Court Information

File No.: C52485/10

Date: 2012-03-12

Ontario Court of Justice 47 Sheppard Avenue East Toronto, Ontario M2N 5N1

Parties

In the Matter of: The Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 11

And In the Matter of:

• D.C., born […] 1998
• T.H., born […] 2003
• E.C., born […] 2006
• J.C., born […] 2006

Between:

• Children's Aid Society of Toronto (Applicant)

And:

• F.C. (mother)
• G.H. (father)
• L.C. (father) (Respondents)

Before: Justice Robert J. Spence

Motion Heard: 5 March 2012

Reasons for Judgment Released: 12 March 2012

Counsel

• Mr. Simon Fisch — for the applicant society
• Mr. David Miller — for the respondent mother
• Ms. Veena Pohani — Office of the Children's Lawyer, legal representative of the children
• G.H. and L.C. (fathers) — not appearing, both in default

Nature of the Case

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto ("society") has brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that four children be made crown wards. D.C. is 13 years old, T.H. is 8 years old, and the twins, E.C. and J.C. are 6 years old. They have been in the care of the society since November 10, 2010. The Office of the Children's Lawyer, on behalf of the children, supports the society's motion. The mother is opposed, claiming that there is a genuine issue for trial.

On May 17, 2011, the parties signed a statement of agreed facts whereby the children were found to be in need of protection pursuant to section 37(2)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act ("Act"). Justice Geraldine Waldman ordered the children to be made wards of the society for six months, with access to the mother in the society's discretion.[1] There are two fathers, but neither of them is involved in the family picture; nor have they participated in the child protection litigation.

Reason for Apprehension of the Children

On November 10, 2010, the mother and her then-boyfriend were arrested and charged with four counts of assault with a weapon against the children. They were subsequently released on bail with conditions that included a no-contact provision in respect of any of the four children. On the same day, the society brought all four children into care.

The allegations of assault included the use of a belt and a wire[2] against the children. Shortly after the apprehension of the children, the society brought them to the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect Program at the Hospital for Sick Children ("SCAN"). The oldest child, D.C., then age 12, was found to have a number of bruises on his body. SCAN concluded that D.C.:

Was demonstrated to have U-shaped bruises and U-shaped hyperpigmented marks that are representative of forceful, direct blows, with a looped over object such as a belt or cord. [my emphasis]

SCAN assessed J.C., who was then 4 years old. J.C. had even more bruising and body marks than her brother D.C., specifically, one on her back over the mid-portion of the right shoulder blade, one on the mid-back to the right of the spine, one on the mid-back on the left side, one on the right side of her trunk, one on her mid-chest, one on the left side of her trunk and one on her lower left leg. Again, SCAN reached the same conclusion as it had with her brother D.C., namely, that J.C. was subjected to:

multiple, forceful direct blows with a looped over object, such as a belt or cord.

SCAN also assessed the child E.C., who was also 4 years old at the time. The examination revealed numerous skin bruising and "abnormalities", scattered over various parts of his back, buttocks and arms. SCAN concluded that E.C.'s marks:

are representative of multiple, forceful, direct blows with a looped-over object, such as a belt or cord. The linear hyperpigmented marks are numerous and very long in length and are suspicious for direct blows with a semiflexible linear object. [my emphasis]

And finally, SCAN assessed the girl T.H., who was then 7 years old. Once again, as with her siblings, SCAN discovered a great many bruises and abnormalities on T.H.'s body, numbering approximately 17 in total. These were on various parts of her body, including the back, the mid-back, her lower back, her arms, her legs, her thigh and her foot. SCAN concluded that T.H.:

Was demonstrated to have several parallel linear bruises that are representative of multiple direct blows with a semiflexible linear object, such as a belt . . . and numerous U-shaped hyperpigmented marks that are representative of multiple, forceful blows with looped over objects such as a belt or cord. [my emphasis]

Impact of the Abuse on the Children

Originally, the children were all placed in the same foster home. However, because of her significant behavioural and emotional issues, T.H. had to be placed in a specialized foster home.

Then 12-year-old D.C. was subsequently seen by Dr. Daniel Fitzgerald for a psychological assessment. I extract the following from Dr. Fitzgerald's report dated July 21, 2011: [my emphasis]

When he was living with his mom, he wanted to die because he just wanted his miserable life to be over . . . While he verbalizes a recognition that his mother and her partner are responsible for the abuse and mistreatment that the children endured at home, he continues to attribute part of the problem to himself. This appears to be the residual effect of years of attempting to control an untenable situation and reduce the impact of his mother's abusive behaviour on himself and his siblings.

Dr. Fitzgerald concluded [my emphasis]:

[D.C.] has experienced debilitating abuse while in his mother's care and he continues to struggle with the emotional sequelae of this mistreatment.

Dr. Fitzgerald assessed then 5-year-old E.C. on July 14, 2011. I extract the following from Dr. Fitzgerald's report [my emphasis]:

E.C. . . . appears to have experienced significant neglect and trauma prior to his apprehension in November 2010. . . . This boy displays significant emotional and behavioural difficulties and appears to have internalized behaviour and come to identify with individuals who are coercive and manipulative.

Dr. Fitzgerald conducted his assessment of E.C.'s twin, J.C., also on July 14, 2011. Dr. Fitzgerald noted, as he had with E.C., that J.C. had experienced "significant neglect and trauma prior to her apprehension". He continued [my emphasis]:

She appears to be highly reactive and volatile and has difficulty regulating her emotions and behaviour independently . . . Her emotions appear to be very primitive and unmodulated and she can easily become overwhelmed. She has low tolerance for frustration and lacks the social and interpersonal skills to build relationships and engage others.

Subsequent to the children's apprehension, T.H. was referred to the Assessment & Treatment Program at BOOST. BOOST provides services to children who have experienced verified abuse or violence. The assessment report, noted [my emphasis]:

T.H. is experiencing significant posttraumatic distress as a result of this abuse, as well as symptoms of anxiety and depressed mood [as well as] a high level of externalizing behaviours (i.e. significant aggression and hypervigilance) that are common reactions to trauma. . . . The results of the assessment indicated that there were several clinical concerns with regards to the impact of trauma on T.H. and it was highly recommended that T.H. receive trauma specific treatment.

Dr. Fitzgerald assessed T.H. on December 9, 2010. Dr. Fitzgerald concluded [my emphasis]:

Given the history of abuse and mistreatment, she is likely to be suffering from a Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and there may be other cognitive limitations and a pattern of severe anxiety and fearfulness.

T.H. disclosed that she was beaten so badly on at least one occasion that she had to shower right afterwards due to the bleeding.

In support of the society's motion for summary judgment, T.H.'s children's service worker filed an affidavit on February 15, 2012. Her affidavit contains extensive details about the serious emotional and psychological difficulties that T.H. has been experiencing since coming into foster care on November 10, 2010, including:

• Ongoing struggles in managing her behaviour and emotions in the specialized treatment home
• Defiance, opposition, threats, verbal aggression, yelling, screaming, kicking, biting, hitting, aggressive posturing
• During 8 of 11 incidents that the society has been advised of, T.H. had to be physically restrained to protect herself or others while she was in specialized care
• On wetting her bed, it was reported that T.H. hid under her bed and needed to be coaxed out with the assurance that she would not be hit
• Only recently it was reported that T.H. can now pick out and wear a belt without difficulty

The children have not seen their mother since November 10, 2010, a period of approximately 16 months.

The society's family service worker deposed in her affidavit dated February 7, 2012 [my emphasis]:

D.C., E.C., and J.C. have all expressed that they do not wish to visit with [their mother]. T.H. has expressed that she would only want to visit her mother to receive presents. However, T.H.'s comments must be viewed in the context that she is psychologically desperate for any type of love and affection.

The Mother's Abuse of the Children and Her Failure to Address Protection Concerns

As I noted earlier, the mother and her then boyfriend were charged with four counts of assault with a weapon against the children. Although she signed a statement of agreed facts on May 17, 2011, the mother refused in that statement to acknowledge any of her actions or take any responsibility for what she had done to her children, or the abuse inflicted by her boyfriend to which she had acquiesced.

On September 14, 2011, mother plead guilty to two counts of assault with a weapon, on D.C. and T.H.. In that guilty plea, she acknowledged that she assaulted D.C. and T.H. with a belt. The transcript of the guilty plea was filed as part of the evidence on this motion. The facts underpinning the guilty plea have been summarized in the affidavit of the family service worker; those facts appear to accord with my review of the transcript itself:

• Mother assaulted T.H. and D.C. with a belt;
• She assaulted D.C. with a belt prior to beginning her relationship with her then boyfriend; she assaulted T.H. with a belt after that relationship commenced;
• She assaulted her four year old children with a belt;[3]
• The assaults occurred when the children misbehaved or when T.H. wasn't looking after her four year old sister properly;
• The assaults were ongoing;
• Mother also witnessed her boyfriend assault the children on a number of occasions;
• All four children had scarring on their bodies which reflected that the children had been assaulted on multiple occasions over a long period of time; and
• Mother was present when her boyfriend assaulted the children on a number of occasions, with objects, and she did nothing to intervene.

On November 23, 2011 mother was sentenced to:

• A 12-month conditional sentence with 8 months of house arrest where she is not to leave her residence except for provisions as approved by her probation officer, and on Saturdays from 1-5 p.m. for personal errands;
• An additional 12 month probation order;
• No contact with her children except with approval and supervision of the society and pursuant to a family court order; and
• No contact with her former boyfriend.

Mother did not subsequently bring a motion for access before the case management judge, Justice Waldman.

On September 12, 2011, mother had a meeting with the society's family service worker. During the course of that meeting, she advised the worker that she was not attending any programs. She also stated that she did not abuse her children and that she had no knowledge that her boyfriend had abused the children. She did state that she had hit the children with her hands in the past, but had not done so in a long time.

It is noteworthy that this ongoing denial by mother, as recently as September 12, 2011, occurred only two days before her guilty plea and her admission of having physically assaulted the children.

On June 6, 2011 the worker had a discussion with the crown attorney who inquired of the society whether mother had engaged in any community programs or accessed any resources directed toward addressing the protection concerns. The worker advised the crown that mother had not done so and, on that basis, the crown advised that she would not agree to any bail variation that would permit contact between the mother and the children. The crown did state that she would reconsider her position if mother subsequently took steps toward addressing the protection concerns.

In her responding affidavit filed for use on this motion, mother downplays the extent of the physical abuse she inflicted[4] on the children. She starts off in her affidavit by stating [my emphasis]:

I admit that I used to physically discipline the children by giving them a tap on the hand or bottom.

Obviously, this case, and the apprehension of the children had nothing to do with the mother "tapping" the children on the "hand or bottom".

While she does go on to state that she assaulted the children, she states that it happened only twice, once against T.H. and once against D.C.. This runs counter to the physical evidence from the SCAN reports that all four of her children were abused repeatedly, and on multiple occasions.

Again, instead of acknowledging her direct observations of her boyfriend assaulting the children, she states [my emphasis]:

I admit I had knowledge of Mr. I. inappropriately disciplining the children. Mr. I. would gather them altogether and he would begin talking to them harshly about cleaning up after themselves or insisting that the children help each other with their own care. When this happened, sometimes I would go into another room but I could hear the children continuing to cry. Only in hindsight did I realize that he was likely physically hitting them during these instances.

What mother is doing in this paragraph is minimizing her role in her boyfriend's abuse of her children by suggesting that she was blind, perhaps wilfully blind, to what he was doing to them. Instead of acknowledging her participation in the abuse by the boyfriend[5] she is attempting to deflect the responsibility from herself, entirely onto the boyfriend's shoulders.

Even if it was the case that mother "only" assaulted two of the children twice, what is abundantly clear from the evidence is that she was present in the home and well aware that her boyfriend was assaulting her children repeatedly. Her explanation that she was afraid to intervene because the boyfriend would push her out of the way, or hit her, speaks volumes about her ability and willingness to protect her children from harm.

What could she have done? She had options, as would any parent in similar circumstances. She could have called the police and had her boyfriend criminally charged. She could have called the society. She could have left the home and taken the children to a shelter. She could have left with the children and gone to the home of a friend or relative. She chose none of these options and, instead, preferred to maintain her own relationship with the boyfriend at the expense of the physical and emotional integrity of her children.

She knew without a doubt that her children were being assaulted, that they were being badly abused, and notwithstanding this, she was prepared to allow this to continue indefinitely. The fact that the abuse came to an end on November 10, 2010 when she and her boyfriend were arrested was sheer happenstance and "good fortune" for the children. But for that arrest, there is no evidence, or any reason to believe, that the beatings would not still be continuing to this day.

All of this speaks to a mother who is desperately in need of intensive psychological counselling to explore her ability and willingness to be a competent and protective parent. I infer from the evidence that mother is a deeply troubled person whose deficits will take a long time to remediate, assuming that remediation is even possible.

What steps has mother in fact taken toward her rehabilitation? The fact is that from the time she was arrested in November 2010, until February 2012, she did nothing by way of participating in parenting programs.[6] In other words she allowed 15 months to go by without doing a thing. In perhaps one of her greatest understatements, mother deposes:

I admit that after the children were apprehended, I did not pursue resources as diligently as I should have . . . .

She attributes her inaction to the outstanding criminal charges and to her "depression".

There is no evidence whatsoever of any depression. As to the criminal charges, while it may[7] be understandable that she did not want to admit her criminal guilt early on, there was nothing to prevent her from immediately beginning to access resources to assist her with her counselling and parenting. She had to know that that she was on a limited time-leash insofar as the ultimate disposition of this case was concerned, and that inaction would spell doom for any meagre chance she had of ever reuniting with her children again. And yet despite that knowledge, she did virtually nothing until almost the eve of the return of this motion for summary judgment.

And when she finally decided to do something what did that consist of? She enrolled in and attended 3 sessions of a 4-session course called 1-2-3 Magic. This is a basic 4-session parenting course; and despite the fact that the course is only 4 sessions in length, even at this late stage of the proceedings, even with the spectre of crown wardship hanging over her head, even with the watchful eye of the court looking over her shoulder, mother could still only manage to attend three of those four sessions.

In her responding affidavit for this motion, mother states [my emphasis]:

It is time to move forward and work on family reconciliation and I am willing to work with the children's treatment providers to begin the process of repairing my relationship with the children. . . . The children and I had a very close relationship . . . . I am supportive of the children's treatment and will follow recommendations made by the children's treatment providers. I am willing to go to meetings with the treatment providers to discuss the children's needs and care . . . . I am willing to attend any counselling or therapy with the children to assist us with our relationship . . . . I am willing to participate in any parenting capacity assessment, psychological assessment and/or attachment assessment to assess my ability to care for the children.

Words like "it is time to move forward" and "I am willing" are mere empty words, expressions of an intention to do something in the future. In the context of a parent who actively inflicted and permitted such egregious abuses against her children, and who then sat back and did nothing for 15 months, those words are hollow, and without substance, uttered in desperation as she now faces the permanent severing of the children from her life.

The Law

In order to succeed in this motion, the burden rests with the society to establish that there is no genuine issue for trial. Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules deals with the availability of summary judgment, and provides in part:

16. (1) When Available - After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case.

(4) Evidence Required - The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out the specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

(4.1) Evidence of Responding Party - In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

(6) No Issue for Trial - If there is no genuine issue requiring trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly.

The mother argues that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. She states [my emphasis]:

It is my position that granting the order for Crown wardship on a summary judgment is premature at this time, given that there is still 8.5 months before the statutory timelines run out under section 70(1) of the CFSA. I am engaging in community resources. I have completed a parenting course[8] and am starting another one.[9] I am also enrolled in a third course that will begin after my current course is complete.[10] I am seeking[11] counseling and other community resources. I am currently on waitlists at numerous organizations and am eager to begin counseling. There is still time for me to engage in these services to demonstrate that I can care for the children. This is a genuine issue for trial.

Furthermore I have had no access since the children were apprehended. I was previously the children's primary caregiver and there is still time to repair the relationship between the children and me. I have not been given the opportunity to resume a parenting role for the children since the children were apprehended. This is a genuine issue for trial.

These comments are very revealing. They disclose to the court the mother's misapprehension of how this litigation must proceed and her misunderstanding of her role in this process from the outset of the litigation.

First, when she states that there are "still 8.5 months" left in the process, it suggests that because the children are now past their sixth birthday, the court should permit the case to continue until the end of the 24-month statutory time limit. That is not my understanding of the law or how the Act is intended to operate in the best interests of children who have been found to be in need of protection.

In the case of Children's Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. D.K., [2004] O.J. No. 3657, Justice Margaret McSorley made certain observations which, in my view, are very apt in the circumstances of the case before me. At paragraph 30, Justice McSorley stated [my emphasis]:

It is possible to keep C.K. in care as a society ward for a further 5 months before the time limit under clause 70(1)(b) is reached. It should be noted, however, that the 24-month limitation on a child over the age of 6 years to remain in care as a temporary ward is not the minimum time limit, but the maximum time limit. Before such an order is made, there has to be a realistic possibility that, at the end of the 5 months, Mrs. D.K. would have addressed all of the concerns to the point that C.K. could go home. Otherwise, the court would be simply "warehousing" C.K. until the time limit expired. Had Mrs. D.K. been working on all of the issues throughout the period since 3 March 2003 with some progress on all of them, I would be more inclined to accept that she would continue with the work and probably, within the remaining period, would succeed in dealing with the concerns. But Mrs. D.K. has virtually wasted the entire period and is only now in desperation indicating to the court that she would address the concerns. She is essentially at the same point at which she was in March 2003.

In the case before me, mother has wasted the first 15 months. Yes, she did provide a number of excuses for doing nothing during that period of time but the bottom line is that she made a choice. And her choice was to do nothing.

Similar comments about the inappropriateness of waiting out the statutory time limit have been made by other courts. For example, in Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. L.W.-P., [2007] O.J. No. 3574, Justice Stanley Sherr stated, at paragraph 76 [my emphasis]:

[the Act's] statutory time periods are maximums, not minimums; the court is not required to wait until the time period expires before ordering crown wardship. There is nothing to be gained by waiting until the end of the statutory period . . . . Mother's parenting deficits are deeply entrenched at this point. She has shown an inability to address these deficits in any meaningful way. It is in A.W.'s best interests to implement a long term plan for her now.

See similar comments by the court in Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. D.S., [2009] O.J. No. 4605.

Second, when mother states that "there is still time" for her to engage in services, she reveals her (perhaps understandable) desperation by making whatever promises she feels are necessary, now that she is on the verge of losing her children. She is telling the court what she believes the court wants to hear. She believes that promises to act in the future are meaningful, without recognizing that her own inaction has led to this desperate state of affairs. As I have earlier stated, promises of this sort, in the context of mother's long-standing inaction, are empty and hollow.

Even if I were accept as sincere, mother's intention to remediate her personal issues, commencing that remediation now is far too late. Justice Sherr's words in the L.W.-P. case, above, are entirely apposite to mother's circumstances here, namely, her "parenting deficits are deeply entrenched", and certainly far too deeply entrenched to now begin to try to work on them in the relatively short period of time that remains in the statutory time limit. Had mother begun working on these deficits shortly after the apprehension, had she been engaging successfully in therapy and counselling, had she demonstrated a sincere ability to move forward in her quest to regain custody of the children, then there might be some reason to believe that the remaining 8 months would bring about a successful conclusion, and hence a reason to allow the case to continue for those remaining 8 months.

I view the process of parental deficit remediation as a continuum, which ranges from zero to 100 percent. As a shorthand, I would refer to this process as a "remediation continuum". As the parent moves along the remediation continuum, there is an increasing likelihood of a successful outcome. The continuum begins at zero percent, typically on the date of apprehension, the time when the greatest remediation is required; the parent then has (in this case) a maximum of 24 months to reach 100 percent, being the other end of the continuum, representing the successful accomplishment of her remediation or, at least, the time that it is safe for the children to return home on a supervision order.

But the law will not permit that 24-month period to play out, just for the sake of the statutory limit, unless the parent has a realistic likelihood of reaching the end of the remediation continuum before the expiry of the statutory limit. Where a parent is at, for example, the 75% point,[12] with 8 months to run, the court will likely conclude that the likelihood of a successful outcome is realistic. In such a case, the court will be more inclined to permit the parent to continue to work on her issues, up to a maximum of another 8 months.[13] However, where the parent has barely nudged forward along the remediation continuum, as is the case here, it would be unconscionable for the court to permit the statutory clock to continue to run while the children languish in litigation limbo. To do so, would not be in the children's best interests.

In this regard, I rely on the comments of Justice George Czutrin in the case of Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. Chelsea R. and Blaine W., [2006] O.J. No. 3442, where he stated, at paragraph 54 [my emphasis]:

In considering whether there is any genuine issue for trial, as to where the best interests of the children lie, the looming time limit imposed by the Act is of paramount importance. Where the parent requires a large amount of time in order to deal with their issues and a court would not order the immediate return of the children to the parent, the result of the trial was a "foregone conclusion" and there was no genuine issue for trial.

Finally, I wish to comment on mother's last-noted statement in support of her contention that a genuine issue for trial exists, namely, "I have not been given the opportunity to resume a parenting role for the children since the children were apprehended". This statement implies that mother's lack of "opportunity" was due to circumstances beyond her control.

However, contrary to this suggestion, the fact that mother has not even seen her children, is due to circumstances entirely within mother's control. As I noted earlier, as far back as June 6, 2011 the crown attorney had been considering a bail variation that would have permitted mother to have access to the children. But when the society disclosed to the crown that mother had not engaged in any remediation, that she had failed to take any steps whatsoever toward addressing the protection issues, the crown declined to agree to such a variation. Nevertheless the crown continued to keep open the possibility of such a variation were mother to commence such steps. And still, the mother sat by idly and did nothing.

The fact that mother failed utterly in this regard is what led to her being denied the "opportunity" to parent her children. She had a choice to make and she chose the path of inaction, the path that inevitably led to where she finds herself at today. She was the author of her own misfortune, and she cannot now complain that her current circumstances result from something which was beyond her control.

I note as well, the record is replete with evidence that all four children, in varying degrees, have highly specialized needs – primarily emotional and psychological needs. Many of these needs doubtless arise from the abusive and neglectful environment in which they were raised. The children will all continue to require a stable and highly structured setting, with consistent and dedicated care-giving if those needs are to be adequately addressed. The mother has demonstrated a clear inability to address her own issues, her own parenting deficits. If she cannot organize her life in such a way as to remediate her own personal issues, it is inconceivable that she would be able to provide the kind of stable, structured and highly dedicated parenting that all four of her children now require, and will continue to require for years to come.

The comments of Justice Pazaratz at paragraph 43 of Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. S.C., [2008] O.J. No. 3969 are entirely apt on the facts of the case before me. Justice Pazaratz stated [my emphasis]:

no genuine issue for trial exists where there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that as sought by the applicant.

If I were to deny the society's motion for summary judgment on the facts of this case, it would simply be for the purpose of allowing mother to "buy" more time by pushing the matter onto a full-blown trial. That is something that the law does not permit, and this court cannot allow. (See Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., [2000] O.J. No. 5853).

Conclusion

On the facts of this case I conclude that there is no genuine issue for trial. On the evidence before me there is no realistic likelihood that, within the next 8 months, the mother will be able to address the protection concerns in such a manner that the children could safely be reunited with her, with or without a supervision order. Those protection concerns are so serious, so deeply entrenched, that the children themselves do not even wish to see their mother, let alone actually live with her. The mother's path toward reconstructing her life, if it is even possible for her to do so, will likely be a long and arduous one. While it is too late for her to succeed insofar as these children are concerned, she may ultimately take some solace in knowing that her children will no longer be exposed to the terrible abuse for which she, the mother, was responsible.

There are no other community plans for the children.

The only remaining option is for the children to be made crown wards. That is my order.

Finally, I am aware that the society will sometimes permit access to parents to continue, in its discretion, or even arrange for a "goodbye" visit between the children and the parents, subsequent to the making of an order for crown wardship. In this case I would urge the society to consider whether it is in the best interests of the children to permit any contact between the children and their mother. She has not seen them for 16 months. They have no real desire to see their mother and, in my view, the risk of emotional harm to the children, were such contact to occur, would likely far outweigh any minimal benefit to the children.

Justice Robert J. Spence

12 March 2012

Footnotes

[1] Although access was not at the time possible, due to the existence of a criminal court bail order which prohibited any contact between the mother and the children.

[2] Or, as it appeared on the subsequent guilty plea, a telephone charger cord.

[3] Although the crown accepted a plea to only two counts of assault – as against D.C. and T.H.

[4] Both the active abuse, as well as the abuse inflicted by her boyfriend, to which she acquiesced.

[5] By acquiescence.

[6] She deposed that she made some telephone inquiries about parenting programs, but she did not actively engage in any programing, therapy or counselling.

[7] Perhaps from the perspective of someone seeking to defend herself in a criminal court, but certainly not from the perspective of a parent who genuinely wishes to rehabilitate herself so that she can ultimately be reunited with her children.

[8] Magic 1-2-3, referred to earlier.

[9] Possibly enrolled in, or on a waiting list, but not yet begun.

[10] "current" only in the expressed intention to begin at some point in the future – i.e., not yet begun.

[11] But not actively engaged in.

[12] My reference to 75% is for illustrative purposes only, as the rehabilitation process obviously cannot be measured with this kind of mathematical certitude.

[13] Subject to a possible further 6-month extension of time under subsection 70(4) of the Act, but only if it is in the best interests of the child to grant such an extension.