Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences - ONCA

The Crown appealed acquittals on firearms charges following a Charter breach finding.

Police executed a general warrant to seize a cellular device associated with a specific phone number during a murder investigation.

The respondent was a victim/witness to the murder.

During execution, police seized three phones and discovered firearms in a hidden door compartment.

The application judge found the search exceeded the warrant's scope, violating s. 8 of the Charter, and excluded the firearms under s. 24(2).

The majority (Miller and Wilson JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding no s. 8 violation and that the firearms should be admitted.

Pomerance J.A. dissented, agreeing with the application judge that the police exceeded the warrant's terms and that exclusion was appropriate.

The applicant was convicted of two counts of human trafficking and sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment.

She sought bail pending appeal on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to re-litigate the hearsay issue; and (3) the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and that detention was not necessary in the public interest, granting bail pending appeal.

The appellant was convicted of various firearms offences.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for drug trafficking, which led to an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search incident to arrest, and that the evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court emphasized that the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds proceeds from a holistic consideration of all facts, including prior surveillance of a suspected drug trafficker, a drug overdose in the hotel room, and the suspicious conduct of the appellant and his associate, Ms. Gaspari.

The court found the trial judge's reasoning for the arrest was sound, making it unnecessary to address the s. 24(2) Charter argument.

The appellant was convicted after trial of two counts each of production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana, and theft of electricity, arising from the operation of two marijuana grow operations in residential premises owned by the appellant.

The appellant received a blended sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by one year probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the search warrant validity and the sufficiency of the evidentiary predicate.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed as the sentence was fit, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following two field strip searches conducted by police in a motel room.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the strip searches violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal found that both strip searches violated the appellant's section 8 rights because they were conducted in the field rather than at a police station, and the Crown failed to establish exigent circumstances justifying the field searches.

However, the Court of Appeal did not exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of nine years less 48 days.

He challenged the validity of a search warrant for an apartment on the grounds that there were insufficient grounds to support it, arguing the grounds amounted only to suspicion.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the information to obtain the warrant contained credible and reliable facts supporting reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was trafficking drugs and that evidence would be found in the apartment.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of the legal test and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

An applicant convicted of first-degree murder sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant had been convicted along with a co-accused following a jury trial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on email correspondence and financial motive.

The applicant had been discharged at the preliminary inquiry but was subsequently tried following a direct indictment.

The applicant proposed a stringent release plan including a $500,000 recognizance with three sureties, house arrest, and GPS electronic monitoring.

The court granted bail pending appeal, finding that while the offence was serious, the applicant had demonstrated flawless bail compliance over three and a half years, there were no flight risks given the enhanced supervision plan, and the grounds of appeal regarding the reasonableness of the verdict clearly surpassed the "not frivolous" threshold.

Following a guilty plea to robbery with a restricted firearm, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, pointing a firearm, dangerous driving, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, the applicant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and bail pending appeal.

The motions judge granted both applications, finding that the applicant had demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the requisite period, that the delay had been adequately explained, and that the proposed appeal raised arguable grounds of merit.

The court found that the applicant would suffer unnecessary hardship if detained pending appeal and that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellant was convicted of drug-related offences following a search of his residence that yielded cocaine, marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the validity of the search warrant on Charter grounds.

The trial judge upheld the warrant based on the Debot criteria, finding the confidential informant's information compelling and credible, with moderate corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, rejecting the appellant's arguments that the trial judge misstated the legal test and misapplied the Debot factors.

An applicant convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking sought bail pending his sentence appeal under s. 679(4) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had been sentenced to two years in custody, less five months' pre-sentence credit.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing the appeal lacked sufficient merit.

The applicant's primary ground of appeal concerned collateral immigration consequences, as a sentence of six months or greater would render him inadmissible to Canada and subject to deportation without a right of appeal.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the bail application, finding the appeal lacked sufficient merit and that continued detention would not cause unnecessary hardship.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice on July 4, 2016.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that a reasonable person in the officer's position would have believed reasonable and probable grounds existed to arrest the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's analysis, finding that she stated the correct test, correctly examined the totality of the circumstances, and that those circumstances supported the objective reasonableness of the search.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on various drug offences, challenging the validity of a search warrant on the grounds that material misstatements and omissions were made in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the warrant breached his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the omissions and alleged misrepresentations were not material to the issuance of the warrant and that a reasonable inference could be drawn that drugs would be found at the residence based on police observations and evidence.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

A high school teacher was acquitted at trial of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after using a camera pen to surreptitiously record videos of female students focusing on their chests and cleavage.

The Crown appealed the acquittal on three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding no sexual purpose; whether evidence from a warrantless search should have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter; and whether the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The majority (Feldman and Watt JJ.A.) allowed the Crown's appeal on the sexual purpose issue but dismissed it on the privacy issue, finding that students in public areas of a school do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, arguing the students did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal resulting from the exclusion of evidence of child pornography under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

Police seized a family computer from the home co-owned by the respondent and his common-law spouse without a warrant, based on the spouse's consent.

The computer was retained for four months without judicial authorization before a warrant was obtained to search it.

The application judge found multiple Charter violations and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the application judge erred in finding the spouse could not consent to the seizure, and conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, ultimately admitting the evidence and ordering a new trial.

The appellants, Vice Media Canada Inc. and journalist Ben Makuch, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a production order requiring them to produce documents relating to their communications with Farah Shirdon, a Canadian resident who had joined ISIS and was charged with terrorism offences.

The appellants also sought to unseal the affidavit supporting the production order and challenged a non-publication order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the production order, finding that the Garofoli standard of review applied and that the issuing judge reasonably balanced the competing interests of law enforcement and freedom of the press.

The court allowed the appeal in part regarding the sealing order, directing that most material be unsealed with limited redactions.

The court also addressed the non-publication order, finding it a valid alternative to sealing but noting that certain portions of the affidavit may not require the publication ban.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.

The appellants were convicted of drug and firearm offences following a search executed pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge dismissed their Charter section 8 application challenging the validity of the warrant.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant regarding the corroborating evidence from the property manager.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by refusing cross-examination and by relying on his own assessment of the confidential informant's reliability to deny the motion.

The court held that when the defence demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination will generate evidence tending to discredit the grounds for the warrant's issuance, cross-examination must be permitted.

The convictions were quashed and new trials ordered.