Court File and Parties

Date: 2017-03-17

Court File No.: 338/13

Ontario Court of Justice

Re: Sasha Amanda Fearon (Applicant)

And: Rubeel Khan (Respondent)

Before: Justice Sheilagh O'Connell

Counsel:

• Alexandra Grant, for the Applicant
• Mr. Rubeel Khan, Acting in Person

Heard On: November 30, 2016

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] The applicant, Ms Fearon, has brought a motion for an order striking the pleadings of the respondent, Mr. Khan, and for an order for costs on a full recovery basis.

Background Facts

[2] The parties were in an intermittent relationship for a number of years.

[3] There is one child of the relationship, Ava Parisa Dior Fearon, born February 11, 2013 ["Ava"]. The parties have no other children together, although Mr. Khan has a child from another relationship.

[4] Since her birth Ava has been in the primary care of Ms Fearon. Mr. Khan has exercised very sporadic and irregular access with his daughter.

[5] The parties dispute the reasons for this. Ms Fearon deposes that Mr. Khan has demonstrated very little interest in knowing his daughter and that he did not want his family to know about the child because she is biracial and non-Muslim. Mr. Khan deposes that Ms Fearon has actively obstructed his relationship with the child and that she is unreasonably and maliciously denying him access.

Procedural History

[6] On February 26, 2013, Ms Fearon commenced an application for custody and child support, amongst other relief. It is not disputed that Mr. Khan did not serve and file an answer and financial statement to this application for at least one year. Mr. Khan states that he disputed paternity and was awaiting the results of the paternity testing before filing a response. Mr. Khan's paternity was confirmed in September of 2013.

[7] For reasons unknown to the court, Mr. Khan did not serve and file his answer and financial statement until May of 2014, several months after his biological paternity was confirmed. Up until that time, the only document filed by Mr. Khan was a hand-written affidavit that he prepared at the first case conference opposing Ms Fearon's request to travel outside of Canada with the child for a vacation.

[8] On January 28, 2014, Ms Fearon sought to have Mr. Khan noted in default and to move for an unopposed hearing. Justice Murray declined to do so at that time, however, she conducted a focused hearing on that day to determine Mr. Khan's financial circumstances. Mr. Khan gave viva voce evidence and responded to a number of questions.

[9] Justice Murray adjourned the request to note Mr. Khan in default, on terms that he serve and file his answer and sworn financial statement within a specified deadline and that he comply with a detailed order for financial disclosure. A transcript of this hearing was produced for the parties and in the court file.

[10] Justice Murray also imputed income to Mr. Khan on that day in the amount of $53,400.00, based on the evidence that the Court heard. This was determined on a without prejudice basis, pending full financial disclosure. Justice Murray made a temporary order for child support in the amount of $500.00, which is the table amount for one child under the Child Support Guidelines for the income imputed.

[11] The matter returned to court on April 17, 2014. Mr. Khan had missed the deadline for serving and filing his answer and financial statement as ordered and had not yet complied with financial disclosure order. According to the court endorsement on that day, an order for further financial disclosure from Mr. Khan was made, including the production of documentary evidence confirming the transfer his business, Mortgage Shopping Centre Inc., to a former girlfriend and proof of the domestic contract regarding the child support payable for his other child, among other disclosure.

[12] The matter returned to court on May 9, 2014. By that time, Mr. Khan had served his answer and financial statement and a large compendium of financial disclosure. On that day, on consent of the parties, Ms Fearon was granted final custody of Ava. A further order for financial disclosure was also made on that day. Mr. Khan consented to an order to provide his 2012 and 2013 bank statements by June 1, 2014.

[13] The matter returned to court on July 7, 2014, to review the child support and access issues. Further financial disclosure had been produced by that hearing. The parties entered into a further temporary consent order for child support. Commencing August 1, 2014, on consent of the parties, Mr. Khan agreed to pay temporary child support in the amount of $400.00 per month based on an imputed income of $44,300.00.

[14] According to his affidavit in response to Ms Fearon's motion to strike, Mr. Khan takes the position that this was a final agreement reached between the parties and the matter should have been resolved on that day. This is clearly incorrect. A review of the Consent Order that the parties signed on July 7, 2014 clearly indicates that it was a temporary order, not a final order, and subject to further review.

[15] The parties entered into mediation in December of 2014 and requested an adjournment of the court case for several months. The mediation was lengthy and not successful.

[16] The parties returned to court on January 8, 2016. Only Ms Fearon attended on that appearance. Mr. Khan deposed that he did not attend because the mother advised him that she was simply seeking an adjournment as her lawyer was unavailable. The mother denies this. The mother advised the court that the father knew that he was supposed to attend court. She sought outstanding financial disclosure from the father, which she alleged had been outstanding for many months.

[17] Based on the mother's submissions, the court made a further order for financial disclosure. Mr. Khan was ordered to provide an updated sworn financial statement (the last statement filed was May 7, 2014), his three most recent income tax returns, his bank statements for the past twelve months, any financial statements regarding his brokerage and real estate business, and all corporate tax returns. This order was served on Mr. Khan by ordinary mail at his last known address. Mr. Khan was also notified of the next court date.

[18] On February 23, 2016, both parties attended the next court date, which was scheduled as a case conference. Access was discussed. The parties entered into a temporary without prejudice order for supervised access at a supervised access facility, given the dispute between the parties regarding the reason no access was occurring, the age of the child (now 3 years old) and the fact that Mr. Khan had little or no relationship with her. The parties agreed that Mr. Khan would exercise supervised access at a supervised access facility to establish a consistent and meaningful relationship with Ava.

[19] A return date of April 5, 2016 was set with the purpose of monitoring access and financial disclosure.

[20] At the return of the matter on April 5, 2016, Mr. Khan was initially not in attendance and then arrived very late. The Court was advised that no access had occurred because Mr. Khan did not complete required intake forms with the supervised access centre within the 30 day timeframe required. The centre closed its file. Mr. Khan then sought a new order for supervised access, however, Ms Fearon would not agree with this request.

[21] Ms Fearon sought further detailed financial disclosure and a motion date to strike Mr. Khan's pleadings for failure to comply with multiple court orders for disclosure and for failing to abide by access orders.

[22] Once Mr. Khan eventually arrived in court on that day, a further order for comprehensive financial disclosure to be produced by Mr. Khan was made. The disclosure was to be provided within 45 days. The mother was also granted leave to bring a motion to strike if necessary. A motion date was set for June 9, 2016.

[23] On June 9, 2016, the motion did not proceed as it had not yet been served or filed with the court by Ms Fearon's former lawyer. The motion to strike was re-scheduled for September 2016. Again, on that date, there was no motion to strike before the court. At that time, Ms Fearon was seeking a new lawyer and requested an adjournment.

[24] Ms Fearon retained new counsel and the motion to strike proceeded on November 29, 2016.

Ms Fearon's Position

[25] Ms Fearon submits that Mr. Khan's repeated failure to obey court orders for financial disclosure and to provide adequate financial disclosure in these proceedings is deliberate and designed to hide his true income. According to Ms Fearon, Mr. Khan's actual income for child support purposes is at a minimum $250,000.00 per annum. It is therefore her position that the only appropriate remedy is to strike his pleadings and make a final order imputing this income to him for child support purposes.

[26] It is Ms Fearon's position that Mr. Khan currently owns a real estate brokerage and has several real estate agents working for him. In addition, she submits that he is a business broker who sells other businesses.

[27] According to Ms Fearon, Mr. Khan is one of only nineteen members of the International Business Broker Association in Ontario and one in five Ontario members who also has his CBI (Certified Business Intermediary) designation. This designation is only awarded to intermediaries who have proven professional excellence through verified education as well as exemplary commitment to the industry.

Mr. Khan's Position

[28] Mr. Khan submits that he has provided ample financial disclosure and that he is reluctant to provide further disclosure because the mother has misused the disclosure provided by sharing confidential information with friends and associates and according to Mr. Khan, perpetrated identity theft against him.

[29] Mr. Khan further submits that he makes nowhere close to $250,000.00 per annum. He states that he is real estate agent and broker involved in a new "start-up" real estate and business brokerage called Investive Inc., of which he is the sole shareholder.

[30] Mr. Khan submits that he only has one other agent working for him, "who is a fairly new realtor and works part-time." According to the sworn financial statement that Mr. Khan filed on November 23, 2016, he only earned a professional net income of $30,000.00 in 2016 and in 2015, he only earned $12,715.32.

[31] Finally, Mr. Khan submits that striking his pleadings would eliminate his input and evidence regarding the child's best interests in this matter. He submits that the mother has actively sought to eliminate or reduce his role in Ava's life and he would like to develop a relationship with his daughter.

The Law and Governing Principles

[32] This proceeding is governed by the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 ("the Rules"). Subrule 1(8) of the provides that if a person fails to obey an order in a case, then the court may make any order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including:

a) an order for costs;

b) an order dismissing the claim;

c) an order striking out any pleading (including documents on motion to change), financial statement or any other document filed by a party;

d) an order that all or part of a document the court ordered produced, and was not, may not be used in the case;

e) if the breach is by a party, that the party is not entitled to any further order in the case, unless the court orders otherwise;

f) an order postponing the trial;

g) on motion, a contempt order. O. Reg. 322/13, s. 1.

[33] The wording of subrule 1(8) is also sufficiently broad to allow the grant of a stay of a claim, where it is necessary for a just determination of the case and where there has been a wilful failure to follow the Rules or obey an order in the case. See: Martin v. Martin, [2005] O.J. 4567 (Ont. S.C.J.); Wreggbo v. Vinton, 2013 ONCJ 250.

[34] Subrule 1(8.4) of the Rules provides that if an order is made striking out a party's application, answer, motion to change or response to motion to change in a case, the following consequences apply unless a court orders otherwise:

1. The party is not entitled to any further notice of steps in the case, except as provided by subrule 25 (13) (service of order);

2. The party is not entitled to participate in the case in any way;

3. The court may deal with the case in the party's absence;

4. A date may be set for an uncontested trial of the case. O. Reg. 322/13, s. 1.

[35] Simply put, a party whose pleadings have been struck is no longer able to participate in the case. Caldwell v. Caldwell, [2006] O.J. No. 1469 (Ont. C.A.).

[36] In a number of decisions, the Ontario Court of Appeal has made it clear that the power to strike out a party's pleadings should be used sparingly and only in exceptional cases. See Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450, [2015] O.J. No. 3236, 2015 CarswellOnt 9247 (Ont. C.A.); Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909.

[37] In Chiaramonte v. Chiaramonte, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that in family law cases, pleadings should only be struck and trial participation denied in exceptional circumstances and where no other remedy would suffice, following its earlier decision in Purcaru v. Purcaru. The exceptional nature of this remedy is rooted in the significance of the adversarial system, as this court recognized in Purcaru, at paragraph 49 of that decision:

"The adversarial system, through cross-examination and argument, functions to safeguard against injustice. For this reason, the adversarial structure of a proceeding should be maintained whenever possible. Accordingly, the objective of a sanction ought not to be the elimination of the adversary, but rather one that will persuade the adversary to comply with the orders of the court."

[38] In Chiaramonte v. Chiaramonte, the Court of Appeal went on to say as follows at paragraph 32 of that decision:

"Striking a party's pleadings is a drastic remedy that should only be applied in exceptional circumstances. The rules authorizing this remedy must be interpreted in light of the draconian effect of rule 10(5)(b). That rule provides that a respondent whose answer has been struck is not entitled to participate in the case in any way. For example, in Kim v. Kim, 2001 CarswellOnt 502 (ONSC), on the basis of rule 10(5)(b), an uncontested hearing was held on custody, support and property without further notice to the party whose pleadings had been struck. Similarly, in Costabile v Costabile, 2004 CarswellOnt 4860 (ONSC), a party whose pleadings had been struck was not entitled to notice of further proceedings nor was he entitled to participate in any way."

[39] Where custody and access interests are involved, the court should avoid the sanction of striking pleadings or use utmost caution because trial courts need the participation of both parties and information that each can provide about best interests. A full evidentiary record, which involves the participation of both parties, is generally required to make a custody decision in the best interests of the children. See King v. Mongrain, 2009 ONCA 486, [2009] O.J. No. 2466, (Ont. C.A.), cited with approval in D.D. v. H.D., [2015], O.J. No. 2959 (Ont. C.A.), and Haunert-Faga v. Faga 2005 39324 (Ont. C.A.), (2005), 20 R.F.L. (6th) 293 (Ont. C.A.)

[40] Further, in Kovachis v. Kovachis, 2013 ONCA 663, the court held that on a motion to strike a party's pleadings in the family law case because of non-compliance with court orders, the court must consider whether the default is willful and whether striking the pleadings is the only appropriate remedy.

[41] The Court of Appeal has also stated that in exercising the discretion to strike pleadings, a court has the jurisdiction to order the reinstatement of pleadings on conditions. In Costabile v. Costabile, 2005 CarswellOnt. 6909 (Ont. C.A.), the court upheld the lower court's decision to strike the appellant's pleadings as the judge contemplated that the appellant would have the right to move to set aside the default and to try to persuade a family court judge that his disclosure and efforts in providing disclosure justified reinstating his pleading. The Court of Appeal opined that this was "a sensible resolution of the matter" and given the broad discretion under the Family Law Rules, the Court also held that a family court judge had jurisdiction to make such an order.

[42] Where financial disclosure orders are violated, courts have struck pleadings on financial issues and have permitted the parenting issues to continue. See: Sleiman v. Sleiman (2002), 28 R.F.L. (5th) 447 (Ont. C.A.).

[43] Finally, before striking a pleading for failure to pay support, the court must consider a payor's financial circumstances and his or her ability to pay support. See Higgins v. Higgins, [2006] O.J. No. 3913 (Ont. C.A.). Courts have also given a party the opportunity to restore the pleading if arrears of support are paid. See Stein v. Stein, [2003] O.J. No. 2288 (Ont. C.A.); Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450.

Application of the Law and Governing Principles to the Facts of this Case

[44] It is not disputed that since these proceedings have started there have been five orders for financial disclosure made against Mr. Khan: January 28, 2014, April 17, 2014, May 9, 2014, January 8, 2016 and April 5, 2016.

[45] The court carefully reviewed all of the financial disclosure produced by Mr. Khan. In particular, the court reviewed a document brief of financial disclosure produced by Mr. Khan on May 7, 2014 and a further binder of financial disclosure produced at the hearing on November 29, 2016. Since the first order for financial disclosure made by Justice Murray on January 28, 2014, Mr. Khan has produced the following financial disclosure:

1. two sworn financial statements, the first dated May 7, 2014, the second dated November 23, 2016;

2. individual income tax returns including statements of rental and professional business activities for 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015;

3. notices of assessments for his individual tax returns for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010;

4. corporate income tax returns for numbered corporation 717-8492 Canada Inc. for 2011 and 2012;

5. corporate income tax returns for MSC Mortgage Shopping Centre for 2011 and 2012;

6. corporate tax returns for Investive Inc. for 2014 and 2015;

7. 2011 notice of assessment for corporate tax return 47178492 Canada Inc.;

8. Certificate of Incorporation and Articles of Incorporation for MSC Mortgage Shopping Centre Inc.;

9. American Express Blue Sky monthly credit card statements for the years 2011, 2012, 2013, and for the first three months of 2014;

10. MBNA credit card statements for the first three months of 2014;

11. RBC bank statements for chequing account for February and March 2014;

12. 2014 TD Canada Trust annual mortgage statements for mortgage against condo property located at 1169 Queen Street West, Suite 712, Toronto Ontario;

13. 2016 statement from RBC confirming balance in chequing account, Avion credit card, RRSP, TFSA printed November 28, 2016;

14. 2016 statement from TD Canada Trust bank confirming in chequing and savings account, credit line/mortgage, and mutual funds, printed November 28, 2016;

15. one credit card statement from MBNA credit card for October 8, 2016 to November 7, 2016.

[46] It is apparent from a review of this limited disclosure, that Mr. Khan has at least two chequing accounts and one savings account from RBC and TD Canada Trust. He has at least three credit cards, one AMEX or American Express card, one RBC Avion card, and an MBNA card. He has at least one line of credit or mortgage with TD Canada Trust. He also has at least three corporations, his most recent being Investive Inc., in which he appears to be the sole controlling shareholder.

[47] At a minimum what is missing from the financial disclosure above pursuant to the previous five court orders is the following:

1. documentary evidence regarding the transfer of Mr. Khan's interest in MSC Mortgage Shopping Centre Inc. to his former girlfriend and the value and consideration received;

2. monthly statements for every bank account from 2014 to the current date, including all chequing and savings accounts, including but not limited to the RBC chequing and savings accounts and TD Canada Trust bank accounts. The monthly statements should include the itemized list of all deposits and withdrawals and not just the balance for each month;

3. monthly statements for all credit cards, both personal and corporate, from 2014 to current, including but not limited to the American Express, RBC Avion and MBNA. Again, the monthly statements should include the itemized list of all entries for each month and balance;

4. corporate income tax returns for all corporations in which Mr. Khan has any interest for 2013 to 2016 and documentary evidence confirming the transfer or dissolution of any corporations listed above;

5. detailed statements of all personal expenses paid by the corporation for Mr. Khan and the year-end financial statements including balance sheets income statements or statements of profit and loss for any and all corporations prepared by Mr. Khan or his accountant or bookkeeper;

6. a copy of Articles of Incorporation and any Shareholders Agreement for Investive Inc. and any other corporation in which Mr. Khan has an interest;

7. a copy of Mr. Khan's driver's license, ownership and current driver's abstract from the Ministry of Transportation;

8. any documentation of Mr. Khan's real estate commissions, agreements, client lists both from Milbourne Real estate, Investive Inc., and from any other source or previously declared business such as the Mortgage Shopping Centre;

9. all year-end financial statements for all businesses in which Mr. Khan has an interest, including income and expense statements and lists of assets, liabilities and debts;

10. a current Equifax Report.

[48] In his affidavit sworn November 18, 2016, Mr. Khan deposes that he has not provided some of the above outstanding disclosure, in particular copies of all of his bank and credit card statements since 2014, because immediately after providing his disclosure in 2014, he alleges that he was a victim of identity theft and credit card fraud. He accuses Ms Fearon of being somehow involved in this. He attached a number of text messages to his affidavit which he deposed that are from Ms Fearon in December 2013.

[49] If those text messages were sent by the Ms Fearon to Mr. Khan, some of the contents were indeed concerning to the court. Mr. Khan also produced a text message in which it appears that Ms Fearon sent a message to a close friend of Mr. Khan disclosing confidential information about his notices of assessment that she had obtained through the disclosure process.

[50] Further on December 13, 2015, Mr. Khan alleges that Mr. Fearon sent him an email advising him that she had purchased three of the domains or websites in his name so that if any potential clients 'googled' him, then negative information about him would be posted there. He attached an email allegedly from Ms Fearon dated December 13, 2015 which reads, "I already own all your domain names cuz I'm ready in 2016 seo and social media marketing is my strong point.. imma optimize it to the point where any potential clients google you, first shit that will come up are those sites." [sic]

[51] None of these allegations have been proven in court. Mr. Khan states that he will not produce any further disclosure and be subjected to further breaches of privacy, or be a further victim of identity theft.

[52] Although the financial disclosure produced to date by Mr. Khan is clearly woefully inadequate and raises some serious questions about the accurate level of his income for child support purposes, in my view, given that some of the disclosure has been provided, Mr. Khan has explained his reasons for not producing all of the disclosure, and the child support order is in good standing, it is not appropriate at this time to strike Mr. Khan's pleadings.

[53] I had considered very carefully the option of striking only those portions of Mr. Khan's pleadings relating to financial issues and restricting the trial to the issue of access. Given the completely different narratives of the parties with respect to the issue of access, it is important that a full evidentiary record is before the court and that both parties participate to determine what is in the child's best interests.

[54] However if Mr. Khan has been reluctant to provide more fulsome financial disclosure as a result of the concerns that he has regarding the alleged identity theft and disclosure of confidential financial information by Ms Fearon, then the court will give Mr. Khan one further opportunity to produce the required disclosure and placed strict limits on the use, distribution and dissemination of this information.

[55] I have also considered my duty as a case management judge to manage this case in a manner that is just, which includes ensuring that the process is fair and proportionate to the nature of the dispute and the interests involved. In doing so, I am guided by Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules which states:

(2) Primary objective. The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2(2).

(3) Dealing with cases justly. Dealing with a case justly includes,

(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;

(b) saving expense and time;

(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and

(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2(3).

(4) Duty to promote primary objective. The court is required to apply these rules to promote the primary objective, and parties and their lawyers are required to help the court to promote the primary objective. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2(4).

(5) Duty to manage cases. The court shall promote the primary objective by active management of cases, which includes,

(a) at an early stage, identifying the issues, and separating and disposing of those that do not need full investigation and trial;

(b) encouraging and facilitating use of alternatives to the court process;

(c) helping the parties to settle all or part of the case;

(d) setting timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case;

(e) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a step justify the cost;

(f) dealing with as many aspects of the case as possible on the same occasion; and

(g) if appropriate, dealing with the case without parties and their lawyers needing to come to court, on the basis of written documents or by holding a telephone or video conference. O. Reg. 114/99, r. 2(5).

[56] A considerable body of case law has developed in determining how Rule 2 should be applied to the conduct of a hearing. It is well established that the court has the power to determine the form and duration of the hearing and whether an oral hearing is even necessary.

[57] The court is very concerned that this matter has been before the courts for more than three years, although recognizing that the parties adjourned the case for one year to attend mediation. It is in the child's best interests, as well as the parties' interest, to achieve finality and to limit the protracted, costly and unnecessary litigation in this case.

[58] This matter should proceed to a focused hearing as soon as possible on the following issues: 1. the determination of Mr. Khan's income for child support purposes; 2. the determination of ongoing child support and child support arrears; and 3. the issue of Mr. Khan's access to the child.

[59] Mr. Khan needs to understand that as a self-employed person, he has the onus of clearly demonstrating what his income is for child support purposes. The self-employed have an inherent obligation to put forward not only adequate, but comprehensive records of income and expenses, from which the recipient can draw conclusions and the amount of child support can be established. See Meade v. Meade (2002), 31 R.F.L 5th 88 (SCJ).

[60] The self-employed person has the onus of demonstrating that deductions from gross business income should be taken into account in the calculation of income for support purposes. See Whelan v. O'Connor, [2006] O.J. No. 1660, (Ont. Fam. Ct.). This principle also applies where the person's employment income is derived from a corporation that he or she fully controls. See MacKenzie v. Flynn, 2010 ONCJ 184.

[61] If Mr. Khan fails to comply with the order for financial disclosure that I have made below, then in accordance with section 21 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court may draw an adverse inference against him and impute the income that is appropriate in the circumstances. See Smith v. Pellegrini, [2008] O.J. No. 3616, (Ont. S.C.); Maimone v. Maimone, [2009] O.J. No. 2140, (Ont. S.C.).

[62] I also remind Mr. Khan that the most basic obligation in family law is the duty to disclose financial information. This requirement is immediate and ongoing. Failure to abide by this fundamental principle impedes the progress of the action, causes delay and generally acts to the disadvantage of the opposite party. It also impacts the administration of justice. Unnecessary judicial time is spent and the final adjudication is stalled. See Roberts v. Roberts, 2015 ONCA 450; Manchanda v. Thethi, 2016 ONCA 909.

Order

[63] For the reasons above, I make the following order:

1. The Respondent, Mr. Khan, shall produce the following financial disclosure, no later than 45 days from today's date:

a. an updated sworn financial statement including copies of 2016 individual and corporate tax returns (when available) and all attachments;

b. documentary evidence regarding the transfer of Mr. Khan's interest in MSC Mortgage Shopping Centre Inc. to his former girlfriend and the value and consideration received;

c. monthly statements for every bank account, both personal and corporate, from 2014 to the current date, including all chequing and savings accounts, personal draw accounts, including but not limited to the RBC accounts and the TD Canada Trust bank accounts. The monthly statements should include the itemized list of all deposits and withdrawals and not just the balance for each month;

d. monthly statements for all credit cards, both personal and corporate, from 2014 to current, including but not limited to the American Express, RBC Avion and MBNA. Again, the monthly statements should include the itemized list of all entries for each month and balance;

e. corporate income tax returns for all corporations in which Mr. Khan has any interest for 2013 to 2016 and documentary evidence confirming the transfer or dissolution of any corporations listed above;

f. detailed statements of all personal expenses paid by the corporation for Mr. Khan and the year-end financial statements including balance sheets, general and expense ledgers, income statements or statements of profit and loss for any and all corporations and businesses prepared by Mr. Khan or his accountant, assistant or bookkeeper;

g. copies of Articles of Incorporation and any Shareholders' Agreements for Investive Inc. and any other corporation in which Mr. Khan has an interest;

h. a copy of Mr. Khan's driver's license, ownership and current driver's abstract from the Ministry of Transportation;

i. any documentation of Mr. Khan's real estate commissions, agreements, and client lists from Milbourne Real estate, Investive Inc., and from any other source or business such as the Mortgage Shopping Centre;

j. all year-end financial statements for all businesses in which Mr. Khan has an interest, including income and expense statements and lists of assets, liabilities and debts;

k. a current Equifax Report;

l. copies of any loan applications, applications for lines of credit, either personal or corporate, car leases or loan financing agreements.

2. The applicant Sasha Fearon is prohibited from disseminating or publishing or disclosing any of the above information to any individual other than her family lawyer or an expert retained in these proceedings to examine the financial disclosure produced. The above information is produced solely for the purposes of this proceedings and the focused hearing to determine child support. It cannot be used, disclosed or distributed for any other purpose. Failure to abide by this order may result in significant cost consequences.

3. The parties shall schedule a trial management conference before me no later than May 15, 2017 to set timelines and directions for the focused hearing.

4. The costs of this motion to be reserved and determined at the conclusion of the focused hearing.

Date: March 17, 2017

Justice Sheilagh O'Connell