Property Tax Assessment - ONCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Temagami Barge Limited and Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel from an order restraining their use of property for 13 uses found to contravene municipal zoning by-laws.

The court upheld the application judge’s findings on legal non-conforming use, the treatment of expert evidence, and the appropriateness of proceeding by application.

The court also found no error in the award of costs to the municipality, noting that leave to appeal costs was not sought as required.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $25,000 to the municipality.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Enbridge Gas Inc.'s appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's finding that the 1957 franchise agreement between Enbridge and the County of Essex had not expired under the rule against perpetuities.

The court found that the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) erred in law by misapplying the rule against perpetuities, focusing on the duration of the right rather than the vesting of the interest.

The court also held that the Divisional Court was not bound by its earlier decision in Dawn-Euphemia and that the OEB could not impose a new franchise agreement unless the existing one had lapsed or was about to lapse.

The appellant, Gaetano Di Blasi, appealed a trial order declaring a berm he constructed to be in breach of municipal bylaw, authorizing the Regional Municipality of York to enter his property for remediation, enjoining him from interfering with water flow, and requiring him to pay damages in nuisance.

He also appealed a contempt finding and a $10,000 fine for failing to comply with a 2014 order to remove the berm.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s decision, upheld the findings, and dismissed the appeal, awarding $25,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Township of Clearview appealed a motion decision that largely dismissed its anti-SLAPP application against an action for defamation, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty brought by the respondents.

The action stemmed from the Township posting resident letters on its website that contained negative comments about the respondents' farming practices and proposed micro-brewery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the defamation claim, finding that the motion judge erred in his analysis of the qualified privilege and indemnity defences, which had a real prospect of success.

The negligence claim dismissal was not appealed.

The breach of fiduciary duty claim dismissal was upheld.

The appellant, Lynn Larabie, as executrix of her parents' estate, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her application to quash a zoning by-law passed by the Township of Moonbeam.

The by-law rezoned an adjacent property to permit expansion.

The appellant argued the Township failed to provide proper statutory notice under the Planning Act and regulations, and acted in bad faith.

The application judge found the by-law procedurally illegal due to notice failures but exercised discretion not to quash it, finding no bad faith and negligible broader consequences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in the bad faith analysis or the exercise of discretion not to quash the by-law, despite the procedural illegality.

The Town of Oakville sought to designate Glen Abbey golf course as a cultural heritage property.

Clublink, the owner, applied under section 34 of the Ontario Heritage Act to demolish and remove the golf course.

The Town argued the application should proceed under section 33, which provides different procedural protections and appeal routes.

The central issue was whether a golf course constitutes a "structure" within the meaning of section 34.

The Court of Appeal held that Glen Abbey, being a product of significant construction and engineering comprising constituent parts intended to remain permanently on the property, was a structure within section 34.

The purposive and contextual interpretation of the statute, considering its legislative history and the evolution of municipal heritage planning beyond a "building-centric" paradigm, supported this conclusion.

The applicant, Clublink, owned the Glen Abbey Golf Course in Oakville and sought to redevelop it into a residential and mixed-use community.

The Town designated Glen Abbey as a cultural heritage property and passed five related by-laws, including a Cultural Heritage Landscape Conservation Plan By-law, authorizing the preparation of a conservation plan that required Clublink to seek Town approval for alterations to the golf course.

The application judge quashed all five by-laws and the conservation plan, finding them ultra vires, passed in bad faith, and void for vagueness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, upholding the validity of the five by-laws but quashing the conservation plan resolution on the basis that it effectively compelled Clublink to continue operating the golf course as a service, contrary to section 11(8)5 of the Municipal Act.

The appellant sought a declaration that a zoning by-law provision limiting gross leasable commercial floor area for a "community shopping centre" to 4,645 m² (50,000 ft²) did not apply to developments with five or fewer separate spaces for lease or occupancy.

The appellant argued that "community shopping centre" must be a type of "shopping centre" as defined in the by-law, which requires six or more separated spaces.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that "community shopping centre" was a distinct term from "shopping centre" and that the provision applied regardless of the number of units.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's contextual interpretation of the by-law in light of the Official Plan.

The appellants, owners of several hookah lounges in the Regional Municipality of Peel, challenged by-law No. 30-2016, which prohibits waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places, enclosed workplaces, and restaurant or bar patios.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires the Region, conflicted with provincial occupational health and safety legislation, and was enacted in bad faith.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the by-law was a valid exercise of municipal authority aimed at protecting public health and safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge under Rule 2.1.01.

The appellant's claim alleged that the City of Ottawa and its police service ought to have prevented an unnamed person from posting materials claiming the appellant was a spy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the respondent is not responsible at law for the torts of police officers, and that the claim does not disclose a cause of action and is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

A motor vehicle collision occurred at an intersection in Hamilton when a vehicle operated by Ms. Safranyos failed to yield the right-of-way and was struck by a vehicle operated by Mr. McHugh, who had consumed alcohol and was speeding.

The trial judge found all three defendants liable: Ms. Safranyos at 50%, Mr. McHugh at 25%, and the City of Hamilton at 25%.

The City appealed on grounds that the trial judge misapplied the non-repair standard and improperly used adverse inferences.

Mr. McHugh appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding he could have avoided the collision and misused evidence regarding his intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal but allowed Mr. McHugh's appeal, finding the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and legal analysis regarding Mr. McHugh's liability.

The Ombudsman of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that held neither the Election Compliance Audit Committee nor the Property Standards Committee of the City of Hamilton constituted "local boards" within the meaning of section 14.1 of the Ombudsman Act.

The Ombudsman sought to investigate whether these committees complied with the public meeting requirement under section 239 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, applying the ejusdem generis principle to conclude that the general language in the definition of "local board" does not extend to investigative/adjudicative bodies that do not carry on the day-to-day operations of the municipality.

Consequently, the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to investigate these committees' compliance with open meeting requirements.

The appellant, a vendor of undeveloped land, appealed a Superior Court judgment requiring it to pay $407,582 in development-related costs as a condition of obtaining a severance consent from the municipality.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale contained a clause permitting the vendor to refuse onerous or unreasonable severance conditions.

The application judge decided the case on the basis of a zoning clause not raised by the parties, constituting a denial of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that requiring a non-developing vendor to pay development costs was unreasonable under the contract, and that the respondent purchaser bore the obligation to satisfy such conditions or terminate the agreement.

The appellant corporation sought to demolish a heritage-designated building it owned.

The City of Hamilton rejected the application and sent written notice of rejection to the sole director of the corporation at his residential address rather than to the corporation's registered address.

The appellant argued that the notice was improperly served under section 67(1)(b) of the Ontario Heritage Act, which requires service to the "last known address" of the person.

The appellant contended that the failure to serve at the registered address meant the municipality failed to comply with the statutory service requirement, triggering a deeming provision that would constitute deemed consent to the demolition application.

The application judge found that the city had taken positive steps to give notice and that the notice was actually received by the sole directing mind of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision on the unique facts of the case.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.

Appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing the appellant's claim on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the claim within the limitation period.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in his findings regarding when the appellant became aware of the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages arising from a municipal tendering process and termination of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The trial judge found that while the respondent Town breached its tendering process by accepting a non-compliant bid, the appellants failed to demonstrate they would have been awarded the contract.

The appellants did not meet their burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the contract would have been awarded to them, as the trial judge found it more probable the Town would have re-tendered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding it was open to the Town to reject all bids and re-tender with different specifications.

The agreement of purchase and sale was also properly terminated in good faith for legitimate business reasons.

The appellants, operators of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged the validity of City of Toronto By-Law 1331-2015, which prohibits the use of hookah devices in licensed premises.

The application judge upheld the by-law as a valid exercise of municipal authority to protect public health and safety.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: (1) that the by-law's true purpose was to prohibit hookah lounges rather than protect health; (2) that the by-law impermissibly infringed property and civil rights; and (3) that the by-law conflicted with the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law's purpose was clearly the protection of public health and safety, that any economic impact was incidental rather than determinative of purpose, that the by-law was not confiscatory, and that it did not conflict with provincial occupational health and safety legislation.

The appellants sought an injunction against the respondent to prevent the operation of a restaurant at a neighbouring property.

The appellants contended that the property was not zoned for commercial use and that the City of Toronto had acted improperly in issuing a building permit.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellants' objection was based on confusion regarding the property's municipal address.

The legal address was zoned to permit restaurants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the application judge erred in allowing Toronto to appear as amicus curiae because Toronto had been an adverse party in previous proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was proper for the application judge to allow Toronto to make submissions and that there was no merit to the underlying zoning issue.