Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences - ONCA

This is a forfeiture application brought by His Majesty the King under s. 771 of the Criminal Code against Nehemiah Campbell and his three sureties (Greg Carter, Anwar Faza, and Sandre Bascoe) due to Campbell's failure to surrender for his appeal hearing.

The court ordered the full forfeiture of Campbell's $20,000 pledge, Carter's $50,000 pledge, and Faza's $10,000 pledge.

Sandre Bascoe's $10,000 pledge was partially forfeited, with $5,000 ordered forfeited, due to her limited financial means.

The decision emphasizes the importance of surety diligence and the 'pull of bail' in maintaining the effectiveness of the bail system.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision to continue his detention on a charge of second-degree murder, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to a trial judge's ruling granting leave to raise a third-party suspect defence.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing the decision de novo, assumed a material change but ultimately found that the apparent strength of the prosecution's case remained very strong despite the third-party suspect evidence.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that detention was still necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the horrific nature of the crime, the vulnerability of the victim, and the overwhelming forensic evidence against the applicant.

The applicant, Jeremy Bailey, sought bail pending appeal of his 2016 drug trafficking convictions, after his initial bail pending appeal was revoked due to new drug charges and breaches of conditions.

He argued that the subsequent stay of his 2018 charges and potential Charter violations related to his April 2020 arrest constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal denied the application, finding that despite these new developments, the lingering public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given his "flagrant" breaches of prior bail conditions, outweighed the reviewability interest.

The appellant appealed his conviction on nine offences arising from an armed robbery of a salon, including use of a firearm, robbery, wounding, and assault.

The trial judge had upheld the validity of two search warrants (residential and digital video recorder) despite Charter challenges.

The Court of Appeal found that both warrants were issued without reasonable and probable grounds due to material non-disclosure in the Information to Obtain affidavits.

The affiant officer failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding the reliability of licence plate evidence, vehicle colour discrepancies, and other material facts.

The digital video recorder evidence, which was crucial to the Crown's case, should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Without this evidence, the Crown's case was gutted, and acquittals were ordered.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by maiming contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code after punching his cellmate in the face, breaking the victim's orbital bone and requiring surgery.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence and in applying the definition of "maiming." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly determined the punch was not reasonable in the circumstances and that the victim suffered a significant loss of use or function of body parts constituting maiming.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a physical altercation that began as a fist fight and escalated when the deceased produced a knife.

The appellant admitted to causing the death but claimed self-defence.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 12 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of various evidence, the jury charge on self-defence and provocation, and the sentencing decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, though it identified an error in sentencing that had no impact on the outcome.

A police officer convicted by jury of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to eight months in prison sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed release, arguing the grounds of appeal lacked merit and that public confidence in the administration of justice required incarceration pending appeal.

The motion judge granted bail, finding the grounds of appeal relating to sufficiency of focus on the dangerous driving and guidance on marked departure were not frivolous and warranted close examination.

The judge held that public interest was best served by allowing the applicant to challenge the conviction before serving the sentence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault of her sometimes girlfriend.

The trial judge found that the appellant caused the complainant's multiple serious wounds, rejecting the appellant's position that the injuries were self-inflicted.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of matters requiring expert evidence, specifically regarding the cause of bruising and blood stain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly drew inferences from the evidence using common sense and human experience, without improperly taking judicial notice of matters requiring expertise.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the trial judge's decision to dismiss his Charter application to exclude evidence obtained through general warrants issued under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the investigative technique could have been authorized under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, making the general warrant unavailable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the general warrant was properly issued because the investigative technique—prospective execution based on a future contingency to link drugs to the accused—was not contemplated by conventional search warrants, and there was no evasion of more stringent statutory requirements.

Application for bail pending appeal from convictions for bribery, attempt to obstruct justice, criminal breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, with a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment less 6 months' credit.

The applicant sought to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender himself into custody, and that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court found that while the applicant's grounds of appeal were not frivolous and he would likely surrender himself, his detention was necessary in the public interest given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances of their commission, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was expedited.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house following a seven-day trial.

He received a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment and two years of probation.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding serious deficiencies in the appellant's bail compliance history, material omissions in his affidavits regarding outstanding breach charges, and insufficient grounds of appeal to overcome public interest considerations.

The trial judge's findings regarding the victim's incapacity to consent due to extreme intoxication were well-grounded in evidence and revealed no obvious error.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a correctional facility where he punched the complainant 25 to 30 times in the head.

The sole defence at trial was self-defence.

The trial judge found that the Crown had disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the appellant had launched a pre-emptive attack to maintain his status as the "heavy" rather than in genuine self-defence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the prison context and the "inmate's code." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the prison setting must be considered as a contextual factor, it does not override the Criminal Code's legal definition of self-defence.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's declaration that section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the "bail misconduct exclusion," was unconstitutional.

The bail misconduct exclusion restricts pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 (rather than the enhanced 1.5:1 credit) where an accused's bail was cancelled due to alleged misconduct while on release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter as overbroad.

The court found that the legislative purpose of the bail misconduct exclusion—to deter misconduct while on release—is not rationally connected to all of its impacts, particularly where individuals are punished for alleged (rather than proven) misconduct, or where detention results from inability to satisfy a reverse onus rather than actual misconduct.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following his fourth conviction for sexual assault, for which he received a four-year sentence.

The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that detention was necessary in the public interest and that the grounds of appeal were frivolous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the grounds of appeal to be very weak, the offence to be serious, and evidence of above-average risk to reoffend in a sexual manner.

The Minister of Justice sought forfeiture of recognizances totalling $510,000 entered into by two sureties, Taylor Wilson and Christopher Gould, after the accused Michael Wilson absconded to Vietnam shortly before his appeal and judicial review hearing in extradition proceedings.

The accused had fled the United States to avoid prosecution on serious fraud charges involving the diversion of approximately $8 million in investor funds.

The court allowed the application in part, ordering Taylor to forfeit $200,000 and Christopher to forfeit $3,000, considering factors including the sureties' diligence, the sophistication of the escape plan, changes in financial circumstances, and post-breach conduct.

Application for release from custody pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant was convicted of second degree murder in connection with the death of a young man following an assault in an Ottawa bar on New Year's Eve 2005.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on fresh expert evidence regarding the mechanism of death.

The applicant had previously been released pending appeal but breached his recognizance by contacting a Crown witness.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicant had demonstrated his detention was not necessary for public protection or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the serious nature of the charge and the prior breach.

The appellant was convicted of possession of controlled substances and possession for the purpose of trafficking based on evidence seized from his residence and vehicle pursuant to search warrants.

The central fact in the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrants was false: the police believed the appellant had sent a text message setting up a drug transaction, but it was actually sent by an employee.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the search warrants invalid, as the false information was the central basis for the residence search, and the remaining evidence was insufficient.

The court also found the warrant overbroad and the execution improper.

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence and set aside the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.