Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, and two counts of breach of undertaking arising from a sustained campaign of social media posts, threats, and communications targeting an OPP officer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the specific intent offences of intimidation and criminal harassment and erred in convicting on one breach of undertaking count.

The Court of Appeal held that the requisite mens rea findings were implicit in the trial judge's meticulous description of the appellant's conduct, which gave rise to irresistible inferences of intent.

However, the court set aside the conviction on the breach of undertaking count alleging the appellant went where the complainant was known to be, finding the trial judge misdescribed the count and failed to make findings supporting the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and material inconsistencies, and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding defence delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her apportionment of delay.

The appellant received a two-year custodial sentence for a serious sexual assault of a 13-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the sentence fit and appropriate.

The applicant, convicted of sexual offences against two young girls and sentenced to seven years, sought bail pending appeal of his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court determined that the grounds of appeal regarding inadvertent collusion, similar fact evidence admissibility, and the sentencing judge's analysis of health circumstances were very weak, not clearly surpassing the 'not frivolous' criterion.

The balance of the competing interests of enforceability (seriousness of the crime) and reviewability (weakness of appeal grounds) favoured enforceability, concluding that a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for breach of trust and his 18-month conditional sentence.

He had been acquitted of sexual assault involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of insufficient reasons, unreasonable verdict, and inconsistent verdicts, and the sentence on grounds of erroneous "double counting" of aggravating factors and insufficient reasons for rejecting a suspended sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the verdict reasonable and reconcilable, and the sentence appropriate.

This is an appeal from a conviction for choking in committing sexual assault and sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the complainant's capacity to consent due to intoxication, the assessment of the appellant's credibility and mens rea, and the sufficiency of reasons for the choking conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the complainant lacked capacity to consent, the appellant's testimony was not credible, and sufficient reasons were provided for the choking conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his life sentence.

The appeal primarily concerned the trial judge's decision to revisit an earlier ruling on similar act evidence (related to triple murders) for cross-examination, despite initially excluding it due to prejudicial effect.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in revisiting the ruling without a material change in circumstances and without re-engaging in the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice as the appellant ultimately did not testify, and the potential prejudice from the similar act evidence therefore disappeared.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the life sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite minor errors in identifying aggravating factors.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault, for which he received a seven-year sentence.

The convictions related to historical sexual assaults on his niece.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest ground, specifically concerning public confidence.

The court, applying the test from R. v. Oland, found that at least one ground of appeal regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility might have merit, and that the appeal was not weak.

Considering the historical nature of the offences and the applicant's prior compliance with bail conditions, the court granted bail pending appeal with stricter terms, including provisions restricting his access to persons under the age of 16, satisfying public safety concerns.

The appellant, I.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation.

The central issue at trial was whether the sexual relationship with the complainant began before she turned 16, as she could not legally consent before that age.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's instruction regarding the complainant's outbursts, the admission of a prior consistent statement, and the correction of a Crown misstatement of facts.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, K.T., appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his father, a judge-alone circumstantial case.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the movement of the deceased's body, the assessment of post-offence conduct (flight to Montreal with the deceased's belongings), and various factual inferences drawn from the evidence, including DNA, fingerprints, and the murder weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's careful and extensive reasons, which were well-rooted in the evidentiary record and properly rejected alternative theories.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference charges at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge's reasons for acquittal were inadequate and that the judge applied a higher degree of scrutiny to the Crown's evidence than to the respondent's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the legal requirement of adequacy, explaining the factual and credibility determinations and the basis for reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the Crown failed to meet the high burden of showing that the credibility determinations were the result of a legally erroneous application of different standards of scrutiny, upholding the deference owed to the trial judge on credibility issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were deficient, specifically in analyzing evidence, addressing a potential motive to fabricate, and interpreting a text message.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the verdict, sufficiently exposed the reasoning for appellate review, and properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, including the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to address every argument explicitly if the reasons as a whole are cogent.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the accused's convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration.

The appeal judge had found that the Crown failed to prove a breath demand was made, which precluded reliance on the evidentiary shortcuts in former ss. 258(1)(c) and (g) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that while the lawfulness of a demand need not be proven to use the shortcuts, the fact that a demand was made is a condition precedent.

The Court also agreed that the defence's failure to object to the certificate's admissibility when tendered did not prevent them from arguing in closing that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence.

The appellant appealed her convictions for uttering forged prescriptions and possession of stolen property, as well as her 18-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals for uttering forged documents, finding no fatal errors in the Crown's examination of an accomplice or the trial judge's Vetrovec warning.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the possession of stolen property charge and ordered a new trial, as the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of theft, specifically 'fraudulently' and 'without colour of right'.

The sentence for the uttering charges was varied to a 12-month conditional sentence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from a conviction on four counts of threatening his professor and family members.

The trial judge provided thorough reasons with careful credibility findings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal and rejected the applicant's motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no proper basis for leave, no legal errors by the lower court, and that the issues did not transcend the facts of the case or raise matters of significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against his stepdaughter.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to his evidence than to the Crown's evidence, and failed to adequately address the improbability of the assaults occurring in the family room with the mother potentially nearby.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge's reliance on the appellant's admissions at the time of arrest was well-founded and that his assessment of the evidence disclosed no error.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice.

The respondent was accused of pushing the complainant down exterior stairs at a bar.

The trial judge found that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence from security camera footage that did not capture the critical moment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the test for directed verdict by weighing inferences rather than determining whether any evidence existed upon which a reasonable jury could convict.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference and were properly reasoned.

The trial judge had provided ample justification for accepting the complainant's evidence and properly assessed conflicting testimony.

The court found no differential standard of scrutiny was applied to defence evidence and that the trial judge properly cautioned himself against treating the case as merely a credibility test.

The young person appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement as an aider and abettor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions relating to the main sexual assault in the bedroom, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported the inference that the appellant intended to assist his friends.

However, the Court quashed the convictions relating to an earlier 'tickling incident' because the trial judge failed to provide any analysis of how the appellant aided and abetted that specific assault.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered on the quashed counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and firearm-related offences, as well as his 11-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended medical and gunshot residue evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 11-year sentence as fit but granted leave to vary the pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5:1 in accordance with R. v. Summers.