ONCJ 2017

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The charges arose from a traffic stop initiated for an expired validation sticker, during which police claimed to smell marijuana and subsequently searched the vehicle, discovering packaged drugs.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence based on alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b)).

The court found that the police officers' testimony was unreliable due to significant discrepancies regarding timing and sequence of events, contradictions between the two officers' accounts, and inconsistencies with independent dispatch records.

The court determined that there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and search, and that the defendant's right to counsel was breached.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration following a multi-vehicle collision.

The Crown alleged the defendant caused a chain-reaction rear-end collision involving four vehicles.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The court found that while the defendant was present at the scene and possessed a key to the vehicle, the identification evidence was weak due to its generality, cross-racial nature, and discrepancies in the witness's description of the driver's age.

The court concluded that the evidence fell short of the requisite standard of proof and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) and approved instrument.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging that while awaiting the arrival of the second ASD, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the cruiser while attending a nearby coffee shop.

The court found that the defendant's rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were breached by the handcuffing, as there were no exceptional circumstances to justify this conduct during the investigative ASD demand.

The breath test results were excluded from evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

A peace bond was subsequently imposed.

The Crown brought applications to admit two hearsay statements from the complainant, who was unavailable to testify.

The first was a 911 call reporting a knife incident; the second was a sworn, cautioned, videotaped KGB statement describing both a knife incident and a hammer incident.

The court admitted the 911 call under the res gestae exception but excluded the KGB statement for failure to meet the principled exception to the hearsay rule as refined in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the KGB statement had procedural safeguards, it lacked sufficient substantive reliability due to the declarant's memory problems, significant criminal record, and material contradictions with medical records.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused drove a Honda Odyssey van to his wife's workplace while impaired by alcohol.

The defence argued that the accused did not drive the vehicle; rather, his cousin drove it while the accused sat in the passenger seat.

The trial judge found that the Crown's evidence was internally inconsistent and contradictory regarding whether the accused was in the driver's seat or had care or control of the vehicle.

The Crown witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the accused's position when first observed by police.

The trial judge preferred the credible testimony of the accused's wife and the defence witnesses, which established that the accused's cousin drove the vehicle.

The trial judge found reasonable doubt on the issue of care or control and acquitted the accused.

The respondent father brought a motion for unsupervised overnight access to his two young daughters on alternate weekends and sought to terminate his child support obligation and rescind arrears, claiming his detention and strict bail conditions prevented him from working.

The applicant mother opposed and cross-moved for no access pending receipt of evidence from the Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The mother alleged a pattern of domestic violence, including forcible confinement and assault during a four-day period in June 2017.

The court found the allegations sufficiently concerning and ordered supervised access once weekly for two hours through the Children's Aid Society, pending further evidence.

The court rejected the respondent's request to terminate child support, finding evidence that he owned and controlled a substantial international shipping company with significant income available to him, inconsistent with his claim of minimum wage employment.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from incidents on September 7, 2015: fraudulently obtaining beverages at a bar, threatening bodily harm to a patron, and assaulting another individual.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused fraudulently obtained beverages by ordering drinks, offering insufficient payment, and leaving without paying.

The accused was found guilty of threatening serious bodily harm after losing his temper and threatening to hit the patron with a chair and kick him in the ribs.

However, the assault charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused's assault on the victim's companion was committed as part of a common purpose to assault the victim or was an independent act of malice.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and one count of threatening death against his estranged wife.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents approximately two weeks apart.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations and providing an alternative account of events.

The court found that the complainant's evidence was largely uncorroborated, while the accused's version received some corroboration from a defence witness.

After careful consideration of credibility and the totality of evidence, the court determined that the Crown had failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving by drug causing bodily harm and refusal to provide a bodily substance sample.

The defendant drove his vehicle into a stranger's driveway and fell asleep at the wheel.

When police attended, the defendant's vehicle rolled backward, pinning an officer between the two vehicles and causing injury to the officer's knee.

A drug recognition expert concluded the defendant was impaired by cannabis and a central nervous system depressant.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm and refusal to comply with a demand for a bodily substance sample.

The court rejected the defendant's Charter s. 10(b) application, finding his rights to counsel were properly upheld and that no second consultation with counsel was required before the bodily substance demand.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, observations of impairment by civilian witnesses and police officers, and breath sample results of 260 and 250 mg/100mL of blood.

The accused challenged the detention and sought exclusion of evidence based on Charter violations.

The court found the Crown proved impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt, rejected Charter violations regarding counsel access, but found an arbitrary detention between the hospital visit and police station release.

However, the court declined to stay proceedings or exclude evidence as the remedy was not warranted.

The accused was convicted on the first count with a stay of proceedings on the second count pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The Crown brought an application for a section 487 Criminal Code search warrant and a section 487.02 assistance order to compel the accused to provide passcodes or PIN codes to unlock his cell phone.

The accused opposed the assistance order.

The court found that while section 487.02 may apply to accused persons, the proposed assistance order violated the accused's section 7 Charter rights, specifically the principle against self-incrimination and the right to silence.

The court declined to issue the assistance order, finding that use immunity did not adequately address the compelled active participation of the accused in his own prosecution.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of heroin and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused initially pleaded not guilty to the trafficking charges but guilty to simple possession.

The Crown rejected the pleas and the trial proceeded.

The accused testified that the drugs were for personal use, funded by online poker winnings.

The court found the accused's evidence incredible due to numerous inconsistencies with statements made to an addiction medicine specialist and the mathematical impossibility of affording such quantities on welfare income alone.

The court concluded the accused was an "addict trafficker" who possessed the drugs to sell them to fund his own addiction.

Both charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A young person was charged with three firearm-related offences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act: possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a motor vehicle knowing a prohibited weapon was present, and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown's case relied on admissions by defence counsel regarding the accuracy of photographs, surveillance video, and police evidence.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown proved the defendant's knowledge and control of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance showing the defendant's exclusive control over the vehicle, his placement of the firearm in the car, and his post-offence conduct, compelled only one reasonable inference: that the defendant knew the loaded shotgun was in the vehicle.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

A corporate defendant brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The defendant was charged with three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace injury.

The court considered whether the Jordan framework applied to regulatory matters and corporate accused, and whether the net delay of approximately 25 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court found that Jordan applies to both regulatory prosecutions and corporate defendants, that the delay was presumptively unreasonable, and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of the remaining charge.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to the investigating officer at the scene.

The defendant argued that his statements were statutorily compelled under section 199 of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act and should be excluded pursuant to the principle against self-incrimination under section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown argued there was no statutory compulsion.

The court found that section 199 had no applicability to the minor accident in question, that the defendant did not provide an accident report, and that the defendant's belief he was compelled to answer questions was unreasonable and not credible.

The Charter application was dismissed and the defendant's statements were admitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm that occurred on July 9, 2016, when he punched the victim twice in the face and threw a bar stool at him while intoxicated at a bar, causing a laceration requiring nine stitches.

The Crown sought a six-month jail sentence followed by two years probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of four to six months.

The court imposed a nine-month conditional sentence with restrictive conditions including house arrest and community service, followed by two years probation, finding that a conditional sentence could achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation and restraint principles.

The applicant was charged with nine drug offences arising from a search warrant executed at his residence.

He challenged the validity of the warrant under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the warrant should not have been issued and that the search breached his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The applicant also argued that the warrant was a ruse or pretext to gain entry to install listening devices related to a parallel homicide investigation.

The court applied the Garofoli test and found that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant under section 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court rejected the argument that the dual purpose of the warrant rendered it invalid, finding that the presence of a secondary purpose did not invalidate the resort to the statutory power.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pled guilty to trafficking 0.24 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer for $60.00.

At the time of the offence, the accused was 18 years old with no criminal record.

He had been on bail with an 11 pm to 6 am curfew for nearly two years, breaching it once.

The Crown sought 90 days intermittent custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months' probation, considering the accused's youth, lack of record, single instance of trafficking a minimal quantity, positive rehabilitation efforts, and community service.

The applicant mother sought an order dispensing with the respondent father's consent to change their seven-year-old daughter's surname from McDonough to either Pastran-McDonough or McDonough-Pastran.

The parents had joint custody pursuant to a Separation Agreement that required mutual consent for name changes.

The father withheld consent and argued that no material change in circumstances had occurred since the Agreement was signed.

The court granted the mother's motion, finding that the proposed name change was in the child's best interests.

The court rejected the material change threshold as inapplicable to Change of Name Act applications and applied the statutory best interests test instead.

The accused was charged with firearms-related offences after police conducted a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

The central issue was whether the accused was subjected to racial profiling.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful and not racially motivated, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the Charter breach against society's strong interest in prosecuting serious firearms offences on the merits.