Court File and Parties

Court File No.: St. Catharines - 2111-998-12-S2983-00

Date: 2014-02-27

Ontario Court of Justice

Between:

Her Majesty the Queen

— and —

Daljinder Singh Sandhu

Before: Justice D.A. Harris

Heard: September 23, 2013 and November 25, 2013

Reasons for Sentence: February 27, 2014

Counsel:

• T. Jacob, for the Crown
• P. DeJulio, for the Accused, Daljinder Singh Sandhu

Reasons for Sentence

HARRIS J.:

Overview

[1] Daljinder Singh Sandhu pled guilty to a charge that he, on or about July 17, 2012, having the care of a tractor-trailer that was involved in an accident with a Ford Aerostar, and knowing that bodily harm had been caused to Laszlo Balog Jr. and being reckless as to whether the death of Laszlo Balog Jr. resulted from that bodily harm, and the death of Laszlo Balog Jr. so resulted, did, with intent to escape civil or criminal liability, fail to stop his vehicle, give his name and address and, offer assistance, contrary to section 252(1.3) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[2] He is before me today to be sentenced.

[3] Crown counsel suggested that I should sentence him to imprisonment for 90 days.

[4] Counsel for Mr. Sandhu suggested that I suspend sentence, or failing that, impose a conditional sentence of imprisonment, or failing that, impose an intermittent sentence.

[5] Both counsel agreed that I should prohibit Mr. Sandhu from driving for between two and four years.

[6] I find that neither a suspended sentence nor a conditional sentence is appropriate in this case. However, I am satisfied that an intermittent sentence of imprisonment for 90 days is appropriate. My reasons are as follows.

Conditional Sentence

[7] The conditional sentence came into being when section 742.1 of the Criminal Code was proclaimed in 1996.

[8] The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently stated in R. v. Proulx that "Parliament clearly mandated that certain offenders who used to go to prison should now serve their sentence in the community."

[9] The Supreme Court of Canada stated further that an offender who meets the criteria of section 742.1 will serve a sentence under strict surveillance in the community instead of going to prison. His liberty will be constrained by conditions to be attached to the sentence. In case of breach of conditions, the offender will be brought back before a judge who may order him to serve the remainder of the sentence in jail, as it was intended by Parliament that there be a real threat of incarceration to increase compliance with the conditions of the sentence.

[10] Section 742.1 lists five criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a conditional sentence. These are:

1. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not specifically excluded under the legislation;

2. the offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;

3. the court must impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years;

4. the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community; and

5. a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[11] The first four criteria are prerequisites to any conditional sentence. These prerequisites answer the question of whether or not a conditional sentence is possible in the circumstances. Once they are met, the next question is whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. That decision turns upon a consideration of the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[12] In Mr. Sandhu's case, the first four prerequisite criteria have been satisfied.

[13] His offence was not excluded under section 742.1 at the time that he committed it.

[14] Nor was it punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment.

[15] Both counsel agreed that I should impose a sentence of imprisonment for much less than two years.

[16] Finally, I find that Mr. Sandhu serving his sentence in the community, subject to appropriate conditions, would not endanger the safety of the community. He had no prior criminal record. He has stayed out of trouble since being charged with the current offence. I am satisfied that, with the appropriate safeguards in place, there is no danger that he would return to crime following the imposition of a conditional sentence.

[17] That then leaves the question of whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in all of the circumstances of this case. In making this decision, as I said before, I must consider the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

[18] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law, the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives of denunciation; deterring the offender and other persons from committing offences; separating offenders from society, where necessary; assisting in rehabilitating offenders; providing reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

[19] The relevance and relative importance of each of these objectives will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.

[20] The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The punishment should fit the crime. There is no single fit sentence for any particular offence.

[21] Doherty J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Hamilton that:

The "gravity of the offence" refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence.

[22] He went on to state that:

The "degree of responsibility of the offender" refers to the offender's culpability as reflected in the essential substantive elements of the offence - especially the fault component - and any specific aspects of the offender's conduct or background that tend to increase or decrease the offender's personal responsibility for the crime.

[23] He then quoted Rosenberg J.A. who had previously described the proportionality requirement in R. v. Priest:

The principle of proportionality is rooted in notions of fairness and justice. For the sentencing court to do justice to the particular offender, the sentence imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offence, the degree of culpability of the offender, and the harm occasioned by the offence. The court must have regard to the aggravating and mitigating factors in the particular case. Careful adherence to the proportionality principle ensures that this offender is not unjustly dealt with for the sake of the common good.

[24] On this point, Doherty J.A. concluded by stating that:

Fixing a sentence that is consistent with s. 718.1 is particularly difficult where the gravity of the offence points strongly in one sentencing direction and the culpability of the individual offender points strongly in a very different sentencing direction. The sentencing judge must fashion a disposition from among the limited options available which take both sides of the proportionality inquiry into account.

[25] Proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, but it is not the only principle to be considered.

[26] I must specifically consider section 718.2(d) which provides that "an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances".

[27] I must also consider the impact of section 718.2(e) which provides that "... all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders."

[28] The Supreme Court of Canada discussed the application of this section in Gladue v. The Queen and said that section 718.2(e) applies to all offenders, and that imprisonment should be the penal sanction of last resort. Prison is to be used only where no other sanction or combination of sanctions is appropriate to the offence and the offender.

[29] The Supreme Court also noted that section 718 now requires a sentencing judge to consider more than the longstanding principles of denunciation, deterrence and rehabilitation. Now a sentencing judge must also consider the restorative goals of repairing the harms suffered by individual victims and by the community as a whole, promoting a sense of responsibility and an acknowledgment of the harm caused on the part of the offender, and attempting to rehabilitate or heal the offender. As a general matter restorative justice involves some form of restitution and reintegration into the community. A conditional sentence is much more effective than jail in achieving these restorative justice goals.

[30] I must also note that the Supreme Court of Canada expressly said in R. v. Proulx that a conditional sentence is "a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence" although it is not as effective as a sentence of real imprisonment.

[31] In addition, I have reminded myself repeatedly that there was no presumption against the imposition of a conditional sentence and that I must consider all of the circumstances and not apply a perfunctory rule that the case "is not one of those rarest of cases", without further consideration.

[32] I must, however, also consider the fact that Parliament has since amended the Criminal Code such that a conditional sentence is not available for the offence committed by Mr. Sandhu. I am satisfied that I should view this amendment as a reflection of Parliament's intention that such offences should be treated differently now.

[33] Before I can apply the applicable principles of sentencing, however, I must look at the facts underlying the offence here and at Mr. Sandhu's background.

The Offence

[34] Karoly Lakatos was driving a van on the Queen Elizabeth Way heading back to Toronto around 1:30 a.m. after spending the day in Niagara Falls with friends and family members – nine people in all in a van designed to hold only seven.

[35] When the van began to experience mechanical problems, Mr. Lakatos drove slowly, between 60 and 70 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone. At first he activated the emergency flashers on the van, but he later turned them off in order to avoid attracting the attention of the police. He did not have a driver's licence or insurance.

[36] Mr. Sandhu was driving his tractor-trailer in the same lane on the Queen Elizabeth Way at the posted 100 km/hr. He swerved left to avoid the van when he saw it but the front right quarter of his truck made contact with the rear left quarter of the van which rolled into the right ditch landing on its side.

[37] Eight of the occupants of the van suffered significant injuries. Eleven year old Laszlo Balog Jr. was pronounced dead at the scene.

[38] Mr. Sandhu did not stop his vehicle.

[39] He continued on his way along the Queen Elizabeth Way. He took his truck to a repair shop in Brampton at about 9:00 a.m. and told staff there that he had hit a moose or a deer. They did not believe him and subsequently contacted the police.

[40] Mr. Sandhu turned himself in on July 23, 2012.

Background of Mr. Sandhu

[41] I have had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report which has provided me with the following information.

[42] Mr. Sandhu is 29 years old.

[43] He was born and raised in India.

[44] He came to Canada in 2005, sponsored by an older sister.

[45] Three sisters live in the USA and two reside near him in Brampton.

[46] His parents reside with him and his wife and child.

[47] He married Jagpreet in India in 2010 and sponsored her to come to Canada that year. They have a two year old daughter.

[48] He completed high school in India.

[49] He had been driving trucks since coming to Canada. He was employed as a long distance trucker for over two years prior to being charged with this offence, which led to him being fired.

[50] He now works full-time as a general labourer at a warehouse through an employment agency.

[51] He has lost approximately $60,000 in income as a result of the change in his employment.

[52] He hopes to return to driving trucks in the future.

[53] He works hard to provide for his family.

[54] He also volunteers his time for community service with the Dashmesh Canadian Sikh Society in Brampton.

[55] He has stated that "he realizes that what he did was wrong and that he fully accepts responsibility for his behaviour" and that "he regrets not stopping at the scene and that he frequently wonders whether the outcome of the incident would be different if he had stopped" and that "he wishes that he could change the past".

[56] He was held in custody for two days before being released on bail. He was then subject to a curfew and not allowed to drive as terms of his bail until these terms were varied approximately one year after he was charged.

Analysis

[57] Up until a point just after Mr. Sandhu struck the van with his tractor-trailer, he had not committed any crime. The collision of those two vehicles was an accident, a very tragic accident, one that Mr. Sandhu did not cause. Karoly Lakatos caused the accident. Karoly Lakatos acknowledged his responsibility for causing the accident and pled guilty to dangerous driving causing death. I sentenced Mr. Lakatos to the equivalent of imprisonment for 18 months and prohibited him from driving for five years. I had been told by Crown counsel that Mr. Lakatos would be deported to Hungary following completion of his sentence.

[58] That sentence did nothing to change the sad fact of Laszlo Balog Jr.'s death. It did nothing to establish the value of Laszlo Balog Jr.'s life. No sentence, however harsh, could do that. The sentence that I impose on Mr. Sandhu today will not do that. Nor is it intended to.

[59] Doherty J.A. aptly described the difficulty inherent in my task here when he began the judgment in R. v. Hamilton by stating:

The imposition of a fit sentence can be as difficult a task as any faced by a trial judge. That task is particularly difficult where otherwise decent, law-abiding persons commit very serious crimes in circumstances that justifiably attract understanding and empathy.

[60] There is much that can be said in favour of Mr. Sandhu.

[61] He pled guilty. He has accepted full responsibility for his offence and he has expressed remorse.

[62] I am satisfied that he has been personally deterred by being apprehended and brought to court and by being subjected to restrictive terms of bail.

[63] He had no criminal record.

[64] He has been a productive and contributing member of society. He has been employed steadily since coming to Canada, working hard to provide for his family. He has also volunteered much of his time for community service.

[65] He has suffered from the loss of reputation and from substantial financial loss as a result of committing this offence.

[66] He has good prospects for rehabilitation and is unlikely to reoffend.

[67] On the other hand, the offence that he committed here is an extremely serious one.

[68] That offence is failing to stop and render assistance when he had the legal and moral obligation to do so.

[69] As Perkins-McVey J. stated in R. v. Aman:

The prohibited conduct is not doing what you are supposed to do, stay at the scene, give your name, and render assistance. The very purpose of that section of the Criminal Code is to allow criminal investigations to occur without delay or obstruction, and allows for the orderly resolution of any criminal or civil dispute arising from the accident.

[70] That was the offence committed by Mr. Sandhu. After his vehicle struck the other vehicle, the thought should have crossed his mind that people in that vehicle might be injured and that he might be able to help. He should have stopped and determined if that was the case. He did not stop however. He did not offer assistance. He did not even check to see if he could be of assistance. Instead, he kept driving. Then for the next four days, he tried unsuccessfully to conceal what he had done.

[71] I would agree with Crown counsel's observation that these efforts at concealment were not particularly sophisticated.

[72] Zuber J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal made it clear in R. v. Ramdass that general deterrence should be emphasized in cases such as this. I note the following passages from that decision:

The appellant is a building contractor, has no previous record and is described by credible witnesses as a person of good character. It must be added, however, that while Mr. Hall was killed instantly in this accident the appellant had no way of knowing this and leaving him on the road was not only contrary to the Criminal Code but contrary to any standard of decency and humanity.

In imposing the sentence of 9 months the learned trial judge emphasized the principle of general deterrence. In my view, he was right in so doing. General deterrence is a paramount principle in a sentence imposed for this offence.

[73] Zuber J.A. then quoted from his own earlier judgment in R. v. Roussy, saying:

[H]ere I am using the term "deterrent" in its widest sense. The sentence by emphasizing community disapproval of an act and branding it as reprehensible has a moral or educative effect and thereby affects the attitude of the public. One then hopes that a person with an attitude thus conditioned to regard conduct as reprehensible will not likely commit such an act.

[74] The Court of Appeal cited R. v. Ramdass with approval in R. v. Gummer, and went on to say:

In our view, the Court has a duty to bring home to persons having the charge of a motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident that the courts of this country will not countenance the failure to remain at the scene and discharge the duties required by the Criminal Code.

For these reasons we have concluded that the error in imposing a concurrent sentence for the offence of failing to remain is sufficiently grave to require our intervention. Accordingly, leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is allowed and the sentence imposed on the charge of failing to remain is directed to be served consecutively.

[75] The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in R. v. Fortin.

[76] I take note that all of these cases were decided before conditional sentences were available.

[77] I take note also however that they were all decided while the maximum sentence was imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. The current maximum sentence of life imprisonment came into effect in 1999.

[78] Counsel for Mr. Sandhu candidly informed me that he had not found any cases in which either a suspended sentence or a conditional sentence was imposed in circumstances similar to ours.

[79] I too found no such cases. My research in fact led to the following further observations.

[80] Not only did I not find any decisions in which a suspended sentence was imposed, I did not find a case in which a suspended sentence was even contemplated as being appropriate for this offence.

[81] Similarly, previous decisions go beyond revealing an absence of cases in which a conditional sentence was imposed. In R. v. Aman, Perkins-McVey J. referred to several decisions in which a conditional sentence was rejected in circumstances similar to those here.

[82] In R. v. Davis and in R. v. Schmitt, the judges found that the respective accused had committed a serious personal injury offence and that therefore a conditional sentence was not available. Both judges then went on however to address whether they would have imposed a conditional sentence if they had come to a different conclusion with respect to whether it was a serious personal injury offence.

[83] Alder J. stated in R. v. Davis, that:

[I]n light of those factors, in light of the need for general deterrence and denunciation, I can indicate that I am satisfied that a conditional sentence would not, in this case, be appropriate in light of the circumstances and the factors that I have just listed, and I certainly do not believe it would be consistent with the principles of sentencing.

[84] Dean J. stated in R. v. Schmitt:

On the facts in this case a conditional sentence would not meet the sentencing principles found in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. In particular the necessary principles of deterrence and denunciation would not be met with a sentence served in the community for this offence in this particular case.

[85] In R. v. Wieczorek, Perkins-McVey J. stated that she did not have to decide on the facts whether Mr. Wieczorek's conduct amounted to a serious personal injury offence. She then went on to say that:

I find on the facts of this case that the imposition of a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the principles of sentence set out in s. 718 to s. 718.2 and as such I do not need to strictly determine if the accused's conduct amounts to a serious personal injury offence.

The most important sentencing objectives in this matter are general deterrence and denunciation. The duty imposed under s. 252 is not an onerous one -- a person involved in an accident must remain at the scene, identify him or herself and give assistance to any injured party. This allows for any criminal investigation to occur without delay, resolves issues of civil or criminal liability. Just as importantly, there is a simple duty as a human being to show care and respect for those who may have been injured or killed -- to remain until authorities determine what has happened.

In my view, a conditional sentence would not meet the fundamental principles and purposes of sentencing. I am not satisfied that the statutory and any additional conditions would meet the necessary principles of deterrence and denunciation and a sentence served in the community for this offence would not send the message of denunciation needed for offences where a driver has failed to meet his obligation under s. 252(1.3) and render assistance to an injured or dying person.

[86] Both counsel in R. v. Wieczorek later appeared before Justice Perkins-McVey again in R. v. Aman. Apparently in light of her earlier decision, counsel did not even suggest that a conditional sentence should be imposed. Rather, the positions of the parties were as follows:

The Crown and defence generally agree that for offences such as these, that the principles of general deterrence and denunciation are the paramount principles of sentence, which the Court's disposition must reflect. The defence asks the Court to consider her youth, her lack of criminal record, her plea of guilt, supportive pro-social family, and her low risk to re-offend. The defence suggests that a sentence of 90 days to be served intermittently plus probation with significant community service hours will have the necessary deterrent effect and will also assist in Ms. Aman's rehabilitation. Counsel argues that for this accused young woman, the imposition of any jail will have the required effect of specifically deterring her.

The Crown argues that a sentence of 9 to 12 months, plus 18 months' probation, is required in order to denounce and deter the conduct. He argues that such a sentence will send a message about the seriousness of the obligation of every driver to stop and render assistance when there has been an accident. The Crown argues that what may have been an impulsive reaction to leave the scene, became something much more when Ms. Aman failed to turn herself in and attempted to avoid detection and responsibility. The Crown also argues that Ms. Aman only went to police when she had no choice, as she was caught.

In this case, both parties agree that a jail sentence is required, along with probation, and a two year driving prohibition. The central issue for the Court is the length of jail, and length and terms of the probation orders to be imposed.

[87] Justice Perkins-McVey imposed a sentence of imprisonment for five months. She concluded her reasons for imposing this sentence as follows:

In this matter, while the paramount sentencing consideration must be general deterrence and denunciation, the Court must also ensure that a sentence addresses other principles of sentence where appropriate. I noted that denunciation, as has been upheld by the Courts is not the same as vengeance. Denunciation is a legitimate legal principle used where necessary to reinforce society's basic code of values.

Bearing in mind the purpose and principles of sentence noted above. Considering Ms. Aman's plea of guilt, no prior record, otherwise good character and positive family support, given that there is no evidence of speeding or the consumption of drugs or alcohol. I also consider that she has recently completed a college degree and is employed. And that when sentencing a youthful offender, lengthy incarceration is considered not necessary or helpful as it works against rehabilitation. In these circumstances, shorter periods of jail may adequately address the need for deterrence.

In R. v. Wieczorek I imposed a five month sentence for an offender with a similar profile as Ms. Aman. Although there were different aggravating factors in that case, as he had consumed alcohol, there were other mitigation factors. He turned himself in early the following day and left the vehicle in the driveway. So although there are different aggravating factors and mitigation factors, I am of the view that a five month custodial sentence in this case is appropriate, followed by a period of probation for 12 months. There will also be a driving prohibition for a period of 2 years.

[88] The fact that a conditional sentence was rejected in all of those cases does not mean that one would never be appropriate or that I cannot impose one here, but after considering all of the above, I have concluded that, in this case, a conditional sentence would not be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2.

[89] In light of that decision, I am satisfied that I do not have to determine whether Mr. Sandhu's conduct amounted to a serious personal injury offence. Other factors in this decision are the fact that Crown counsel did not argue that this was a "serious personal injury offence" and the fact that in light of the amendments to the conditional sentence provisions, this will not be an issue in future cases.

[90] The final fall-back position of counsel for Mr. Sandhu was that I should impose an intermittent sentence of imprisonment.

[91] I was not given, nor did I find, any cases in which an intermittent sentence was imposed for a similar offence. Having said that, I note that Crown counsel agreed that while an intermittent sentence would be at the very bottom end of the range, such a sentence would be appropriate here.

[92] I agree.

[93] Fish J. of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Middleton that:

Intermittent sentences strike a legislative balance between the denunciatory and deterrent functions of "real jail time" and the rehabilitative functions of preserving the offender's employment, family relationships and responsibilities, and obligations to the community.

That balance cannot be sustained indefinitely. Parliament has therefore fixed its duration at a reasonable limit of 90 days. Beyond that limit, intermittent sentences lose their purpose: the recurring "taste of jail" becomes disproportionately punitive as a deterrent and counter-productive as a rehabilitative and correctional alternative to continuous terms of imprisonment.

[94] I am satisfied that an intermittent sentence of imprisonment for 90 days, in combination with the two days of pre-sentence custody and restrictions on Mr. Sandhu's driving for a prolonged period and a community service order will adequately denounce his behaviour and deter others from choosing to do as he did. Such a sentence can accomplish the goals of denunciation and deterrence while still satisfying the rehabilitative and restorative justice functions of preserving Mr. Sandhu's employment, family relationships and responsibilities, and obligations to the community.

[95] The restrictions on his driving shall be for a total of four years. Mr. Sandhu should be prohibited from driving at all for three years and restricted to driving for work purposes for another one year. He has already been prohibited from driving for 17 months and I will give him credit for that. The driving restrictions will be accomplished by means of a combination of Criminal Code prohibition and probation terms.

[96] Mr. Sandhu cannot give anything back to Laszlo Balog Jr. or any of the other eight people who were injured in the accident. He can however give something back to the community in the form of community service.

Sentence

[97] I sentence Mr. Sandhu to time served being two days pre-sentence custody credited as two days, plus imprisonment for 90 days, to be served on an intermittent basis.

[98] He will be taken into custody today for processing and then released. He will then surrender himself into custody at the jail at 8:00 p.m. on Friday, March 7, 2014 and remain in custody until 5:00 a.m. on Monday, March 10, 2014 and thereafter between each subsequent Friday at 8:00 p.m. and the following Monday at 5:00 a.m. until the sentence is completed.

[99] He will be placed on probation for three years commencing today.

[100] The terms of the probation will require that Mr. Sandhu:

1. keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

2. appear before the court when required to do so by the court;

3. notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation;

4. report within two working days or as the court directs in person to a probation officer as directed and, thereafter, be under the supervision of a probation officer or a person authorized by the probation officer to assist in his supervision, and report at such times and places as that person may require;

5. cooperate with the probation officer and sign any consents or releases necessary to permit the probation officer to supervise him and provide on request proof of compliance with any term of this order;

6. appear at the jail on time and in a sober condition;

7. not apply for or accept admission into any temporary absence program at the jail;

8. perform 150 hours of community service. The work is to commence within 30 days of the completion of the intermittent sentence and shall be completed at a rate of not less than 10 hours per month in consecutive months and shall be completed to the satisfaction of the probation officer or designate within 16 months following commencement;

9. not operate or be in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle unless he is the holder of a valid Ontario driver's licence;

10. for the first 31 months of this order, he will not operate a motor vehicle except for employment purposes or travelling directly from home to/from the place of employment even if he is the holder of a valid Ontario driver's licence;

11. whenever he is operating a motor vehicle he will carry a copy of this probation order with him and if a peace officer (including any police officer or MTO official) speaks to him for any reason he will inform the peace officer that he is bound by the terms of a probation order and he will show the copy of the probation order to the peace officer.

[101] Mr. Sandhu is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, highway or other public place for 19 months, commencing today.

[102] Mr. Sandhu will have 90 days in which to pay the victim fine surcharge, calculated at the old rate which was in effect at the time that he committed the offence.

Released: February 27, 2014

Signed: "Justice D.A. Harris"

Justice D.A. Harris