WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

This hearing is governed by section 278.9 of the Criminal Code. This section reads as follows:

278.9 Publication prohibited. —(1) No person shall publish in any document, or broadcast or transmit in any way, any of the following:

(c) the determination of the judge pursuant to subsection 278.5(1) or 278.7(1) and the reasons provided pursuant to section 278.8, unless the judge, after taking into account the interests of justice and the right to privacy of the person to whom the record relates, orders that the determination may be published.

(2) Offence. — Every person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

The court hearing this matter has made an order allowing the publication, broadcast or transmission of this determination.

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. —(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,

(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or

(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).

(2) Mandatory order on application. — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 Offence. —(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Court Information

Date: 2015-10-06

Court File No.: Brampton 14-7369

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

• and –

S.W.

Before: Justice P.A. Schreck

Heard on: September 18, 2015

Counsel

J. Vlacic — counsel for the Crown

S. Klotz, J. Klotz and S. Rodrigues — counsel for the applicant

J. Birenbaum — counsel for the complainant

RULING ON MILLS APPLICATION

SCHRECK J.:

[1] S.W. is charged with sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm. Both offences are alleged to have been committed on June 14, 2014 and both relate to the same complainant, T.B. S.W. has brought an application, pursuant to s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code, seeking production of certain material in the hands of third parties, namely:

1. Medical records from the Trillium Health Partners Hospital in relation to treatment received by T.B. following the alleged offences ("the Trillium records").

2. Bell Canada telephone records in relation to a telephone registered to S.W.'s mother but used by him ("the Bell records").

3. Rogers/Fido telephone records in relation to a telephone registered to T.B.'s mother but used by her ("the Rogers/Fido records").

4. Medical records created by T.B.'s family physician ("the family physician records").

5. Toronto Police Service records of the investigation of T.B. in relation to allegations where S.W. was the complainant ("the Toronto police records").

6. Records created by two probation officers assigned to supervise the term of probation imposed on T.B. for the offences relating to S.W. ("the probation records").

7. Peel Regional Police occurrence reports involving T.B. ("the Peel police records").

[2] For the purposes of this application, little needs to be said about the allegations. There is no issue that S.W. and T.B. had been involved in an intimate relationship that ended some time prior to the date of the alleged offences. T.B. alleges that on the day of the alleged offences, S.W. unexpectedly came to her building where he sexually assaulted her and struck her, causing her nose to break. S.W.'s position is that he was invited to the complainant's building by her and that he did not assault her, sexually or otherwise. It is anticipated that the central issue at trial will be credibility as it is the defence position that T.B. has fabricated the allegations. What is perhaps somewhat unusual about this case is that the parties have been involved in prior criminal proceedings in which their roles were reversed, that is, where S.W. was the complainant and T.B. the accused. Some of those charges have resulted in findings of guilt for which T.B. was placed on probation.

I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Overview

[3] Sections 278.3 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code, often referred to as the "Mills regime" after the judgment in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, set out the process whereby an accused charged with certain enumerated offences (listed in s. 278.2(1)(a)) can apply for production of third-party records.

[4] The type of records the Mills regime applies to are defined in s. 278.1:

278.1 For the purposes of sections 278.2 to 278.9, "record" means any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and includes, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by any other Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature, but does not include records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.

[5] A Mills application is a two-stage process. The first stage is to determine whether some or all of the records should be produced to the court for review. If they are, the second stage is for the court to review the records in question and determine whether some or all of those records should be provided to the applicant.

B. The First Stage

[6] At the first stage, s. 278.5(1) provides that the applicant must satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities that the records are "likely relevant" to an issue at trial and that their production is necessary in the interests of justice. Evidence is "likely relevant" if it may be probative with respect to the material issues in the case, the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of other evidence: R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at para. 22. Section 278.3(2) sets out a list of assertions which are not, on their own, sufficient to establish likely relevance.

[7] Section 278.5(2) sets out the factors to be considered in making a determination at the first stage:

278.5(2) In determining whether to order the production of the record or part of the record for review pursuant to subsection (1), the judge shall consider the salutary and deleterious effects of the determination on the accused's right to make a full answer and defence and on the right to privacy, personal security and equality of the complainant or witness, as the case may be, and of any other person to whom the record relates. In particular, the judge shall take the following factors into account:

(a) the extent to which the record is necessary for the accused to make full answer and defence;

(b) the probative value of the record;

(c) the nature and extent of the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the record;

(d) whether production of the record is based on a discriminatory belief or bias;

(e) the potential prejudice to the personal dignity and right to privacy of any person to whom the record relates;

(f) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual offences;

(g) society's interest in encouraging the obtaining of treatment by complainants of sexual offences; and

(h) the effect of the determination on the integrity of the trial process.

The court does not have to engage in a conclusive evaluation of each factor. Rather, each factor must be taken into account to the extent possible in determining what order is necessary in the interests of justice: R. v. Mills, supra at para. 134.

[8] If, at the end of this balancing process, the court is uncertain whether production should be ordered or there is a danger that the accused's right to make full answer and defence will be violated, the interests of justice require that the court err on the side of production to the court: R. v. Mills, supra at paras. 132, 137.

B. The Second Stage

[9] Section 278.6 of the Code provides that where production has been ordered to the court for review, the judge must review the material in the absence of the parties in order to determine whether the record or part of the record should be produced to the accused. In so doing, the judge must consider the same factors as in the first stage. The judge may hold an in camera session to hear submissions if the court feels that would assist in making a determination as to whether any or all of the documents should be produced to the accused.

C. The Procedure Followed in This Case

[10] In this case, I heard submissions with respect to the first stage from counsel for the applicant, the Crown and the complainant. As required by s. 278.4(1), the hearing was held in camera. At the conclusion of the hearing, I ordered some of the records produced to the court for review. I gave brief oral reasons for doing so and indicated that I would be providing more detailed reasons later. Counsel were content that I consider the submissions made at the first stage in determining whether any of the records should be produced at the second stage and did not seek an opportunity to make additional submissions. Counsel for the complainant also made brief additional submissions with respect to the second stage. This ruling sets out my reasons for decision at both stages of the process.

II. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE

A. The Trillium Records

[11] These records were created after the complainant's visit to the hospital following the alleged assaults. There is no issue that these are "records" as defined in s. 278.1, as the section specifically mentions medical records. As indicated earlier, counsel for all parties agree that these records should be reviewed by the court. Counsel for the complainant has submitted that certain portions of those records should be redacted, namely (1) information such as the complainant's address, telephone number and health card number; (2) information relating to the complainant's past medical history and (3) portions of a form entitled "Report of Domestic Violence Nurse", which appears to be a form completed by a nurse based on information from the complainant.

[12] I agree that the first two categories are irrelevant and should be redacted. However, I do not agree that the "Report of Domestic Violence Nurse" should be redacted. It appears to contain information from the complainant which is arguably inconsistent with other information provided by her. As well, I note that the complainant signed a consent form which indicated that the Report "can be subject to a warrant". While this obviously does not mean that she waived her privacy interest in the contents of the report, it does mean that she disclosed the information on the understanding that it could be ordered disclosed by a court. After balancing the various relevant factors, I have concluded that it is in the interests of justice that this report be produced with the aforementioned redactions.

[13] The rest of the records relate to injuries suffered by the complainant. Given that the applicant is charged with assault causing bodily harm, they are clearly relevant and should be produced to him.

B. The Bell Records

[14] These records relate to a telephone number registered to S.W.'s mother but it is common ground that the telephone was used by him. While it may seem odd that S.W. is seeking production of what are essentially his own telephone records, the reason for this is that Bell Canada will not provide him with records of the numbers of incoming calls without a court order. Neither S.W. nor his mother claim any privacy interest with respect to these records. However, the complainant takes the position that she has a privacy interest in S.W.'s phone records because they show that she made calls to him.

[15] Telephone records are not specifically mentioned in s. 278.1 of the Code. Thus, the issue to be determined is whether these records contain "personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy".

[16] The definition of a "record" and the scope of s. 278.1 was recently discussed in R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390 at paras. 27-29:

The assessment of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code draws on the jurisprudence applying s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: see Mills, [supra] at para. 99. That jurisprudence establishes that expectations of privacy must be assessed in light of the "totality of the circumstances" (R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, at para. 26; R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 19). The circumstances (or nature of the relationship) in which information is shared are not determinative: the reasonable expectation of privacy is not limited to trust-like, confidential, or therapeutic relationships.

Unlike much of the jurisprudence under s. 8 of the Charter, the analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy in this case does not concern the right to be free from unreasonable intrusion by the state. Rather, the question is whether it is reasonable to expect that the state will keep information that it has legitimately acquired private from other private individuals.

A reasonable expectation of privacy is not an all or nothing concept: Mills, at para. 108. A person may have a reasonable expectation that the state will not have access to her hotel room, even if she fully expects hotel staff to enter the premises: R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 22, discussing R. v. Dinh, 2001 ABPC 48, 42 C.R. (5th) 318. Equally, a person may divulge information to an individual or an organization with the expectation that it be used only for a specific purpose: R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at pp. 429-30.

[17] The records at issue here divulge the date, time and duration of telephone calls, but not their content. The information is similar to that which would be revealed by a digital number recorder, which the police may employ if granted a warrant pursuant to s. 492.2 of the Criminal Code. The courts have held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to this data, albeit a limited one: R. v. Cody (2007), 2007 QCCA 1276, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (Que. C.A.) at paras. 15, 25-26.

[18] However, as noted in Quesnelle, a reasonable expectation of privacy is not an all or nothing concept and depends on the circumstances or nature of the relationship in which the information was shared. In this case, the complainant chose to telephone the applicant. He could have made a record of those calls at the time they were made. Indeed, he could have surreptitiously recorded them. In my view, the nature of the relationship in which the information was shared, that is, voluntary calls the complainant made to the applicant, was such that although she may have a claim of privacy with respect to the state having access to this information, she has no claim of privacy in relation to the applicant's ability to access the information. As a result, I conclude that the Bell records are not "records" for the purposes of s. 278.1 and the Mills regime does not apply.

[19] Even if I am wrong, I would still order that the records be produced to the applicant. As noted earlier, any expectation of privacy with respect to this information is minimal. The records are also likely relevant to the complainant's credibility. The applicant's theory of relevance differs somewhat with respect to calls which pre-date the alleged offence and those that post-date it. With respect to the earlier calls, they are said to be relevant because in her statement to the police, the complainant arguably insinuated that after her relationship with S.W. ended, he continued to try to stay in contact with her and, in doing so, was abusive. It is the defence position that this is untrue and that it was in fact the complainant who repeatedly contacted him during this period. The records provide some confirmation of this. While counsel for the complainant submits that the complainant's statement should not be interpreted as insinuating that she did not contact S.W., it would be inappropriate for me to make findings of fact in this regard at this stage of the proceedings. The defence position is arguable and, as a result, the records are likely relevant.

[20] With respect to calls that post-date the offence, the applicant submits that they are relevant to contradict the complainant's statement to the police that she feared S.W. Counsel for the complainant submits that to reason in this way is to rely on stereotypes as to how a fearful victim of domestic violence ought to behave. While I agree that in many circumstances, a victim's decision to continue contact with an abuser is understandable (as, for example, in R. v. Lavallée, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852), this does not mean that the fact that she did so is not relevant. Not all victims react in the same way and how they react and what can be inferred from the reaction will depend on the circumstances of each case. At this stage, I need only determine if the records being sought are likely relevant. I need not and cannot determine if they actually are relevant or if the inferences they are relied on to demonstrate can in fact be drawn.

[21] I am therefore satisfied that the Bell Records ought to be produced to S.W.

C. The Rogers/Fido Records

[22] The next category relates to the records for the phone used by the complainant. For the reasons outlined earlier, the complainant has a privacy interest in these records. The applicant submits that they should be produced because they show that the complainant contacted the applicant, that is, for the same reasons that the applicant's records should be produced. In addition, it is submitted that if the applicant's records reveal that he received blocked calls, the complainant's records will show if she made an outgoing call at the same time that he received a blocked call, which could then lead to the inference that she made the call.

[23] With respect to the first reason, given that I have ordered that the applicant's phone records be produced, he does not require the complainant's records to show that she contacted him. With respect to the second reason, there is nothing in the record to show that the applicant received any blocked calls, let alone that there was any reason to believe that they came from the complainant. In my view, the applicant has failed to establish likely relevance. As a result, the application with respect to the Rogers/Fido records fails at the first stage. If the applicant's phone records reveal some basis for revisiting this determination, the applicant may renew his application if necessary.

D. The Family Physician Records

[24] The family physician records are medical records and, as such, expressly covered by s. 278.1. The submission as to why these records are likely relevant, as I understand it, is as follows. The complainant alleges that S.W. broke her nose. An x-ray taken at the hospital after the alleged assault confirms that her nose was broken, but not when it was broken. The applicant is in possession of a string of text messages dated four days prior to the alleged offence which appear, on their face, to be communications between him and the complainant. In it, the complainant (if it is her) appears to be attempting to persuade the applicant to come to her home, which he refuses to do. In the course of the conversation, she mentions on a couple of occasions that her face was swollen. It is submitted that whatever caused her face to be swollen may also have caused her broken nose and that the complainant may have sought medical attention for her swollen face from her family physician. As a result, the physician's records are likely relevant to show that the complainant's broken nose was not caused by the applicant but, rather, by whatever caused her face to be swollen four days before the alleged assault.

[25] In my view, all of this is entirely speculative. The context in which the complainant mentions her face being swollen makes it clear that she was likely referring to the fact that she had been crying for a long time. Even if there was some other cause, there is nothing to indicate that her swollen face had anything to do with a broken nose, nor is there any reason to believe that she saw her family physician about it. As a result, the application fails at the first stage.

E. The Toronto Police Records

[26] As mentioned earlier, T.B. was investigated by the Toronto police and charged with a number of offences in relation to which S.W. was the complainant. I have been advised that some of those charges resulted in findings of guilt after T.B. pleaded guilty. Counsel for the applicant is in possession of a number of occurrence reports and police synopses in relation to these charges. Counsel may of course also order a transcript of the proceedings in which T.B. pleaded guilty.

[27] The applicant has also applied for production of all of the occurrence reports and the notes of all of the investigating officers in this matter. In the course of oral argument, however, counsel for the applicant narrowed his request and now only seeks production of any statement the complainant may have made to the police in the course of the investigation. Relying on R. v. Quesnelle, supra, counsel for the complainant submits that the complainant has a privacy interest in the records and that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that they are likely relevant.

[28] R. v. Quesnelle, supra, dealt primarily with police occurrence reports in which a witness or complainant is claiming a privacy interest. However, in my view accused persons or targets of police investigations also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to such records. In Quesnelle, the Court stated (at para. 33):

Police occurrence reports may reveal family status, health information (including statements concerning mental health or the use of drugs and alcohol), and details about housing and employment. They may reveal personal conflicts or details about relationships between individuals. See P. C. Keen, "Gebrekirsto s: Fallout from Quesnelle" (2013), 4 C.R. (7th) 56, at pp. 60-61. Moreover, they very often reveal the extent of an individual's engagement with the criminal justice system. Most significantly, they can reveal previous instances where the witness or complainant has been the victim of criminal activity, including previous sexual assaults. [Emphasis added].

[29] I take the reference to an individual's engagement with the criminal justice system to include situations where the individual is an accused or the target of an investigation. That such individuals have a privacy interest was subsequently made clear by the Court in R. v. Grant, 2015 SCC 9, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 475. In that case, the Court concluded that it was open to the defence to tender evidence that an unknown third party suspect had committed the offence with which the accused was charged provided that certain conditions were met. In dealing with the Crown's argument that this conclusion would unduly increase the Crown's disclosure obligations, the Court stated (at para. 52):

Nor does this conclusion jeopardize the Crown's ability to protect the privacy interests of individuals implicated in unrelated criminal matters or the confidentiality of ongoing investigations. The disclosure test remains one of relevancy, and the legislative measures that restrict disclosure to protect the privacy interests of individuals implicated in criminal matters continue to apply (see, for example, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 278.1 to 278.91; R. v. Quesnelle, supra).

Any ambiguity in the reasons in Quesnelle is resolved by the reference in Grant to "individuals implicated in criminal matters". I therefore conclude that the complainant in this case has a privacy interest with respect to the Toronto police records.

[30] That said, in this case the allegations faced by T.B. are part of the history of the relationship between her and S.W. The dynamics of that relationship are likely to be highly relevant to the issues at trial. Furthermore, unlike in situations involving completely unrelated investigations, in this case S.W. is the complainant with respect to the charges faced by T.B. S.W. may therefore have a greater right to information about the investigation than other members of the public. For example, s. 7(a) of the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, S.C. 2015, c.13, s.2 gives him the right to information about "the status and outcome of the investigation into the offence".

[31] Because the history of the relationship between S.W. and T.B. is at issue, I ruled that the Toronto police records were likely relevant and ordered that they be produced to the court. I have reviewed them and they contain statements allegedly made by the complainant about the relationship which are likely relevant to her credibility. I therefore order that those portions of the Toronto Police records be produced to the applicant but with the complainant's personal information, such as addresses and telephone numbers, redacted.

F. The Probation Records

[32] In my view, the complainant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the probation records. Probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 at para. 23, 32; R. v. Shoker, 2006 SCC 44, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399 at paras. 13-14. One of a probation officer's roles is to assist the probationer in her rehabilitation: R. v. Shoker, supra at para. 15. In this sense, the relationship between a probation officer and a probationer shares some of the characteristics of a therapeutic relationship, although there are obvious differences as well. The relationship will obviously function more effectively if there is open communication between the probation officer and the probationer. While a probationer cannot reasonably expect that all communications between her and the probation officer will remain confidential, in my view she can expect that insofar as she abides by the conditions of her probation, those communications will remain private.

[33] In this case, the applicant seeks production of the probation records to demonstrate that the complainant continued to contact the applicant even after she was cautioned by her probation officer not to do so. This, it is submitted, shows not only her willingness to remain in contact with him, but also that her desire to do so is so strong that she was willing to ignore the caution of her probation officer.

[34] While I expressed some doubts as to the relevance of this, I decided to err on the side of caution and ordered that the records be produced to the court for review. Having now reviewed the records, I have concluded that any relevance they may have is outweighed by the complainant's privacy interests. The probation officers have no direct knowledge of any interaction between the applicant and the complainant and any advice or warnings they may have given to the complainant have little, if any, relevance to the issues before the court. If the applicant seeks to establish that she continued to contact him, he can do so through other evidence, including his own testimony.

G. The Peel Police Records

[35] Counsel for the applicant subpoenaed all Peel Regional Police occurrence reports involving T.B. Crown counsel helpfully provided me with a general description of those reports. Two involve T.B. as a complainant in an unrelated matter, two involve a family dispute and one involves a school dispute. None of these involve S.W. There is nothing to indicate that any of these records have any relevance to the charges before the court and the application with respect to these records fails at the first stage. If the applicant's phone records reveal some basis for revisiting this determination, the applicant may renew his application if necessary.

[36] I am advised that one of the reports relates to T.B. as an accused person but does not involve S.W. Crown counsel advised me that having reviewed this report, given the nature of the charge she was unable to take the position that the report was irrelevant. Given Crown counsel's role as a Minister of Justice, it was entirely appropriate for her to do so. While counsel for the complainant took the position that Crown counsel's assertion in this regard did not establish likely relevance, based on Crown counsel's assertion I ordered the report to be produced to the court for review.

[37] I have reviewed these records and they reveal a number of allegations that the complainant committed offences of dishonesty. For the reasons outlined earlier, the complainant has a privacy interest in these records. However, they have a clear bearing on her credibility. Even if the charges are still outstanding or were ultimately withdrawn, the complainant can be cross-examined on the facts underlying the allegations: R. v. Gassyt (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 546 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 37; R. v. Miller (1998), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 141 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 22-23; R. v. Frater, [2008] O.J. No. 5329 (S.C.J.) at paras. 21-22. In my view, these records ought to be produced. However, identifying information and the identities of persons other than T.B. will be redacted.

[38] The final Peel police report relates to allegations made by T.B. against S.W. I fail to see how these records are any different than ordinary disclosure. Like any other complainant, T.B. must have expected that the details of her complaint about S.W. would eventually be made known to him. As a result, this report should be produced to the applicant.

III. OTHER ORDERS

[39] Section 278.7(3) of the Code provides that I may impose any conditions on the production of the records to protect, to the greatest extent possible, the privacy, personal security and equality interests of the complainant. In accordance with that section, I impose the following conditions with respect to those records that are to be produced to the applicant:

1. That the applicant and counsel for the applicant not disclose or disseminate the contents of the records to any other person, except with the approval of the court.

2. That no copies of the records be made and that counsel for the applicant and the Crown maintain custody of the copies that have been produced.

3. That personal information regarding any person named in the record, such as an address, telephone number and place of employment, be redacted from the record, with the exception of the address where the offences are alleged to have taken place.

[40] In accordance with s. 278.7(6), those records and portions of records that have not been produced shall be kept in a sealed package by the court until the later of the expiration of the time for any appeal and the completion of any appeal in these proceedings, whereupon the record or portion of the record shall be returned to the person lawfully entitled to possession or control of it.

Justice P.A. Schreck

Released: October 6, 2015