Court File and Parties

Ontario Court of Justice

Date: 2018-02-20

Court File No.: Halton 336/17

Between:

Brenda Ann Connelly Applicant Recipient

— And —

Stephen Blundon Respondent Payor

Before: Justice Victoria Starr

Before the Court for Hearing on: October 31, 2017, no one appearing

Reasons for Judgment released on: February 20, 2018

Representation:

• Brenda Ann Connelly on her own behalf
• Stephen Blundon on his own behalf

STARR VICTORIA J.:

THE NATURE OF THE CASE

[1] The applicant lives in New Brunswick, with the parties' son. The respondent lives in Ontario. The applicant applies for support for the parties' son pursuant to the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 13 ("ISOA" or "Act").

[2] This is a de novo application as there are no prior support orders or formal agreements dealing with this issue. As requested by the applicant, the issues on this application have been decided in accordance with the law of Ontario. As neither party requested an oral hearing and both filed written material, this decision is made based solely on the documents and evidence filed by both parties and which can be found in the Continuing Record.

POSITIONS

[3] The applicant asks for an order that the respondent pay the table amount for their son as set out in the Child Support Guidelines, O Reg 391/97 (the "Guidelines"). She seeks child support retroactive to September 2010 (the last time the respondent paid any child support), and on a go forward basis. She also seeks an order that the respondent obtain and maintain extended health and dental care insurance coverage for the benefit of the parties' son.

[4] The respondent opposes the application. He submits that the court ought to terminate his parental rights (and by extension his duty to support his son) because doing so will have no negative effect on the well-being of his son as he has been raised in a stable and loving home and is/has been thriving without the respondent's involvement in his life. It is his view that the applicant does not need money from him to be able to continue to support their son financially.

[5] He also submits that he should not be required to pay any child support because such an order will cause him financial hardship and negatively affect his ability to pay the support he is required to pay for a different son. It will also cause financial hardship for others in his household – his current partner and her son – because his income is necessary to support that household and them.

[6] If the court is unwilling to terminate his parental rights and duty to support his son, he asks, for the same reasons, that the court order him to pay child support starting October 31, 2017. That is the hearing date set out in the Notice of Hearing he was served with. He also asks that the court set the level of child support payable based on his estimate of what his gross income will be in 2017, rather than his income for the previous taxation year. He claims this is more appropriate because overtime work is no longer available to him.

THE ISSUES

[7] These are the issues this court must decide on this application:

1. Does the respondent have a continuing duty to support Devin financially?

2. If the respondent owes a duty to support Devin:

   • (a) Should he be ordered to obtain and maintain extended medical, health and dental coverage for the parties' son?
   • (b) What is the respondent's ongoing child support obligation?
   • (c) Is this an appropriate case for the court to exercise its discretion and make a retroactive child support order? and, if so,
   • (d) What is the date of effective notice and the amount of retroactive support that should be paid?
   • (e) How should any arrears be paid?

ISSUE #1: DOES THE RESPONDENT HAVE A CONTINUING DUTY TO SUPPORT DEVIN FINANCIALLY?

[8] I find that the applicant and the respondent are the biological parents of the child, Devin James Connelly, born May 22, 2001.

[9] I make this finding on the basis of the following unchallenged evidence:

• (a) The applicant's evidence that the respondent is the child's biological father;
• (b) The evidence of the applicant's mother, Ardeth Elizabeth Cyr, which is that the respondent routinely acknowledged to her that the child was his son during visits to her home on special occasions;
• (c) The child's birth certificate lists the respondent as the child's biological father; and,

[10] I also make this finding by way of adverse inference drawn by me from these facts:

• (a) The respondent's failure to challenge the applicant's and her mother's evidence on this issue;
• (b) His reference in his evidence to the termination of his parental rights;
• (c) His failure to request paternity testing; something the applicant indicates she is willing to agree to.

[11] In law, both parents have an absolute responsibility to support their children to the extent that they are able to do so. The child's right and the parent's duty arises on the birth of the child and continues until the child is no longer eligible for support. Paying child support is the way in which the non-residential parent continues to fulfill his or her financial duty following separation. A parent does not escape his duty because the other parent is capable of supporting the child on his or her own.

[12] As the respondent is the biological father of Devin, he has an absolute responsibility to support him financially by paying child support to the applicant.

[13] Subsection 31(1) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, sets out the parent's duty to support a child and provides clear indicia of the circumstances under which that duty could be terminated. It reads as follows:

31 (1) Every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who,

(a) is a minor;

(b) is enrolled in a full-time program of education; or

(c) is unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.

[14] Based on the evidence before me, I find Devin is unmarried, a minor (he is under the age of 18), has not withdrawn from parental control (he resides with his mother), and is in full-time attendance at school. The respondent's duty to support Devin financially and to the extent that he is able, therefore continues.

[15] For these reasons I dismiss the respondent's request to terminate his parental rights and duty to pay child support for Devin.

ISSUE #2: SHOULD THE RESPONDENT BE ORDERED TO OBTAIN AND MAINTAIN EXTENDED MEDICAL, HEALTH AND DENTAL COVERAGE FOR DEVIN?

[16] The applicant seeks an order that the respondent obtain and maintain Devin as a beneficiary of his extended health and dental plan. The respondent did not address this request in his answer or responding affidavit.

[17] I conclude that the respondent has such a plan available to him through his place of employment. I reach this conclusion based on these considerations:

• (a) He does not deny that he has coverage;
• (b) On his financial statement he deposed that he spends $102.44 on medical insurance;
• (c) His pay slips show a biweekly deduction of $51.22 per month on account of group insurance and a separate deduction for LTD.
• (d) The amount shown on his financial statement for medical insurance and the amount shown on his pay slip for group insurance equate to the same monthly amount payable: $102.44.

[18] Given he has such a plan available to him through his employer, his failure to place any evidence before me to suggest that he cannot maintain Devin as a named beneficiary under the plan, and failure to state any reason why I should not make the order, I grant the applicant's request in this regard.

ISSUE #3: WHAT IS THE RESPONDENT'S ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION?

Legal Framework

[19] For the general principles and approach to follow in cases proceeding under ISOA such as this one, the decision of Justice S.B. Sherr in the case of Wright v. Christie, [2011] O.J. No. 1131, is of assistance. In that case Justice Sherr, among other things, states at paragraph 20:

Child support is calculated in Ontario using the Guidelines. The Guidelines provide that the basic amount of child support to be paid (the table amount) depends on the Respondent's income and the number of children….

[20] Sections 15 to 20 of the Guidelines are the starting point for the calculation of a party's income for child support purposes. Section 15(1) provides that subject to section 15(2), a spouse's annual income is determined by the court in accordance with sections 16 to 20.

[21] Section 16 of the Guidelines provides that subject to sections 17 to 20, a spouse's annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading "total income" (line 150) in the T1 General Form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency, and by then making the adjustments provided for in Schedule III to the Guidelines.

[22] Section 16 is silent, however, regarding whether this determination of income is based on the parent's annual income in the past taxation year, the estimated annual income of the current year, or an estimate of probable future income. However, s. 2(3) of the Guidelines provides that, "[w]here, for the purposes of these Guidelines, any amount is determined on the basis of specified information, the most current information must be used."

[23] Sections 17 – 20 and Schedules II and III, are not applicable to the facts in this case.

Discussion

[24] The respondent's Total Income or Line 150 income for 2016, is reflected on his notice of assessment that year and I find it was $70,858.

[25] The respondent projects that his 2017 gross annual income will be significantly less in 2017 than it was in 2016. His evidence is that this is because he no longer qualifies for overtime with his employer, Ontario New England Express. He projects it will only be $57,500.

[26] Based on his sworn financial statement and on my review of his pay slips, I find his base salary to be $2211.54 every two weeks or $57,500 annually [$2211.54 x 26 pay periods= $57,500.04].

[27] I do not accept his projection that his 2017 income will only be $57,500.04. I make this finding for two reasons. First, the two pay slips he produced for income earned with Ontario New England Express Inc., show that in 2017, he earned income over and above his base salary of $2211.54 every two weeks. His pay slips show that he is also paid something called "Misc. $$$$". That type of income does not appear to be paid regularly as no amount appears to have been paid in either of the two pay periods for which the respondent produced pay slips.

[28] However, the pay slips do show year-to-date income earned and as at pay period ending September 22, 2017, his year to date "Misc. $$$" income was $10,673.16. Based on what is reflected in his pay slips, I calculate his projected 2017 income will be, at least, $68,173.16 [$57,500 salary plus Misc. $$$ of $10,673.16]. I say "at least" because this calculation is based on the assumption that he will earn nothing more in "Misc. $$$" from September 22, 2017 to December 31, 2017.

[29] Second, the respondent provided no reason why he "no longer qualifies for overtime" and no evidence from his employer to corroborate this.

[30] I find that it is more appropriate to determine the respondent's income for 2017 and onwards, on the basis of his income for the previous taxation year. This is the most reliable income information the court has available to it, given:

• (a) The lack of evidence corroborating the respondent's assertion that overtime is no longer available to him;
• (b) The fact that the court cannot rely on the respondent's projections about his income for 2017; and,
• (c) He is likely to earn an income in 2017 which approximates that which he earned in the previous taxation year.

[31] The respondent's Total Income (Line 150 income) as reflected in the Notice of Assessment form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency for the previous taxation year (2016) is $70,858. Thus, for the purposes of determining the respondent's current and prospective child support obligation I find his income is $70,858.

[32] Formal notice of these proceedings was given to the respondent on September 7, 2017 as that is the date when he was served with the notice of hearing and application. As such, support from that date onwards properly falls in the category of ongoing support, rather than retroactive.

[33] The Guideline table amount for one child based on an annual income of $70,858, was $646 per month, in October and November, 2017. The Guideline tables changed effective December 1, 2017, and the new table amount for one child based on this level of income, is $662. Therefore I have ordered that the respondent pay $646 per month for October and November 2017, and starting December 1, 2017 and moving forward from there, that he pay $662 a month.

ISSUE #4: IS THIS AN APPROPRIATE CASE FOR THE COURT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO MAKE A RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER?

The Legal Framework and Principles

[34] The leading case with respect to retroactive child support is the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), 2006 SCC 37 - ("S. (D.B.)").

[35] The four factors identified in S. (D.B.), as those that court should consider before making a retroactive child support order are:

• i. the reason why support or a variation in support was not sought earlier;
• ii. the conduct of the payor parent;
• iii. the circumstances of the child; and
• iv. any hardship occasioned by a retroactive award.

[36] In the decision of Justice S.B. Sherr in the case of Watson v. Watson, 2017 ONCJ 24, Justice Sherr, summarizes a number of additional principles that courts should consider at paras 96 – 104:

96 None of the above factors are decisive or take priority and all should be considered in a global analysis. In determining whether to make a retroactive award, a court will need to look at all of the relevant circumstances in front of it. The payor's interest in certainty must be balanced with the need for fairness and flexibility.

97 Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. (S. (D.B.) par. 97).

98 Where ordered, an award should generally be retroactive to the date when the recipient gave the payor effective notice of his or her intention to seek an increase in support payments; this date represents a fair balance between certainty and flexibility (S. (D.B.), par. 5).

99 Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair (S. (D.B.), par. 121). In this case, the mother gave the father effective notice of her claim for child and spousal support in the letter sent by her lawyer to the father's lawyer, dated May 8, 2013.

100 Once the issue is raised, the recipient must still be responsible in moving the discussion forward. If he or she does not, legal action should be contemplated. A prolonged period of inactivity after effective notice may indicate that the payor's reasonable interest in certainty has returned. Thus, even if effective notice has already been given, it will usually be inappropriate to delve too far into the past. (S. (D.B.) par.123). This principle is very relevant to this case.

101 It will not always be appropriate for a retroactive award to be ordered. Retroactive awards will not always resonate with the purposes behind the child support regime; this will be so where the child would get no discernible benefit from the award. Retroactive awards may also cause hardship to a payor parent in ways that a prospective award would not. In short, while a free-standing obligation to support one's children must be recognized, it will not always be appropriate for a court to enforce this obligation once the relevant time period has passed. (S. (D.B.), par. 95).

102 A court order is presumptively valid when assessing conduct. However, the larger the difference between the order and what should be paid, the less reasonable it becomes to rely upon it. (S. (D.B.), par. 65).

103 A reasonably held belief that the payor is meeting their obligations is a good indicator that there is no blameworthy conduct. (S. (D.B.), par. 108).

104 Courts ordering a retroactive award must still ensure that the quantum of the award fits the circumstances. Blind adherence to the amounts set out in the applicable guideline tables is not required — nor is it recommended. There are two ways that the courts can affect the quantum of retroactive awards (S. (D.B.), par. 128). The first involves exercising the discretion that the guidelines allow. Courts may exercise their discretion with respect to quantum in a variety of other circumstances under the guidelines. See: ss. 3(2), 7, 9 and 10 of the guidelines (S. (D.B.), par. 129). The second is by altering the time period that the retroactive award captures. While the date of effective notice should be chosen as a general rule, this will not always yield a fair result. For instance, where a court finds that there has been an unreasonable delay after effective notice was given, it may be appropriate to exclude this period of unreasonable delay from the calculation of the award.

[37] I adopt and have followed the reasoning and principles set out above.

Analysis

A) The conduct of the payor parent

[38] The parties were in a brief common-law relationship that ended in March 2002, when their son was about 10 months old. The respondent left for Ontario about two to three weeks later. The applicant did not have direct contact with the respondent until 2006 and it was not until May 2010, that the respondent travelled to New Brunswick to see Devin again.

[39] Between 2002 and 2010, the respondent made no contribution whatsoever towards Devin's support. The only thing he appears to have done was to send Christmas gifts for Devin via mail to Devin's maternal grandmother sometime between 2002 and 2004.

[40] The applicant's evidence is that: On or about May 2010, the respondent met Devin. He also saw Devin a second time towards the end of May 2010. It was at that time that he agreed to pay support and that was the last time he ever saw Devin.

[41] Consistent with his agreement to pay support for Devin, the respondent then made four payments in 2010 by INTERAC Email Bank Transfers. The details of the four payments made are as follows:

• (1) $550 sent on July 2, 2010;
• (2) $500 sent on August 22, 2010;
• (3) $300 sent on September 9, 2010; and,
• (4) $400 sent on November 13, 2010.

[42] The respondent's evidence is that the applicant never directly asked him for child support and indicated that her financial position was stable. Further, while she received a few email transfers from him for assistance with expenses, she did not indicate to him it was specifically child support. He also did not call it child support in any of his communications.

[43] I prefer the applicant's evidence regarding when the issue of child support was first raised and about the nature of the four payments made thereafter, over the respondent's. I do so because the respondent's evidence is inconsistent with the documentary evidence the applicant filed in support of her factual assertions. From my review of the copies of the INTERAC Email Bank Transfers it is clear that the payments were in fact specifically referred to and earmarked as child support payments and the respondent knew and intended this.

[44] For example, in the message from sender that accompanied the payment made in November 2010, the respondent wrote: "$100 outstanding from November 1st, $300 for December". In the sender message that accompanied the payment made on July 2, 2010, the respondent wrote: "Remainder June – $250, July $300."

[45] Further, on September 28, 2010, the applicant wrote to the respondent about her and Devin's attempt to reach him by phone, asking for his new number, and asking him "When are you sending Oct. support?" The respondent replied to this email message by email sent on September 28, 2010. In his response he discusses his phone and most importantly writes: "Pay at the end of the month, like I have several times before." He also wrote that he was moving again and would text her when his new phone was turned on.

[46] For all these reasons I find that the respondent's conduct in relation to his obligation to support Devin falls within the margins of blameworthy conduct. He has shirked his responsibility to support his son for almost 16 years. The subject of child support was clearly broached in 2010 and so the respondent knew of the applicant's request that he pay support for Devin. Nonetheless, after clearly agreeing to pay support and making only four payments, he stopped paying support.

B) The reason why support was not sought earlier

[47] The applicant explains that the reason why her application for child support was not made before November 28, 2016, is because she did not have a phone number and address for the respondent and thus, she could not serve him with any application. She brought this application in 2016, four days after she obtained his address for service.

[48] To demonstrate her efforts to obtain his address the applicant points to several email exchanges with the respondent (one in 2006 and several in 2010) wherein she asks him to send her his phone number or address. In his responding emails he generally answers by giving some excuse. Sometimes it is that he is in the process of moving and does not have an address. Sometimes it is that his phone is not working, or he needs a new one. What is clear is that he does not give the applicant his address. I note, however, that in none of these email communications does the applicant actually tell the respondent she wants his address for service of an application for child support. Her requests always refer to an ulterior purpose.

[49] Her efforts also included trying to initiate court-based mediation in September 2010. That effort failed because the mediator's efforts to contact the respondent were not successful. I note, however, that during this period the applicant does appear to have had an email address for the respondent (the one associated with the INTERAC E-Transfers), and there is no evidence that she ever broached the subject of mediation directly with the respondent.

[50] The applicant also proved that she consulted a private investigator in an effort to locate the respondent. That effort went no further than the preliminary inquiry stage as she could not afford the up-front costs.

[51] Between the fall of 2010 and November 2016, there is no evidence that the applicant tried to find the respondent for the purpose of serving him with legal process.

[52] On November 22, 2016, the applicant found the respondent's parents' phone number on Canada411. She learned that Devin's paternal grandfather and step-grandmother live in New Brunswick. She called his step-grandmother, Lisa Blundon. From her she learned that the respondent has another son who is 5 years old. The mother of his other son is Emily Brown. Ms. Blundon also told her that the respondent is working for Ontario New England Express (ONEE) and that she believes he lives in Burlington, Ontario.

[53] Two days later, on November 26, 2016, the applicant found and began chatting with Emily Brown. Through those communications the applicant learned that Ms. Brown and the respondent were no longer together and that she had just begun receiving child support. Ms. Brown provided the applicant with the respondent's work and home address.

[54] On November 28, 2016, a mere two days after being provided with the respondent's address for service, the applicant started these proceedings.

[55] The respondent claims the applicant is not being truthful and that she always had a way to communicate with him. He does not explain what "way" she had to do so. The respondent did not provide any evidence, beyond his bald assertion to the contrary, to demonstrate that the applicant did in fact have a means of contacting him all along. He also provided no evidence to demonstrate that the applicant had an address for service for him. Given this and the fact that the applicant has proven to be the more accurate historian and the more credible of the two, I prefer her evidence over his.

[56] While I accept her explanation for the delay, I do so just barely. I say this because she appears to have done nothing more after 2010 to try and locate the respondent and does not explain why she never attempted to conduct the same searches as those which she conducted in 2016, earlier, during the intervening years between 2010 and 2016.

C) The child's circumstances

[57] The applicant is of modest means. Devin is still under the age of majority and living at home. The evidence shows that he is a good student and involved in extracurricular activities. I have little doubt that if a retroactive award is made, that he will benefit from it.

D) Hardship occasioned by a retroactive award

[58] An award of retroactive support as far back as 2010 would undoubtedly cause the respondent financial hardship. I say this for several reasons:

• (a) He has no assets of significant value that could be sold to satisfy the debt and thus, would have to make payment out of his annual earnings;
• (b) A significant portion of his earnings are already payable on account of support for his youngest son. According to his financial statement, he pays $1007 a month in child support (no proof of this was provided however);
• (c) His household budget is significant and is the budget for the respondent, his "cohabiter", her son, and the son for whom he pays support but who is with him for access. 20% of the budget is covered by his "adult co-habiter", Kendall Mills. This is because Ms. Mills apparently works only part-time and according to the respondent, only earns about $800 a month.

[59] Although his evidence is not sufficient for this court to make a finding of undue hardship, it is evident that even with an annual income of $70,000, the respondent would have a difficult time paying a significant retroactive award.

Conclusion

[60] After considering and balancing all of these considerations, I find that the balance tips in favour of a retroactive award. As such I find that this is an appropriate case to award some retroactive support.

ISSUE 5: FORMAL AND EFFECTIVE DATES OF NOTICE AND AMOUNT TO BE AWARDED

[61] As I noted earlier, the formal date of notice in this case is September 7, 2017.

[62] The effective date of notice is May 2010. That is both the date when the subject of child support was first broached and the date after which support payments began for the first time.

[63] Although the date of effective notice is May 2010, this does not mean that the court must award support retroactive to that date. In this case there are four good reasons for not using the date of effective notice as the means to determine the amount of the retroactive award.

[64] First, in S. (D.B.), supra, the Supreme Court of Canada held that it will usually be inappropriate to make a support award retroactive to a date more than three years before formal notice was given [see paragraph 123]. Applying the three year rule, this would put the start date of any retroactive award at September 2014. In this case the circumstances which justify the making of a retroactive award just barely outweigh those which mitigate against one.

[65] Second, in my view, the prolonged period of inactivity after effective notice was given resurrects the payor's reasonable interest in certainty. As such, even though effective notice was given in 2010, it would be inappropriate to delve as far back as 2010.

[66] Third, while the lion's share of the responsibility certainly falls at the feet of the respondent as a result of his failure to continue paying support after November 2010 failure to keep in touch with his son or the applicant thereafter, and, failure to provide his phone number and address, some responsibility does lie at the feet of the applicant. The applicant's six year delay in taking any kind of action mitigates against a retroactive award that delves too far into the past. It would be unfair to the respondent to force him to bear all of the responsibility by delving as far back as 2010. This is because to go back to 2010 would both fail to hold the applicant responsible for her role in the delay and fail to give any weight to the respondent's interest in certainty.

[67] Stepping back and considering all of the circumstances, I conclude that what is fair and just is to award retroactive support back to three years from the date of formal notice – starting September 2014.

[68] I have decided to award a fixed amount on account of retroactive child support. I have determined that the fixed sum payable shall be $22,078.00. I arrive at this amount on the basis of the following considerations and calculations:

• (a) 2017: based on his annual income of $70,858 and for the period of January 1, 2017 to and including September 1, 2017, the table amount for one child was $646 per month. The respondent's support obligation for this period totals $5,814.00 [9 months x $646].

• (b) 2016: based on his annual income of $70,858 and for the period of January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, the table amount for 1 child was $646 per month. The respondent's support obligation for this period totals $7,752.00 [$646 x 12 months];

• (c) 2015: based on his annual income of $59,712, and for the period of January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015, the table amount for 1 child was $543 per month. The respondent's support obligation for this period totals $6,516.00 [543 x 12 months]

• (d) 2014: based on his annual income of $55,074, and for the period of September 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014, the table amount for 1 child was $499 per month. The respondent's support obligation for this period totals $1,996.00 [$499 x 4 months].

ISSUE 6: HOW SHOULD ANY CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS BE PAID?

[69] The respondent's current financial circumstances are limited. The respondent will not be able to pay all of the arrears that will automatically accrue as a result of this order and the sizeable award of retroactive support, all at once. A repayment schedule is appropriate in the circumstances and will relieve some of the hardship that he may face as a result of the order I have made. A payment of $200 a month towards arrears is fair and just in all of the circumstances.

[70] I am mindful however, that his current partner is only working part-time. If she works full-time her ability to contribute towards the household budget would be increased and this would free up some of the respondent's funds.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

[71] For the reasons outlined above, this court makes the following final order.

1. The respondent shall pay $22,078.00 in retroactive child support for the child, Devin James Connelly, born May 22, 2001. This award covers his support obligation up to and including September 7, 2017;

2. The respondent shall pay, as child support for the child, Devin James Connelly, born May 22, 2001, the sum of $646 per month, for the months of October and November 2017. This level of child support accords with the Guideline table amount, effective during these months and payable for one child where the payor's annual income is found to be $70,858;

3. Commencing December 1, 2017, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the respondent shall pay child support to the applicant for the child, Devin James Connelly, born May 22, 2001, in the amount of $662 per month. This level of child support accords with the Guideline table amount, effective on December 1, 2017, and payable for one child where the payor's annual income is found to be $70,858;

4. The arrears which will automatically accrue as a result of this order shall be paid to the applicant at the rate of $200 a month, commencing March 1, 2018, and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter until they have been repaid in full;

5. The respondent shall name and maintain the child, Devin James Connelly, born May 22, 2001, as beneficiary under any medical, dental and extended health care plan available to him through his place of employment;

6. The respondent shall advise the applicant of any changes in his address or telephone number or email address, within 5 days of any change thereto. He will give such notice and advise of the new information to her, in writing;

7. By May 15th of each year, starting May 15, 2018, the respondent shall provide to the applicant, financial disclosure as set out in s. 24.1 of the Guidelines. This includes copies of his income tax return for the previous taxation year, proof of year to date income, and a copy of any notice of assessment or reassessment issued to him for the previous taxation year. Where the respondent has not yet received his notice of assessment for the previous taxation year by May 15th, or where a notice of reassessment is issued to him, the respondent shall provide copies of such documents to the applicant, within 7 days of his receipt of same;

8. Each year, starting June 1, 2018, the respondent's support obligation shall be recalculated so that the level of support payable starting on June 1st of each year, accords with the Guideline Table amount payable based on the respondent's Line 150 Total Income for the previous taxation year.

9. Court Services is requested to:

   • (i) Prepare, issue and enter this order; and,
   • (ii) Take the necessary steps that must now be taken pursuant to the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

10. Separate SDO to issue.

Released: February 20, 2018

Signed: Justice Victoria Starr