ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Flores-Vigil, 2019 ONCJ 192

DATE: 2019-04-02

COURT FILE No.: Kitchener 998-18-5288-00

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

MANUEL FLORES-VIGIL

Before Justice C.A. PARRY

Heard on March 21, 2019

Reasons for Judgment released on April 2, 2019

Simon McNaughton........................................................................... counsel for the Crown

Brian Starkman........................................ counsel for the defendant Manuel Flores-Vigil

PARRY J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] A measurement is only as accurate as the instrument that performed the measuring. The instrument in the case before me is an Intoxilyzer 8000C. Mr. Flores-Vigil blew into one on March 7, 2018. The instrument analyzed the concentration of alcohol in his breath and thereby purported to measure his blood alcohol concentration. According to this instrument, Mr. Flores-Vigil’s blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit. As a result he stands charged with breaching section 258(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. The outcome of this case turns entirely upon whether the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 8000C instrument used to measure Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath. In particular, the case turns on whether or not the Crown has established compliance with the statutory preconditions necessary for it to rely upon the statutorily created presumption that the Intoxilyzer 8000C instrument accurately performed its measurements of Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath and blood alcohol content.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the Crown cannot rely upon the presumption of accuracy created by section 320.31(1) to prove that Mr. Flores-Vigil’s blood alcohol content was over the legal limit. Without proof that the Intoxilyzer 8000C used in this case measured Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath accurately, I am left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Flores-Vigil’s blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit when he provided his breath sample.

[3] Given this conclusion, and given that I have not yet received complete submissions on a second issue [proof that the accused actually had care and control of the motor vehicle in question] I will comment upon but not adjudicate upon this care and control issue.

II. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT

[4] On March 7, 2018, at about 11:40-11:45 p.m., Amanda Drummie came across Mr. Flores-Vigil’s rolled over Honda CRV, near the intersection of Homer Watson Blvd. and Hanson Avenue. His car appeared to have taken out a traffic-light standard before coming to a rest on its side. Ms. Drummie approached the CRV, which she testified was resting on the driver’s side. She testified that Mr. Flores-Vigil was in the driver’s seat, adjacent to the ground. She could see him through the CRV’s sun roof. She knew he was in the driver’s seat because the steering wheel was in front of him. He was fidgeting with the seatbelt, apparently attempting to get out. She quickly called 911. While on the phone, she circled the car to look for gas leaks. By the time she came back around to her starting point, Mr. Flores-Vigil had extricated himself from the car. When she spoke with Mr. Flores-Vigil, she could smell alcohol on his breath. She passed this information onto the 911 operator.

[5] Constable Batchelor arrived on scene at about 11:55 p.m., after receiving a dispatch at about 11:39 p.m. From his recollection, the CRV was resting on its passenger side, not the driver’s side. Having said that, he did not provide a description of his visual observations that caused him to have this recollection. He did not, for example, indicate that the front of the CRV was pointing in the opposite direction of the flow of traffic on the side of the road adjacent to it; he did not describe the location of the steering wheel; nor did he describe the orientation of the rear of the CRV. As a result, his recollection is a conclusory one, incapable of objective scrutiny. For that reason, I am inclined to prefer the evidence of Ms. Drummie on this issue to the evidence of Constable Batchelor. As noted, while this issue is key to the determination of whether or not Mr. Flores-Vigil was in the driver’s seat – and thus had care and control of the CRV – I need not finally resolve this issue to arrive at the verdict in this case.

[6] When Batchelor arrived, paramedics were attending to Mr. Flores-Vigil in the vicinity of his overturned car. Batchelor inferred that Flores-Vigil was the driver of the overturned car, because he was the only civilian walking from the vicinity of the overturned car towards Batchelor when Batchelor first arrived -- his walking companions were the two paramedics. Another officer, James Goulden, was also on scene, dealing with Ms. Drummie away from the immediate vicinity of the accused’s car. In short order, Mr. Flores-Vigil declined transportation to a hospital. Accordingly, Constable Batchelor brought Mr. Flores-Vigil to his cruiser in an effort to determine whether he could detect the presence of alcohol. By 12:00 a.m., Mr. Flores-Vigil was sitting in the rear passenger seat of Batchelor’s cruiser, with the door open and his feet sticking out. As Mr. Flores-Vigil sat there and signed a form to decline further treatment, Constable Batchelor could smell the odour of alcohol coming from Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath. When asked, Mr. Flores-Vigil admitted to consuming 2 beers about 30 minutes prior to the accident. Believing that Mr. Flores-Vigil had been the driver and believing he had alcohol in his system, Cst. Batchelor made an ASD demand to Mr. Flores-Vigil at 12:04 a.m. He then requested a device via dispatch. Another officer brought a device at 12:12 a.m. Mr. Flores-Vigil then provided a sample and failed the screening test. Cst. Batchelor then arrested him, advised him of his rights, and demanded he come to the police station to provide a sample into an approved instrument. He made this breath demand at 12:21 a.m. He then transported Mr. Flores-Vigil to Central Division for that purpose.

[7] Constable Grieve is the qualified breath technician who obtained breath samples from the accused on the evening of his arrest. She was already at Central Division when, at 12:21 a.m., she received word that Constable Batchelor required her to perform breath tests on an arrestee. She immediately dropped what she was doing and went to the breath room to ready the approved instrument, an Intoxilyzer 8000c.

[8] Upon arrival in the breath room, Constable Grieve turned on the Intoxilyzer, which then began its own internal diagnostic tests. The device performed these diagnostic tests and then produced a report which indicated that it passed all of these tests. Constable Grieve then commenced to obtain an analysis of her own breath sample to satisfy herself that the device was in proper working condition. During this procedure, the device performed a system calibration check, in which the system analyzed a standard alcohol solution, for the purpose of determining that the machine could accurately measure her own blood alcohol content. The device passed this calibration check. She then provided her own breath sample, and received a result that indicated her blood alcohol content was zero. This result conformed to her expectation. She was therefore satisfied that the device was in proper working order.

[9] At 12:56 a.m., Constable Grieve then obtained Constable Batchelor’s grounds for the arrest and subsequent breath demand.

[10] Constable Grieve then inputted the accused’s name and arrest information into the device.

[11] At 1:06 a.m., the accused came into the breath room. Grieve then made her own breath demand of the accused, confirmed the accused understood the reason for his arrest, and confirmed he was satisfied with the legal advice he had obtained.

[12] Constable Grieve then commenced the accused’s breath testing procedure. At 1:14 a.m., the Intoxilyzer began by conducting an air blank test, the result of which was zero. At 1:15 a.m., the Intoxilyzer indicated that it passed another internal diagnostic test. At 1:16 a.m., the device performed a calibration check, which indicated that the standard alcohol solution had a concentration of 97 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of solution. At 1:17 a.m., the device performed another air blank test, which again produced a zero result. At 1:19 a.m., the accused then provided a suitable breath sample into the device, which provided a reading of 117 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. The device then performed another air blank test, again obtaining a zero reading.

[13] At 1:37 a.m., Constable Grieve began the process of obtaining a second breath sample from Mr. Flores-Vigil. Again, the device began by performing an air blank test at 1:37 a.m., which again produced a zero result. The machine then performed a self-diagnostic test, again indicating that it had passed this test. At 1:38 a.m., the device performed another air blank test, again obtaining a result of zero. At 1:39 a.m., the device performed a calibration check, which indicated that the standard solutions alcohol concentration was 96 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of solution. The device then performed another air blank test, again producing a result of zero. Then at 1:41 a.m., the accused provided his second sample of breath into the Intoxilyzer. The device indicated that his blood alcohol concentration was 108 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

[14] With regard to the system calibration tests performed by the Intoxilyzer, Constable Grieve testified that the device obtained a sample from a breath simulator which in turn utilized a standard alcohol solution. Constable Grieve expected the standard alcohol solution to contain an alcohol concentration of 100 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of solution. Utilizing the simulator, the Intoxilyzer tested the solution and indicated that the solution’s alcohol concentration was within 10% of the assumed concentration of the standard solution.

[15] While Constable Grieve expected and assumed the standard alcohol solution to contain a 100mg/100ml concentration, she did not test it herself. According to her training, to be certified as a suitable standard alcohol solution the solution had to contain a concentration of 100 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of solution. Constable Grieve had examined the Certificate of Analyst associated with the standard alcohol solution, which caused her to believe that the solution was suitable for use with the Intoxilyzer. She was satisfied that her standard alcohol solution had been certified by an analyst. However, the certificate she examined did not specify the solution’s alcohol concentration.

[16] The Crown had attempted to file the Certificate of Analyst to prove the suitability of the standard alcohol solution employed by the Intoxilyzer during the calibration checks. The defence objected, noting that the Crown had failed to provide in advance a Notice of Intent to adduce this Certificate in the trial. Initially, the Crown informed the court that it intended to prove service of a Notice of Intention by proving the pre-trial disclosure of the certificate to the defence. The Crown announced his intention to prove disclosure of the certificate by putting an administrative staff member on the stand, without knowing what that administrative staff member would or could say about the issue and without giving the defence disclosure of that staff member’s anticipated evidence in advance. The defence objected, because it had not received disclosure of the anticipated evidence of any administrative staff witness and because it contended that proof of the disclosure of a copy of the Certificate would not satisfy the distinct additional statutory requirement of providing notice of the intention to tender that certificate at trial. I ruled that the Crown could not proceed without first providing disclosure to the defence of the anticipated evidence of a staff witness. I also provided the crown the opportunity to use a brief recess to obtain a witness statement and disclose it to the defence. The Crown declined the opportunity to obtain a witness statement from a staff member and ultimately abandoned the attempt to tender the Certificate of Analyst in this trial.

[17] With the above evidence in mind, I must now decide whether the Intoxilyzer readings can establish beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Flores-Vigil’s blood alcohol concentration at the time he provided the sample.

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE NEED FOR A STATUTORY PRESUMPTION

[18] Absent a statutory presumption, the crown would be faced with a daunting task in establishing that an Intoxilyzer device was indeed capable of measuring what it purported to measure at the particular time and in the particular circumstances of any given measurement. The statutory presumption, which envisions the employment of a calibration procedure as an assurance of accuracy, provides a statutory shortcut while safeguarding the truth seeking function of the trial.

B. THE GOVERNING STATUTORY PROVISION

[19] To prove that the Intoxilyzer 8000C used by Constable Grieve accurately measured Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath, the Crown must rely upon a new provision of the criminal code that did not exist at the time Mr. Flores-Vigil provided his breath sample.

[20] On December 18, 2018, pursuant to Bill C-46, Part VIII.1 [Offences Relating to Conveyances] of the Criminal Code came into force. Starting on December 18, 2018, these new provisions repeal and replace the driving offences that previously existed in the Criminal Code. Mr. Flores-Vigil’s conduct occurred prior to December 18, 2018, so his conduct must be judged against the criminal laws that existed at the time when he engaged in that conduct. Consequently, Mr. Flores-Vigil is charged and is being tried for the offence of Over 80 as it is described in section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which was the applicable provision on March 7, 2018. Having said that, Bill C-46 contains transitional provisions that make certain evidentiary amendments apply to charges that arose prior to the enactment of Bill C-46. One of these transitional provisions applies to Mr. Flores-Vigil’s charge. Section 32(2) of the transitional provisions indicates that the presumption of accuracy contained in the new section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code applies to breath samples that were obtained before December 18, 2018. Thus, the presumption of accuracy that existed when Mr. Flores-Vigil provided his breath sample is replaced by this new section 320.31(1).

[21] Section 320.31(1) provides as follows:

320.31 (1) If samples of a person's breath have been received into an approved instrument operated by a qualified technician, the results of the analyses of the samples are conclusive proof of the person's blood alcohol concentration at the time when the analyses were made if the results of the analyses are the same - or, if the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the results is conclusive proof of the person's blood alcohol concentration at the time when the analyses were made - if

(a) before each sample was taken, the qualified technician conducted a system blank test the result of which is not more than 10 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood and a system calibration check the result of which is within 10% of the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst;

(b) there was an interval of at least 15 minutes between the times when the samples were taken; and

(c) the results of the analyses, rounded down to the nearest multiple of 10 mg, did not differ by more than 20 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

[22] As can be seen, this sub-section dictates that numerous pre-conditions must be met before the presumption can be triggered in a criminal trial. Only one of them is at issue in the case before me, namely, whether the Crown has established the performance of a system calibration check before each sample, “the result of which is within 10% of the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst.”

C. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 320.31(1)

[23] The defence contends that the Crown has failed to establish compliance with this precondition, because

1. It has failed to establish that the calibration check employed an alcohol standard that was certified by an analyst; and

2. It has failed to establish the alcohol concentration of the alcohol standard, so it is impossible to discern whether or not the calibration results are within 10% of the target value of this alcohol standard.

[24] For its part, the Crown contends that it has complied with the criterion in question. The Crown argues

(1) That the target value is the value of the expected concentration of the standard alcohol solution certified by an analyst, not the actual concentration of the solution employed during the calibration test; and

(2) That it therefore does not have to prove that the standard alcohol solution was actually certified by an analyst, nor does it have to prove the concentration of that solution.

(3) Alternatively, if it does have to prove that the actual concentration of the standard alcohol solution and that the solution was certified, I can rely upon Constable Grieve’s testimony about her training and about her observation of the very Certificate the crown failed to tender as evidence.

[25] In short, the parties interpret the statute differently, and ask the court to embark upon an exercise of statutory interpretation.

[26] In R. v. Stipo, [2019] O.J. No. 28, the Court of Appeal confirmed the modern approach to statutory interpretation:

(1) The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

(2) No statutory provision is an island unto itself. Context therefore plays a vital role in the interpretation of the words of a statue. The words take their colour from their surroundings.

(3) All issues of statutory interpretation involve the fundamental question of what Parliament intended. To discover what Parliament intended, we look at the words of the provision, informed by its history, context and purpose.

(4) Parliament does not intend to produce absurd consequences. Absurdity occurs if the interpretation

(a) leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences;

(b) is extremely unreasonable or inequitable;

(c) is illogical or incoherent;

(d) is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the enactment; or

(e) defeats the purpose of the statute or renders some aspect of it pointless or futile.

(5) Courts are required to interpret legislation harmoniously with the constitutional norms enshrined in the Charter. However, other principles of statutory interpretation, such as the Charter values presumption, are only applied when the meaning of the provision is ambiguous.

[27] I now turn to the interpretation of the phrase “a system calibration check the result of which is within 10% of the target value of an alcohol standard that is certified by an analyst”.

[28] I remind myself that each word in the phrase must be interpreted by reference to its relationship with the other words in the phrase and within the context of the greater statutory scheme.

[29] I note that that phrase envisions the employment of a calibration check to confirm the accuracy of the device. The word calibrate is commonly defined as the act of correlating the readings of an instrument with those of a standard in order to check the instrument's accuracy: see for example, Katherine Barber, et. al., Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2004); Collins English Dictionary, sub verbo “calibrate”, accessed April 1, 2019, <https://www.collins­dic­tionary.com; Dictionary by Merriam-Webster, sub verbo “calibrate”, accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com; and Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “calibrate”, accessed April 1, 2019, <en.oxforddictionaries.com>. In other words, the word calibration contemplates the use of an item with a known value to determine whether or not an instrument is capable of accurately measuring that value.

[30] The alcohol standard’s usefulness in a calibration procedure depends entirely upon it containing a known concentration of alcohol, which explains Parliament inserting the requirement that the alcohol standard be “certified by an analyst”. Calibration by definition requires the use of a known standard, whose value is not in dispute. Certification provides the necessary assurance of the concentration of the standard against which the device will be tested. In this context, the phrase “target value” must refer to the known/actual concentration of alcohol in the alcohol standard, as established through the certification of an analyst. The device’s accuracy is only established when the calibration test provides a result that is sufficiently close to this target value. Parliament has thus indicated that successful calibration, within the meaning ordinarily assigned to that term, is a fundamental precondition to the existence of a presumption of accuracy. Read in its ordinary and grammatical sense, in the context of the provision as a whole, and with the obvious intent of parliament, the phrase in question clearly contemplates a process by which the accuracy of a measuring device can be assured by commanding that device to test an alcohol standard that contains a known concentration, so as to ascertain whether or not the device accurately measures the known sample. Certification of that known sample – the alcohol standard – provides the necessary assurance of the known sample’s true alcohol concentration. This is the only way to rationally interpret the application and purpose of section 320.31(1).

[31] The Crown urges me to interpret the provision differently. On the Crown’s reading, the term “target value” means the concentration of the alcohol solution expected by the breath technician. Read in this way, the actual concentration of the alcohol standard becomes superfluous, as does the need for certification of this alcohol standard by an analyst. If we don’t care what the standard actually contains, but rather only what the breath technician expects it to contain, then any standard will do. This interpretation perverts the meaning of the word calibration and dispenses with the need for comparisons between test results and actual known values. Imagine if the solution contained a concentration of 50 mg / 100 ml, but the breath technician subjectively expected the solution to have a 100 mg / 100 ml concentration. If the calibration check came within 10% of 100, it would in fact disclose that the machine was woefully inaccurate. Yet, the Crown would argue that the statute would nevertheless presume the machine to be accurate. This, of course, would lead to absurd results. Parliament is presumed not to intend such absurdities.

[32] I would also note that, on the Crown’s interpretation of the phrase in question, the words that follow “10% of the target value of the alcohol standard” are superfluous, meaningless, and redundant. If the breath technicians expectations regarding the alcohol concentration of the standard are all that matters, there is simply no need to add the words “that is certified by an analyst.” These words become pointless or futile. In other words, the Crown’s interpretation gives rise to an absurdity. Parliament does not intend absurdities.

[33] The Crown also argues that the court can infer the content of the alcohol solution from Constable Grieve’s training. In making this submission, the Crown asks me to rely upon hearsay evidence tendered for the purpose proving that an expectation was in fact a reality, without bothering to tender evidence of proving that reality.

[34] The Crown further argues that Constable Grieve offered proof that the alcohol standard was certified by an analyst when she testified about her observations of the contents of the Certificate of Analyst. In making this submission the Crown purports to proffer evidence a piece of documentary hearsay, without even tendering the document itself and without establishing that any exception to the hearsay rule permits the Crown to prove the truth of the contents of the document. This the Crown cannot do.

[35] I make one final observation. Section 320.31 does not presume that an alcohol standard will have a concentration of 100 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of solution. It leaves open the possibility that different devices or different generations of the same device will employ varying concentrations of alcohol in the standards. Parliament could easily have codified the use of a 100 mg / 100 ml concentration in the standard solution – together with a permissible 10 mg deviation from that concentration - but it did not do so. The fact that a solution is “suitable for use” with a particular device does not and cannot tell the court whether the particular device’s calibration test is designed to detect a specific alcohol concentration in any particular alcohol standard. In my view, future Certificates of Analyst should not only declare the standard to be suitable for use with a particular device, they should also declare the concentration of the standard. In doing so, the certificates will declare the “target value” in the calibration procedure. Only then will the results of the calibration test be capable of triggering the presumption found in section 320.31.

[36] In summary, I conclude that section 320.31(1) requires the crown to prove the concentration of the alcohol standard used in the approved instrument employed by the breath technician. The provision also requires that he alcohol standard be certified by an analyst. The provision also requires that calibration check be within 10% of the known alcohol standard. This known concentration is the target value of the calibration test results.

D. THE VERDICT THAT IS COMPELLED BY THE STATUTORY INTER­PRETATION

[37] On the evidence before me, the Crown has failed to establish the concentration of the alcohol standard used in this case and has also failed to establish that the alcohol standard was certified by an analyst. I therefore conclude that the Crown cannot rely upon the presumption of accuracy found in section 320.31(1) of the Code.

[38] Without the availability of the presumption of accuracy, I have no evidence before me capable of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 8000C used to measure Mr. Flores-Vigil’s breath. Therefore, the tests results cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Flores-Vigil’s blood alcohol content at the time he provided his breath samples. As a result, Mr. Flores-Vigil must be acquitted.

E. ONE FINAL MATTER: AN INTERPRETATION OF S. 320.31(2) AND ITS PREDECESSOR, S. 258(7)

[39] Before concluding this case, I wish to address one further issue.

[40] While the Crown abandoned any attempt to tender the Certificate of Analyst in this case, I will nevertheless consider whether proof of disclosure of the Certificate would have been capable of satisfying the notice requirement stipulated in sections 258(7) and its replacement, 320.32(2). Because the contents of these provisions are virtually identical, I need not resolve the issue of whether the new provision applies retrospectively or whether its predecessor applies.

[41] Both sections 258(7) and 320.32(2) specifically prohibit the receipt of a Certificate of Analyst unless before the trial the party intending to produce it at trial has (1) given the other party reasonable notice of the intention to produce it at trial and (2) provided a copy of the Certificate to the other party.

[42] Previous judicial interpretation of section 258(7) makes it clear that notice, within the meaning of the word as used in that section, does not need to take a specific form. Reasonable notice is a concept, not a document. In R. v. Basi, [2011] O.J. No. 30 (S.C.J.), Justice Durno, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court judge, observed the following:

10 In Oslowski, the trial judge relied in part on Good et al. where the Alberta Court of Appeal held:

7 Appellate courts have consistently, and rightly, refused to invalidate notices on mere technical objection that the procedure left something to be desired. The utility of these provisions in simplifying the production of evidence thereby reducing the time and cost of criminal prosecutions is not to be diluted by an insistence on perfection. Regina v. Morrison (1983), 1982 CanLII 3670 (NB CA), 42 N.B.R. (2d) 271; 110 A.P.R. 271; 70 C.C.C. (2d) 193. The real test is that the notice must be reasonable in time and substance and must not be misleading, confusing or otherwise prejudicial. It must clearly and precisely bring home to the accused that the certificate may be used in relation to a charge arising from the incident. No particular form of notice is required ...

11 In R. v. McCullagh (1990), 1990 CanLII 10972 (ON CA), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 130, (Ont. C.A.), Morden J.A. held that the above excerpt correctly reflected the approach to be taken in interpreting what is now s. 258(7). Accordingly, the test is whether the appellant knew the certificate of analysis might be used in evidence. The appellant concedes that if that is the test, the appeal cannot succeed. Even without that concession, the trial judge made a finding of fact that the giving the appellant the certificate was notice. That finding of fact was clearly open to His Honour to make. The finding is reasonable and well supported on the facts of this case, including that the appellant was represented by defence counsel with abundant experience defending drinking and driving cases.

Given the similarity of section 258(7) to section 320.32(2), the above noted jurisprudence ought to have equal application to the new section 320.32(2).

[43] Consequently, had the Crown taken the opportunity to establish that it had indeed disclosed the Certificate of Analyst to Mr. Flores-Vigil, I would have concluded that sufficient notice had been provided to Mr. Flores-Vigil. That conclusion turns on the specific circumstances of this case. In particular, I note that Mr. Starkman is a very experienced defence counsel with considerable experience in defending impaired driving cases. I have no hesitation in concluding that he would know the import of the disclosure of the Certificate of Analyst and he would similarly be aware of his right to apply to cross-examine the Analyst.

[44] Having said this, the Certificate of Analyst in question failed to state the concentration of the alcohol standard used in Mr. Flores-Vigil’s case. Consequently, its admission into evidence could not have altered the verdict in this case.

Released: April 2, 2019

Signed: Justice C.A. PARRY