Court of Appeal

The appellant, Reset Electronics Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action against Hydro One Networks Inc. for alleged negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance of service.

Reset claimed Hydro One's delays in processing incentive payments for energy-efficient products caused its business failure.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the trial judge's findings that Hydro One owed no duty of care to Reset, did not breach any duty if one existed, and did not cause Reset's alleged losses.

The court affirmed that no undertaking inviting reasonable reliance was established between the parties, and Hydro One's actions were based on legitimate safety concerns.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was refused.

The applicant, an experienced litigation lawyer, sought leave to bring a motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The appeal had been dismissed for failure to perfect it within the ordered timeframe.

The court found that the applicant's conduct, including repeated delays and failure to comply with rules, indicated an attempt to stall the enforcement of the bankruptcy order.

The motion for leave was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties sought security for costs of an appeal arising from mortgage disputes.

The responding parties (appellants) had defaulted on mortgages, and proceeds from power of sale were paid into court.

The motion judge ordered payment of these funds to the moving parties, which the responding parties appealed.

The Court of Appeal granted security for costs under Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c), finding the appeal frivolous and vexatious with a low prospect of success, and that the appellants had insufficient assets or would be difficult to collect from.

The moving parties sought a stay of the Ontario Court of Appeal's order pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay, emphasizing the stringent 'serious issue' threshold for leave to the Supreme Court.

The motion was denied because the factual situation was unclear, evidence of canon law was thin, and key parties (Diocese and Synod) were not involved, making it unlikely the Supreme Court would grant leave to appeal.

This appeal concerned the constitutionality of section 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, which limits parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech and debate, for members of the Committee regarding the disclosure of classified information.

The application judge had declared section 12 ultra vires Parliament.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Parliament possesses the plenary legislative authority under section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to define and limit its own privileges, including freedom of speech and debate, without requiring a constitutional amendment.

The court found that section 12 is intra vires the federal Parliament, emphasizing that Parliament can legislate to define the scope of its own powers and privileges, especially when members voluntarily accept such limits.

This costs endorsement followed an appeal where the damages awarded to the respondents were significantly reduced from $975,000 to $45,000.

The Court of Appeal determined the prejudgment interest and costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The respondents' claim for prejudgment interest was recalculated based on the reduced damages.

Their original substantial indemnity costs award for trial was reduced from $136,971.02 to $75,000, though still granted on a substantial indemnity basis due to the appellants' egregious conduct during litigation.

The appellants were awarded $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal, which were deducted from the respondents' trial costs.

The appellants, Tyson Rogerson and his adoptive parents, appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against two physicians, Dr. Elyse Savaria and Dr. Nkiruka Nwebube.

The appellants argued that the physicians breached their duty of care by failing to report a suspected risk of harm to Tyson to the Children's Aid Society (CAS) under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act, which they contended would have prevented Tyson's catastrophic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the physicians did not breach the standard of care in failing to report, and even if there was a breach, the appellants failed to prove causation, as the CAS would not have intervened in a way that would have prevented the injury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Hopeton Wright, appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual interference and three counts of sexual assault (stayed) in relation to two of his common-law partner’s children.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence from another child of his common-law partner, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the similar fact evidence, which was highly probative of a specific propensity, and no consequential error in the jury instructions regarding prior inconsistent statements.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of indecent assault and sentenced to four years concurrent, sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the three elements under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was deemed not frivolous and the applicant was likely to surrender, the court found that his detention was necessary in the public interest.

Balancing the strong interest in enforceability due to the seriousness of the sexual offences against children against the weak interest in reviewability given the weakness of the appeal grounds, the court dismissed the application for bail pending appeal.

The First Nations moved to vary costs awards against the Estate of William Albin Herold, seeking to make Jeffrey S. Herold, the Estate Trustee, jointly and severally liable for over $190,000 in costs.

This motion was brought under Rule 59.06(2)(a) after the First Nations discovered that Mr. Herold had personally received a transfer of Lot 35, the property forming the basis of the Estate's claim to certain islands, a fact not disclosed during the original litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion regarding Supreme Court of Canada costs, stating it lacked authority, but granted the variation for its own costs awards.

The court found that the non-disclosure was a material fact, not a mere irregularity, and that Mr. Herold was the true litigant, satisfying the "person of straw" test for imposing costs on a non-party.

The appellant, Shakur Clarke, appealed his conviction and 10.5-year sentence for offences related to a drive-by shooting.

He argued that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial judge to establish his role as driver and shooter was open to other reasonable inferences, specifically that he could have entered the vehicle after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the alternative inferences were not reasonable and that the cumulative circumstantial evidence led to the only reasonable inference that the appellant and his co-accused acted in concert.

The appellant, J.Y.L., appealed his conviction for historical sexual offenses involving a complainant, D.H., arguing that the trial judge erred by not determining the physical possibility of the assault as described and by focusing solely on credibility over reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's evidence despite minor inconsistencies, especially given the significant passage of time since the incident.

This is an appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition that denied an absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault charges.

The Board determined that the individual continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to a lack of insight into their mental illness, persistent cannabis use, and the resulting mental decompensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by the evidence, emphasizing the deference owed to the Board's risk assessment.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal and a stay of a judgment granting possession of a residential property and $10,000 in costs.

The underlying judgment was issued after their pleadings were struck for non-compliance with court orders, leading to an uncontested hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the delay in appealing was brief and excusable, the proposed appeal lacked merit, and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify hearing an appeal from an uncontested proceeding.

The appellant, T.C., appealed his convictions for five counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his five-year sentence.

The appeal against convictions was based on two alleged errors by the trial judge: allowing the Crown to recall a complainant after closing its case, and failing to sufficiently instruct the jury on prior inconsistent statements.

The sentence appeal argued that the assault sentences should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to allow the recall of the witness for a limited purpose, no error in the jury instructions regarding inconsistencies, and no error in principle in the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal and cross-appeal, along with motions to quash.

The parties agreed that the appeal and cross-appeal were sufficiently interrelated to be heard together to avoid duplication and ensure consistency.

Consequently, the court, on consent, dismissed both motions to quash without costs, ordering the consolidated appeal and cross-appeal to proceed.

The appellant, Waseem Khan, was convicted of child luring and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the trial judge's mens rea analysis and the dismissal of his abuse of process application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mens rea ground, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Morrison framework.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the abuse of process ground, concluding the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the "genuine offer" element under s. 286.4 of the Criminal Code.

Consequently, the convictions were vacated, findings of guilt upheld, and a new trial ordered solely to complete the abuse of process application.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of Minutes of Settlement that resolved prior litigation between two factions of a church, Bethel Restoration Ministries.

The motion judge had ordered enforcement, requiring Bethel to make overdue payments and allowing a property registration.

The appellants challenged this order on three grounds: lack of jurisdiction due to the internal church dispute, the Minutes being void as prohibited by Bethel's constating documents, and the respondents having unclean hands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Minutes created legally cognizable civil rights (contractual and property rights), thereby grounding the court's jurisdiction.

It also found that the Minutes were not prohibited by the church's by-laws, as they represented a valid exercise of the Elders' power to compromise claims.

The unclean hands argument was rejected as it pertained to conduct resolved by the Minutes.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of six years imprisonment for charges including distributing child pornography and breaching a s. 161 Criminal Code prohibition order.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons inadequate for failing to sufficiently explain the sentence in light of sentencing objectives and comparable authorities.

Re-exercising its discretion, the Court reduced the global sentence to five years imprisonment, finding it to be a fit sentence considering all aggravating and mitigating factors.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of Agreements of Purchase and Sale (APSs) for two apartment buildings, specifically regarding the allocation of common amenity costs in a redeveloped condominium complex and the responsibility for leasing and collecting rent for rental units prior to their legal transfer.

The appellant sought to impose higher maintenance costs on the respondents due to City-mandated design changes and to retain control over pre-transfer leasing and rent collection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the appellant's discretion in cost-sharing was not unfettered and that the respondents, as beneficial owners, were entitled to control leasing and receive rents from the time units became available, thereby preventing unjust enrichment of the appellant.