Court of Appeal

The appellants, proposed representative plaintiffs in a class action, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding leave to pursue claims against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged misrepresentations under the Ontario Securities Act.

The appeal concerned the denial of leave for certain misrepresentation allegations related to Barrick's capital expenditure budget and production schedule, and the identification of public correction dates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that there was no reasonable possibility of success for the additional misrepresentation claims and that the earlier public disclosure fully corrected the alleged misrepresentations, thereby limiting the class period.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion regarding the respondent's legal capacity to bring an action and the adjournment of their motion concerning abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the capacity issue, finding no error in the motion judge's determination that it was not plain and obvious the respondent lacked capacity.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process issue, concluding that the motion judge erred by adjourning the matter sine die despite making findings that indicated an abuse of process.

The Court found the 'Milton Action' to be vexatious and an abuse of process, as it replicated a prior 'Toronto Action' without viable explanation, leading to unnecessary delay and expense.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the 'Milton Action'.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address invited the jury to engage in impermissible reasoning, specifically by linking the absence of a motive to fabricate with the reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing improperly invited the jury to equate the complainant's good relationship with the appellant and lack of motive to fabricate with the reliability of her evidence.

The court held that a corrective instruction was required, and its absence compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the sentencing judge failed to sufficiently account for harsh presentence custody conditions and made other errors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge correctly considered the harsh conditions as a mitigating factor, resulting in a sentence at the low end of the range.

However, the court agreed with the appellant that he was improperly denied enhanced R. v. Summers credit for a 32-day period due to a missed court appearance, as his explanation was unchallenged.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an additional 16 days of presentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed a lower court's dismissal of her application against the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for dismissal of frivolous, vexatious, or abusive proceedings.

The appellant sought declarations regarding the disrepute of the justice system and breaches of Charter rights.

The motion judge dismissed the application without a hearing, finding it an attempt to relitigate similar allegations, lacking standing, and non-justiciable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretion to proceed without submissions under Rule 2.1.01 and her finding that the application was an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, J.R., appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the touching of the complainant's leg to be of a sexual nature.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's legally and factually sound reasons.

The appellant also raised an issue regarding the complainant's age in institutional records, but the trial judge had already found that the complainant's age (under 18) was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

A publication ban order under ss. 486.4 or 486.6 of the Criminal Code remains in effect.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

This is an appeal from conviction where the appellant argued the Crown breached confidential informant privilege by disclosing information to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an overly narrow standard for determining a privilege breach, emphasizing that any information that *might tend* to identify an informant is protected.

The Crown's failure to protect this near-absolute privilege, despite repeated warnings, constituted an abuse of process.

The convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against real estate agents was dismissed on summary judgment due to being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued she did not discover the material facts until later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the discoverability period begins when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the material facts, not the legal conclusion.

The court noted the appellant had previously pleaded the agents were her agents in a prior action, indicating knowledge of the material facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting leave to amend a statement of claim.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The court found the order to be interlocutory, confirming that appeals of such orders lie with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action, which was found to be statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge concluded that the appellant's injuries were discoverable well within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's application of discoverability principles under the Limitations Act and the threshold for serious and permanent impairment under the Insurance Act.

The Court clarified that formal medical opinions required for a threshold motion are not necessary to trigger the limitation period.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising two grounds: an alleged error in the severance application regarding charges involving two complainants, and serious errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the high deference owed to severance decisions and credibility findings.

The court found no error in the application judge's decision to not sever the charges, noting the low threshold for similar act evidence at the severance stage and the lack of injustice given the judge-alone trial and partial acquittal.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no impermissible reasoning or unequal scrutiny.

The appellant, Romaine McBean, appealed convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by stating that the appellant compelled the complainant to engage in sexual touching by abusing a position of power and authority, claiming there was no basis for such a finding.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the trial judge's reasons did not hinge on the complainant's inability to consent due to a power imbalance, but rather on the complainant's subjective lack of consent stemming from fear induced by the appellant's actions, including preventing her from leaving, threatening her, and making demands for sexual activity.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's approach to consent and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal concerned parenting orders for a child who suffered a catastrophic brain injury.

The trial judge granted sole decision-making responsibility and residence to the father and restricted contact for the maternal grandmother (appellant) due to her delusional beliefs and hostile conduct towards the father and medical team.

The maternal grandfather was granted supervised contact.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's application of the best interests test and alleged infringement of fair trial rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the appellant's conduct was not in the child's best interests and finding no material errors or misapprehensions of evidence.

The appellant, Joseph Hodgkin, appealed his sentence for accessory after the fact to murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explicitly apply R. v. Gladue principles.

However, the Court concluded that despite this error, the sentence would have been the same had a specific Gladue analysis been conducted, given that the sentencing reasons adequately addressed the appellant's background and Indigeneity.

The appeal was dismissed, but a correction to the warrant of committal was ordered regarding a Long-Term Offender finding.

The appellant, Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc., appealed the dismissal of its motions to stay or dismiss actions brought by Bennington Financial Corp. and Heffner Investments Limited.

Medcap argued that the respondents breached the immediate disclosure rule by failing to disclose a verbal agreement requiring any settlement with Medcap to include all creditors.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the agreement did not need to be disclosed as it did not fundamentally alter the litigation landscape or the adversarial relationship between the parties.

The appeals were dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order concerning monthly access to children.

The Society argued that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules after a final order had been made, contending that the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 was a complete code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the OCJ retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as the definition of "case" in the Family Law Rules explicitly includes "enforcements," and requiring a new proceeding for enforcement would contradict the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Superior Court judge and addressed procedural fairness concerns.

The appellant sought a review of a single judge's order refusing to stay a case management judge's order pending appeal and refusing to stay other proceedings.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's request for review, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the stay principles, particularly regarding the lack of a serious issue given the case management judge's lack of jurisdiction to grant criminal declarations in a civil action.

The Court also granted the respondents' motion to quash the appeal, confirming that the case management judge's order was interlocutory and thus appealable to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claim regarding a conflict of interest by their former counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the respondents, acting as counsel for both the appellant company and its insurer, were not in a conflict of interest because they timely withdrew their representation of the plaintiffs.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, alleging the trial judge erred in treating similar fact evidence and analyzing the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the grounds raised did not constitute errors of law alone, which is the only basis for a Crown appeal of an acquittal.

The court affirmed that weighing evidence or assessing credibility, unless based on ungrounded stereotypical assumptions, are not errors of law.