Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a peace officer, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and drug possession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in determining the moment of the appellant's detention under the Charter.

The Court held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the police cruiser blocked his vehicle, and that this detention was arbitrary, leading to a breach of his s. 9 Charter rights.

Furthermore, the police failed to immediately advise him of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained as a result of these breaches must be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the evidence did not support a finding of lack of consent, there were inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence, and the trial judge erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the evidence of lack of consent adequate, the treatment of inconsistencies proper, and the finding of a position of trust supported by the evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent because his breathalyzer readings were close to the legal limit, presuming a margin of error in the machine.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by presuming a margin of error and acquitting on that basis.

The acquittal was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, an 18-year-old, was stopped by three police officers on the street and asked if he had anything he shouldn't.

He admitted to possessing marijuana and a loaded revolver.

At trial, he argued his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated and sought to exclude the firearm under s. 24(2).

The trial judge found no detention or search and convicted him.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant was arbitrarily detained (s. 9 breach) but that the questioning did not constitute a search (no s. 8 breach).

Applying the Collins/Stillman framework, the Court concluded that although the firearm was conscriptive real evidence, its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the reliability of the evidence, the good faith of the police, and the seriousness of the offence.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to have charges quashed or a new preliminary inquiry ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the provincial court judge had already decided to convert the proceedings into a preliminary inquiry, a decision not subject to the current appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's findings of credibility regarding himself, his wife, and the grandmother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence.

The Crown brought an application under section 680 of the Criminal Code seeking a review of an order granting judicial interim release to the respondent pending his retrial for murder.

The respondent had been in custody since 1990 and was granted bail on strict terms following a successful appeal that ordered a new trial.

The Chief Justice found that the Crown's motion had arguable merit given the unique combination of factors and directed that a panel of the Court of Appeal review the bail decision.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) brought a motion to intervene in a Crown appeal concerning the exclusion of evidence obtained during a dog-assisted search of a high school.

The CCLA also sought permission to adduce fresh evidence, including newspaper articles and a letter from the Ontario Principal's Council.

The court granted the CCLA leave to intervene, file a factum, and participate in oral argument, recognizing its experience and expertise.

However, the court denied the request to adduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed materials lacked probative value and would unfairly widen the scope of the appeal.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud related to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program.

They argued that the jury lacked a basis to find the plan was deprived of funds and that inadmissible hearsay evidence was admitted regarding the total detriment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the convictions and concluding that any hearsay evidence caused no prejudice since the appellants conceded the detriment exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying ammunition in a careless manner and possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the police lacked articulable cause to stop his vehicle and that his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police had articulable cause to stop the vehicle based on a seatbelt infraction and suspicious driving behaviour.

The Court also agreed that although the appellant's s. 10 rights were violated, the real evidence obtained (a firearm and bullets) should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of s. 16(1.02) of the Young Offenders Act.

The issue was whether an oral application for a transfer to youth court made before a justice of the peace constituted an application made in 'youth court'.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that a justice of the peace does not preside over a 'youth court' as defined in the Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's decision was set aside, without prejudice to a future defence application in the proper court.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to order disclosure of the complainant's psychiatric records, allowing the Crown to call the treating psychiatrist in reply, and assessing the complainant's credibility.

The appellant also argued the verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of sexual assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the false memory defence or the complainant's evidence.

The Court also rejected the appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence, concluding it would not assist in preventing a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants appealed their sentence for aggravated assault.

During pre-trial discussions, the trial judge indicated he would impose 12 to 15 months' imprisonment on a guilty plea if the pre-sentence report was positive.

The report was positive, and the appellants pleaded guilty.

However, the trial judge sentenced them to two years less a day, having forgotten his earlier position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding an appearance of unfairness, and reduced the sentence to 15 months plus three years' probation.

Inco Limited was charged with discharging untreated mine effluent into a creek and failing to report the discharge under the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The Crown appealed the summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial on the basis that the trial court applied the incorrect test for water impairment.

Inco cross-appealed, arguing the charges should be stayed as an abuse of process because the environmental officer lacked statutory authority to conduct a warrantless inspection and violated the Charter rights of its employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that the capacity to impair water quality must be assessed based on the nature and circumstances of the discharge.

The Court allowed Inco's cross-appeal, holding that while the corporation lacked standing to assert its employees' Charter rights, a new trial was required to determine whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence was committed before conducting the inspection, which would dictate whether a warrant was required.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the judge refused to edit the appellant's criminal record, which included a prior sexual assault conviction, but failed to properly instruct the jury in her final charge on the limited use of that record.

The trial judge also erred by admitting a hearsay statement made by the complainant to a friend for the truth of its contents, and by failing to adequately remedy an incorrect mid-trial ruling regarding the materiality of the date of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence arising from an armed jewellery store robbery in which he was alleged to have been the getaway driver.

The court held that handgun evidence found during a warrantless search of his residence should have been excluded because the breach of s. 8 of the Charter was deliberate, flagrant, and not justified by urgency, but applied the proviso because the accomplice evidence made the conviction inevitable.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in treating the rejected alibi as concocted absent sufficient extrinsic evidence of fabrication, though that error likewise caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge failed to adequately account for parity, differing criminal records, and the appellant’s lesser role in the violence.