Motion:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Yeghoyan attended (not retained for trial).
• Defence motion to vacate trial dates was granted, to allow defendant time to retain counsel. A few days prior to defence motion, Mr. Clarke advised Mr. Yeghoyan that his civilian witness was not available between March and September, so new trial dates would be outside that time. Defendant waived s.11(b) Charter rights. New trial dates offered: (1) July 11, July 18 and August 8, 2016 or (2) October 17, October 24 and October 26, 2016.
• Adjourned to 3 full-day trial dates of October 17, 24 and 26, 2016, with or without legal counsel.

October 17, 2016 – Trial:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Fata attended.
• Defence requested another adjournment, as he had just retained counsel for his trial last week. Motion to again adjourn the trial was denied.
• Short adjournment to allow defendant to review some additional disclosure that crown did not intend to tender into evidence.
• Trial proper commenced at 11:00am.
• After lunch recess, Mr. Yeghoyan attended and advised he now could be placed on the record. Afternoon trial proceedings were discontinued, to allow Mr. Yeghoyan to review the additional disclosure with Mr. Fata.
• Court asked both parties to consider some agreed upon facts and/or other options to cut down the five hours of video surveillance evidence.
• Mr. Yeghoyan advised that he would be available only in the afternoons of the next two full-day trial dates.
• Adjourned to October 24, 2016, at 2:30pm to 5:00pm.

October 24, 2016 – Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Proceedings commenced at 2:30pm and ended at approximately 5:00pm.
• Crown advised that only a very limited amount of the five hours of surveillance video would be played into evidence.
• Adjourned to October 26, 2016, at 2:00pm to 4:00pm.

October 26, 2016 – Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Proceedings commenced at 2:00pm, until approximately 4:00pm.
• Adjourned to further full-day trial dates of May 1, 8 and 15, 2017.

April 5, 2017 – Crown Motion:

• Mr. Clarke and Defence Counsel, Mr. Adourian, attended as agent for Mr. Yeghoyan.
• Crown motion to adjourn the continuing trial, as "the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently granted leave on three matters on the issue of the interpretation of the mens rea element of the section 149(2) offence." … "I came to the conclusion that despite how long it has taken Mr. Fata's matter to proceed in this court I think it would be premature to finish the trial at this point considering that the Court of Appeal is now going to give its decision on the mens rea element of the section 149(2) offence." … "It's my understanding this motion is on consent … this motion is to vacate the upcoming trial dates, set an interim date to be spoken to so that we can monitor the status of the upcoming Court of Appeal matter."
• Defence counsel responded, "Yes. I can confirm that this is – the defence is not opposed to this. It is a serious issue in terms of the outcome of Mr. Fata's trial. Although there, there will be some delay in the matter, given the trial fairness concerns I think it would be warranted."
• Motion was granted and adjourned to October 4, 2017 re: update on progress of Ontario Court of Appeal ["OCA"] proceedings.

October 4, 2017 – Update on OCA Proceedings:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Several case conferences occurred, but no hearing date set in OCA yet.
• Adjourned to October 31, 2017 for update on progress of OCA proceedings.

October 31, 2017 – Update on OCA Proceedings:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Further case conferences in OCA proceedings, but no hearing date set. Hearing dates anticipated to be set between April and June 2018.
• Adjourned to May 2, 2018 for update on progress of OCA proceedings.

May 2, 2018 – Update on OCA Proceedings and Set Dates for Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• OCA hearing took place on March 22, 2018. No date was given for OCA to release its decision, but approximately six months was anticipated.
• Adjourned to full-day, continuing trail dates of October 29, 30 and 31, 2018.

October 29, 2018 – Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Trial proper continued all day. Voir dire on admissibility of evidence – re: issue of statements made to 'person in authority'.
• Adjourned to October 30, 2018 for Court ruling on voir dire and continuing trial proper.

October 30, 2018 – Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Ruling on voir dire given and trial proper continued. Adjourned to October 31, 2018, at 9:00am, for continuing trial.

October 31, 2018 – Continuing Trial:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Trial continued and both parties closed their cases.
• The parties agreed to adjourn to February 20, 2019 to allow them to prepare and bring their submissions before the court.

February 20, 2019 – Section 11(b) Charter Application and Submissions:

• Mr. Clarke, Mr. Fata and Mr. Yeghoyan attended.
• Defence brought section 11(b) Charter Application. Motion was heard, as were submissions of both parties on the trial proper.
• Adjourned to May 3, 2019 for section 11(b) Charter ruling and then, if appropriate, judgment on trial proper.

(c) Applying the Jordan Framework

Total Delay

[10] I accept that the presumptive ceiling for cases such as these in our Provincial Offences Courts is 18 months (548 days). In determining the delay, the time is calculated from when the information was sworn, on November 10, 2014, commencing the proceedings against Mr. Fata. [see. e.g. R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704.] The proceedings concluded 51 months and 11 days later (1,563 days), on February 20, 2019.

Defence Delay

[11] In order to calculate the net delay, I must determine if any of the delay was either waived or solely caused by the conduct of the defence. Defence waiver of delay can be explicit or implicit, but the waiver must be clear and unequivocal. Defence-caused delay is any situation where the acts of the defendant either directly caused the delay or are shown to be a deliberate and calculated tactics employed to delay the trial. When the court and prosecution are ready to proceed, but the defence is not, the defence will have directly caused the delay. [See e.g. R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704; R. v. Manasseri, 2016 ONCA 703.]

[12] In the matter before me, I find three time periods during which delay is attributable to the defendant.

[13] Firstly, when the information was sworn on November 10, 2014, a summons was also issued for the defendant to attend court on December 3, 2014. Notwithstanding that the summons was served, the defendant did not appear for this first appearance. The Crown advised that this was going to be a multi-day trial. Hence, it met the guidelines for a judicial pre-trial, which was scheduled for January 29, 2015. Given that Mr. Fata did not appear in court on the first appearance date, meaningful progress could not be made and I attribute the delay from when the information was sworn (November 10, 2014) until this first appearance (December 3, 2014), a total of 23 days, to defence-caused delay.

[14] The information was sworn pre-Jordan. Consequently, I have taken into consideration the transitional nature of these proceedings. In so doing, under the Morin guidelines that existed at that time, this failure to appear for court could be considered defence delay.

[15] Mr. Fata appeared at the judicial pre-trial on January 29, 2015 and received only partial disclosure. He was not ready to proceed with a judicial pre-trial, as he wished to retain counsel. The Crown is requesting that I attribute December 3, 2014 to January 29, 2015 to defence-caused delay. However, given that the Crown had provided Mr. Fata with only partial disclosure, I am not satisfied that either party was ready to move these proceedings forward in any meaningful way. Consequently, I do not find this period of time, from December 3, 2014 to January 29, 2015, to be defence-caused delay. In fact, at the next judicial pre-trial on February 26, 2015, Mr. Yeghoyan appeared, retained only for judicial pre-trial purposes. The Crown had recently received full disclosure and provided Mr. Yeghoyan with "roughly 500 pages" – something that necessitated additional time to review. This was not unreasonable in the circumstances and, again, no defence delay occurred.

[16] Secondly, the defendant explicitly waived his s.11(b) rights on February 5, 2016, when he brought a motion to vacate the trial dates that previously had been set for February 22, 2016, February 29, 2016 and March 7, 2016. New trial dates of either July 11, 2016, July 18, 2016 and August 8, 2016 or October 17, 2016, October 24, 2016 and October 26, 2016 were offered. Defence counsel submits that defence waiver should be calculated from the date of the motion until July 11, 2016, as he was available for these earlier trial dates, but they were not conducive to the Crown's civilian witness. The Crown argues that the defence waiver was from the date of the motion until October 17, 2016. Having reviewed the transcripts, I note that Mr. Clarke advised Mr. Yeghoyan, a few days prior to the February 5, 2016 motion, that he would be asking for dates outside of March to September, a time period during which his civilian witness was not available due to the seasonal nature of his business. Knowing this, Mr. Yeghoyan nonetheless brought his motion to adjourn the February 2016 trial dates. Hence, I attribute the entire period from February 5, 2016 until October 17, 2016 (255 days) to delay explicitly and implicitly waived by defence. Again, whether under the former Morin guidelines or the post-Jordan framework, I would ascribe this delay to the defendant.

[17] The third period of delay attributable to the defendant commenced in October 2016. Half a day of trial time was lost on October 24, 2016 when the defendant's late retainer of counsel created a scheduling conflict for Mr. Yeghoyan. On October 26, 2016, over half a day of trial time again was lost for this reason. If over a day of trial time had not been lost and instead full advantage of this October 2016 court time been utilized, there would not have been the need to adjourn the proceedings from October 31, 2018, to another day for proceedings to conclude on February 20, 2019. The defendant had been provided with more than ample time to retain counsel in a timely fashion. When the trial dates were originally set for February 2016, the defendant was granted an adjournment until October 2016 – a period of 8 more months – to retain counsel or else proceed without legal representation. Mr. Yeghoyan was present in February 2016 when the October 2016 trial dates were set and would have been available throughout these full-day trial dates had he been retained at that time or shortly thereafter. Yet it was not until a few days before the trial proceedings commenced on October 17, 2016 that Mr. Fata retained Mr. Yeghoyan's legal services. By then, Mr. Yeghoyan faced scheduling conflicts, which would not have occurred had he been retained in a timely fashion. Hence, the need to add another day to the proceedings on February 20, 2019 is attributable to the defence. I find the period from October 31, 2018 to February 20, 2019 (112 days) to be defence-caused delay.

Net Delay

[18] The net delay is determined by subtracting total defence delay from the total delay. In the case before me, defence-caused delay of 23 days and 112 days, plus defence-waived delay of 255 days results in total defence delay of 390 days. Subtracting 390 days of delay attributable to the defence, from the 1563 days from when the information was sworn to the end of the trial proceedings, leaves a net delay of 1,173 days, well above the presumptive ceiling of 18 months. Therefore, the Jordan framework dictates that the delay in bringing Mr. Fata's matters to trial is presumptively unreasonable.

Exceptional Circumstances

[19] Jordan, supra, is clear - the burden is on the Crown to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances are those that lie outside the Crown's control. These circumstances are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the Crown cannot reasonably remedy the delays that derive from these circumstances.

[20] At paragraph 71 of Jordan, supra, the majority continues:

It is obviously impossible to identify in advance all circumstances that may qualify as "exceptional" for the purposes of adjudicating a s. 11(b) application. Ultimately, the determination of whether circumstances are "exceptional" will depend on the trial judge's good sense and experience. The list is not closed. However, in general, exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases.

[21] In this s.11(b) Charter Application, I accept that neither the Applicant nor the Respondent is relying on issues of case complexity.

[22] The Crown brought a motion on April 5, 2017, to vacate future continuing trial dates pending OCA proceedings. Mr. Clarke submits that the delay resulting from the parties awaiting a decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal in Curtis v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2018 ONCA 441 ["Curtis"], is a discrete event and that the time period from May 1, 2017, when trial proceedings were to continue, until the trial did, in fact, resume again on October 29, 2018, a total of 572 days, constitutes a discrete event. The defence disagrees, but posits that even if this time was taken off of the total delay, that would still leave well above 18 months for these proceedings to fully unfold.

[23] The Crown relies on R. v. Corner, 2017 ONSC 5629 ["Corner"], in which Justice McKelvey dismissed a s.11(b) Charter Application. In that ruling, Justice McKelvey determined that the adjournment of the trial to a later date, pending a Supreme Court of Canada ruling on an interlocutory motion brought by Crime Stoppers was a 'discrete event' for purposes of applying the Jordan framework.

[24] I have summarized the relevant chronology in those proceedings, gleaned from paragraph 4 of Corner, supra, as follows:

• On April 21, 2016, Justice McKelvey "concluded that the evidence of the Crime Stoppers call was admissible evidence at trial subject to a consideration of the probative and prejudicial value of the evidence."

• On August 11, 2016, in defence counsel's written submissions to the court requesting trial dates in September 2017, rather than in the Spring of 2017, she wrote that "there is also the issue of Crime Stoppers leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and that matter obviously needing to be decided upon ultimately by the Supreme Court before the trial can continue. And so there is some concern that if a ruling from the court is not received, this trial would need to be adjourned anyways in light of the impact it would have on the admissibility of some of the Crown's evidence." Justice Fuerst concluded that the trial still needed to proceed as scheduled: 2 weeks of pre-trial motions starting January 9, 2017 and 8 weeks of trial commencing April 3, 2017.

• On October 20, 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada ["SCC"] granted leave to appeal Justice McKelvey's interlocutory decision re Crime Stoppers.

• At the November 7, 2016 JPT, it was noted that the SCC would hear the appeal on January 20, 2017. The April 3, 2017 trial date remained in place.

• On November 7, 2016, following the JPT, Justice Fuerst wrote a pre-trial memo to Justice McKelvey, with a copy to counsel, summarizing the matters that were addressed. Item 7 advised that "It was agreed that if the Supreme Court of Canada's decision is not released by March 20, 2017, counsel jointly ask that the trial be adjourned to start on September 25, 2017. An eight week period commencing on that date has been tentatively blocked on everyone's schedule in case of delay at the Supreme Court of Canada."

• On January 20, 2017, the SCC heard the Crime Stoppers appeal.

• On March 22, 2017, the SCC decision had not been received. The parties appeared before Justice Salmers. Defence advised that s.11(b) rights would not be waived. The exiting trial dates were vacated and the trial set to commence on September 25, 2017 for eight weeks.

[25] McKelvey J. concluded that the Crime Stoppers appeal constituted a discrete event or a novel legal issue within the context of the Jordan framework. The third party appeal led to a significant delay and constituted one type of exceptional circumstance provided under Jordan.

[26] As in Corner, supra, I find that the OCA judgment in Curtis engages novel legal issues. To begin, this is reflected in the fact that the OCA granted leave to appeal. It is rare for the OCA to grant leave in an appeal arising originally out of Provincial Offences Court proceedings. Even rarer is an appeal of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Act proceeding. Nonetheless, the Ontario Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal. Moreover, the legal issue was with respect to the interpretation of the mens rea of s.149(2) of the WSIA, the very section under which count #1 against Mr. Fata is laid.

[27] I understand that Corner and Curtis are easily distinguishable on the basis that the interlocutory motion to the Supreme Court of Canada arose out of the Corner proceedings themselves, whereas the Curtis appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal arose out of proceedings separate and apart from Mr. Fata's proceedings. Nonetheless, when Mr. Clarke brought the motion to adjourn the continuing trial dates pending the OCA decision in Curtis, defence counsel replied,

"Yes. I can confirm that this is – the defence is not opposed to this. It is a serious issue in terms of the outcome of Mr. Fata's trial. Although there, there will be some delay in the matter, given the trial fairness concerns I think it would be warranted." [Emphasis added.]

[28] When trial fairness is at issue, I consider such an appeal to the OCA to be vitally germane to Mr. Fata's proceedings. For that reason, although the Curtis appeal to the OCA arose outside his proceedings, I find that they constituted a novel legal issue of utmost importance to Mr. Fata's matters.

[29] I have reviewed the transcripts to determine if the Crown took "reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling." [See Jordan at para. 70]. On that front, Mr. Clarke provided the Court with regular updates on the OCA proceedings, as the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board was the Respondent and Mr. Clarke was one of the Respondent's counsel. There was some delay as a result of the three appellants in Curtis needing some time to retain counsel, following which defence counsel needed time to prepare for the appeal. Several case conferences were held, the appeal was heard on March 22, 2018 and OCA rendered its judgment on May 10, 2018. I find that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and Mr. Clarke made efforts to move the appeal forward. However, the Respondent had little, if any, control over the time required for the Applicants to retain counsel or when the OCA would be available to hear the appeal, let alone when it would render its judgment.

[30] Both Mr. Yeghoyan and Mr. Clarke are sufficiently experienced to have been aware of the expected timeframe for matters to proceed through the Ontario Court or Appeal. Nonetheless, they both supported the Crown's motion to truncate Mr. Fata's trial proceedings, pending the OCA appeal judgment in Curtis.

[31] For all of these reasons, I conclude that the Crown has met its onus. I find that the Curtis appeal heard in the Ontario Court of Appeal is a discrete event, which constitutes exceptional circumstances in the context of the Jordan framework. This represents a delay from April 5, 2017 until October 29, 2018 – a total of 572 days.

Net Delay Minus Exceptional Circumstances Delay

[32] In determining the time it took for Mr. Fata's matters to be completed, I find that the net delay of 1173 days, less the delay for exceptional circumstances (discrete event) of 572 days, results in these proceedings taking 601 days from start to finish. Once the net delay is over 18 months (548 days), the Crown bears the burden of demonstrating some exceptional circumstances that would account for the delay beyond this presumptive ceiling. No further exceptional circumstances or discrete events have been demonstrated.

II. CONCLUSION

[33] I have carefully considered all of the evidence, transcripts, submissions and jurisprudence in this matter. I find that the proceedings against Mr. Fata commenced on November 10, 2014 and concluded on February 20, 2019, a total time period of 1563 days. Defence-waived delays and defence-caused delays were 23 days, 255 days and 112 days, leaving 1173 days for completion of these proceedings. For the reasons I have provided, I also find that an exceptional circumstance, in the form of a discrete event, delayed the proceedings a further 572 days. The remaining 601 days is above the 18-month equivalent of 548 days set by Jordan. Consequently, Mr. Fata's s.11(b) Charter rights have been infringed and the charges against him are stayed.

[34] I appreciate the time and tremendous work of the prosecution and defence in bringing the merits of the case before me. Their efforts on that front were apparent to me throughout the proceedings and, for that, I extend my thanks to them.

Released: May 3, 2019

Signed: Justice of the Peace M. Coopersmith